Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[Kevin_Lowe]

Big deal. Science starts with "ought" statements: We "ought" to value evidence. We "ought" to prefer hypotheses which explain the most observations with the fewest assumptions. We "ought" to value theories with proven predictive power. We "ought" to strive to understand the rules by which the universe operates.

"Ought statements" in that context refers solely to moral "ought statements". "You ought to be nice to your little sister" etc.

Science starts with the observation that applying those methods yields more predictive power than alternative methods. It does not make any moral judgment about them.

Scientific ethics, which is a different beast to science, does generally hold that it is ethical to do good science and unethical to do bad science.

And why?

I believe it's the same fundamental "ought" which Harris proposes: to benefit sentience, and especially human sentience. Why is it important to understand that food crops grow best in a temperature range which returns at roughly the same time and lasts roughly the same portion of every year? To improve our ability to reliably feed ourselves. Why is it important to understand that eating that plant nourishes, while eating this plant kills? The knowledge benefits those who choose which plants to eat. Why should we try to understand the world around us, rather than simply attempting to appease imaginary gods which direct its seemingly capricious unfolding?

Because it's good for us.

You and Piggy are both just utilitarians claiming to be scientists. You've snuck in the unstated premise that it is morally good for humans to be happy and flourishing, which is not a scientific premise at all. Then you argue from there.

There's nothing wrong with that, as long as you understand what you are doing. There is no other way to get to supported moral claims, in fact.

The is-ought problem is irrelevant to what I believe Harris is proposing. Get me Hume on the phone, and ask him to tell me why we ought to know what is. The ought-is problem supercedes his. We start with "ought", and all of our actions (and especially the pursuit of science) proceed from that.

Yeah, this is just utilitarianism trying to position itself as the one, true fundamental moral system. It's not science.

 

[Piggy]

As Earthborn and I have already said, if you've found a way around the is/ought problem you'll be the first person in history to do so.



Now you're helping yourself to the unstated moral premise that satisfying human preferences is morally good. That's not a scientific premise, it's a moral one pulled out of thin air.

As moral premises to pull out of thin air it's not a bad one though. It's flawed but there are much worse ones you could have gone for.



Same trick again. You are hiding the moral premise that satisfying the preferences of such creatures is morally good, and then claiming that your whole position is based on purely factual premises.



That can only happen if the people involved have already agreed on at least one non-scientific, moral premise.

Without that moral premise to start off with you can pile facts as high as you like without ever getting to a moral conclusion.

I don't believe Harris was proposing -- and I don't intend to either -- that there is a purely scientific approach to working through all moral issues.

What he does seem to be saying -- and I agree -- is that there is no reason to exclude science from any part of the process, including deciding among basic precepts.

Take the issue of whether we're better off organizing our societies in a way which ensures happiness and thriving for the broadest spectrum of persons, or whether we should instead encourage social orders in which a few live in comfort and happiness while the majority live in general misery.

You could take a completely non-scientific view of that question, of course.

You could take, say, a religious view, citing scriptures which contend that those born into the ruling families are blessed by the gods for good acts in prior lives, while others are being cursed for evil acts in prior lives.

You could take a purely selfish point of view, eschewing all attempts at reason or evidence and say simply, well, I'm among the powerful so screw everybody else.

You could claim that your tradition tells you that other races or tribes aren't quite human, so they don't actually feel pain like you do, don't grieve over dead children like you do, can't be educated, and so forth, so it's perfectly fine to enslave them.

That sort of thing.

But we also have the option of using a scientifically informed approach. And if we do, we'll come to the conclusion that we all have similar brains and nervous systems; that those scriptures have no basis in fact; that there are benefits even to the ruling classes if there are not extreme differences in conditions between them and the poor; that humans are more psychologically fit when they develop empathy; and so on and so forth.

In other words, science can have something to say about the matter. And not just after you've picked your premises arbitrarily or to suit yourself.

I think that's what his argument essentially comes down to -- that it's an error to say that science really isn't or can't be involved in moral issues at all levels.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

But we also have the option of using a scientifically informed approach. And if we do, we'll come to the conclusion that we all have similar brains and nervous systems; that those scriptures have no basis in fact; that there are benefits even to the ruling classes if there are not extreme differences in conditions between them and the poor; that humans are more psychologically fit when they develop empathy; and so on and so forth.

In other words, science can have something to say about the matter. And not just after you've picked your premises arbitrarily or to suit yourself.

But hang on, why is it better for humans to be "psychologically fit"? Why is it better for there to be more equal societies?

Science can tell us how to bring about such things. It can tell us in factual terms what the consequences of such things will be.

