Russia invades Georgia

[Tailgater]

Basing your opinion on what some internet posters say is no better (maybe a little better or worse) than making it from the media. Where do you think they get their opinions from? Exceptions for people who want to spell out the entire history between these countries and have eyewitness accounts for all events.

 

[egslim]

Yes and no. There is no reason not to make friends and allies all over the world. The mistake is to assume no one else will care.

Friends/good relations are fine. Alliances are something entirely different, as Switzerland demonstrates.

Since the US has, from before its inception, been inolved in global/international trade, and international trade has been its life blood since inception, it is indeed a sound policy to be involved, in some way, in as many places as possible. That does not require having collective security deals with everyone, and the mix of styles of relationships in a given region isn't simple.

I agree, but it seems the US does have the tendency to close collective security deals in as many places as possible.

Your obsession with soft power au outrance surfaces again. It's a mix of hard and soft, always has been, that is the most effective in the long term.

The value of hard power is in slow long term decline, for two reasons.

First, because nuclear weapons have made any war between Great Powers extremely dangerous.

Second, because technological advances have increased the cost of warfare more rapidly than our wealth to pay for it.
I remember reading a study that compared the number of average workers necessary to pay for one British soldier, between the Napoleonic wars and WWI. I believe it was 2:3 vs 3:1, or something like that. Anyway, the number of workers necessary per soldier had certainly increased.
Similarly, for the Ottomans and Mongols warfare was profitable. While any modern war is a huge money-sink. The tendency is pretty clear.

I'm only in favour of hard power when the cost of applying it is outweighed by the benefits obtained. Those situations become ever rarer.
Not to mention that modern "hard power" is relatively soft, compared with the ruthlessness of old times. That's a political reality, but it drives up the cost even more.

Who is we?

Everyone who needs oil, to some extent. Of course some countries suffer more than others, for various reasons.

Noted. You prefer the risks of a multipolar world, which means more conflict, than the risks of a single global hegemon.

Like I mentioned above, I disagree with that assessment. But that's not really what I like to respond to here.

We no longer live in a true unipolar world - assuming we ever did. There are plenty of places in the world where the US does not have hegemonic power, the Caucasus is one of them.
Before this war some people, including the Georgian president, were under the America-centric belief that the US's position on the conflict would be decisive. Possibly even including people in the US government. Such overestimation of the US's position is dangerous, as this conflict demonstrates.
Much like the political planners of the Iraq war seemed to ignore the presence of Iran next door, not realising that the latter just might decide to run a little interference.

Lack of respect for the capabilities and interests of other (regionally) important players is America-centrism.

The maritime option to run ships for logistic support through the Turkish Straits is fraught with political friction,

In addition, running a gauntlet of anti-ship missiles from nearby Russian-controlled shores isn't very attractive either.

 

[Darth Rotor]

I'm misquoting Clausewitz deliberately, because I don't like the more usual form. Diplomacy is more than making deals, it's how governments influence events outside their own territories.

I disagree slightly: diplomacy is one means by which governments influence events outside their own territories. Other means include trade embargoes, most favored nation status, and more. Diplomacy is typically empty without a little bit of leverage of some sort -- information, future promises, force, money, trade -- behind it so something can be put on or taken off the table when deals are made. The general case is suasion, diplomacy is a subset of that case of governmental options for influence.

It's how they communicate. Aggressive war influences events, so should be included in diplomacy, not in policies. Diplomacy acts in pursuit of national policies which are determined by governments.

See above, I don't think you are using that term correctly, but we are now dancing in fine semantic distinctions. The model I am most familiar with is elements of national power, Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Ecnomic (called DIME by some). The elements interact continuously, save that force isn't often called upon, and its threat, or mere presence, looms in the background of a given transaction.

The various sources of power are used to influence, allegedly, events in pursuit of national interests and objectives. When watching the international scene, the model is pretty applicable, but the actual actions taken often leave one wondering how coherent aims and objectives are in some capitals.

Long story short, modern war isn't (or at least shouldn't be) an end in itself. It has a political objective.

I never said otherwise, and neither did Clausewitz. Without a political objective, war has no purpose, unless the thrill of slaughter (an end in itself ??) is a national aim or goal.

