Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[Dragoonster]

I should've watched the video from the start.

Basically it seems an argument against moral relativism using scientific knowledge vs. scientific ignorance as analogous to moral rightness vs. moral wrongness. That if we can obviously tell that one expert physicist's theory is more correct (or maybe likely to be correct, but he seemed pretty absolutist in the other twin of the analogy) when compared to a physics theory of a plumber who doesn't even know what an atom is, then we should be able to obviously tell that one expert moral philosopher is more correct than a non-expert. Except he doesn't really define what makes a person an expert moralist. He compares the Dalai Lama with Ted Bundy, but makes no reference to which of the two has actually studied moral philosophy more than the other, or independently discovered more moral truths than the other, which makes that particular analogy a bit wonky.

He referenced religious leaders who believe in a universal morality as defined in their holy books, and led to this sentence that I found cringeworthy: "but the demagogues are right about one thing--we need a universal concept about human values". He appears to be a desire utilitarianist, though I might have the wrong term for it. He doesn't explain why human suffering is bad, or why human joy is good; he seems to be justifying his position by appealing to the majority, as in "in Islamic society some fathers punish their daughters for being raped by killing them. Can you imagine? that's clearly wrong" (not an actual quote but that's the gist). At the same time he doesn't embrace this solution to the merging of cultures he notes is coming--that morals should be decided as in democracy--if enough people think veils or starvation or murder is immoral, then they'll either make laws or perform social duties relevant to that by majority decision, or they'll lobby for it.

Instead he seems to want his particular view on what is objectively good and what is objectively bad to be if not held by all others, at least the perceived universal law of the land, or the inherent correct version. That even if a person disagrees with that version, they should recognize that it's more correct than theirs.

I didn't see much in the way of how science itself can achieve such a vision, as the only way it can is if the observer of its conclusions has a preconception of what outcome they desire. If the person thinks starvation is undesirable, an experiment with two groups, one malnourished, the other plump, will reach the conclusion "the best moral course is to feed people". Obviously if one thinks starvation is desirable, the best moral course is the opposite. So at least there some of my comments in the thread prior to watching the tape are a bit on-point.

But all in all I found it unimpressive. It's an objective moralist attempting to win people to his position by any means necessary--science, rhetoric, appeal to authority, appeal to majority, and if they don't agree he'll still be right.

 

[bluskool]

The game of chess analogy he uses, functions as a response to the "objectivity" question.

It doesn't answer the question at all though. In chess the object is to win so there is always an objectively correct move to make. In life, there is no object, meaning or purpose behind it except that which we ascribe to it. We can say that we generally want certain outcomes from life and then create a moral system to achieve them, but that just makes morals subjective. They are just based on what most people generally want.

 

[Michael Redman]

How can "the well-being of conscience beings" be a fact? He uses extreme examples to imply a quantifiable spectrum, but gives no indication of how movement along such a spectrum could be quantified. If you can't measure happiness, how can you apply science to it?

And even if you could, how could you compare different types of happiness and suffering to each other to reach an objective conclusion? Exactly how happy would you have to make one person to justify making several other people mildly unhappy? Or does the fact that there are more people on one side alone tip the balance in that direction? What does science tell us?

Is it morally OK to punish an innocent person if it makes the community feel safer?

It is better to live a short, exciting, hedonistic life, or a long, contemplative life of moderation?

Is happiness/suffering the only moral concern? It morally OK to sterilize the entire population and let the species go extinct if the last generation gets an increase in happiness due to the ability to waste all resources?

Is it better to have loved and lost . . .

 

[cienaños]

I should've watched the video from the start.

Basically it seems an argument against moral relativism using scientific knowledge vs. scientific ignorance as analogous to moral rightness vs. moral wrongness. That if we can obviously tell that one expert physicist's theory is more correct (or maybe likely to be correct, but he seemed pretty absolutist in the other twin of the analogy) when compared to a physics theory of a plumber who doesn't even know what an atom is, then we should be able to obviously tell that one expert moral philosopher is more correct than a non-expert. Except he doesn't really define what makes a person an expert moralist. He compares the Dalai Lama with Ted Bundy, but makes no reference to which of the two has actually studied moral philosophy more than the other, or independently discovered more moral truths than the other, which makes that particular analogy a bit wonky.