It cannot tell us whether we ought to bring about such things. To do that you need to bring in some non-factual premise to the effect that X is morally preferable to Y.

 

[Piggy]

But just because "human beings as a species prefer" something does not make it "good." For example, human beings as a species prefer not being shot, but desertion in the face of the enemy is still immoral,.... to the point that armies will punish it with death.

The idea that "it is sweet and seemly to die for one's country" (yes, I do know it in the original Latin, why do you ask) is a statement that a particular behavior is moral despite being exactly what human beings as a species do not prefer.

The moral code you outline above -- whatever people like is good, or more tersely, pleasure is good -- is one moral theory. It has the name "hedonism." There are lots of other moral theories that are not hedonism, such as deontology.

Feel free to prove "scientifically" that hedonism is "correct."

You won't be able to.

Why would you think I would ask you about the Latin?

In any case, it's a good example, because of course we have Owen's brilliant response on the other side.

Is it sweet and fitting to die for one's country?

Sometimes.

Does science have anything to say about when it is and when it ain't?

Well, yeah, as it turns out, it does.

We can use a scientifically informed view of history and psychology to better understand under what circumstances human beings are likely to deem it proper to sacrifice themselves or to lose loved ones in the national interest, and what the consequences are of pusing people beyond those limits and forcing sacrifices which people deem bitter and unfitting.

And we can use that to inform policy. That is, to answer moral questions about how to wage war.

Will our answers be better if we include scientific inquiry than if we exclude it? There's every reason to think that, yes, they will be.

Of course, you're never going to get everyone to accept that, especially when it comes to religion and power.

You're always going to have people who say, for instance, that their scriptures have the answer to thus-and-such a question, and science is either of the Devil or a fraud or something like that. And you're always going to have people who say, well, I don't care what the science has to say about this issue, I'm doing whatever I want because I can and it's in my interest.

But this is no different from any other field of endeavor. So that shouldn't stop us from using science to answer moral questions, to solve moral problems, even to establish moral premises.

 

[Piggy]

But hang on, why is it better for humans to be "psychologically fit"? Why is it better for there to be more equal societies?

Science can tell us how to bring about such things. It can tell us in factual terms what the consequences of such things will be.

It cannot tell us whether we ought to bring about such things. To do that you need to bring in some non-factual premise to the effect that X is morally preferable to Y.

Of course it can tell us why we ought to bring about such things.

Or, to be more accurate, it can help us to answer the question of whether we should or should not.

Science can help us to predict potential outcomes, to understand why we want what we want (e.g. why extended confinement and isolation causes stress to a calf but not to a rockfish), and so forth.

And it can help us remove the question of "Why is it better?" from the black hole of pure relativism and provide some more concrete answers, such as "It is better because evolution has shaped us so that we want it and we thrive when we get it, and thwarting it has eventual repurcussions which serve up consequences that evolution has shaped us to dislike."

Science can also help us with thorny conflicts, such as when the "we want" part clashes with long-term thriving.

Of course, evolution produces maladaptations as well, so that, for instance, we get people like Larry Bittaker and Dean Corll who simply get off on watching other people suffer. They're going to come to their own conclusions, and that's just the way it is.

But for the rest of us, science does indeed have something to say about why psychological fitness is preferable to trauma, and why the benefits of more equal societies are to be preferred over those of highly polarized ones.

I simply don't see any place in the process of moral reasoning where it's justifiable to build a wall of exlusion to the participation of science, and to declare "There be dragons".

 

[bluskool]

"Ought statements" in that context refers solely to moral "ought statements". "You ought to be nice to your little sister" etc.

Science starts with the observation that applying those methods yields more predictive power than alternative methods. It does not make any moral judgment about them.

Scientific ethics, which is a different beast to science, does generally hold that it is ethical to do good science and unethical to do bad science.

That's right. Scientific ethics assumes that we want to have productive science. Similarly, Harris's assumption is that we want human beings to flourish. Harris is saying that all sciences have assumptions at the heart of them and he wants this "scientific morality" to start with this "flourishing" assumption. After reading his rebuttal, it doesn't seem like a bad argument. But I'm of two minds on this issue.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

That's right. Scientific ethics assumes that we want to have productive science. Similarly, Harris's assumption is that we want human beings to flourish. Harris is saying that all sciences have assumptions at the heart of them and he wants this "scientific morality" to start with this "flourishing" assumption. After reading his rebuttal, it doesn't seem like a bad argument. But I'm of two minds on this issue.

That "flourishing" assumption is just utilitarianism. It beats me how Harris managed to stagger through a philosophy degree without picking up that point but maybe he skipped ethics.

