Some observations on the problem of evil

[UndercoverElephant]

Couldn't you validly apply "evil" to divine actions which deliberately cause suffering for no good reason?

Sure, if there's an deity that deliberately and purposelessly inflicts pain on human beings as an act of divine will, that's evil.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Since several people seem to have mistaken this thread for being an attempt to prove God exists, I figured I'd post my position regarding the argument that this thread has been mistaken for, which is the cosmological argument from contingency:

The term “Cosmological Argument” actually refers to a diverse collection arguments, all of which start from claims about the Universe and attempt to reason back to the necessary existence of something purported to be God. I am going to argue that none of the deductive versions are particularly compelling, but that some sort of inductive cosmological argument might work.

Historically, the argument has had both temporal and non-temporal forms. For example, the Islamic philosopher al-Ghāzāli (1058-1111) argued that “everything that begins to exist requires a cause of its beginning.”1 This particular version is known as the “kalām argument”. It no longer makes scientific sense to believe in a meaningful concept of “time before the Universe.” For example, people are likely to argue that the idea of a “pre-Universal” time is incoherent, on the grounds that time is either a condition of human cognition or that time is a property of the physical Universe, following Kant and Einstein respectively. In both cases the question “What happened before the big bang?” is rendered meaningless, and the argument from first temporal cause therefore fails since there need have been no temporal cause of the physical Universe. This problem had been anticipated before Kant, and it is possible to replace the temporal (or horizontal) cause with sustaining (or vertical) cause. In other words, we would be talking about an ongoing cause rather than a mere trigger.

The atemporal versions of the cosmological argument largely depend on one apparently undeniable fact about existence: Nothing whatsoever can arise out of a state of absolute nothingness. Provided one accepts this claim, I believe that some form of the cosmological argument is bound to go through, although precisely what conclusions one draws from the validity of the argument is another question entirely. The cosmological argument on its own can never succeed in proving the existence of anything resembling the God of western theism. Indeed a comparative survey of religions would be likely to suggest we would be attempting to prove the existence something more like the Hindu “Brahman”, which could arguably be claimed to be a direct translation of “Necessary Being”, although it is usually translated as something like “the Unmanifest Being of God” or more literally “that from which everything grows”. Further arguments would be required to establish the existence of an entity with the extended set of properties usually allocated to God, but these would be likely to take the definition of God away from a concept which is common to most (maybe all) religions (absolute being) and towards a concept which is much more specific to a particular religious system, a move which may not be a particularly helpful at this point in time.

The main atemporal version of the cosmological argument is the deductive argument from contingency, which originated with Aquinas. It holds that everything that everything in the physical Universe only exists contingently, i.e. not necessarily. It then claims that these contingent things must ultimately depend upon something which exists necessarily. It can be summarised as follows:

1. Contingent things exist.
2. These contingent things must have a cause or explanation.
3. The cause or explanation the existence of these contingent things must either be solely other contingent things or include a necessary thing/being.
4. Contingent things alone cannot cause or explain the existence of all contingent things.
5. Therefore, what causes or explains the existence of the contingent things must include a necessary being.
6. Therefore, a necessary being exists.

There are many objections. Russell claimed that the Universe “just is”. This objection relies on claiming that just because the individual parts of the Universe have a property (contingency), it does not follow that the Universe as a whole has that property. A wall is composed of bricks, and is itself made of brick – but while a proton is composed of quarks, we cannot say it is “made of quark”. Quarks just don’t share the properties of protons in the same way that the brick of the brick wall shares the properties of the brick of the individual bricks. I think Russell has a good case. We currently have no idea what we mean when we talk about “the whole of the Universe.” For example, we have no idea whether the Universe has or hasn’t got a boundary. We do not know whether it is finite, infinite or finite but potentially infinite. The standard model of particle physics is currently in crisis following the discovery that neutrinos have mass, something which is ruled out by current theories of gravity, adding to the problems caused by the ongoing failure to find the Higgs boson, which is supposed to carry it. In other words, we simply do not have the cosmological facts to start reasoning from. All we have is guesswork and theories which are looking increasingly vulnerable – and were our theories of gravity/mass change then it may well change our understanding about the properties of the Universe as a whole.

