Some observations on the problem of evil

[UndercoverElephant]

Um, yeah, geoff, this does seem to be what you are saying...

I see no problem with thinking such a being exists but... what good does it do other than answering a few questions that don't affect life as we know it?

I left open the question of whether or not this God could or does intervene in the daily lives of human beings or the course of history. I have stated it is possible, within the laws of physics, for this to happen. I've made no comment as to whether or not it actually does.

In a way, though, what you say is true. The picture I have painted does rather leave humans, at least for the most part, in precisely the same existential pickle they have always been in. Simply "knowing God is there" isn't much use if He can't intervene to stop the bailiffs coming round. But is faith in God supposed to be about expecting something in return? That's one of the weird things about mainstream theism. Everybody thinks God is on their side.

If you are looking for life after death (requiring an individuated soul, etc....) or think God can come and rescue humanity from the mess it has created then you are going to be disappointed. So it kind of depends on what you are looking for as to whether such a being could rightly be called "God".

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Anyone would think that Christianity was the only religion in town judging by most of the discussion in this thread. What I am calling "God" is a concept that has some things in common with the Christian conception of God, and not others. It also has some stuff in common with various concepts from eastern religions. Why should the word "God" be reserved for the God which is believed in by mainstream Christians? Plenty of other people have used that word to describe other things, such as neccesary beings or the root of all existence, etc...

When we have these debates, people seem to think there is an either/or thing going on. Either the God of Christianity exists, or it doesn't. This is then followed with "....and if it doesn't then all religions are wrong", or something along those lines. What should be happening is that we are discussing what sort of properties God could conceivably/logically have. In other words, "Does God exist?" is the wrong question. A better question is "What could be the properties of a God which can exist?" It's a better question because we actually stand some chance of answering it. What we would be left with would be a God which is at least not neccesarily non-existent by the laws of logic. In other words, what most Christians believe in is actually a logically inconsistent concept, so it cannot possibly exist - any more than a square circle can exist. But it does not follow that no God at all exists. All that follows is God cannot have the contradictory properties that some people claim for him - including absolute "goodness" or the power to defy the laws of logic or the ability to know the outcome of a human free will decision before the decision is made. All of these things can be ruled out via logical reasoning on its own, but ruling them out does not rule out the possibility of a God with other properties existing.

 

[Robin]

Anyone would think that Christianity was the only religion in town judging by most of the discussion in this thread. What I am calling "God" is a concept that has some things in common with the Christian conception of God, and not others. It also has some stuff in common with various concepts from eastern religions. Why should the word "God" be reserved for the God which is believed in by mainstream Christians? Plenty of other people have used that word to describe other things, such as neccesary beings or the root of all existence, etc...

When we have these debates, people seem to think there is an either/or thing going on. Either the God of Christianity exists, or it doesn't. This is then followed with "....and if it doesn't then all religions are wrong", or something along those lines. What should be happening is that we are discussing what sort of properties God could conceivably/logically have. In other words, "Does God exist?" is the wrong question. A better question is "What could be the properties of a God which can exist?" It's a better question because we actually stand some chance of answering it. What we would be left with would be a God which is at least not neccesarily non-existent by the laws of logic. In other words, what most Christians believe in is actually a logically inconsistent concept, so it cannot possibly exist - any more than a square circle can exist. But it does not follow that no God at all exists. All that follows is God cannot have the contradictory properties that some people claim for him - including absolute "goodness" or the power to defy the laws of logic or the ability to know the outcome of a human free will decision before the decision is made. All of these things can be ruled out via logical reasoning on its own, but ruling them out does not rule out the possibility of a God with other properties existing.

Perhaps this indicates that you are not paying attention. When I discuss God I normally make it clear which tradition or family of traditions I am discussing. Otherwise I post a definition that I understand is used by a certain family of traditions. Many others on the forum do this and sometimes discussion centres on different families of traditions such as Hinduism, Confucianism or Buddhism.

Normally theists respond by saying that this definition is entirely invented by me for the purpose of denying God. So for example I have apparently invented the concept of omniscience purely for the purpose of denying God.

The problem is that when I suggested that to most Christians your argument would appear to be atheism you did not agree. You said "it may seem that way". If you are suggesting that their conception of God is logically inconsistent aren't you claiming that their God does not exist?

The other problem is that you are suggesting here that you are a superior philosopher to, for example, St Augustine of Hippo. You are saying that you are a superior philosopher to the many who claim that the traditional conception of God is logically possible.