DR

 

[senorpogo]

They're happily engaged in demolishing Georgia's military infrastructure and stealing all the copper wire they can spot.

This is the funniest thing I've read all week.

 

[Darth Rotor]

According to wikipedia "paper tiger" means something which seems as threatening as a tiger, but is really harmless.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paper_tiger

The EU as a collective security organization is precisely that, harmless, to those outside its borders, when force is the issue at hand. A trade embargo is another matter, and not what I am discussing, at all.

The EU does not match that description.

Wrong. It has not ever demonstrated the capacity to act with force as the EU.

First, because the EU does not seem threatening to anyone,

Sorry, your attempt at a petty redefinition does not answer the mail.

Here, I'll give you another slang term for the EU, as a collective security organization: all flash, no boom.

The EU relies, still, on its embedded NATO relationships, and thus the embedded funding and capability, for the moment, as a substitute for any organic EU security establishment. That may not always be so, but for the time being, it is.

In ten years, this may have changed. I bet against, as the Europeans have yet to back it up with the purse, and are chary of risking blood and treasure like a Power does.

And how well does NATO actually function? As a defense against Russia it's not particularly useful anymore, and it barely operates as a collective in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is an out of area operation, a relatively new endeavour for Europe and NATO, since it's first OOAO was in Europe proper: Bosnia. It may prove to dampen NATO ministers' appetite for out of area operations. It may not. Still in play.

Which is why I said "If the US had had its way". The fact that the US did not have its way does not make it a fantasy.

Your strawman retraction is noted. Thanks. The US having its way never entered into it, due to the facts of NATO decision processes I pointed out. So what if Cheney or Bush wants Georgia in NATO? You can crap into one hand, and want into the other, and see which one fills first. Getting anyone into NATO means all of NATO must agree.

Defense of one of its members is not an out of area operation.

Sorry, you don't seem to understand the term. Out of area is outside of the area bounded by NATO nations. Bosnia was out of area. Afghanistan is for darned sure out of area. Georgia is out of area. And so on.

(There has been an intriguing development on Europe's southern marches, begun in the late 1990's as "the Mediterranean Dialogue" which, from what I read last month, still has political backing. This may lead to more out of area operations. Time will tell.

The whole of NATO's credibility rests on the belief that an attack on any one of its members will be considered an attack on all. If that belief is proved wrong, NATO loses all credibility as a collective security organization.

Yes, I agree, since that is what Article V is all about. It was also the basis for the ISAF and other NATO operations in Afghanistan. America could not call on Article V response in Iraq, obviously, and so didn't.

That's why allowing members into NATO for whom the other members won't really be willing to wage war for is dangerous to the organization.

We agree completely. Also why Israel has no place in NATO. (Ref a very different conversation elsewhere.)

Without that belief its members will look to other alliances for their security. Gradually taking NATO's capabilities with them.

That may or may not occur in time. We shall see. There are plenty of folks in America who think that's a good thing, and that NATO should shrink or go the way of the plains buffalo.

As for out of area operations I agree with you entirely. But defense of Georgia, had the US had its way to make Georgia a NATO member, would not have been an out of area operation.

Since Georgia is not in NATO, you are still arguing nonsense. Try to keep up with who is, or isn't, in NATO, please.

That begs the question: The US wanted Georgia in NATO. Does that mean the US really would have been willing to wage war against Russia for defense of Georgia? Or was it a bluff?

Excellent question. I wish I knew the answer. I think it was a calculated risk, with a bit of bluff, that ran into other NATO nations being far too close to Russia to be willing to share that risk. (Looks like their caution was well considered.)

Here is a tidbit from recent news that throws an interesting light on your question:
source = http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/washington/13diplo.html?ref=europe

WASHINGTON — One month ago, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in Tbilisi, Georgia, for a high-profile visit that was planned to accomplish two very different goals.

During a private dinner on July 9, Ms. Rice’s aides say, she warned President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia not to get into a military conflict with Russia that Georgia could not win. “She told him, in no uncertain terms, that he had to put a non-use of force pledge on the table,” according to a senior administration official . . . snip . . .

