Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

This seems to relate to the extent to which we think various creatures can have experiences similar to those that are important to us - pain, pleasure, sorrow, etc.

That doesn't sound much like an empirical method of deciding that these experiences should or should not be experienced.
 
Actually, science can tell us everything there is to know about things that are subjective. For example, ice cream preferences are purely subjective. Tell me anything useful about ice cream preferences that science cannot (in principle, we may not have figured it out yet) tell us.

As annnoid has noted, this qualification is very telling.

Why haven't we "figured it out yet"? When will we "figure it out"?

Also...tell my anything even in principal MORE useful concerning individual humans' ardor for various types of ice cream that Science can answer better than these individuals saying "I like the taste of this ice cream!"

Science can figure out what happens when different people taste ice cream. They can assess ice cream preferences in the population. They may find correlations between ice cream preferences and mental states. They may be able to measure how much pleasure different people experience when they try different ice creams and tell us why some people like vanilla more than chocolate. They may be able to scan my brain and craft the ultimate ice cream flavor for me or tell me why and how much I will and won't like all flavors.

"can"
"may be able"
"may be able"

Various religions can also "may be able" to assign an objective component to ice cream taste, even if they can't yet.

There is nothing useful about something subjective that science cannot (at least in principle, we may not know yet) tell us. I think you'll find that anything that would actually be useful would necessarily be amenable to scientific study for precisely the same reason it would be useful. If it has effects, we can study them scientifically. If it has no effects, what difference does it make?

As I've said/asked before, show one moral question answered by Science that is scientifically indisputable. All the "in principle" and "may in the future" qualifications in the world are and should not convince any theist or atheist rationalist that Science can actually come up with a definitive answer.

Is scientific study of the brain and morality interesting? Could it possibly develop into groundbreaking, revolutionary territory? Sure. "In time" it could. This doesn't seem to be the time though.

Subjective properties are completely amenable to objective analysis and understanding. We can understand the input objectively, we can understand the process objectively, we can understand the output objectively. What is left that we can't understand scientifically? There is nothing beyond the input, the processing, and the output.

Okay. Declare an objective moral certitude with this, from input to processing to output. Obviously this declaration shouldn't rely on any subjective axioms, such as "well-being" being preferred.

KUKO 4000 said:

Uh...yeah. If I'm going to be convinced by some new morality, it needs to deliver NOW and be ironclad. Why would I or anyone go all-in on a moral system that is based around "coulds" "cans" and "in the future"s? It could be in 40 years Science does actually answer moral questions. It doesn't now though.

What does your brain and your experiences say about this picture without applying any scientific inquiry?



Here's the url in case the picture doesn't show up:

http://www.eyetricks.com/3401.jpg

The URL led me to some Kardashian sisters or something video so I immediately clicked it off. Sorry.
 
Paul/Linda/Joel,

As a morality based on science does not yet exist, which of the ethical systems based on axioms that do exist do you currently use to decide what the right thing to do is?

And Joel, given your "input, processing and output" comment, you may be interested in this wiki page, particularly the following section:

Emergent properties and processes

An emergent behavior or emergent property can appear when a number of simple entities (agents) operate in an environment, forming more complex behaviors as a collective. If emergence happens over disparate size scales, then the reason is usually a causal relation across different scales. In other words there is often a form of top-down feedback in systems with emergent properties.[4] The processes from which emergent properties result may occur in either the observed or observing system, and can commonly be identified by their patterns of accumulating change, most generally called 'growth'. Why emergent behaviours occur include: intricate causal relations across different scales and feedback, known as interconnectivity. The emergent property itself may be either very predictable or unpredictable and unprecedented, and represent a new level of the system's evolution. The complex behaviour or properties are not a property of any single such entity, nor can they easily be predicted or deduced from behaviour in the lower-level entities: they are irreducible. No physical property of an individual molecule of any gas would lead one to think that a large collection of them will transmit sound. The shape and behaviour of a flock of birds [1] or school of fish are also good examples.

One reason why emergent behaviour is hard to predict is that the number of interactions between components of a system increases combinatorially with the number of components, thus potentially allowing for many new and subtle types of behaviour to emerge. For example, the possible interactions between groups of molecules grows enormously with the number of molecules such that it is impossible for a computer to even list the arrangements for a system as small as 20 molecules.

...
 
That doesn't sound much like an empirical method of deciding that these experiences should or should not be experienced.

That description referred to which creatures potentially have these experiences, which could be gathered empirically. As to determining which properties are reflected in our moral intuitions, that is also information which can be gathered empirically. And then the consequences of choosing on these properties is also gathered empirically to some extent.

Linda
 
As annnoid has noted, this qualification is very telling.