Once you figure that out, Harris' point is utterly banal. The fact that science is useful to utilitarianism is not news and never has been news.

Of course it can tell us why we ought to bring about such things.

Or, to be more accurate, it can help us to answer the question of whether we should or should not.

Science can help us to predict potential outcomes, to understand why we want what we want (e.g. why extended confinement and isolation causes stress to a calf but not to a rockfish), and so forth.

Those are brute facts, not moral judgments.

"If I shoot you with this gun you will be in pain, and experience terror, and then die" is a factual claim.

It has absolutely no moral content until you pair it up with some kind of non-evidence-based moral claim, such as "you should not cause pain" or "you should not frustrate a person's preferences by killing them".

"Extended isolation causes a calf or a human infant stress" is a factual claim. It has no moral content until you pair it up with some kind of non-evidence-based moral claim, such as "you should not cause stress".

Science can only tell you what the outcomes will be as a matter of brute fact. It cannot tell you which outcome you should prefer from a moral perspective until and unless you establish some criteria for which outcomes are morally preferable.

Science cannot establish those criteria. It can only tell you what actions will bring about situations that meet those criteria.

And it can help us remove the question of "Why is it better?" from the black hole of pure relativism and provide some more concrete answers, such as "It is better because evolution has shaped us so that we want it and we thrive when we get it, and thwarting it has eventual repurcussions which serve up consequences that evolution has shaped us to dislike."

Before you were being a utilitarian, and utilitarianism is a fairly useful moral theory. It's imperfect but it's pretty decent.

Whereas now you're wallowing in the Naturalistic Fallacy. Something is not better just because we have evolved to like it. We've evolved to like kidnapping women from neighbouring tribes and raping them, yet rape is almost universally held to be immoral. We've evolved to like hitting people who annoy us in the face, but that too is generally held to be immoral.

You can't pick and choose some evolved preferences as moral preferences, and some as immoral preferences, without first adopting some kind of non-evidence-based moral assumptions.

Of course, evolution produces maladaptations as well, so that, for instance, we get people like Larry Bittaker and Dean Corll who simply get off on watching other people suffer. They're going to come to their own conclusions, and that's just the way it is.

It's not a maladaption from an evolutionary perspective unless and until it limits their chances of passing on their genes.

Personally, I hold moral views such that I think that behaviour is immoral regardless of whether it helps or hinders the transmission of their genes.

I simply don't see any place in the process of moral reasoning where it's justifiable to build a wall of exlusion to the participation of science, and to declare "There be dragons".

You and Harris, it seems to me, are both making the same fundamental error and attacking the same straw man.

The straw man is the imaginary position that holds that nothing science says can ever be relevant to moral evaluations. That position is straightforwardly daft if you give any weight to consequences at all, and almost all sane people place at least some weight on consequences when evaluating the morality of an action. (Kant would not do so, but Kant was a bit nutty that way).

The fundamental error is sneaking in utilitarianism (broadly, utilitarianism is the position that "good" is maximising desirable outcomes) without acknowledging it as a non-evidence-based moral assumption, and then claiming that your utilitarian moral philosophy is purely scientific with no non-evidence-based moral assumptions at all.

That just makes you a confused utilitarian, and a bad scientist. It's greatly preferable to be an honest utilitarian and a good scientist - at least according to my non-evidence-based moral assumptions.

 

[Democracy Simulator]

I see you pulled a so-called god out of your hat, when did he say anything about a so-called god being needed for Values or Facts.

Paul

He didn't. Sam Harris' statement about Values/Facts is a proscriptive moral premise, much in the way that the 'God' statement is a proscriptive moral premise. Neither position of which can you arrive at through science.
The confusing thing about Harris' statement is that it is a moral premise masquerading somewhat as a definition. It is certainly not an adequate definition!

A definition of 'Values' might be along the lines of, 'Beliefs concerning how humans ought to behave'.

Note a definition doesn't tell us what those values should be.

The chief problem with Harris' entire presentation is that when he uses the word values, he equivocates between the definition of values and what values ought to be. I am surprised that he intends to release a whole argument which seems to be based largely on a fallacy of equivocation. No wonder he thinks he's solved the problem!

 

[Democracy Simulator]

That "flourishing" assumption is just utilitarianism. It beats me how Harris managed to stagger through a philosophy degree without picking up that point but maybe he skipped ethics.

Once you figure that out, Harris' point is utterly banal. The fact that science is useful to utilitarianism is not news and never has been news.