You're correct. He doesn't make philosophical or moral enlightenment/study references between the two. What does that have to do with the analogy or it being wonky?

He referenced religious leaders who believe in a universal morality as defined in their holy books, and led to this sentence that I found cringeworthy: "but the demagogues are right about one thing--we need a universal concept about human values". He appears to be a desire utilitarianist, though I might have the wrong term for it. He doesn't explain why human suffering is bad, or why human joy is good; he seems to be justifying his position by appealing to the majority, as in "in Islamic society some fathers punish their daughters for being raped by killing them. Can you imagine? that's clearly wrong" (not an actual quote but that's the gist). At the same time he doesn't embrace this solution to the merging of cultures he notes is coming--that morals should be decided as in democracy--if enough people think veils or starvation or murder is immoral, then they'll either make laws or perform social duties relevant to that by majority decision, or they'll lobby for it.

(I agree with your cringe-worthy comment by the way.) Maybe it's just what I brought into it, but I did get the "why" about human suffering being bad. Accelerated physical decay is not good. More on that later.

The merging of the cultures I thought was clearly not only embraced, but he made a show of it. He played on the emotions of the issue so much so as to generate the audience to embrace this solution of merge. The example was the comparison he made of the burqa vs. the slutty mags in the west. He went on to suggest "why can't there be somewhere in between, in the gradations, where we can meet? How? I don't have all the answers, I'm just kicking ideas around here guys." (comically loose paraphrase).

Instead he seems to want his particular view on what is objectively good and what is objectively bad to be if not held by all others, at least the perceived universal law of the land, or the inherent correct version. That even if a person disagrees with that version, they should recognize that it's more correct than theirs.

Can you point to some examples please?

I didn't see much in the way of how science itself can achieve such a vision, as the only way it can is if the observer of its conclusions has a preconception of what outcome they desire. If the person thinks starvation is undesirable, an experiment with two groups, one malnourished, the other plump, will reach the conclusion "the best moral course is to feed people". Obviously if one thinks starvation is desirable, the best moral course is the opposite. So at least there some of my comments in the thread prior to watching the tape are a bit on-point.

This is addressed in my earlier post. Is my English that bad? I mean, not immoral, just bad - I mean, poop!

But all in all I found it unimpressive. It's an objective moralist attempting to win people to his position by any means necessary--science, rhetoric, appeal to authority, appeal to majority, and if they don't agree he'll still be right.

Also addressed (the quote at the end) in that earlier post.

Peace

 

[cienaños]

It doesn't answer the question at all though. In chess the object is to win so there is always an objectively correct move to make. In life, there is no object, meaning or purpose behind it except that which we ascribe to it. We can say that we generally want certain outcomes from life and then create a moral system to achieve them, but that just makes morals subjective. They are just based on what most people generally want.

Really with Seth and Amy?

Is your object of desire in life to live in some poverty-stricken, war destroyed, AIDS and/or genocide infested society? If it is, congratulations. You're living in one. One of the tamer versions, yes, but still.

In life, there is an objective. Survival. The objective is there. Waiting for us to catch up.

EDIT: Sorry I forgot to address your chess comment: The game of chess was not created by un-life.

 

[bluskool]

Really with Seth and Amy?

Is your object of desire in life to live in some poverty-stricken, war destroyed, AIDS and/or genocide infested society? If it is, congratulations. You're living in one. One of the tamer versions, yes, but still.

In life, there is an objective. Survival. The objective is there. Waiting for us to catch up.

It doesn't matter what my objective is. Of course my objective is to live a happy, meaningful life, but it is still my objective, which is, by definition, subjective.

 

[cienaños]

How can "the well-being of conscience beings" be a fact? He uses extreme examples to imply a quantifiable spectrum, but gives no indication of how movement along such a spectrum could be quantified. If you can't measure happiness, how can you apply science to it?