Why haven't we "figured it out yet"? When will we "figure it out"?

I suspect ice cream flavor research has low priority. :)

However, I think we already use science to determine moral choices, we just don't identify it as such. For example, a lot of questions are answered by reference to health, our tendency to distinguish 'the other' on the basis of similarity of appearance or disgust turns out not to be so useful for selecting relevant characteristics, the products of pathophysiology are distinguished from the range of functional physiology, etc.

Linda
 
I'm not sure what you're getting at. I'm just pointing out very common arguments which take place in the public arena and here to some extent. If you have not encountered them, I'm surprised and a bit envious. However, it doesn't really matter - just like the presence of quack medicine does not serve to make medicine any more or less useful.
I see. The probablity that few are concerned with existing morality as they understand it makes it probable that Harris' proposals should be mandated by the elite like yourself who do take Harris seriously.


Couples with the strong desire to have a child who need the help medical advances provide. Woman killed or maimed for not wearing a burqa. We don't have to care, just like I don't have to care whether you die from a heart attack in order for an aspirin a day to effectively prevent that heart attack.
Since neither of us care, who is supposed to?

Do you blindly prescribe aspirin regimens for patients?


One good indicator is the value of the resources couples will put towards fertility technologies.
The only thing that indicates is that those with the gold make the rules. You seem to think all agree the fertility tech is "moral"; some don't agree.

As to needless suffering, why aren't those resources being directed to help existing babies in great need?


I don't know if that question has been posed in a study. I wanted you to think on it a bit and to hear some other opinions. My guess is that most people wouldn't make much of a distinction between them.
Especially since the actual moral questions involved remain in dispute.


Right...but it doesn't alter those properties we are looking for - suffering, pleasure, autonomy, etc.
Tell me again where and over what time-span we are looking for suffering, pleasure, autonomy, etc., and why we "ought" to be?

It's not like it's suddenly okay for people to die because we can perform liver transplants.
So what?

I do agree that few moral dilemmas appear related to liver transplants; just more gold makes the rules.
 
Last edited:
That description referred to which creatures potentially have these experiences, which could be gathered empirically. As to determining which properties are reflected in our moral intuitions, that is also information which can be gathered empirically. And then the consequences of choosing on these properties is also gathered empirically to some extent.

That dances around the central point - by what empirical basis do you determine that an experience should or should not be experienced?

Invoking "moral intuition" hardly nails down anything resembling an answer free of bias does it?
 
That description referred to which creatures potentially have these experiences, which could be gathered empirically. As to determining which properties are reflected in our moral intuitions, that is also information which can be gathered empirically. And then the consequences of choosing on these properties is also gathered empirically to some extent.

Linda
As has been pointed out a few times already, nobody is disagreeing that science can help us to determine the consequences of various choices. There seems to be some assumption here that once we know all the possible outcomes, we would all make the same choices, but this isn't always the case. Different values would lead to people making different choices, even if the consequences were precisely known.

The only way in which science tackles the is/ought issue in the case of having identified the consequences of choices, is if we insert a moral axiom (eg. well-being of conscious creatures is #1 priority). But it's precisely this moral axiom that we're asking science to find if we are going to claim to have solved the is/ought problem.
 
Can science tell us that needlessly increasing suffering should be generally considered as ethical priority number 1?
I think we would identify those properties which have the greatest import, like for health where quality adjusted life years give us more relevant information than just mortality.
That health example includes a non-science value judgement. How would science begin to determine which properties have the greatest import without starting with some moral axiom?

Can science give us a basis for ranking which persons or creatures we should assign more importance to reducing needless suffering, in cases where we need to make a choice?
This seems to relate to the extent to which we think various creatures can have experiences similar to those that are important to us - pain, pleasure, sorrow, etc. This is reflected in the ethical guidelines for the treatment of animals in research, where we are careless about undergraduate labs using fruit flies, but have stricter requirements for the use of rats and very rigid criteria for primates. Persons are generally treated as indistinguishable.
I would agree with your assessment, but not for any scientific reasons. So we determine an ape feels less sorrow than a rat. What's the empirical reason for putting a value on sorrow? How does science determine that it's okay to test our drugs on the rat?

As far as persons being treated as indistinguishable, that may the case (and hopefully is) in our modern, western society, but it's not always been the case and probably still isn't in some parts of the world. Sure, science can determine that we're genetically all very similar, but we're not culturally. How does science tell us that we should treat all people the same?

How does science tell us what classifies as "needless"?
No benefit is derived or benefit could be obtained without the suffering.
How does science determine what we should class as "benefit" without assuming a moral axiom? What's the empirical basis for why we should care about suffering?
 