. . . publicly, Ms. Rice struck a different tone, one of defiant support for Georgia in the face of Russian pressure. “I’m going to visit a friend and I don’t expect much comment about the United States going to visit a friend,” she told reporters just before arriving in Tbilisi, even as Russian jets were conducting intimidating maneuvers over South Ossetia.
. . . snip . . .
But as Ms. Rice’s two-pronged visit to Tbilisi demonstrates, the accumulation of years of mixed messages may have made the American warnings fall on deaf ears.

The United States took a series of steps that emboldened Georgia: sending advisers to build up the Georgian military, including an exercise last month with more than 1,000 American troops; pressing hard to bring Georgia into the NATO orbit; championing Georgia’s fledgling democracy along Russia’s southern border; and loudly proclaiming its support for Georgia’s territorial integrity in the battle with Russia over Georgia’s separatist enclaves.

But interviews with officials at the State Department, Pentagon and the White House show that the Bush administration was never going to back Georgia militarily in a fight with Russia.

Looks like your guess of a bluff is at least partly true.

This narrative, if true, is an eerie replay of the mixed messages sent to Saddam Hussein in the summer of 1991 about Kuwait. I don't know how accurate this article is, but the pattern of behavior since the Wall fell in 1989 has sustained through two administrations, with differing emphasis on means: NATO expansion as a prime goal, to the East. Hmmm, NATO in a political Drang Nach Osten . . .

I don't share your optimism about a unipolar world. It makes stability in the world pretty much dependent on the wisdom and sanity of the hegemon's leaders.

I didn't spout optimism. If you had read a bit more closely, each set up holds its own risks.

I don't have that much confidence in the US's elected leaders.

I have none in the elected leadership of Europe, Russia, nor the leaders in China. Any of those power blocs can, within a generation from today's writing, approximate the power of a global hegemon if America hits the skids due to a cracking economy. Someone will fill the power vacuum, just as the US did when Russia cracked. My money is on the Chinese, but that's speculation. More likely is a multipolar world, which holds significant risks, some of which make the Cold War seem a picnic.

As to American leadership, of late I've not seen a lot to recommend American leadership writ large in some endeavours, thanks to the Wilsonian/Jacksonian fusion that has characterized the Bush Administration. That will likely change as the administration changes.

Then throw terrorist pro1vocations in the mix, and the situation becomes very risky. Too much power in one nation's hands is dangerous, much like too much power in one person's hands is.

How are terrorists relevant to uni polar, bi polar, or multi polar power models?

The are not. They exist in all of those scenarios.

They tend to be extranational actors on the stage generally occupied by the powers, or power blocs, and are the random elements that make things a mess for everyone, yet who can, now and again, form alliances with various power blocs. Politics make for interesting bedfellows (See Soviet sponsorship/equipping of various guerilla movements during the Cold War, US support for the Contras or the Muj in Afghanistan, Chinese affiliation/friendship with for Albania, and so on, Cold War era. )

DR

 

[moon1969]

Bush is scared of Putin. Imperialist Russia is trying to bring back the Soviet Union. What will happend to Russia if they overthrow the government of Mikheil Saakashvili? Nothing because Bush is scared of Vladimir Josef Putin just like Roosevelt was scared of Josef Stalin in WW2. Finland didn"t start the Winter War. What did USA do to help Finland in the Winter War? NOTHING just like they will do nothing to help Georgia. I guess they have to help Estonia when Russia invades because Estonia is a member of EU and NATO.

 

[Darth Rotor]

Bush is scared of Putin.

Might be. I doubt it. I think even he looks at the art of the possible, and realizes some things are less practical than others.

Imperialist Russia is trying to bring back the Soviet Union.

Don't think so. Putin may be trying to reestablish a Russian Empire, but Soviet Union isn't it.

What will happend to Russia if they overthrow the government of Mikheil Saakashvili?

Good question, but it is OBE since the two parties seem to be calming down, as of today's news.

Nothing because Bush is scared of Vladimir Josef Putin just like Roosevelt was scared of Josef Stalin in WW2.

Yeah, nothing has changed since.

Finland didn"t start the Winter War. What did USA do to help Finland in the Winter War? NOTHING just like they will do nothing to help Georgia. I guess they have to help Estonia when Russia invades because Estonia is a member of EU and NATO.