And even if you could, how could you compare different types of happiness and suffering to each other to reach an objective conclusion? Exactly how happy would you have to make one person to justify making several other people mildly unhappy? Or does the fact that there are more people on one side alone tip the balance in that direction? What does science tell us?

Is it morally OK to punish an innocent person if it makes the community feel safer?

It is better to live a short, exciting, hedonistic life, or a long, contemplative life of moderation?

Is happiness/suffering the only moral concern? It morally OK to sterilize the entire population and let the species go extinct if the last generation gets an increase in happiness due to the ability to waste all resources?

Is it better to have loved and lost . . .

Last one. I'm getting tired.

My apartment. Science gives me what? the exact dimensions, temperature, geometry, uses, and other basic information.

Someone bangs on my door screaming saucy language. Science gives me what? It gives me half. The other half is reason. Combining science with other constructs in this thing we call world - that can be a good thing. Science is not your ruler. It's okay. It's just one of the guys. There are others that are pretty cool too.

 

[cienaños]

It doesn't matter what my objective is. Of course my objective is to live a happy, meaningful life, but it is still my objective, which is, by definition, subjective.

This I think, is why I have a deep respect and love, for language.

Let me ask you a philosophical question. If you'll indulge me?

When you were in your mother's womb, who got what label? Who was the subjective? Who was the objective? Did that change after you reached an age of consciousness? And before that, when you were partly in your mother, and your other part swam in lustfully, where - at what scientific measurement did you become your own idea of subjective/objective - apart and completely separate from your parents?

And when you feed the worms one day. Will you be doing so subjectively, or objectively?

 

[Kahalachan]

Looks like Sam Harris is ignorant of science and delving into pseudoscience.

 

[Paulhoff]

Science gives me what?

What, is it all about you?

What does religion give you, lies.

Paul



Turn off that computer, and if your chest hurts, stay home.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

He may have a BA in Philosophy, but I'm guessing Harris slept through Hume.

If he's solved the is-ought problem (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is-ought_problem) that would be amazing news, but it's about as likely as him having come up with a watertight logical proof for the existence of the Christian God.

 

[Dragoonster]

You're correct. He doesn't make philosophical or moral enlightenment/study references between the two. What does that have to do with the analogy or it being wonky?

Because the reason we defer to a professional physicist's theories over a layman's is because the physicist has studied physics and is respected for his knowledge in the area. Maybe it's an implied assumption that the Dalai Lama has studied more philosophy than Bundy. Otherwise the analogy is just an odd way of saying "the Dalai Lama is the philosophical expert because Bundy's philosophy was clearly inferior".

(I agree with your cringe-worthy comment by the way.) Maybe it's just what I brought into it, but I did get the "why" about human suffering being bad. Accelerated physical decay is not good. More on that later.

The merging of the cultures I thought was clearly not only embraced, but he made a show of it. He played on the emotions of the issue so much so as to generate the audience to embrace this solution of merge. The example was the comparison he made of the burqa vs. the slutty mags in the west. He went on to suggest "why can't there be somewhere in between, in the gradations, where we can meet? How? I don't have all the answers, I'm just kicking ideas around here guys." (comically loose paraphrase).

But he wants the cultures to meet in his defined area, where morality is objective. There is a right amount of skin to show, and he believes it's not either extreme because...why exactly? He's either already determined the correct amount or he disbelieves one of the two has discovered the correct amount and it happens to be one of the extremes. Maybe I missed something.

The additional reason I don't think he supports "majority-decided morality" which would result from a merger is that he claims moral X is still objectively bad even in societies where everyone thinks it's objectively good. So there he specifically denies that majority-decided morality is a good way of deciding morality. Iran is a society, yet if its morality can't be defined as objectively correct for it even if the society thinks it is...it follows that a global merged society's morals couldn't be defined as objective for it even if most of the world thinks it is.

Can you point to some examples please?

I think he pretty much explicitly stated such, but didn't record the quote. Might be wrong.

