Some observations on the problem of evil

[UndercoverElephant]

I have to prepare for a three-hour exam on the philosophical foundations of cognitive science which is tomorrow at 9.30 am.

I'll be back on Sunday.

 

[Bri]

We have established that there are instances of suffering that in themselves do not lead to a greater good. If we lessened the suffering this would be beneficial. So why wouldn't it be beneficial if God did so? What could be unbeneficial about alleviating unnecessary suffering?

I don't wish to read through the whole thread, so could you please post a reference to where this was established, or else give me an example or a brief synopsis of the argument? I'm not sure one could prove that there are instances of suffering that do not lead to a greater good or are not necessary for a greater good.

-Bri

 

[ceo_esq]

I don't wish to read through the whole thread, so could you please post a reference to where this was established, or else give me an example or a brief synopsis of the argument? I'm not sure one could prove that there are instances of suffering that do not lead to a greater good or are not necessary for a greater good.

-Bri

I think Robin had this in mind:

In this case what should we do when we encounter somebody suffering? According to the premise above we should do nothing, because we have faith that this suffering is individually and specifically necessary to some greater good. If we interfere we are preventing that greater good.

But a world where the morally good action in the face of suffering would always be to do nothing would be absurd.

So we know that there exist individual instances of suffering due to natural causes that are not specifically necessary to a greater good.

I don't think this line of argument necessarily leads to the conclusion that, as Robin put it, "there are instances of suffering that in themselves do not lead to a greater good." For one thing, if the greater good made possible by the existence of an instance of suffering in another is the morally good action of the person who responds to such suffering. In other words, the premise that the suffering is necessary to the greater good is not to say that the suffering is sufficient by itself to bring about the greater good (such that inaction on the part of the bystander would be most conducive to the realization of the greatest possible amount of good). At any rate, I can accept the theoretical possibility of "instances of suffering that in themselves do not lead to a greater good" - that is, I see no logical contradiction posed by their existence - but I cannot agree that the actual existence of any instance of gratuitous suffering can be formally demonstrated.

 

[gnome]

That is why it wasn't offered as a proof of God. It is merely one possible definition of what is meant by the word God. This thread is not an attempt to prove God exists. It is an attempt to show that the argument from evil against the existence of God isn't sound. In other words, it is merely attempting to establish that the existence of God is not impossible (on those specific grounds).



Again, this would be a discussion about a different argument. In this case it is the cosmological argument from contingency - which is an attempt to prove that the existence of God is neccesary. I do not believe this argument is successful, and I am not defending it.

Now I get it Thanks.

 

[Bri]

I don't think this line of argument necessarily leads to the conclusion that, as Robin put it, "there are instances of suffering that in themselves do not lead to a greater good." For one thing, if the greater good made possible by the existence of an instance of suffering in another is the morally good action of the person who responds to such suffering. In other words, the premise that the suffering is necessary to the greater good is not to say that the suffering is sufficient by itself to bring about the greater good (such that inaction on the part of the bystander would be most conducive to the realization of the greatest possible amount of good). At any rate, I can accept the theoretical possibility of "instances of suffering that in themselves do not lead to a greater good" - that is, I see no logical contradiction posed by their existence - but I cannot agree that the actual existence of any instance of gratuitous suffering can be formally demonstrated.

Thanks, ceo. Of course, if the mere presentation of the choice to help the suffering person is a greater good (independent of the choice actually made) then the suffering might be for the greater good (i.e. it might be a greater good for the person to have a choice to help another person than for the other person to not suffer). Of course, if the person actually chooses to help, that is even better than if they choose not to help.

So, I'll have to agree with you that Robin cannot demonstrate that any instance of suffering isn't for the greater good.

-Bri

 

[Robin]

For one thing, if the greater good made possible by the existence of an instance of suffering in another is the morally good action of the person who responds to such suffering.

You will have to admit that this does not sound like a plausible justification for suffering.

But let us suppose that the opportunity for moral behaviour was sufficient justification for some act of suffering.

So Mr A suffers so that Mr Y has an opportunity for moral behaviour. Does it have to be Mr A? Would Mr B's suffering afford a poorer quality of moral behaviour? Or would Mr B do just as well?

Would Mr Y's behaviour be less moral if Mr A suffered just a little less or a little more?

We can see that no act of suffering can be individually and specifically necessary to the moral behaviour of the responder.

So this objection cannot stand as it does not give an instance of suffering individually and specifically necessary to a greater good.

So the argument still stands, there exist instances of suffering that are not individually and specifically necessary to a greater good.

In any case the conclusion is simple common sense. Does anybody believe that an earthquake had to be in just that place and just that severity and just that number of casualties in order to affect some greater good? That one less casualty would have prevented the good from happening?

Surely nobody is seriously suggesting that?

 

[Krandal2]

Does anybody believe that an earthquake had to be in just that place and just that severity and just that number of casualties in order to affect some greater good? That one less casualty would have prevented the good from happening?

