Well the common vernacular is part of what we tend to get away from here at the JREF, alot of the discussion is about terminology.
Sure, but it's still a word that gets used...even in neuroscience lectures.
It's just that at the same time, neuroscientists and neurologists are rather forward with being clear that the phrase is a conceptual term and not a topographical reference.
Now I have to quibble here, it is alongside consciousness, as consciousness is often loosely defined. That is part of why I like the other terms like 'preconscious' (I am not aware of its Freudian baggage, but always open to learning).
Preconscious isn't really any better than subconscious, as neither are really used in publication that much.
Preconcious was mostly used by Freud and psychoanalysis.
Aside from that, even just based on the words themselves, I wouldn't consider them to be equal to each other as preconscious would be something before consciousness and implies consciousness will be coming in at some point, while subconscious can be considered regardless of consciousness as it is lateral to it and not conceptually linear to it like preconsciousness.
There are multiple areas of sensory integration and multiple channels of perception and processing. So for me the term 'below' is part of the problem. Along with the vague nature of the term consciousness.
There is no unitary entity called consciousness, as I think you state further down, there are multiple processes that are lumped together as consciousness.
Yep.
But that doesn't mean that everyone just stops referring to the concepts as best as we can since we can verify that there are associative information processes which run in the brain and are not information processes that are aware to the individual.
Equally, while we lack a finite means of pointing to consciousness topographically, and cannot even tell anyone what defines consciousness as distinct from non-consciousness in other living organisms, the term is still used as a conceptual reference to the idea of being awake and sentient.
Sometimes people mean "self-aware consciousness" when they say consciousness, but the two aren't equal; however, this is a tangent.
Well that is the rub in general, 'you can be aware of something' and yet not meet some of the standard definitions of 'conscious awareness' of it. Part of many areas of practice is learning to bring those things to 'conscious attention' such as small facial gestures, rates of breathing and conversational pauses and inflections. We may be 'conscious to another person's anxiety', and then need to learn why we think they are anxious for example
I don't think there's a solid definition for self-aware consciousness or consciousness yet.
There's some interesting proposals, but it mostly remains the holy grail of figuring out an empirical method of measuring consciousness.
On the other hand, we can measure awareness of something.
It's used in fMRI scans regularly as a means of determining when someone is overtly making a decision compared against when someone is having the decision geared up and routed to make a decision before they are aware of it, or aside from when they are aware of it.
And that is exactly the same problem with the term 'consciousness'.
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And that is the problem I have it is too broad a term and so it is inherntly incoherent and lacking in definitive quality.
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Which is why the term as commonly used is incoherent, 'consciousness' is a partly integrated series of parallel and associated and integrated processes.
I tend to prefer the functional medical definition for that reason, it focuses on the behaviors as opposed to abstracted and idiomatic terminology.
OK, but we can't really stop from using the term as we know the concept of the experience of being conscious exists, and we have to pursue searching for a material identification for it so we have to call it something.
I'm not even sure what neuroscience or neurology would do without the conceptual term of consciousness; nor am I sure what anesthesiology would do, as that's a rather big part of their work - determining when someone is or is not consciously sentient to the best of our ability.
Also, consciousness is a pretty important conceptual word for neuroscience.
It may not be extremely vital in all cases for neurology, but it is rather valued in neuroscience.
I am sorry but the whole brain CNS and PNS would be the DMN, and you forgot parasympathetic system.

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Sorry the prefontal cortex and all would be part of the DMN, unless you have some functional criteria that will explain the definition to me.
What is your understanding of what DMN is exactly?
Your descriptions of its topography do not line up with any publication on the DMN that I am familiar with.
So what utility does the term have, why use it, would it not be better to use teh actual terms that defines the process subsumed under 'subconsciousness'.
When it is stated that something is subconscious, it is stating that it is something that doesn't occur in overt executive processes in the brain.
The utility of the word is that most people probably don't know every nook in the brain by name, but within the field the term is functional to describing concepts.
It's not a word that's used in identification of a region of the brain, anymore than consciousness, but it is a functional term in regards to brain states.
That said, most often the same concept is referred to as unconscious, rather than subconscious.
However, some have a problem with that within the field (and I somewhat side with this group a bit) as "unconscious" can be confusing if your paper is attempting to discuss wakeful states of a conscious brain and non-wakeful states of the same brain, and also wish to discuss the processes not aware to the individual during wakeful consciousness.
You end up referring to two rather different concepts as both "unconscious", rather than one as "unconscious" and the other as "subconscious".
The "under" concept isn't considered by anyone today that I'm aware of.
It just refers to the idea of things running in the brain for analytical processes which are not made readily aware to the executive processes of the same individual.
Most anything involved in unconsciousness, subconsciousness, and consciousness are using the same shared regions of the brain.
The primary difference is in the specific nature of the processes shared together simultaneously and which are taking the attention of the sentient awareness of the individual.
Not within your attention is "sub"; or under.
It doesn't mean it's topographically under or metaphorically inferior to something else.
It just means "not aware".
Yes and no, you can be living with OCD, be stuck in some sort of perseveration or ambivalence and quite unable to resolve it, the whole time being quite 'conscious' of it.
What you are describing sounds more like an ability to make attentive focus on certain factors, come to a decision of some sort and make a possible volitional response.
That's not really how it's proposed.
It's more about testing whether something lacks the articulated imagination to solve a problem by determining how to prioritize competing signals simultaneously.
In many animals, such an event will put them in an unresolved loop from which they won't stop until someone or something interferes.
The concept of OCD doesn't fit in with the measuring system as OCD isn't a species definition, but an abnormality, and even in the case of OCD humans, the humans still do resolve their conflicts; they are just less capable than other humans without the condition.
The proposition was offered as one means to attempt to start a grade for measuring whether various animals have consciousness states or not since, currently, we can't even measurably tell anyone whether they are or are not conscious outside of an empathetic extension that we know we are conscious so we assume those like us are equally conscious in the sense of self-awareness.
I think it's a pretty clever method for a starting point, and at least it's a bit better than the current standard, and contentious and problematic, mirror test.