This becomes clearer with an examination of Hume’s objection: An explanation of all the parts is an explanation of the whole. This objection is largely self-explanatory. Perhaps an explanation of the whole requires nothing more than an explanation of all the parts in terms of all the other parts. If X explains Y, Y explains Z, and Z explains X, is anything more required for a complete explanation of the set of {X,Y,Z}? William Rowe1 argues that even if each part is explained by another part, there is still no explanation for the whole. At first glance, this response seems reasonable, but there is at least one weakness. It can be exposed by highlighting one particularly intriguing suggestion as to how Rowe’s objection could be deflected, as described by Brighton-based nihilist/transhumanist David Pearce. His suggestion (called “The Zero Ontology”) is that all of the components, taken together, add up to precisely Zero leaving “nothing to explain”:

“…the totality of the real, "substantial" world (the world of physical things) is ultimately indistinguishable from the void. That is, the substance of the world as a whole is identical with nothingness, and reality is interpreted as the realisation of Zero.”

If something like Pearce’s suggestion is true, then Hume’s objection would have been vindicated – and I believe that the cosmological evidence invoked does indeed support Pearce – a suggestion supported by people like Victor Stenger3, who has described the Universe as “the ultimate free lunch”. If all of the potential gravitational energy in the Universe exactly cancels out all of the matter and energy then we are left with the an equation which reads something like “1 + -1 = 0”, where “0” is considered to be in need of no explanation. Arguments like these threaten to kill off the cosmological argument before it has even got started. It is for this reason that our lack of a proper understanding of the mass and extent of the Universe and our unstable theories of gravity and mass are of critical importance. We simply do not possess reliable enough cosmological data or stable enough theoretical explanations to be able to say whether Pearce’s suggestion is correct, regardless of the fact that cosmologists have spent the past 100 years trying to provide this information. Therefore we cannot know whether the totality of the parts adds up to precisely nothing.

There is another famous objection, which should be mentioned. Kant claimed that the cosmological argument critically depends on the ontological argument, which fails. Kant claimed that the cosmological argument is dependent on the ontological argument. This objection is based on confusion about the meaning of “necessary being”. Kant is referring to logically necessary existence, which would make this a version of the ontological argument, which Kant had already undermined. But the Cosmological argument refers to metaphysical necessity rather than logical necessity. A necessary being is one that if it exists, it cannot cease to exist, and if it does not exist then it will never exist. It is a being which cannot come into existence. So Kant’s objection can be safely ignored.

In conclusion, I believe that no deductive form of the cosmological argument is likely to be convincing, a position which is shared by the majority of commentators, both theist and atheist.

Geoff's position:

1)The cosmological argument fails to establish that God exists.
2)The argument from evil fails to establish that God does not exist.

 

[Robin]

The obvious return question is:

What do earthquakes have to do with "good" and "evil", and "free will"?

JustGeoff brought up the subject of earthquakes in reference to free will. If you read my question properly you will see that I am asking him what earthquakes have to do with free will.

So it makes not a shred of sense for you to come back and ask me the same thing does it? You should ask JustGeoff.

As for what earthquakes have to do with good and evil. In the absense of God - nothing.

The problem assumes the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent God who created the universe.

So things like floods, earthquakes, cancers etc are either unintended consequences of the design - mistakes - or they are intended consequences.

If they are intended consequences they can be considered as good or evil.

If they are unintended consequences this contradicts God's omnipotence and omniscience.

"Natural evil" is definitely considered under the classic "Problem of Evil", for example St Augustine did not try to run away from the aspect of the problem.
all

 

[ceo_esq]

Sure, if there's an deity that deliberately and purposelessly inflicts pain on human beings as an act of divine will, that's evil.

Well, part of the PoE as applied to natural evil is the question of whether the existence of earthquakes and so forth would constitute a true moral evil on the part of a hypothetical God.

