According to wikipedia "paper tiger" means something which seems as threatening as a tiger, but is really harmless.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paper_tiger
The EU as a collective security organization is precisely that, harmless, to those outside its borders, when force is the issue at hand. A trade embargo is another matter, and not what I am discussing, at all.
The EU does not match that description.
Wrong. It has not ever demonstrated the capacity
to act with force as the EU.
First, because the EU does not seem threatening to anyone,
Sorry, your attempt at a petty redefinition does not answer the mail.
Here, I'll give you another slang term for the EU, as a
collective security organization: all flash, no boom.
The EU relies, still, on its embedded NATO relationships, and thus the embedded funding and capability, for the moment, as a substitute for any organic EU security establishment. That may not always be so, but for the time being, it is.
In ten years, this may have changed. I bet against, as the Europeans have yet to back it up with the purse, and are chary of risking blood and treasure like a Power does.
And how well does NATO actually function? As a defense against Russia it's not particularly useful anymore, and it barely operates as a collective in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is an out of area operation, a relatively new endeavour for Europe and NATO, since it's first OOAO was in Europe proper: Bosnia. It may prove to dampen NATO ministers' appetite for out of area operations. It may not. Still in play.
Which is why I said "If the US had had its way". The fact that the US did not have its way does not make it a fantasy.
Your strawman retraction is noted. Thanks. The US having its way never entered into it, due to the facts of NATO decision processes I pointed out. So what if Cheney or Bush
wants Georgia in NATO? You can crap into one hand, and want into the other, and see which one fills first. Getting anyone into NATO means all of NATO must agree.
Defense of one of its members is not an out of area operation.
Sorry, you don't seem to understand the term. Out of area is outside of the area bounded by NATO nations. Bosnia was out of area. Afghanistan is for darned sure out of area. Georgia is out of area. And so on.
(There has been an intriguing development on Europe's southern marches, begun in the late 1990's as "the Mediterranean Dialogue" which, from what I read last month, still has political backing. This may lead to more out of area operations. Time will tell.
The whole of NATO's credibility rests on the belief that an attack on any one of its members will be considered an attack on all. If that belief is proved wrong, NATO loses all credibility as a collective security organization.
Yes, I agree, since that is what Article V is all about. It was also the basis for the ISAF and other NATO operations in Afghanistan. America could not call on Article V response in Iraq, obviously, and so didn't.
That's why allowing members into NATO for whom the other members won't really be willing to wage war for is dangerous to the organization.
We agree completely. Also why Israel has no place in NATO. (Ref a very different conversation elsewhere.)
Without that belief its members will look to other alliances for their security. Gradually taking NATO's capabilities with them.
That may or may not occur in time. We shall see. There are plenty of folks in America who think that's a good thing, and that NATO should shrink or go the way of the plains buffalo.
As for out of area operations I agree with you entirely. But defense of Georgia, had the US had its way to make Georgia a NATO member, would not have been an out of area operation.
Since Georgia is not in NATO, you are still arguing nonsense. Try to keep up with who is, or isn't, in NATO, please.
That begs the question: The US wanted Georgia in NATO. Does that mean the US really would have been willing to wage war against Russia for defense of Georgia? Or was it a bluff?
Excellent question. I wish I knew the answer. I think it was a calculated risk, with a bit of bluff, that ran into other NATO nations being far too close to Russia to be willing to share that risk. (Looks like their caution was well considered.)
Here is a tidbit from recent news that throws an interesting light on your question:
source =
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/washington/13diplo.html?ref=europe
WASHINGTON — One month ago, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in Tbilisi, Georgia, for a high-profile visit that was planned to accomplish two very different goals.
During a private dinner on July 9, Ms. Rice’s aides say, she warned President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia not to get into a military conflict with Russia that Georgia could not win. “She told him, in no uncertain terms, that he had to put a non-use of force pledge on the table,” according to a senior administration official . . . snip . . .
. . . publicly, Ms. Rice struck a different tone, one of defiant support for Georgia in the face of Russian pressure. “I’m going to visit a friend and I don’t expect much comment about the United States going to visit a friend,” she told reporters just before arriving in Tbilisi, even as Russian jets were conducting intimidating maneuvers over South Ossetia.
. . . snip . . .
But as Ms. Rice’s two-pronged visit to Tbilisi demonstrates, the accumulation of years of mixed messages may have made the American warnings fall on deaf ears.
The United States took a series of steps that emboldened Georgia: sending advisers to build up the Georgian military, including an exercise last month with more than 1,000 American troops; pressing hard to bring Georgia into the NATO orbit; championing Georgia’s fledgling democracy along Russia’s southern border; and loudly proclaiming its support for Georgia’s territorial integrity in the battle with Russia over Georgia’s separatist enclaves.
But interviews with officials at the State Department, Pentagon and the White House show that the Bush administration was never going to back Georgia militarily in a fight with Russia.
Looks like your guess of a bluff is at least partly true.
This narrative, if true, is an eerie replay of the mixed messages sent to Saddam Hussein in the summer of 1991 about Kuwait. I don't know how accurate this article is, but the pattern of behavior since the Wall fell in 1989 has sustained through two administrations, with differing emphasis on means: NATO expansion as a prime goal, to the East. Hmmm, NATO in a political
Drang Nach Osten . . .
I don't share your optimism about a unipolar world. It makes stability in the world pretty much dependent on the wisdom and sanity of the hegemon's leaders.
I didn't spout optimism. If you had read a bit more closely,
each set up holds its own risks.
I don't have that much confidence in the US's elected leaders.
I have none in the elected leadership of Europe, Russia, nor the leaders in China. Any of those power blocs can, within a generation from today's writing, approximate the power of a global hegemon if America hits the skids due to a cracking economy. Someone will fill the power vacuum, just as the US did when Russia cracked. My money is on the Chinese, but that's speculation. More likely is a multipolar world, which holds significant risks, some of which make the Cold War seem a picnic.
As to American leadership, of late I've not seen a lot to recommend American leadership writ large in some endeavours, thanks to the Wilsonian/Jacksonian fusion that has characterized the Bush Administration. That will likely change as the administration changes.
Then throw terrorist pro1vocations in the mix, and the situation becomes very risky. Too much power in one nation's hands is dangerous, much like too much power in one person's hands is.
How are terrorists relevant to uni polar, bi polar, or multi polar power models?
The are not. They exist in all of those scenarios.
They tend to be extranational actors on the stage generally occupied by the powers, or power blocs, and are the random elements that make things a mess for everyone, yet who can, now and again, form alliances with various power blocs. Politics make for interesting bedfellows (See Soviet sponsorship/equipping of various guerilla movements during the Cold War, US support for the Contras or the Muj in Afghanistan, Chinese affiliation/friendship with for Albania, and so on, Cold War era. )
DR