It does not seem that you have a good argument at all. You claim things are logically impossible when they are only physically impossible. The two things are not equivalent. There is no logical impossibility to a perpetual motion machine, only a physical impossibility. There is no logical impossibility to an organism that adapts without dying, it is just that this does not happen in our case.

Finally, the gist of your argument is essentially "it is logically impossible for God to be distinguishable from blind natural processes". If this is true then you are just applying the name "God" arbitrarily to blind natural processes.

 

[Z]

Finally, the gist of your argument is essentially "it is logically impossible for God to be distinguishable from blind natural processes". If this is true then you are just applying the name "God" arbitrarily to blind natural processes.

And therein lies the problem, from both angles.

The 'problem of evil' itself originates, IIRC, as an Abrahamistic deific problem, not a universal problem. For example, the same traditions who define God as 'necessary beings,' 'root of all existence,' et. al., are the same traditions who lack a 'problem of evil'. Hence, what we are witnessing is Geoff fervently attacking a straw man of his own design.

What, really, is the 'problem of evil'?

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/

This site has a pretty good introduction to the problem of evil. What has happened here is best covered, I think, by the section which ends with this paragraph:

By contrast, if God is conceived of in a purely metaphysical way, and if no connection can be forged between the relevant metaphysical properties and the possession of significant power, knowledge, and goodness, then the problem of evil is irrelevant. But when that is the case, it would seem that God thereby ceases to be a being who is either an appropriate object of religious attitudes, or a ground for believing that fundamental human hopes are not in vain.

In other words, either evil poses a major problem for the existence of God (as generally conceived of), or God becomes a being unworthy of worship or, possibly worse, irrelevant in any way.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Perhaps this indicates that you are not paying attention. When I discuss God I normally make it clear which tradition or family of traditions I am discussing. Otherwise I post a definition that I understand is used by a certain family of traditions. Many others on the forum do this and sometimes discussion centres on different families of traditions such as Hinduism, Confucianism or Buddhism.

It wasn't so much yourself I was talking about.

Normally theists respond by saying that this definition is entirely invented by me for the purpose of denying God. So for example I have apparently invented the concept of omniscience purely for the purpose of denying God.

The problem is that when I suggested that to most Christians your argument would appear to be atheism you did not agree. You said "it may seem that way". If you are suggesting that their conception of God is logically inconsistent aren't you claiming that their God does not exist?

I am saying that their conception of God is logically inconsistent, and cannot exist. But I am also saying that something which has some of its characteristics could exist.

The other problem is that you are suggesting here that you are a superior philosopher to, for example, St Augustine of Hippo. You are saying that you are a superior philosopher to the many who claim that the traditional conception of God is logically possible.

I am not saying this. Unlike Augustine, I have the benefit of the past 500 years of science and philosophy to help me. No modern philosopher can be compared to Augustine for this reason. It's not a level playing field.

It does not seem that you have a good argument at all. You claim things are logically impossible when they are only physically impossible.

If they are physically impossible then they are logically impossible with regard to actual realities that really exist. If something cannot physically exist, then it cannot exist in our world.

The two things are not equivalent. There is no logical impossibility to a perpetual motion machine, only a physical impossibility. There is no logical impossibility to an organism that adapts without dying, it is just that this does not happen in our case.

No, it really is impossible. A good example is the Wollemi Pine, which against all the odds has survived since 93 mya. But it survived not by adapting but by being in exactly the right place and avoiding death by perpetual coppicing. It evolved when Gondwanaland was on top of the south pole, in conditions of almost permanent twilight. When Australia drifted north and got hotter/brighter it was wiped out by faster-adapting true pines and flowering trees. But in two deep gorges with very low light levels it has hung on, not by apadting but by sending up more and more trunks from the same root system and not giving up its place on the gorge floor. When individuals in a species opt for near-immortality as a survival strategy then all evolution must grind to a halt. The wollemi's are dinsousaur food. The point is that it is a logically entailed by this strategy that evolution is halted. You cannot be immortal and genetically adaptive. These things are logically incompatible, not just physically impossible.

Finally, the gist of your argument is essentially "it is logically impossible for God to be distinguishable from blind natural processes".

No, that is absolutely NOT what I am saying.

If this is true then you are just applying the name "God" arbitrarily to blind natural processes.

No, the natural processes are the natural processes. I never said they were God.