FDR didn't have the political will, nor means, to help Finland in the Winter War. You might want to check the size of the US Army in 1939 - 1940. Less than three hundred thousand, (though mixing and matching reserves and National guards will as shown below, show that number to be flexible if TIME is allowed to spool up the Army.) The US Army also lacked a transporter beam to teleport them to Finnland in time to make a difference. Mobilization and equipping the US Army for WW II was known at the time to be a two year process. (From Chapter 19 of American Military History, published in 1989 by CMH. http://www.history.army.mil/books/AMH/amh-toc.htm) Bold and italics mine.

Immediately after the European war started the President proclaimed a limited national emergency and authorized increases in Regular Army and National Guard enlisted strengths to 227,000 and 235,000, respectively. He also proclaimed American neutrality in the war, but at his urging Congress presently gave indirect support to the western democracies by ending the prohibition on munitions sales to nations at war embodied in the Neutrality Act of 1937. British and French orders for munitions in turn helped to prepare American industry for the large-scale war production that was to come. When the quick destruction of Poland was followed by a lull in the war, the tempo of America s own defense preparations slackened.

However, long before the US ever declared war against Japan, its sailors and merchant seamen were in battle with the German Navy in the North Atlantic as a result of shipping things to England once the war began.

As to Georgia, see the article I offered up to egslim a few posts up: there appears to never have been an intention to back Georgia.

Estonia is a more delicate matter. The US is under no obligation to help due to EU membership, but any NATO nation is under Article V protection. (Or so the NATO head shed will assert. I wonder if Russia will test that.)

DR

 

[Cylinder]

Bush orders U.S. military to help Georgian civilians

President Bush said Wednesday he is dispatching U.S. military personnel to Georgia in a "vigorous and ongoing" mission to provide humanitarian aid to victims of the fighting between Russian and Georgian troops.

Shortly after Bush spoke, the White House announced that a U.S. Air Force C-17 cargo jet carrying medical supplies arrived in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi.

Another C-17 is to arrive in Tbilisi on Thursday carrying more supplies, including 104,000 doses of antibiotics requested by the Georgian Ministry of Health, a State Department spokesman said. The value of both shipments is $1.28 million, he said.

Bush said more U.S. military aid missions were planned by the Navy and Air Force.

 

[CapelDodger]

I disagree slightly: diplomacy is one means by which governments influence events outside their own territories. Other means include trade embargoes, most favored nation status, and more. Diplomacy is typically empty without a little bit of leverage of some sort -- information, future promises, force, money, trade -- behind it so something can be put on or taken off the table when deals are made. The general case is suasion, diplomacy is a subset of that case of governmental options for influence.

This from Lord Salisbury, who knew a thing or two about diplomacy :

"There is nothing dramatic in the success of a diplomatist. His victories are made up of a series of microscopic advantages; of a judicious suggestion here, or an opportune civility there; of a wise concession at one moment, and a far-sighted persistence at another; of sleepless tact, immovable calmness, and patience that no folly, no provocation, no blunders can shake."

It's the diplomat who gathers the information, who spreads disinformation ("A diplomat is a gentlemen who goes abroad to lie for his country"), threatens, promises, cajoles, blackmails, bribes, panders, and even less salubrious activities. Trade concessions and the like are just some of the things they can offer in exchange for a furtherance of national policy.

The various sources of power are used to influence, allegedly, events in pursuit of national interests and objectives. When watching the international scene, the model is pretty applicable, but the actual actions taken often leave one wondering how coherent aims and objectives are in some capitals.

Well, quite.

In the current case, I think the explanation lies in the isolated nature of the governing cabal. They don't get to hear dissenting voices. Their US contacts will be disproportionately neocon, since they take a special interest in Russia-baiting (apparently for its own sake). So the echo-chamber effect kicks in and another group-think fiasco goes ploughing into the sand.

It's all very sad.

I never said otherwise, and neither did Clausewitz.

Indeed, and I never intended to imply otherwise. I just come at the thing from a slightly different perspective.

Without a political objective, war has no purpose, unless the thrill of slaughter (and end in itself) is a national aim or goal.

The French have traditionally had a problem with la gloire, the Glory of France which can only be demonstrated in the field of battle. Not so much recently.

Fighting a war can have some dubious political objectives, of course. A leader can fight one just to improve their image. Saakashvili's profile has increased immensely over the last week. Medvedev has proved his mettle. And Putin has put everybody straight on who's really in charge. I spy a conspiracy ...