This is addressed in my earlier post. Is my English that bad? I mean, not immoral, just bad - I mean, poop!

I don't think any moral component was addressed. Science tells us humans starve without food. That's the only conclusion science makes. It doesn't conclude whether human death is good or bad.

I don't know if you mean I totally missed your point (which I might have!) because I don't read English well, or that it's not your native language, because your English seems perfect to me.

Also addressed (the quote at the end) in that earlier post.

Peace

I agree with the bottom of your post, and many of your assesments. I'm not sure that Harris does though. Was hard to tell when he was being absolutist and when he was being compromising.

 

[cienaños]

What, is it all about you?

What does religion give you, lies.

Paul



Turn off that computer, and if your chest hurts, stay home.

Oh you Paulhoff you. You're funny. I'm sure you understand context and the framework surrounding the "what does science give me?" quote.

Just so we're clear, I'm not religious. And yes, religion gives people lies.

Also, thanks for the advice. I did as you said and now I feel super. It was my head though, not my chest. I have pills for my chest. Pills created by scientists with the wacky idea that they might ease human suffering just a bit.

 

[Paulhoff]

Oh you Paulhoff you. You're funny. I'm sure you understand context and the framework surrounding the "what does science give me?" quote.

Just so we're clear, I'm not religious. And yes, religion gives people lies.

Also, thanks for the advice. I did as you said and now I feel super. It was my head though, not my chest. I have pills for my chest. Pills created by scientists with the wacky idea that they might ease human suffering just a bit.

Ppppppppppffffffffffffffffffffffff

Paul

 

[Earthborn]

Why don't we have ethical obligations toward rocks? Why don't we feel compassion for rocks? It's because we don't think rocks can suffer.

Here we have a factual claim that seems to point to the base of Harris' argument; that our sense of morality stems from our feeling of compassion, and our compassion is directed towards things we know are capable of suffering. It is a factual claim; it would be disproven if people are capable of feeling compassion for lifeless objects or if we feel we have ethical obligations toward them.

To answer this claim, two words:
Pet Rock.

People are perfectly capable of feeling compassion for lifeless objects, even if they know they aren't really conscious beings. Our compassion isn't that directed. We can get emotionally involved in a computer animated story about a rusty old robot. We might feel the need to play with a Tamagotchi, or "heal" it when it "gets sick". Many people will feel some sadness when they bring their old car to the junk yard, as if they are betraying an old friend. They may in fact feel more emotionally involved in lifeless objects than they are toward other humans in a far away place.

Let's say there is a huge pile of rocks Sam Harris claims we have no ethical obligation towards, and we call it a mountain. Suppose a mining company wants to blow it up, shovel it down, grind it to bits to extract whatever ores there are in it. The mining company will of course deny it has any ethical obligation toward its preservation, but you will probably find that many people profoundly disagree; even people who do not believe a mountain is capable of experiencing suffering.

Whether a natural feature of a landscape, or shaped by humans into great cathedrals, statues or other buildings, many piles of rocks have many people feeling great ethical obligation toward their preservation. Harris does not show how they are wrong.

 

[Oystein]

Harris begins his argument with the concept of consciousness, which is vested in brains, and the property of our consciousness to fell empathy. That is, we can relate to other beings who also possess consciousness and thereby asses their well-being.

He manages to drop that line of thought early on, and he also manages to not mentionm the Golden Rule - where, I think, one would naturally end up when following through with this reasoning.

What he is saying is: Individual happiness and suffering are real things in the sense that there is a bodily organ (then brain) bringing forth such emotions through processes that can, in principle, be described and detected in strict scientific terms. And this indeed can and must be admitted.

Now when it comes to translating human experience into objective values: I don't think he is suggesting that we can measure experiences, in the sense of assigning numbers on a scale to them, and then compute and compare the numbers. But it should in many cases be possible to order experiences. Clearly, inflicting pain is inferior morally to not inflicting pain, with pain being a property the existence of which can be objectively verified.