Surely nobody is seriously suggesting that?

I'm not only suggesting it, I'm asserting that if the existence of an omni-god is given, *then it is neccessarily true*, and that because of this local instances of "Evil" do not disprove the existence of such an omni-god.

 

[ceo_esq]

Surely nobody is seriously suggesting that?

I would suggest that the contrary cannot be shown, so I would be unwilling to incorporate this as a premise in any version of the PoE.

 

[Robin]

I'm not only suggesting it, I'm asserting that if the existence of an omni-god is given, *then it is neccessarily true*, and that because of this local instances of "Evil" do not disprove the existence of such an omni-god.

So what you are saying is that when an earthquake happens, God ensures that a particular number are killed, a particular number are injured and their injuries are of a particular kind.

Does he also micromanage wars in this way?

 

[Robin]

I would suggest that the contrary cannot be shown, so I would be unwilling to incorporate this as a premise in any version of the PoE.

But you will have to admit that your objection was invalid because instances of suffering cannot be individually and specifically necessary to the moral good of the response.

I have yet to see a reasonable objection to this argument.

 

[Krandal2]

So what you are saying is that when an earthquake happens, God ensures that a particular number are killed, a particular number are injured and their injuries are of a particular kind.

Does he also micromanage wars in this way?

If his universe is determined, than yes. Also plagues, genocide, and any other atrocity you care to imagine.

The point is that no particular instance of evil, no matter how horrific, can be shown to be an exception to the greater good.

In order to do so we would have to demonstrate the absolute effects of said "evil" event, which is impossible.

 

[Robin]

If his universe is determined, than yes. Also plagues, genocide, and any other atrocity you care to imagine.

The point is that no particular instance of evil, no matter how horrific, can be shown to be an exception to the greater good.

In order to do so we would have to demonstrate the absolute effects of said "evil" event, which is impossible.

OK, I will add that one to the countless contradictory versions of God that people believe in.

 

[Krandal2]

...

 

[Bri]

In any case the conclusion is simple common sense. Does anybody believe that an earthquake had to be in just that place and just that severity and just that number of casualties in order to affect some greater good? That one less casualty would have prevented the good from happening?

Surely nobody is seriously suggesting that?

To make the claim you made, you would have to prove that a particular earthquake could have been elsewhere or of a different severity and have added just as much "good" to the world (or more). I don't think you can prove that, but you're welcome to try.

-Bri

 

[ceo_esq]

But you will have to admit that your objection was invalid because instances of suffering cannot be individually and specifically necessary to the moral good of the response.

I have yet to see a reasonable objection to this argument.

Let me say two things. First, when I spoke of a person's response to suffering, my primary motivation was to object to the notion that inaction could be the moral response, because it seemed to me that whatever good was intended to be realized by the suffering in the first place (regardless of whether that good was somehow bound up with the response or opportunity for response), the total amount of actualized goodness would be greater if the bystander responds compassionately than if he does not. I was not really focusing on such questions as:

Does it have to be Mr A? Would Mr B's suffering afford a poorer quality of moral behaviour? Or would Mr B do just as well?

Would Mr Y's behaviour be less moral if Mr A suffered just a little less or a little more?

But now that you've posed them, I submit that we don't know the answer to your questions.

1. It is logically possible that Mr. B's suffering would provoke a different moral outcome than Mr. A's.

2. Imagine that we were able to plot a graph of overall goodness brought about as a function of the degree of Mr. A's suffering. It is intuitively plausible that the plotted curve could have a single highest point on it. I can't logically exclude the possibility that net goodness (whether bound up in Mr. Y's response, the requirements of justice, or something else) is negatively affected if we move off of that point and Mr. A suffers just a bit more or a bit less. Even if I could foresee all of the consequences, I have no knowledge that would permit me to weigh the intrinsic value of virtue (or some other good) versus that of suffering.

I have no way of determining whether suffering is individually and specifically necessary to either (i) the moral good of the response or (ii) any other moral good possibly occasioned by the suffering.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

This is what I mean about unavoidable suffering. The following is a hypothesis only:

People have asked: why couldn't we eliminate the suffering from earthquakes by having a planet to live on where there are no earthquakes? This is a good example, because it can show what I mean by logically unavoidable suffering for the greater good. There's a reason why there are earthquakes on this planet, but no earthquakes on Mars. The Earth is still geologically active partially because it is bigger than mars, but this is not the primary reason. The primary reason is because Earth has a much higher proportion of heavy radioactive elements in it's core in proportion to it's size. There is a reason for this, too. The Earth-Moon system was created by the collision of two planets. The moon is made of the lightest bits that were ejected furthest from the collision zone and the Earth is made from the cores of both planets plus whatever was left over. So we got a double dose of the heavy stuff. This is also why there is so much iron on Earth and why the planet has such a large iron/nickel core. Why does this matter? It matters because life on earth is absolutely dependent on that disproportionately large iron-nickel core because it is the reason why the Earth has a powerful-enough magnetic field to deflect the solar wind and prevent life on earth from being frazzled with solar radiation. We need that magnetic field, so we need the massive iron/nickel core and there is no way to end up with a massive iron/nickel core without ending up with the radioactive elements which cause that core to heat up, inevitably resulting in earthquakes, volcanoes and tsunamis at the surface.