 

[Nogbad]

Bush is scared of Putin. Imperialist Russia is trying to bring back the Soviet Union. What will happend to Russia if they overthrow the government of Mikheil Saakashvili? Nothing because Bush is scared of Vladimir Josef Putin just like Roosevelt was scared of Josef Stalin in WW2. Finland didn"t start the Winter War. What did USA do to help Finland in the Winter War? NOTHING just like they will do nothing to help Georgia. I guess they have to help Estonia when Russia invades because Estonia is a member of EU and NATO.

Are we not getting a little carried away here?

The Georgians are not entirely without culpability in all this. There was an interesting quote in the Glasgow Herald today

"Meanwhile, in South Ossetia trouble stirred up from across the Russian border in North Ossetia led to a large-scale rising against the Georgians. The latter, who had never liked the Ossetians, repressed it ruthlessly. Thousands of Ossetians were killed and many thousands more sought refuge....." Fitzroy Maclean writing about the events of 1920 back in the 1970s.

When there is talk about the territorial integrity of Georgia what do we mean? Is it fair that two peoples with a long history of bloodshed are forced to share the same boundary. What of Serbia's territorial integrity?

Is Russia really going to invade Ukraine and the Baltic states? Ukraine is a big country.

 

[Darth Rotor]

This from Lord Salisbury, who knew a thing or two about diplomacy :

While that is a fine description, it and your following point are slightly out of date. The diplomat is hardly the prime source of information, even though he is a source of information, and disinformation. The year is 2008 as we speak.

It's the diplomat who gathers the information, who spreads disinformation ("A diplomat is a gentlemen who goes abroad to lie for his country"), threatens, promises, cajoles, blackmails, bribes, panders, and even less salubrious activities.

He can't do that without the other elements being present. He has nothing in his hand to deal with, and no hole card, as well as no ace up his sleeve. He is a catalyst, and a good one is worth his weight in gold, and more. Being able to fuse the offers and lies relating to what he has, or can sell people he has, in order to make a deal is a rare talent. It helps nations move forward with other nations.

Trade concessions and the like are just some of the things they can offer in exchange for a furtherance of national policy.

Right, he is drawing upon national economic power elements to get his job done. And some pure BS.

We seem to be in violent agreement, actually, with a subtle distinction on the relative importance of the diplomat. that varies with the scenario.

In the current case, I think the explanation lies in the isolated nature of the governing cabal. They don't get to hear dissenting voices.

Yes they do. What they don't seem to do is give a crap about dissenting opinions.

Their US contacts will be disproportionately neocon, since they take a special interest in Russia-baiting (apparently for its own sake).

Yes, more poor strategic thinking. This source of Russophobia might be better handled in another thread.

Indeed, and I never intended to imply otherwise. I just come at the thing from a slightly different perspective.

Aye.

The French have traditionally had a problem with la gloire, the Glory of France which can only be demonstrated in the field of battle. Not so much recently.

I think a better case of war for the aim of slaughter would be the Rwandan genocide of 1994, but that may be too simplistic an assessment.

Fighting a war can have some dubious political objectives, of course. A leader can fight one just to improve their image. Saakashvili's profile has increased immensely over the last week. Medvedev has proved his mettle. And Putin has put everybody straight on who's really in charge. I spy a conspiracy ...

I don't. Seems to me politics as usual. Once in power, Putin wasn't going to retire to any dacha, or ranch. He's still addicted, and has found a way to stay in the Game.

DR

 

[CapelDodger]

Might be.

Nah, Bush is too stupid to be frightened.

Don't think so. Putin may be trying to reestablish a Russian Empire, but Soviet Union isn't it.

Indeed. Putin's generation aren't lamenting the USSR, but they are still thinking in Great Power terms. Russia has been in the Great Power league for centuries, and in the Civilisation league back to Kiev a thousand years ago.

As to Estonia, the US is under no obligation to help due to EU membership, but any NATO nation is under Article V protection. (Or so the NATO head shed will assert. I wonder if Russia will test that.)

Such a test strikes me as incredible, and I draw my credibility line quite a way out. A NATO border is a neutralised border. Which is fine for Russia.

