ceo_esq said:
Let me say two things. First, when I spoke of a person's response to suffering, my primary motivation was to object to the notion that inaction could be the moral response, because it seemed to me that whatever good was intended to be realized by the suffering in the first place (regardless of whether that good was somehow bound up with the response or opportunity for response), the total amount of actualized goodness would be greater if the bystander responds compassionately than if he does not. I was not really focusing on such questions as:
Don't forget that the implied premise, (the Agnostic Defense) is that we are intrinsically incapable of judging the ultimate value of any individual instance of suffering.
So we have no way of knowing whether acting compassionately will increase or decrease actualised goodness. Assumptions about whether individual actions increase or decrease good cannot be part of the logic.
If the only thing we know about a situation is that a benevolent, omnipotent God has arranged that this suffering is specifically and individually necessary to some greater good then of course the only moral action would be to stand back and let that good eventuate.
Just as in a hospital we see a patient suffering but know him to be in the active care of an ethical and competent doctor, the good of the patient would not be helped by our acting compassionately and attempting to ease the suffering of the patient. Our inept intervention could lead to calamity.
The moral action in either case is to do nothing, unless specifically asked.
But now that you've posed them, I submit that we don't know the answer to your questions.
1. It is logically possible that Mr. B's suffering would provoke a different moral outcome than Mr. A's.
No doubt - in fact that is already stipulated in my premise.
But we are considering whether it is logically possible that Mr. B's suffering would provoke a different moral
response than Mr A's.
2. Imagine that we were able to plot a graph of overall goodness brought about as a function of the degree of Mr. A's suffering. It is intuitively plausible that the plotted curve could have a single highest point on it. I can't logically exclude the possibility that net goodness (whether bound up in Mr. Y's response, the requirements of justice, or something else) is negatively affected if we move off of that point and Mr. A suffers just a bit more or a bit less. Even if I could foresee all of the consequences, I have no knowledge that would permit me to weigh the intrinsic value of virtue (or some other good) versus that of suffering.
I have no way of determining whether suffering is individually and specifically necessary to either (i) the moral good of the response or (ii) any other moral good possibly occasioned by the suffering.
The problem is that if you are attempting to show that it is logically possible that an individual instance of suffering can be individually and specifically necessary to the moral response, then you must limit your argument to the moral response and not the overall goodness brought about by the suffering.
Perhaps that graph could be plotted but Mr Y could not plot that graph (again, from the theist premise). The overall goodness of the result cannot be part of Mr Y's moral response and it cannot be part of the logic of the argument.
So this objection could not be considered unless it can be reframed only in terms of Mr Y's moral response and not in terms of the overall moral outcome.
Now it seems to me my moral framework ought to be consistent across each situation that I encounter. That I ought to apply a consistent set of morals to each situation. I ought not to apply one moral standard to men and another to women. I ought not to apply one moral standard to my own race and another to different races.
I ought not, but of course I am human. If I fail in this and apply different moral standards, then the weakness is entirely mine and nothing to do with the person of another race or another sex that I encounter. It is in fact a part of my moral response.
So if I help people on a racist or sexist basis then this does not depend on which race or sex I encounter, but on my own prejudices. Racism, it is well understood, is not the fault of the victim.
So let us suppose that Mr. A produces one specific moral response in Mr. Y and Mr. B another - for whatever reason. The difference between those responses depends, not on Mr A, or Mr B, but on Mr Y.
If Mr Y treats Mr A one way does that change the fact that he would have treated Mr B another way?
If Mr Y treats Mr B one way does that change the fact that he would have treated Mr A another?
So whether it is Mr A or Mr B has not changed the basic moral response, applied to different situations.
In other words it is illogical that one instance of suffering can be individually and specifically necessary to the moral response to it.