+1

To the doubters:

Even if we knew every relevant fact about a situation (and this is where science can help out, e.g. forensics), to arrive at a value statement about what we want to do about it, we have to also incorporate a moral premise:

Person A stole person B's jewellery (Fact X)

Person B was mildly upset to lose the jewellery for a couple of hours and didn't tell anyone about the theft, but person A and their whole family were absolutely elated that person A stole it (Fact Y)

Stealing is bad (Moral premise)

Let's punish person B (Action/Value statement)

or,

The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number/Utilitarianism (Moral premise)

Let's not punish person B (Action/Value statement)

There are two common moral premises/values here that produce different outcomes. What does science say about who is right here?

 

[bluskool]

That "flourishing" assumption is just utilitarianism. It beats me how Harris managed to stagger through a philosophy degree without picking up that point but maybe he skipped ethics.

Once you figure that out, Harris' point is utterly banal. The fact that science is useful to utilitarianism is not news and never has been news.

It seems more like a form of moral realism.

 

[drkitten]

Why would you think I would ask you about the Latin?

In any case, it's a good example, because of course we have Owen's brilliant response on the other side.

Is it sweet and fitting to die for one's country?

Sometimes.

Really? Prove it.

Does science have anything to say about when it is and when it ain't?

Not a thing, actually.

By your own admission:

We can use a scientifically informed view of history and psychology to better understand under what circumstances human beings are likely to deem it proper to sacrifice themselves...

... which isn't the same as understanding under what circumstances it is proper.

We know that humans make mistakes in judgment; Nobel prizes have been for won studying the circumstances and types of mistakes.

Of course, the only reason we know these are "mistakes" is because we have access to an objective "truth" about the problem at hand. We know what the correct answer is, because we've phrased the problem in terms of mathematics or something, and we know that humans can't do math with perfect reliability.

Why do we assume that humans can do "morality" with perfect reliability? -- especially since we know that at least two humans differ on exactly this question, so we know that either Horace or Owen was an unreliable source.

 

[Piggy]

Those are brute facts, not moral judgments.

"If I shoot you with this gun you will be in pain, and experience terror, and then die" is a factual claim.

It has absolutely no moral content until you pair it up with some kind of non-evidence-based moral claim, such as "you should not cause pain" or "you should not frustrate a person's preferences by killing them".

"Extended isolation causes a calf or a human infant stress" is a factual claim. It has no moral content until you pair it up with some kind of non-evidence-based moral claim, such as "you should not cause stress".

Science can only tell you what the outcomes will be as a matter of brute fact. It cannot tell you which outcome you should prefer from a moral perspective until and unless you establish some criteria for which outcomes are morally preferable.

Science cannot establish those criteria. It can only tell you what actions will bring about situations that meet those criteria.

This doesn't at all contradict what I'm saying, nor what I believe Harris is saying.

My point is simply that science does have a role in making moral judgment, that it has something to contribute, and that we're going to make better moral judgments if we include science in the process.

I don't believe this is any sort of radical idea.

And I don't see how it can be claimed that one must first "establish some criteria for which outcomes are morally preferable" without the help of science in order to make moral judgments. There's no reason to believe that.

And "you should not cause stress" is not in fact a "non-evidence-based moral claim". Knowing what stress does to an animal, in particular whether the animal is conscious of the effects, has a great bearing on that "should" there.

And let's not pretend that our moral preferences are entirely arbitrary. They're not. They're biologically based. Surely, a clear understanding of the biology of the brain, of evolution, of the psychology of emotion will enhance our understanding of how we make moral choices and which ones are preferable.

So far, I don't see any valid argument here for excluding science from any part of the process.

 

[Piggy]

Before you were being a utilitarian, and utilitarianism is a fairly useful moral theory. It's imperfect but it's pretty decent.

Whereas now you're wallowing in the Naturalistic Fallacy. Something is not better just because we have evolved to like it. We've evolved to like kidnapping women from neighbouring tribes and raping them, yet rape is almost universally held to be immoral. We've evolved to like hitting people who annoy us in the face, but that too is generally held to be immoral.

You can't pick and choose some evolved preferences as moral preferences, and some as immoral preferences, without first adopting some kind of non-evidence-based moral assumptions.

You omitted the very next bit of my post which addresses this.

You're grossly mischaracterizing my argument here.

 

[Piggy]

You and Harris, it seems to me, are both making the same fundamental error and attacking the same straw man.

The straw man is the imaginary position that holds that nothing science says can ever be relevant to moral evaluations. That position is straightforwardly daft if you give any weight to consequences at all, and almost all sane people place at least some weight on consequences when evaluating the morality of an action. (Kant would not do so, but Kant was a bit nutty that way).