Geoff.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

ZD,

The relevant bit of your quote is "fundamental human hopes". If that means supernatural intervention to save humanity or grant individual immortality, as is expected by some groups of theists, then this is true. My concept of God denies these things as realistic hopes. However, I do not believe this invalidates all religions. It just compromises those forms of theism which offer these things as sweeteners to get people to believe. If a Christian sees his belief in God as his ticket to the afterlife then that Christian is probably going to hate my position.

Geoff.

 

[Z]

That, of course, brings us to the question of the validity of any given religion. Some would claim that any religion that offers no reward for membership is an irrelevant one; others would see that reverence of the divine need not result in expectation of reciprocal reverence and/or rewards. To the majority of posters here, religion is less about reverence of the divine, and more about imposition of morality and expectation of rewards (via afterlife, reincarnation, etc) and/or punishments (hell). There are some who would claim that any religion that lacks the former attributes, would be unworthy of being called a 'religion' and might better be relegated to a 'philosophy' (and in some cases, like Taoism, can actually be considered philosophies rather than religions).

The divine I believe in is not one 'worthy of worship', and one that can be considered 'irrelevant' - precisely for the reasons you have outlined. Consequently, many prefer to state that the Divine I believe in may simply be disregarded. That's a choice.

Logically, there's no point in believing as I do... but I do.

 

[Z]

Besides, isn't pretty much accepted as given that, in religions where the divine metes out neither reward nor punishment, that evil is not only NOT a problem, but not even an issue (beyond human notions of evil)?

 

[Bri]

...I feel certain we could easily engineer a 'better possible world'.

For example, if God is in full control of all constants and variables, there is no reason God could not have created a perfect possible world without any natural disasters whatsoever...

How do you know that such a world would be "better" than the current one? Perhaps a world with natural disasters is better than a world in which we cannot choose to help victims of natural disasters.

-Bri

 

[rocketdodger]

How do you know that such a world would be "better" than the current one? Perhaps a world with natural disasters is better than a world in which we cannot choose to help victims of natural disasters.

-Bri

The fallacy in this theodicy is, as I said before, that the current state of the world allows for natural disasters with victims we cannot help -- those that died.

It is certainly conceivable that a world could exist where we could make moral choices regarding good and evil that avoids the death of innocent victims.

For example, a criminal shooting someone in a major organ could simply be "engineered" to take longer to heal rather than completely kill the victim. And at any rate, pain causes much more suffering than death, at least to the one feeling it. So why so much death, when morality would be the same without it?

 

[Bri]

The fallacy in this theodicy is, as I said before, that the current state of the world allows for natural disasters with victims we cannot help -- those that died.

Perhaps it is necessary that some victims of natural disasters must die in order for the same moral choice to present itself. After all, if we knew that all victims of natural disaster live, we would have no reason to help them (or at least not the same reason). So again, perhaps a world in which some victims of natural disasters die is better than a world in which no victims of natural disasters die.

It is certainly conceivable that a world could exist where we could make moral choices regarding good and evil that avoids the death of innocent victims.

For example, a criminal shooting someone in a major organ could simply be "engineered" to take longer to heal rather than completely kill the victim. And at any rate, pain causes much more suffering than death, at least to the one feeling it. So why so much death, when morality would be the same without it?

If pain really caused more suffering than death, it would have greater consequences. It doesn't, of course. So you'll have to provide a better example of a world in which victims of crime never die that necessarily offers the same consequences for the criminal as a world in which the possibility exists for a victim to die.

-Bri

 

[rocketdodger]

Perhaps it is necessary that some victims of natural disasters must die in order for the same moral choice to present itself. After all, if we knew that all victims of natural disaster live, we would have no reason to help them (or at least not the same reason). So again, perhaps a world in which some victims of natural disasters die is better than a world in which no victims of natural disasters die.

I am talking about the victims that would die no matter what -- like when a building falls on them or something. In these cases, no morality is effected, so why have them killed?

If pain really caused more suffering than death, it would have greater consequences. It doesn't, of course. So you'll have to provide a better example of a world in which victims of crime never die that necessarily offers the same consequences for the criminal as a world in which the possibility exists for a victim to die.

One of the great contradictions of religion is that death is nothing more than a transition to a better life yet killing is the worst possible sin.

I did not make the claim that pain caused more suffering than death in general. My claim is that to the victim it does, and this is what is observable to the sinner.

In effect, my argument is that simply killing a person seems to be much less immoral than purposefully harming them with the intent of causing their suffering. Since a world without death doesn't preclude the horrible evil of causing pain on purpose, I think it could be just as good for moral development.

Furthermore, I would make the claim that the act of killing another human is not by itself evil. It is difficult to explain why so I would ask you to give me examples of one person killing another that you consider evil, and I will attempt to refute those examples.

