Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[fls]

I see. The probablity that few are concerned with existing morality as they understand it makes it probable that Harris' proposals should be mandated by the elite like yourself who do take Harris seriously.

No, it's the opposite. I'm treating it as more of a non sequitur.

Since neither of us care, who is supposed to?

Those who are affected by the experience.

Do you blindly prescribe aspirin regimens for patients?

Yes, but how can that be relevant?

The only thing that indicates is that those with the gold make the rules. You seem to think all agree the fertility tech is "moral"; some don't agree.

Are you talking about objections based on whether it follows religious rules (i.e. pretend morals) or about objections based on properties of fertility tech?

As to needless suffering, why aren't those resources being directed to help existing babies in great need?

This seems very much like a 'false dichotomy'.

Especially since the actual moral questions involved remain in dispute.

Religious rules seem to dispute the use of human embryos, but as a moral question, it seems relatively straightforward.

Tell me again where and over what time-span we are looking for suffering, pleasure, autonomy, etc., and why we "ought" to be?

Whatever is relevant to our moral question.

So what?

Exactly.

I do agree that few moral dilemmas appear related to liver transplants; just more gold makes the rules.

How so?

Linda

 

[fls]

That dances around the central point - by what empirical basis do you determine that an experience should or should not be experienced?

Is there a choice to be made between getting hit on the head with a hammer or not?

Invoking "moral intuition" hardly nails down anything resembling an answer free of bias does it?

I agree. Hence the suggestion to dump morals based on some sort of consensus of moral intuitions.

Linda

 

[fls]

That health example includes a non-science value judgement. How would science begin to determine which properties have the greatest import without starting with some moral axiom?

It doesn't. For example, quality adjusted life years came about because it is observed that years of life have different values depending upon functional status, pain/discomfort, disease, etc. This is very much observation-driven, rather than something referred to as axiom-driven. As has been pointed out, "axioms" are a philosophical concept which really has no use in science, and attempting to shoehorn observations into axioms only really ensures that you end up with something quite wrong.

I would agree with your assessment, but not for any scientific reasons. So we determine an ape feels less sorrow than a rat. What's the empirical reason for putting a value on sorrow?

Do you think that our value for sorrow would be different if it was observed that sorrow is a state of mind that is preferentially sought and is associated with gain? That is, could our perception of 'sorrow' have anything to do with observations about how we feel when experiencing sorrow and what external events it is associated with?

How does science determine that it's okay to test our drugs on the rat?

Would this be altered by discovering, contrary to what we think now, that rats have the same kinds of thought processes as humans with a rich inner life full of sorrow, schadenfreude, elation, relief, etc.?

As far as persons being treated as indistinguishable, that may the case (and hopefully is) in our modern, western society, but it's not always been the case and probably still isn't in some parts of the world. Sure, science can determine that we're genetically all very similar, but we're not culturally. How does science tell us that we should treat all people the same?

It tells us whether we can be distinguished in ways that are relevant to the question. It generally means that people are indistinguishable until they vary in ways that are relevant.

How does science determine what we should class as "benefit" without assuming a moral axiom? What's the empirical basis for why we should care about suffering?

I can see that medical research would grind to a stop under your watch.

Linda

 

[JJM 777]

Religious rules seem to dispute the use of human embryos, but as a moral question, it seems relatively straightforward.

Sounds like we will have a good practical example for discussion here, if you explain to us, and thus subject for peer review:
a) what, why and how is straightforward about the use of:
a1) human sperm or egg cells
a2) human embryos
a3) human healthy fetuses
a4) human fetuses with serious health disorders
a5) human healthy early born babies
a6) human newborn babies with serious health disorders
a7) human late term unborn babies (older than earliest born babies)
a8) human healthy children
a9) human children with serious health disorders
a10) human adults
a11) human braindead with body still alive in coma
a12) human dead bodies

 

[cyborg]

Is there a choice to be made between getting hit on the head with a hammer or not?

I don't know - this isn't a question of determinism.

I just want you to tell me how science can empirically tell me whether or not I should be hit on the head with a hammer - I'm saying it can't, it can only deal with things like the effect of doing so.

I agree. Hence the suggestion to dump morals based on some sort of consensus of moral intuitions.

I am left again wondering how empirical inquiry is going to help when what you are describing is just what people have been doing ever since they formed societies.