 

[Robin]

1)The cosmological argument fails to establish that God exists.
2)The argument from evil fails to establish that God does not exist.

However you appear to be arguing that the argument from evil does establish that an omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent God could not be the purposeful creator of the universe. (Which is farther than I would go).

To the majority of Christian theists this would certainly be equivalent to "God cannot exist"

Now you can easily justify the possibility of God by altering the definition of God.

 

[ceo_esq]

So things like floods, earthquakes, cancers etc are either unintended consequences of the design - mistakes - or they are intended consequences.

...

If they are unintended consequences this contradicts God's omnipotence and omniscience.

Perhaps this is simply a definitional wrangle, but the way I'm used to thinking about unintended consequences, they aren't necessarily mistakes. In determining a criminal frame of mind, for example, many penal codes distinguish between intentional acts and merely knowing acts. In that context, a person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious object to cause such a result. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that it is certain (or nearly so) that his conduct will cause such a result. By an extension of that definition, God could conceivably act knowingly, without acting either intentionally or mistakenly, with respect to natural evil.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If they are unintended consequences this contradicts God's omnipotence and omniscience.

Not quite. The fact that God cannot create a stone which is so heavy that even he cannot lift it does not contradict God's omnipotence. The reason for this is that it is a logical impossibility, and even an omnipotent God cannot defy the laws of logic. In other words, God's inability to create a square circle does not make God any less omnipotent. Similarly, if it is logically impossible to know the future, then God is not rendered non-omniscient because he does not know the future. And if the present is the only thing which exists and determinism is false, then it is impossible even for an omniscient being to know the future. The future is simply unknowable, in principle.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well, part of the PoE as applied to natural evil is the question of whether the existence of earthquakes and so forth would constitute a true moral evil on the part of a hypothetical God.

Yes, so one has to claim that life can only exist on planets that have earthquakes. If this is so, then earthquakes are neccesarily unavoidable. Perhaps geologically-dead planets are inevitably non-life-supporting.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

However you appear to be arguing that the argument from evil does establish that an omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent God could not be the purposeful creator of the universe. (Which is farther than I would go).

I don't think this follows from my arguments, although I can see why it might look like it has been implied. I would say that considerations from science alone rule out the fact that God purposefuly designed human beings, you don't need the argument from evil for that. I am also saying that God is limited in his means of "creating" things and limited in terms of what is logically possible on a life-supporting world. So I am indeed placing limits on the potential creative and omni-properties of God, but these are side-effects of the argument.

To the majority of Christian theists this would certainly be equivalent to "God cannot exist"

Many of them would interpret it that way, yes.

Now you can easily justify the possibility of God by altering the definition of God.

Yes, I am suggesting the argument over the existence of God which goes on between mainstream theists and the sort of atheists you meet at the JREF is pointless because both groups of people are arguing about a concept of God which is itself implicitly incoherent. This suits the atheists, because disproving the coherence of these ideas is relatively simple. The whole debate is a red herring.

 

[Krandal2]

If you think God is all powerful, all knowing and 100% "good" (whatever that means), then it seems inevitable that such arguments should kill off any chance that such a God exists. With this much I am total agreement.

Why? By what standard would we judge an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being? How could we possibly determine the neccessity or ultimate consequence of *any* event, never mind those that seem "Evil"?
Hardly a convincing reason to discard the true "omni-god" in my opinion.

 

[Robin]

Why? By what standard would we judge an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being?

If God is good then we must be using "good" in the same sense as we would use it for a human being. Otherwise, as CS Lewis points out, we would not be saying "God is good", we would be saying "God is we know not what".

So if we have no standard to judge God by then we are simply removing the property of omnibenevolence and replacing it with omniX. As I said, it is easy to solve the Problem of Evil by simply changing the definition of God.

How could we possibly determine the neccessity or ultimate consequence of *any* event, never mind those that seem "Evil"?
Hardly a convincing reason to discard the true "omni-god" in my opinion.