The fundamental error is sneaking in utilitarianism (broadly, utilitarianism is the position that "good" is maximising desirable outcomes) without acknowledging it as a non-evidence-based moral assumption, and then claiming that your utilitarian moral philosophy is purely scientific with no non-evidence-based moral assumptions at all.

That just makes you a confused utilitarian, and a bad scientist. It's greatly preferable to be an honest utilitarian and a good scientist - at least according to my non-evidence-based moral assumptions.

Please, spare me the labels.

If you agree that there's no part of the process from which science must be excluded, then it looks like you're agreeing with me and with Harris.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

This doesn't at all contradict what I'm saying, nor what I believe Harris is saying.

My point is simply that science does have a role in making moral judgment, that it has something to contribute, and that we're going to make better moral judgments if we include science in the process.

I don't believe this is any sort of radical idea.

You're arguing two inconsistent cases at once.

#1 is "Science has something to offer in helping come to moral conclusions". Absolutely nobody is disagreeing with that claim.

#2 is "Science can answer moral questions just by stacking up factual claims, with no need for non-factual moral axioms". This is completely wrong.

What you are doing is presenting arguments for #1, and then acting like you have presented arguments for #2.

And I don't see how it can be claimed that one must first "establish some criteria for which outcomes are morally preferable" without the help of science in order to make moral judgments. There's no reason to believe that.

On the contrary, there is excellent reason to believe that no moral judgments can be made without doing so.

And "you should not cause stress" is not in fact a "non-evidence-based moral claim". Knowing what stress does to an animal, in particular whether the animal is conscious of the effects, has a great bearing on that "should" there.

This is a manoeuvre akin to claiming that the world sits on a turtle, and when asked what the turtle sits on claiming that it sits on another turtle.

We ask "Why should you not cause stress?" and you respond "Because of what it does to an animal, and because it is conscious of it". So we ask "Why does that mean we should not cause stress?". You can try to position yet another factual turtle under yourself ("Don't you know that stressed animals die sooner?") but then we'll just point out that this turtle in turn is standing on nothing ("Why should we care if an animal dies sooner?").

The only way out is to stake a moral claim of some sort, such as "suffering is morally bad just because it is".

And let's not pretend that our moral preferences are entirely arbitrary. They're not. They're biologically based. Surely, a clear understanding of the biology of the brain, of evolution, of the psychology of emotion will enhance our understanding of how we make moral choices and which ones are preferable.

Straw man. Nobody has ever said otherwise.

That said, while science may enhance our understanding of these issues it's also insufficient to ever get to a moral conclusion. A clear understanding of why people rape, murder and steal will not tell us whether or not it is moral to rape, murder or steal.

So far, I don't see any valid argument here for excluding science from any part of the process.

Straw man. Nobody has said that science should be excluded. Rather we have explained to you that science alone is insufficient to ever get to a moral conclusion.

As I said earlier, what you are doing is sneaking in utilitarianism (the moral claim that we should maximise desirable outcomes, for defined values of desirable) and then trying to pretend that utilitarianism is a factual claim.

Handwaving this away as "labels" is a serious philosophical error. There is a very important difference of kind between factual claims and moral claims and you will continue to be confused about moral issues until you get that straightened out.

 

[MattusMaximus]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=

This is Sam Harris at TED. Can science answer moral questions? Does Sam Harris even answer that question in this talk?

What do you think?

Yes, to both questions.

 

[Piggy]

#2 is "Science can answer moral questions just by stacking up factual claims, with no need for non-factual moral axioms". This is completely wrong.

It may be completely wrong, but since it's not anything I've actually said, I'm not too concerned about it.

 

[Piggy]

On the contrary, there is excellent reason to believe that no moral judgments can be made without doing so.

I would be interested in hearing those reasons.

 

[Piggy]

This is a manoeuvre akin to claiming that the world sits on a turtle, and when asked what the turtle sits on claiming that it sits on another turtle.

We ask "Why should you not cause stress?" and you respond "Because of what it does to an animal, and because it is conscious of it". So we ask "Why does that mean we should not cause stress?". You can try to position yet another factual turtle under yourself ("Don't you know that stressed animals die sooner?") but then we'll just point out that this turtle in turn is standing on nothing ("Why should we care if an animal dies sooner?").

The only way out is to stake a moral claim of some sort, such as "suffering is morally bad just because it is".

You don't appear to be actually reading what I'm writing.

 

[Piggy]

Rather we have explained to you that science alone is insufficient to ever get to a moral conclusion.

But that is not something I've ever disagreed with. And I've said so explicitly.

ETA: If you're interested, my view is that morality is useless anyway, and no one really bases any actions on it at all, but I think that's a tangent.