 

[Bri]

In other words, either evil poses a major problem for the existence of God (as generally conceived of), or God becomes a being unworthy of worship or, possibly worse, irrelevant in any way.

I agree that it is irrelevant to the discussion to define God in metaphysical terms (i.e. "God is being") as define in the paragraph of the article prior to the one you quoted:

But what if God, rather than being characterized in terms of knowledge, power, and goodness, is defined in some more metaphysical way - for example, as the ground of being, or as being itself?

However, the only conclusion that can be made from the paragraph you quoted is that such definitions don't advance the discussion. The statement you made following the quote (that "evil poses a major problem for the existance of God") is not supported by the article, nor even of the section of the article your quote came from.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

I am talking about the victims that would die no matter what -- like when a building falls on them or something. In these cases, no morality is effected, so why have them killed?

That is a fair question, but in no way proves that there is no greater good that could possibly come from their deaths. Perhaps if earthquakes didn't pose such a danger to its victims (and to potential rescuers) they wouldn't pose the same moral dilemma arrising from helping the victims that can be helped. After all, if all victims of earthquakes could be helped if we only chose to do so, then what reason would there be for us to not choose to do so? Perhaps a world in which earthquakes kill some victims without the possibility of them being saved is better than a world in which all victims of earthquakes can be saved if we choose to do so.

One of the great contradictions of religion is that death is nothing more than a transition to a better life yet killing is the worst possible sin.

I did not make the claim that pain caused more suffering than death in general. My claim is that to the victim it does, and this is what is observable to the sinner.

In effect, my argument is that simply killing a person seems to be much less immoral than purposefully harming them with the intent of causing their suffering. Since a world without death doesn't preclude the horrible evil of causing pain on purpose, I think it could be just as good for moral development.

You seem to be arguing against yourself here. If the pain from being injured were worse than death, then the present world (in which the victim would die from massive injury rather than simply continue to suffer horrible pain) might indeed be the better world.

It also cannot be argued that the uncertainty of death doesn't pose a different moral dilemma than simply causing a person physical pain without the possibility of death. Again, I'm not certain that the same moral choices would be presented to us in a world in which death wasn't a possible outcome of certain actions.

Furthermore, I would make the claim that the act of killing another human is not by itself evil. It is difficult to explain why so I would ask you to give me examples of one person killing another that you consider evil, and I will attempt to refute those examples.

The Problem of Evil relies on the claim that certain events (such as the death or suffering of innocent people) are in fact "evil." If you claim that they aren't evil at all, the Problem of Evil isn't even a problem.

-Bri

 

[rocketdodger]

You seem to be arguing against yourself here. If the pain from being injured were worse than death, then the present world (in which the victim would die from massive injury rather than simply continue to suffer horrible pain) might indeed be the better world.

But this is not part of my argument. My argument concerns suffering caused by other humans as their intent. Pain, in a purely biological sense absent morality, is nothing more than the body telling us it is injured. As such, it is an attempt by our bodies to get us to fix them so we won't die. In the case of another person causing the pain, there is no such utility, since ending the pain does not mean saving our lives.

It also cannot be argued that the uncertainty of death doesn't pose a different moral dilemma than simply causing a person physical pain without the possibility of death. Again, I'm not certain that the same moral choices would be presented to us in a world in which death wasn't a possible outcome of certain actions.

I don't claim that the same moral choices would be present -- just that equivalent ones would be. And in any case, the possibility of death doesn't make sense when viewed from the standpoint of the deceased. How does it translate into moral progress for them to be killed?

The Problem of Evil relies on the claim that certain events (such as the death or suffering of innocent people) are in fact "evil." If you claim that they aren't evil at all, the Problem of Evil isn't even a problem.

My claim is that the only definition of evil that makes sense to me is the causation of suffering for the purpose of causing suffering. Killing another human does not, by itself, fit that definition. Causing pain on purpose, however, does.

 

[Bri]

I don't claim that the same moral choices would be present -- just that equivalent ones would be.

Prove that they would be equivalent.

And in any case, the possibility of death doesn't make sense when viewed from the standpoint of the deceased. How does it translate into moral progress for them to be killed?