We do not have to determine the ultimate consequences of events because we have a philosophical method which lets us find this information another way.

Say that every single instance of undeserved suffering from natural causes was individually and specifically necessary to some greater good.

In this case what should we do when we encounter somebody suffering? According to the premise above we should do nothing, because we have faith that this suffering is individually and specifically necessary to some greater good. If we interfere we are preventing that greater good.

But a world where the morally good action in the face of suffering would always be to do nothing would be absurd.

So we know that there exist individual instances of suffering due to natural causes that are not specifically necessary to a greater good.

Hence when we see suffering we are obliged to help. But what if suffering is occurring and nobody is there to help? We know God can help. We know God wants to help. We know that helping would not have any adverse consequences.

But still God is apparently obliged not to help.

 

[Robin]

Yes, I am suggesting the argument over the existence of God which goes on between mainstream theists and the sort of atheists you meet at the JREF is pointless because both groups of people are arguing about a concept of God which is itself implicitly incoherent. This suits the atheists, because disproving the coherence of these ideas is relatively simple. The whole debate is a red herring.

But if I am debating with someone with a particular concept of God, I have to address that concept. I cannot unilaterally alter the definition of God just because his concept happens to be incoherent.

If this were true it would be impossible to disprove any proposition whatsoever.

1. If I am successful in disproving the proposition then the proposition was invalid.
2. But if the proposition is invalid I should not be trying to disprove it.
3. Therefore I have not disproved the proposition.

 

[Robin]

Not quite. The fact that God cannot create a stone which is so heavy that even he cannot lift it does not contradict God's omnipotence. The reason for this is that it is a logical impossibility, and even an omnipotent God cannot defy the laws of logic. In other words, God's inability to create a square circle does not make God any less omnipotent. Similarly, if it is logically impossible to know the future, then God is not rendered non-omniscient because he does not know the future. And if the present is the only thing which exists and determinism is false, then it is impossible even for an omniscient being to know the future. The future is simply unknowable, in principle.

So if I build a bridge and it falls down because I ran the stress analysis incorrectly then it is not my fault because the future is simply unknowable in principle?

I don't think so.

It does not defy the laws of logic that God could have designed a planet which had no earthquakes. It does not defy the laws of logic that God could have devised a biosphere in which suffering did not occur except by the free will of humans.

Remember he is designing every single element of this system, it's not like he has to use the existing physical laws.

After all most Christians believe that God has devised an eternity with no suffering. How can he promise that if the future is unknowable in principle?

 

[Krandal2]

If God is good then we must be using "good" in the same sense as we would use it for a human being. Otherwise, as CS Lewis points out, we would not be saying "God is good", we would be saying "God is we know not what".

Agreed. We must judge God by the same quality of goodness, as we do a human being.

So if we have no standard to judge God by then we are simply removing the property of omnibenevolence and replacing it with omniX. As I said, it is easy to solve the Problem of Evil by simply changing the definition of God.

But we can judge an omni-being by the same quality of goodness, while at the same time judging it by a different standard (in this case, that of omni-benevolence). In fact we must, since it is, by definition, capable of infinitely more.

We do not have to determine the ultimate consequences of events because we have a philosophical method which lets us find this information another way.

Say that every single instance of undeserved suffering from natural causes was individually and specifically necessary to some greater good.

Alright.

In this case what should we do when we encounter somebody suffering? According to the premise above we should do nothing, because we have faith that this suffering is individually and specifically necessary to some greater good. If we interfere we are preventing that greater good.

Simply because specific instances of suffering may be neccessary does not mean that suffering itself is neccessary. There is therefore no reason to assume that actions taken on behalf of others are not a function of the greater good.

But a world where the morally good action in the face of suffering would always be to do nothing would be absurd.

See above.

So we know that there exist individual instances of suffering due to natural causes that are not specifically necessary to a greater good.

Hence when we see suffering we are obliged to help.

You are confusing past and future events. We act to prevent future suffering caused by events which either in themselves or in their consequences, may have been perfectly neccessary and justifiable.