 

[Z]

This is what I mean about unavoidable suffering. The following is a hypothesis only:

People have asked: why couldn't we eliminate the suffering from earthquakes by having a planet to live on where there are no earthquakes? This is a good example, because it can show what I mean by logically unavoidable suffering for the greater good. There's a reason why there are earthquakes on this planet, but no earthquakes on Mars. The Earth is still geologically active partially because it is bigger than mars, but this is not the primary reason. The primary reason is because Earth has a much higher proportion of heavy radioactive elements in it's core in proportion to it's size. There is a reason for this, too. The Earth-Moon system was created by the collision of two planets. The moon is made of the lightest bits that were ejected furthest from the collision zone and the Earth is made from the cores of both planets plus whatever was left over. So we got a double dose of the heavy stuff. This is also why there is so much iron on Earth and why the planet has such a large iron/nickel core. Why does this matter? It matters because life on earth is absolutely dependent on that disproportionately large iron-nickel core because it is the reason why the Earth has a powerful-enough magnetic field to deflect the solar wind and prevent life on earth from being frazzled with solar radiation. We need that magnetic field, so we need the massive iron/nickel core and there is no way to end up with a massive iron/nickel core without ending up with the radioactive elements which cause that core to heat up, inevitably resulting in earthquakes, volcanoes and tsunamis at the surface.

That sounds like a good theory. Certainly, we don't seem to have examples of radiation-resistant life forms that can thrive on a planet without the magnetic field.

On the other hand, if we're talking about a God (as many Christians, et. al. do) who can deliberately cause certain events, why can't we conceive of a planet with strong magnetic fields, but no tectonic activity? Or of a star whose radiation is not harmful to life forms (as we know them)?

This is where the problem of evil comes to play. If God the Creator is a being with will, intent, and purpose, and has (within logical limits) infinite powers to create, why would he not simply create a world without tectonic activity, deliberately seeded with intelligent life? Otherwise, the god in question is no different from the mindless forces of physics and laws of nature... and is therefore irrelevant (from a theological standpoint).

In other words, the problem of evil asks why, if God is capable of doing so, can't He make a world which sustains life without natural disasters. The answer you provide above is, He can't. Hence, he is unworthy of worship as a Supreme Being.

Heck, give mankind another million years or so, and we'll be engineering our OWN habitat worlds - without the natural disasters. (Yeah - instead we'll get power failures, shoddy workmanship, decaying orbits, etc... )

 

[UndercoverElephant]

On the other hand, if we're talking about a God (as many Christians, et. al. do) who can deliberately cause certain events, why can't we conceive of a planet with strong magnetic fields, but no tectonic activity?

If we are talking about the God of naive Christianity, then you might as well ask why he didn't just create utopia in the first place. (Hold on. He did, didn't he! Then humans, according to the story, "ate from the tree of knowledge" and screwed everything up. This is an aside....)

I am not talking about the God of naive Christianity. I pretty much rejected that concept in the opening post. But I answered your question anyway. I am saying that reason such a thing cannot exist is that it is not possible to have a logically consistent space-time Universe where there is a planet which supports life but doesn't have earthquakes, for the reasons I just gave.

Or of a star whose radiation is not harmful to life forms (as we know them)?

Again, there are only a limited number of logically consistent possible universes. Some of those very same "harmful radiations" are not deflected by the magnetic field, but absorbed by ozone. Those radiations are implicated in kick-starting life at the very beginning, but they would kill nearyl everything now which is why we need the ozone layer (which was created later out of oxygen, only made available by plants).

Engineering utopias isn't so easy. Any reality, in order to exist, must be able to be logically coherent. My argument implies that this is the best possible world. Did you ever meet Franko?

 

[Z]

Never had that misfortune, no. However, I disagree... I feel certain we could easily engineer a 'better possible world'.

For example, if God is in full control of all constants and variables, there is no reason God could not have created a perfect possible world without any natural disasters whatsoever. And if we're talking about 'logically coherent', there's really no room there for a God anyway...

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Never had that misfortune, no. However, I disagree... I feel certain we could easily engineer a 'better possible world'.

For example, if God is in full control of all constants and variables, there is no reason God could not have created a perfect possible world without any natural disasters whatsoever.

So you keep saying. But you can only justify it in generalised terms of "God is so powerful, I'm sure he could do it...." without looking at the details of my explanation as to why it may well be impossible.

And if we're talking about 'logically coherent', there's really no room there for a God anyway...

Don't confuse your own cognitive limitations with what is is possible in reality.