We're talking about the greater good here. It is quite possible that something that seems to be bad for one individual is for the greater good of mankind. The Problem of Evil argues that surely it would be possible for an omnipotent God to create a world without human suffering, and that if God is truly benevolent, there should be no human suffering. But one argument against the Problem of Evil asks whether the world without suffering would really be better than the world in which we live? It is logical to assume that if humans are to have the freedom to choose to alleviate or cause human suffering, the result must be the possibility of human suffering. It is possible that a world where we have the freedom to choose is better than a world with no human suffering (or no world at all). Therefore, a benevolent God would have to create a world in which human suffering is possible.

My claim is that the only definition of evil that makes sense to me is the causation of suffering for the purpose of causing suffering. Killing another human does not, by itself, fit that definition. Causing pain on purpose, however, does.

By your definition, beating a person over the head for the purpose of stealing their watch isn't evil. They weren't robbed specifically to cause suffering -- the robber did it because he wanted their watch. Of course, the suffering was a forseeable consequence of the robber's action, which makes it "evil" by most definitions. If you consider forseeable consequences of one's actions in your definition of "evil," then killing any person intentionally would fit your definition, since it would cause pain to the person's family, and might also cause pain to someone whose pain might otherwise have been alleviated by this person in the future. But this seems off-topic to me since this line of discussion doesn't seem to further an argument of the Problem of Evil.

-Bri

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If you have nothing to fight for, life becomes empty.

 

[blutoski]

Relevant cartoon:

http://www.photodump.com/direct/Reginleif/god.jpg

 

[Robin]

I am saying that their conception of God is logically inconsistent, and cannot exist. But I am also saying that something which has some of its characteristics could exist.

So what do you think are the base characteristics that would allow God to exist and still qualify as a God?

I am not saying this. Unlike Augustine, I have the benefit of the past 500 years of science and philosophy to help me. No modern philosopher can be compared to Augustine for this reason. It's not a level playing field.

I don't see how science affects Augustine's arguments at all. As I seem to remember he proposed something along the lines of evolution in any case didn't he?

If they are physically impossible then they are logically impossible with regard to actual realities that really exist. If something cannot physically exist, then it cannot exist in our world.

If God is defined as creator of the world then he must be ontologically prior to the world.

So in creating the universe God cannot have been bound to what is possible in that Universe. That does not make a shred of sense.

God could define what is possible. Could define a physics to allow perpetual motion machines or anything he pleased.

Logically possible and physically possible are two different things.

No, it really is impossible. A good example is the Wollemi Pine, which against all the odds has survived since 93 mya. But it survived not by adapting but by being in exactly the right place and avoiding death by perpetual coppicing. It evolved when Gondwanaland was on top of the south pole, in conditions of almost permanent twilight. When Australia drifted north and got hotter/brighter it was wiped out by faster-adapting true pines and flowering trees. But in two deep gorges with very low light levels it has hung on, not by apadting but by sending up more and more trunks from the same root system and not giving up its place on the gorge floor. When individuals in a species opt for near-immortality as a survival strategy then all evolution must grind to a halt. The wollemi's are dinsousaur food. The point is that it is a logically entailed by this strategy that evolution is halted. You cannot be immortal and genetically adaptive. These things are logically incompatible, not just physically impossible.

Let me repeat - the fact that it does not happen in our case does not make it impossible.

In the case of our biology adaption depends on replication. Adaptation happens when errors occur in the copying mechanism and the consequent physical change provides an advantage.

Is it really impossible to conceive that if there is life elsewhere in the universe it does not depend on DNA?

Again, was God limited to one particular biology when he created the Universe? If so then what was it that defined the biology he was limited to?

Does adaptation logically have to depend on replication error? Can you show that the idea of a physiology of adaptation without replication is contradictory?

And again, is adaptation really necessary for the creation of a sentient agent? Is trial and error the only tool available to a being with all power over existence?

If God could have nudged evolution he could have created a human being from scratch. Or any other kind of being. Or any kind of universe.

Or he would not be God.

No, the natural processes are the natural processes. I never said they were God.

You appear to be saying that God is logically bound to what is possible within those natural processes. For example that God had to use genetic mutation and natural selection to create a sentient being.

If God is defined by the natural processes, then they are ontologically prior to God and by definition it is those processes that are God.

 

[Robin]

The Problem of Evil relies on the claim that certain events (such as the death or suffering of innocent people) are in fact "evil." If you claim that they aren't evil at all, the Problem of Evil isn't even a problem.

-Bri

You seem to be claiming also that they are not evil. That they are all justified by a greater good.

And since we do not have any knowledge about what that greater good might be or whether our actions will enhance or detract from that good then our best course of action is still to do nothing and let the greater good occur.

No problem of evil. Also no real consequences to our choices. No consequences to our choices, no free will.