We know God can help. We know God wants to help.
We know that helping would not have any adverse consequences.

No, we know that we can help, and we know that in acting we may be contributing to the grand plan of the greater good. But we have no idea whether gods intervention would be either benificial or neccessary.

But still God is apparently obliged not to help.

Your simply repeating the original error of judging the infinite through finite means.

So again I ask, on what grounds can we possibly judge what the ultimate consequences of any event, and use them to disprove the existence of an omni-god?

 

[Q-Source]

Did I? When?

In the opening post?

What (a) and (b)?

sorry, I meant 1) and 2)

I think you have completely missed my point. I was just replying to the OP, especifically to altering the conception of God in order to attack the argument from evil. I think Robin said it better (post #32)

 

[Robin]

Agreed. We must judge God by the same quality of goodness, as we do a human being.

But we can judge an omni-being by the same quality of goodness, while at the same time judging it by a different standard (in this case, that of omni-benevolence). In fact we must, since it is, by definition, capable of infinitely more.

And so presumably would evaluate God's goodness to a higher standard. So my judging God's goodness by at least the standard I judge my own must consequently be eminently reasonable.

Simply because specific instances of suffering may be neccessary does not mean that suffering itself is neccessary. There is therefore no reason to assume that actions taken on behalf of others are not a function of the greater good.

However my statement was a logical step from my assumption that every instance of suffering was specifically necessary to a greater good. That assumption was not meant to reflect reality, but just to explore the consequences.

Take for example a patient under a doctors care - the patient may seem to be suffering but if we know that doctor to be ethical and competent our only course of action is to do nothing.

But it is absurd to suppose that every instance of suffering from natural causes is like this.

Would you really say that, for example if 10 people died in an earthquake this might lead to a greater good, but if 9 people died or 11 people died that greater good would not ensue?

It is really common sense that even if suffering from natural cause does have a purpose, each specific instance does not.

You are confusing past and future events. We act to prevent future suffering caused by events which either in themselves or in their consequences, may have been perfectly neccessary and justifiable.

No I am not, if suffering is caused by an earthquake, the event itself is neutral. We don't care event in the past (the earthquake) was necessary or justified because we do not regard it as bad in itself. It is the situation in the present (the suffering) that we are considering and asking if it is necessary or justified. So if the suffering (rather than the earthquake) is individually necessary to a consequent good we should just let it happen.

If suffering is not individually necessary we should help. And we know by logic and common sense that this is the case.

No, we know that we can help, and we know that in acting we may be contributing to the grand plan of the greater good. But we have no idea whether gods intervention would be either benificial or neccessary.

We have established that there are instances of suffering that in themselves do not lead to a greater good. If we lessened the suffering this would be beneficial. So why wouldn't it be beneficial if God did so? What could be unbeneficial about alleviating unnecessary suffering?

Your simply repeating the original error of judging the infinite through finite means.

No. I am not judging the infinite. I am judging a finite situation (suffering) against a quality (good).

If I am incapable of judging the finite situation of suffering or the quality of good I cannot be good. I - as with most people - believe that I can and I am.

If God's obligations in a given situation are different then God is not good within any meaning we are capable of comprehending. So not omni-benevolent, just omni-X.

So again I ask, on what grounds can we possibly judge what the ultimate consequences of any event, and use them to disprove the existence of an omni-god?

You need to read my argument again. We do not need to judge the ultimate consequences of any event. We just need to know that there are instances of suffering that are not individually and specifically necessary to some greater good. I have demonstrated that there must be. And shown that it is common sense that there are.

Alleviating suffering in such instances would not detract from any greater good. So if God is held to at least the same standard as us then God would have an equal obligation to help.

But the implications of your argument are that an infinite being is intrinsically incomprehensible to us. So how does that make God different from the blind forces of nature?

Christian tradition promises an eternity in communion with God, but we cannot become infinite beings ourselves. So even in eternity we will be finite beings unable to comprehend the infinite.

So if God's goodness seems like suffering to us now, it may eternally seem like suffering to us.