Last edited:
How does science determine what we should class as "benefit" without assuming a moral axiom? What's the empirical basis for why we should care about suffering?

Do you know that “science” is a tool and people use it. Science is not a thing unto itself.

Paul

:) :) :)
 
Do you know that “science” is a tool and people use it. Science is not a thing unto itself.

Paul

:) :) :)
Of course. And the same could be said for the title of this thread. "Science" does get used more broadly in the English language though (see WP). If my wording is potentially misleading, allow me to clarify by a minor rephrase of the question:

How would we use the scientific method to determine what we should class as "benefit" without assuming a moral axiom?
 
Do you know that “science” is a tool and people use it. Science is not a thing unto itself.

Paul

:) :) :)

The scientific method is a tool, but Science is a discipline, a pursuit, a project, a body of knowledge ... not precisely defined, I admit, but a thing nevertheless.

That knowledge, of course, does not and cannot include the Knowledge of Right and Wrong in a Biblical sense. Which Sam Harris apparently fails to grasp (unless he's just attention-seeking, in which case he wouldn't care).
 
How would we use the scientific method to determine what we should class as "benefit" without assuming a moral axiom?

A good day for the lions is a bad day for the zebra ... so where, indeed, is the benefit?

I never argue with people's axioms, once they admit that's what they are. I take note of their axioms for future reference in my dealings with them, but otherwise I leave it there.

I never get drawn on my own axioms, of course :). That would be far too revealing.
 
Which Sam Harris apparently fails to grasp (unless he's just attention-seeking, in which case he wouldn't care).
Just attention-seeking? No other motives? I will believe that when the book is available for free online.
 
I accidentally unsubscribed to this thread and forgot about my last post until I was looking through my old ones. Kevin had taken the time to reply with some good ideas so I figured that the objective, scientifically moral thing to do would be reply despite the time expired. (March 10th) My brain did need a break from this topic and I'm fresssshhh.

I think Harris would point to religious ideas of good and bad as counterexamples to that claim. A lot of those ideas seem clearly counterproductive if the goal is the well-being of conscious creatures, yet people care a lot about them.

I would argue that they thought they were in alignment with the highest form of well-being due to their supernatural distortions. For example, if you think that God's well-being and happiness is all-important and earthy suffering leads to heavenly well-being there's nothing you won't do for him no matter how painful or destructive the actions are to conscious creatures on earth.

I'm not even sure about that. I think that I'd point to Peter Singer and the animal liberation movement as a counterexample there. Scientists were busily torturing animals for decades before Singer led the charge to get people to believe that the wellbeing of non-human conscious beings mattered.

I disagree but that's a really good point. I would argue that people who enjoy or don't care about the suffering of animals are demonstrably disturbed, it's a factor in diagnosing psychopaths. You could objectively say that it matters because being callous towards suffering causes the species to become callous towards itself. That's kind of a simplistic argument that could be elaborated upon and clarified but you see where I'm going.

Similarly the appalling state of much of the Third World isn't a scientific problem - the world has more than enough food to feed everyone, and more than enough industrial capability to give everyone in the world clean water, basic medical care, mosquito netting and so forth. Science can make it easier to fix those problems without making any real sacrifices, but another solution would be to persuade people they should make some sacrifices.

But the fact is that poverty persists because of corruption and religion. It's not the only cause, but if Canada suddenly became the leader of the NWO, everyone had their belief systems reset, and all of the corrupt people dropped dead for some reason the situation would be remedied pretty fast. The reason those people keep their power is lies about reality that their followers believe, whether they are conscious frauds or not. The lie is that there isn't a better way to conduct themselves in order to achieve objective well-being for all. It's knowing facts about reality that would make the difference. Perhaps convincing people through philosophy would be worthwhile but I would argue that exposing the lies and illuminating the facts about reality should technically be enough.

Really? What is he saying that, say, Singer and Parfit and maybe Rawls haven't said before?

I wouldn't know. I was already thinking in this way before TML and I've heard parallel ideas before. The neuroscience arguments and comparison to religion's search for well-being were two fresh perspectives I hadn't thought deeply about.

I still keep an open mind, I intend to read a lot more about this in the future, including the posts I missed. I'm sure that the Dawkins/Harris event based on TML will generate more interest and new debate. It's on the 12th and will be posted online shortly after.
 
Last edited:
This doesn't present any fundamental limitation, it just shows why some problems are very, very hard.

It's irrelevant anyway - you can't extract "the" moral truth from observing an individual brain's moral processing - only "a" moral truth for that particular brain.

Really, I don't see what advantage this "scientific" analysis of brain function has over just seeing how people behave and drawing conclusions from that. It still won't tell you which behaviours are scientifically "right".
 

Back
Top Bottom