But Harris misses one obvious point: Pain is worse than no pain only with all other things being equal! His example of flogging pupils ignores the justification brought forward even by people who do not follow Scripture as such: They assume that a little suffering now will spare the kid more suffering later, because only by the use of force will they learn some lessons properly. Now you may (as do I) question the veracity of this assumption, and maybe you can show scientifically that it is indeed wrong. But maybe you cannot? Maybe it is true after all? Then you must weigh pain now against pain later, and that argument will be subjective and probably science won't be able to evaluate the two options.

Another rather obvious thing Harris misses: When talking about burkas, he assumes that it is obvious that many women who veil themselves completely in muslim lands do so under threat - and that they would be free in their choice of clothing (to veil or not to veil) in the USA. But I am pretty sure Harris saw no naked or topless folks in attendance at TED. Now - do all American woman cover their breasts fully voluntarily? Or are they not subject to the threats of the culture they happen to born to, that heaps ridicule and court orders upon women (or men) who would want to run around in the nude? Would the Sam Harris of the Yanonami not talk about American clothing rules in the very same terms as the real Harris does about the Taliban, for obviously, every person should be free to be naked anywhere anytime?

 

[Oystein]

...
Whether a natural feature of a landscape, or shaped by humans into great cathedrals, statues or other buildings, many piles of rocks have many people feeling great ethical obligation toward their preservation. Harris does not show how they are wrong.

Emotional feelings do not equal moral values. When we make a moral choice not to obliterate an inanimate object, we not do so on the grounds of inate properties or rights of said object, but based on what we would do to other humans and their emotions.

I have a toy bear that I would very dearly miss if you destroyed it, so my sadness would make your act immoral. However if there was a container full of identical toy bears somewhere that belong to no one, and you burn it up, I couldn't care less, because you would not cause any suffering. Certainly not to the bears, no matter how cute and cuddly they may be.

 

[bluskool]

This I think, is why I have a deep respect and love, for language.

Let me ask you a philosophical question. If you'll indulge me?

When you were in your mother's womb, who got what label? Who was the subjective? Who was the objective? Did that change after you reached an age of consciousness? And before that, when you were partly in your mother, and your other part swam in lustfully, where - at what scientific measurement did you become your own idea of subjective/objective - apart and completely separate from your parents?

And when you feed the worms one day. Will you be doing so subjectively, or objectively?

The answer to them all is that it doesn't matter. Something is not objective when two people share the thought. Even if the entire human race agrees on what is moral, that doesn't make morality objective. So the question of "who got the label" is meaningless.

 

[Earthborn]

Emotional feelings do not equal moral values.

No, but Harris expects us to accept as self-evident that such feelings don't exist ("Why don't we feel compassion for rocks?") and we have absolutely no ethical obligations toward them, while many people feel they do. The fact that there are people who do feel ethical obligations toward rocks means he'll have to come up with a better argument why "objectively" or "scientifically" we don't actually have them.

It is a very old claim that there are no ethical obligations toward rocks. It is not easy being a rock in Western philosophy, and not much easier being a tree or an ant. It is such an old cliché that when most of us hear it we automatically accept it as self-evidently true, but like so many things claimed to be "self-evident" it isn't. For a guy who claims that morality is derived from the well-being of concious beings, it is perhaps strange that he doesn't give rocks a bit more respect considering that the concious beings he cares about have only managed live and thrive on a big rock.

When we make a moral choice not to obliterate an inanimate object, we not do so on the grounds of inate properties or rights of said object, but based on what we would do to other humans and their emotions.

Is that the only reason? I think many of the people who ethical choices toward inanimate objects refer to properties they believe are innate.

 

[Oystein]

...Is that the only reason? I think many of the people who ethical choices toward inanimate objects refer to properties they believe are innate.

Such as? Do rocks really have these properties, or is that just make-believe and projection?

I (and, I would thinkm Sam Harris) do not deny that some people think it is moral to be nice to some rocks, but Harris argues that they are objectively wrong, because they would argue the morality of such behaviour with properties, that rocks do not in fact possess.