 

[Ossai]

JustGeoff

Even though allowing humans free will results in infinite amounts of terrible suffering, this is still better than continual intervention by God to prevent human-induced evil.

What about all the nonhuman caused suffering and evil?

1) God must stand outside the human decision-making process.

From the way you describe the human decision-making process then what is the difference in no god and the one you propose?

He cannot be "all good" because "good" is a human-relative term. Whose side does He take when two humans have a dispute because they genuinely disagree on what is "good" and what is "bad"? He cannot. To do this, He would need a brain of his own so He could independently figure out what "absolute good" was.

You just violated your basis. You claim that anthropomorphism of god is wrong, then the first thing you do is anthropomorphize god by giving it a brain.

…so He could independently figure out what "absolute good" was.

Does your god then bother to teach anyone what “absolute good” is? How it could be accomplished. What the benefits are. Is there a downside?

If God did exist (*the sort of God I have described, not the naive Christian omni-everything God), what could He actually do to fix the situation on Earth? What could He do that would not risk making the situation even worse?

Communicate clearly with everyone on earth and explain his plan and what part everyone is to play in it.
Communicate clearly with everyone on earth, each generation, and tell us to ‘play nice with each other’.
Share his knowledge with us for cheap clean energy.
Complete the human genome project.
Teach us how to do weather control, or stick around himself and do it.
Offer aid after natural disasters, or prevent them in the first place.

One might even go further and claim that God has already tried to do something to make it better, and that these attempts have resulted in organised religion - which turned out to cause more problems than it solves.

Show up and declare all religions null and void, after proving to everyone that he is god.

Basically, you’ve got some really lousy excuses for your imaginary sky god.

Ossai

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But if I am debating with someone with a particular concept of God, I have to address that concept.

Of course. If you are faced with a literalist creationist then that is what you must challenge.

I cannot unilaterally alter the definition of God just because his concept happens to be incoherent.

No, but that doesn't mean that Geoff can't adopt a different definition of God if he wants to. There's no literalist here in this thread. There's no reason why all debates about God should revolve around the most simplistic definitions of God.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So if I build a bridge and it falls down because I ran the stress analysis incorrectly then it is not my fault because the future is simply unknowable in principle?

I don't think so.

That's a false analogy. I've already said that I am not defending the idea of God as an engineer.

It does not defy the laws of logic that God could have designed a planet which had no earthquakes.

Only if God is an engineer.

It does not defy the laws of logic that God could have devised a biosphere in which suffering did not occur except by the free will of humans.

Remember he is designing every single element of this system, it's not like he has to use the existing physical laws.

I am stipulating that if God works within the physical world then God must work within existing physical laws - and since some of those are probablistic, this remains possible.

After all most Christians believe that God has devised an eternity with no suffering. How can he promise that if the future is unknowable in principle?

With difficulty, it seems. If we are going to analyse the mythology, I would say that "the kingdom of God" requires a great deal of effort by humans, so God cannot promise it.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

JustGeoff
What about all the nonhuman caused suffering and evil?

That's what the discussion about earthquakes is for.

From the way you describe the human decision-making process then what is the difference in no god and the one you propose?

I'll answer that with another question: If there's no difference, why are you so concerned to show the God I defined doesn't exist? If there was no difference, you wouldn't care.

You just violated your basis. You claim that anthropomorphism of god is wrong, then the first thing you do is anthropomorphize god by giving it a brain.

When did I give God a brain?

Does your god then bother to teach anyone what “absolute good” is?

No.

Communicate clearly with everyone on earth and explain his plan and what part everyone is to play in it.

What if the plan is to allow humans to make what they want to of the Earth?

Communicate clearly with everyone on earth, each generation, and tell us to ‘play nice with each other’.

One might claim that God has already done this. It doesn't seem to have made much difference. What is the next step? God as universal policeman?

Share his knowledge with us for cheap clean energy.

And exactly what do you think human beings would do with a new cheap energy source? Answer: make even better weapons with it.