 

[fls]

Sounds like we will have a good practical example for discussion here, if you explain to us, and thus subject for peer review:
a) what, why and how is straightforward about the use of:
a1) human sperm or egg cells
a2) human embryos
a3) human healthy fetuses
a4) human fetuses with serious health disorders
a5) human healthy early born babies
a6) human newborn babies with serious health disorders
a7) human late term unborn babies (older than earliest born babies)
a8) human healthy children
a9) human children with serious health disorders
a10) human adults
a11) human braindead with body still alive in coma
a12) human dead bodies

I don't understand what you are asking.

Linda

 

[fls]

I don't know - this isn't a question of determinism.

I just want you to tell me how science can empirically tell me whether or not I should be hit on the head with a hammer - I'm saying it can't, it can only deal with things like the effect of doing so.

Are you saying that there's no way to suggest that you choose to live or die?

I am left again wondering how empirical inquiry is going to help when what you are describing is just what people have been doing ever since they formed societies.

Well, blood-letting went on for centuries before someone got the bright idea of applying the scientific method to the process of medicine. And people by and large embrace effective treatments, although one wonders why given that we are apparently obliged to pretend that we don't care whether we succumb or not.

Linda

 

[AlBell]

Nope, no unanswered moral questions there on JJM's list.

Although I guess we understand why stating publically that everything on the list is fair game to cut & dice as needed to further medical research isn't a position one would take lightly ... in public.

 

[fls]

Nope, no unanswered moral questions there on JJM's list.

Although I guess we understand why stating publically that everything on the list is fair game to cut & dice as needed to further medical research isn't a position one would take lightly ... in public.

Is that what he was asking?

Linda

 

[cyborg]

Are you saying that there's no way to suggest that you choose to live or die?

I'm sorry - I just don't understand the question.

Well, blood-letting went on for centuries before someone got the bright idea of applying the scientific method to the process of medicine.

Yet again I don't see how this is analogous: there's no discernible difference between asking me what my moral thoughts are and observing the mechanism my brain uses to generate them assuming I am not being deceptive. What people think is responsible for morality is not the topic of discussion here and is largely irrelevant to the question.

So: what part of the scientific method is at all useful in obtaining a "consensus of moral intuition"? How is that different to what people have just being doing ever since they started living socially - that is forming a consensus of moral intuition by just interacting with each other? I fail to see what benefit confirming that, oh yes, the way this piece of brain operates in this person under these circumstances will indeed lead to this moral decision is going to have in persuading people that this particular person's moral decision under these circumstances is the right one to make.

In short please just actually say how one is supposed to use science to decide that for a given moral situation a given moral decision is "right".

 

[fls]

Yet again I don't see how this is analogous: there's no discernible difference between asking me what my moral thoughts are and observing the mechanism my brain uses to generate them assuming I am not being deceptive. What people think is responsible for morality is not the topic of discussion here and is largely irrelevant to the question.

Exactly.

So: what part of the scientific method is at all useful in obtaining a "consensus of moral intuition"?

It's not. I thought I said we should dump the idea of using consensus.

In short please just actually say how one is supposed to use science to decide that for a given moral situation a given moral decision is "right".

Well, one would have to actually admit that we distinguish between getting hit on the head with a hammer, or not. Or using the health analogy, that we should use effective treatments. But this is clearly not an option.

Linda

 

[cyborg]

It's not. I thought I said we should dump the idea of using consensus.

Then I don't understand what you are proposing at all.

Well, one would have to actually admit that we distinguish between getting hit on the head with a hammer, or not.

What?

Or using the health analogy, that we should use effective treatments. But this is clearly not an option.

Again - what?

What is an effective "moral treatment"?

Assume I am stupid - I just don't understand what your point is as to the relevance of the scientific method to morality.

 

[Egg]

Well, one would have to actually admit that we distinguish between getting hit on the head with a hammer, or not. Or using the health analogy, that we should use effective treatments. But this is clearly not an option.

It strikes me that this pretty much matches the argument that Sam Harris puts forward - i.e. take an example where the majority (if not all) the listeners/readers would agree and use that agreement to suggest that science has answered the is/ought problem.

Sure, people generally don't want to suffer or die, but while we could probably confirm this to be the case using the scientific method, we can't determine whether they are right not to want to suffer. We can use this idea as a starting assumption, but that is inserting a moral axiom, however obvious that particular axiom may appear to be.

If someone put forward the idea that sometimes the wisdom of strength gained was more valuable than the suffering that led to it, that's not a value that the tools of science can show to be incorrect.

This isn't a case of pretending we don't care about suffering, it's merely a matter of recognising that such cares do not come from using the scientific method.

