Robin
Penultimate Amazing
- Joined
- Apr 29, 2004
- Messages
- 14,971
No. If I see a starving child on television and respond compassionately, then do nothing about it, I cannot state that actualized goodness has increased in any way.Honestly, I'm not sure I follow you here. Would you agree that if responding compassionately to does not materially affect the suffering, then it can only increase actualized goodness?
I can't see that what some theists believe is really relevant.At any rate, at least some theists believe that responding compassionately (in a conventional sense of those terms) is a divine imperative, that the truth of this is known by revelation, and that it would not be so if responding compassionately would decrease actualized goodness. This premise could be true or false.
Nobody, I hope. But that is not the point. The point is what would be the correct moral response if we knew that God had arranged the suffering for some greater good, and knew that we knew nothing else. The correct moral response would be to do nothing. Or at the least there would be no correct moral response.Yet who is going to use that premise (that a benevolent, omnipotent God has arranged that this suffering is specifically and individually necessary to some greater good) in isolation?
Since my premise is that we can know nothing certain about actualised goodness then my answer is obviously no. But we are talking about what we would do in a situation, rather than how it would make us feel.The health of the patient might not be helped, but can you state with assurance that actualized goodness would be decreased?
And no doubt others would say that they have been asked to trust God and do nothing.A daresay that our Christian friends will assert that they have been specifically asked by God to respond compassionately to any instance of suffering brought to their attention.
To use an analogy, thing of a mathematical function called f which is defined to multiply it's input by 3. So f(3) would result in 9, f(4) would result in 12.When I alluded to a different moral outcome, I meant to encompass the possibility of a different moral response in the beholder.
Whether we supply a 3 or a 4 to this function, we have changed the outcome, but we have not changed the function itself. Now suppose the function discriminates - it multiplies even number by three and odd numbers by 4. So f(3) would be 12 and f(6) would be 18.
We can now provoke a different response by the type of number we give it, but we have still not altered the function itself. Do you see what I am getting at? Mr A and Mr B might provoke different outcomes of the moral response without altering the moral response itself.
Is my moral response to a situation dependent on something I am incapable of knowing? This is quite clear. We are considering the situation I encounter and my moral response to it. How can the actual good I manage to do relevant, especially if I am unable to know this?I'm not sure I can assent to this condition. I'm not even sure I understand what you're getting at. (And when I said it was logically possible, I meant only to say that no proof of its impossibility has yet been adduced here or is apparent to my mind.)
But if you are arguing that a specific instance of suffering might be necessary for a specific moral response, how is the moral outcome relevant?I realize that. It's not necessary to my point that Mr. Y be able to plot it. The fact that it could theoretically be plotted suffices to cast doubt on the notion that a given instance or amount of suffering cannot be specifically necessary to a given moral outcome (and in particular, maximized goodness).
The moral outcome may or may not be conditional upon my moral response, but my moral response can never be conditional upon the moral outcome, unless I know what that outcome will be.
No, the one we are currently engaged in that says that an instance of suffering might be individually and specifically necessary to our moral response.The logic of which argument? The argument from evil?
But the (unknowable) outcome is not relevant when you are considering the moral response.In a manner of speaking; yet the specific outcome depends on the conjunction of Mr. Y and the other person, doesn't it?
Your assertion was that the moral response might be the greater good that justified some specific instance of suffering. In this case the actual outcome is irrelevant.
If you are arguing that the greater good might depend on the moral response, then the actual outcome would be relevant, but I would be countering it with a different argument.
Well let me ask you - do you agree that if Mr Y responds to Mr. A's suffering in a different way to Mr. B's suffering, the different response depends on Mr Y, not Mr A, or Mr B? It is key that you understand this step first. If, for example I would help a suffering Scotsman, but let an Englishman suffer this depends on me and not on any individual sufferer?I'm not sure what the relevance is, here. And those would appear to be counterfactuals of freedom, not facts.
So if I only ever encounter suffering Scotsman I do no wrong. If I encounter only suffering Englishmen I do no right.
So presumably I am morally good just so long as I never meet a suffering Englishman. I am morally bad just so long as I never encounter any suffering Scotsmen. But would it really make me good, just because circumstances had never allowed me to put my prejudice into practice?
I say no, my prejudice would still be part of my moral response even if I had only been able to exercise one components of it.
Well remember, the argument is to the proposition that an instance of suffering might be individually and specifically necessary to the moral response of a free agent.I guess I'm still working through your argument. This conclusion seems incorrect to me, or at least undemonstrated.
To me it is quite clear. Unless there is the possibility that some suffering might be gratuitous then there is no possibility of real consequences to our moral choices.