 

[fls]

It strikes me that this pretty much matches the argument that Sam Harris puts forward - i.e. take an example where the majority (if not all) the listeners/readers would agree and use that agreement to suggest that science has answered the is/ought problem.

Except, of course, that Harris and I have specifically stated otherwise - that if you are interpreting our words in that way, you have misunderstood. Except that it's obviously no longer a matter of misinterpretation, as that would imply that one reasonable interpretation of the words "consensus does not imply something is true"* is "consensus does imply something is true". We are almost up to 2000 posts where posters insist that Harris is saying something that he very specifically denies saying. It is interesting to watch how his words, and mine, are completely ignored in favor of pretending that this is a different argument.

Sure, people generally don't want to suffer or die, but while we could probably confirm this to be the case using the scientific method, we can't determine whether they are right not to want to suffer. We can use this idea as a starting assumption, but that is inserting a moral axiom, however obvious that particular axiom may appear to be.

Exactly. So as Harris and I have suggested, don't do it.

If someone put forward the idea that sometimes the wisdom of strength gained was more valuable than the suffering that led to it, that's not a value that the tools of science can show to be incorrect.

Why not?

For example, if we reduce the suffering a mother feels over the loss of her child by providing medication which obviates those feelings, it may have the effect of prolonging the grieving process. This is information obtained from scientific research.

This isn't a case of pretending we don't care about suffering, it's merely a matter of recognising that such cares do not come from using the scientific method.

Exactly.

Linda

*"The deeper issue, however, is that truth has nothing, in principle, to do with consensus: one person can be right, and everyone else can be wrong. *Consensus is a guide to discovering what is going on in the world, but that is all that*it is. *Its presence or absence in no way constrains what may or may not be true." page 30 of The Moral Landscape

 

[Jono]

This is Sam Harris at TED. Can science answer moral questions? Does Sam Harris even answer that question in this talk?

What do you think?

I believe it can enlighten the issue of the how's, what and why's of morality. In itself it would be without any preference in its answer, if answered coherently, because the inference of preference is something "that which is" is indifferent to. So, I say yes, but I also happend to disagree with Sam quite a lot I've found out. Then again, never met a philosopher who could consistently agree with him/her self for long.

 

[Beth]

Except, of course, that Harris and I have specifically stated otherwise - that if you are interpreting our words in that way, you have misunderstood. Except that it's obviously no longer a matter of misinterpretation, as that would imply that one reasonable interpretation of the words "consensus does not imply something is true"* is "consensus does imply something is true". We are almost up to 2000 posts where posters insist that Harris is saying something that he very specifically denies saying. It is interesting to watch how his words, and mine, are completely ignored in favor of pretending that this is a different argument.

Actions speak louder than words. When someone makes statements denying they are doing something that others observe them doing, the denial doesn't carry as much weight as the observation. In this case, the 'action' is the argument that is being made. Denying that your argument is based on a consensus of morality seems contradictory to observations made by the people disputing the denial.

Perhaps you could explain what why your 'hit on the head with a hammer' doesn't qualify as a consensus morality and what it is you are basing that obvious choice on instead. Then you would be explaining why your argument is not what it appears to be as opposed to simply denying what you appear to be doing.

Exactly. So as Harris and I have suggested, don't do it.

So what is being proposed instead if that isn't what you and Harris are suggesting? Because that is what your suggestions seem to be. I don't see the distinction between what you are suggesting and what you are denying your suggestion is.

This isn't a case of pretending we don't care about suffering, it's merely a matter of recognising that such cares do not come from using the scientific method.

Exactly.

If you agree that such cares do not come from the scientific method, that contradicts the argument that science can get an ought from an is, which is what you and Harris have been arguing.

 

[Paulhoff]

No comment on the nice picture of Hitler.

I have a lot more.............

Paul

 

[Paulhoff]

The real bottom line is fls, they are just way to complex for science to figure out.

Paul

 

[JJM 777]

A way to look at it:

Can science answer moral questions?

Can science answer any questions whatsoever?

Yes and no, and very similarly, if you compare these two thoughts above. If you ask science to tell what ought to be, you run in similar trouble in every possible topic, not just if the question is about a moral ought. If the question is about an ought how many grams a hammer should weigh.

 

[fls]

Then I don't understand what you are proposing at all.

What?

Again - what?

What is an effective "moral treatment"?

Assume I am stupid - I just don't understand what your point is as to the relevance of the scientific method to morality.

I realize that, but I honestly don't see how explaining it would alter the situation.

Linda