If Georgia were a NATO member matters would be very different, but a NATO that would have Georgia as a member is not the NATO we currently know and love. Which is why Georgia isn't a member, despite sponsorship by the US. (Which was probably an empty gesture, hey, talk costs nothing and it was never going to actually happen.)

So the US is flying in medicine as we speak (including lots of antibiotics by special request, apparently. Let's wait and see where that story goes, if anywhere). My outer cynic suspects they're shipping in stuff they've got to hand for the sake of shipping in stuff.

Eyebrows will be raised if they start to ship in arms or ammunition. I expect that'll be out-sourced to Ukrainians and Israelis. Maybe even Russians, who knows.

 

[CapelDodger]

We seem to be in violent agreement, actually, with a subtle distinction on the relative importance of the diplomat.

I'm a Brit who went to a school that was founded in the 17thCE. You're a bloody Colonial. As rational and educated beings we're going to see the same things, but from different perspectives.

I've got some reading to catch up on - I wasn't paying any attention until last week. I don't even know who the US Ambassador to Georgia is, let alone his background.

Condie Rice was out there not long ago, IIRC, and I'll bet she didn't tell Saakashvili to go poke the bear with a stick. Quite the reverse, in fact. Now she's having to go out there to show solidarity with the dickhead who poked the bear with a stick. Something which means infinitely more to the dickhead than it does to Rice. That must be galling.

The world is noticing that Bush isn't planning a visit yet. Unless I've missed something, which is quite possible; it's a fast-moving story.

 

[CapelDodger]

I don't. Seems to me politics as usual. Once in power, Putin wasn't going to retire to any dacha, or ranch. He's still addicted, and has found a way to stay in the Game.

My conspiracy involves Putin, Medvedev and Sacksville cooking it up together - and they'e all done well out of it.

Putin is in his prime; he ain't going nowhere. He's got decades in him. In an uncertain world, Putin (leveraged through Russia) could have a defining influence on the early 21stCE. Not by wild imperialist flings, a la Napoleon, but by being stable and dependable. A fixed-point to orient oneself by.

 

[CapelDodger]

When there is talk about the territorial integrity of Georgia what do we mean?

Well, there's the crux of the matter.

There's one school of thought which holds that territorial legitimacy is defined by lines on maps drawn by guys in suits far away. There's another school which regards that as a Western European model that does not translate well to other, very different environments.

Is it fair that two peoples with a long history of bloodshed are forced to share the same boundary.

Perhaps more to the point, is it tenable?

The Georgians don't actually lose anything in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. They're better off without them. They've demanded the right to national self-determination, but within the administrative borders defined by Stalin. And they've made those borders the measure of their own manhood.

It beggars belief, but that's mountain-folk for you. Being pissed-off about something is what they live for.

 

[Darth Rotor]

The Georgians don't actually lose anything in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. They're better off without them. They've demanded the right to national self-determination, but within the administrative borders defined by Stalin. And they've made those borders the measure of their own manhood.

It beggars belief, but that's mountain-folk for you. Being pissed-off about something is what they live for.

In another thread, this bloody Colonial (the economy, army and navy of which save Brit bacon a few decades back ) suggested that the Durand line is a load of bollocks, and that Pashtunia Irridenta is not an unreasonable position for the Pashtun to take. Why are those lines deemed sacrosanct? You seem sympathetic to that idea.

Similar fun with lines in Africa, of course, if one examines the butcher's bill for the past two generations.

DR

 

[Matteo Martini]

(..)
See the difference? In each case 2000 people die, but 2000 dead Americans leads to far more international trouble than 2000 dead Georgians.
(..)

As some people, especially Americans, are probably only concerned with the lives of their fellow citizens.
This explains why there is so much hatred against America all around the world.
And this hatred sooner or later will turn against the hated country, I fear for you..

 

[moon1969]

Russia will find another excuse to invade Ukraine or Estonia? Maybe someday it will be Finlands turn and then Finland can take Karelia back that Russia stoled from us in 1939.

 

[Matteo Martini]

Second Congo War 3.9 million dead. Mass targeting of civilians and the Pygmies kept getting eaten. I see a slight difference.

So, Sept. 11 was not a big deal, according to you?

 

[Matteo Martini]

Noted. You prefer the risks of a multipolar world, which means more conflict,

??
Evidence?

than the risks of a single global hegemon.

Who should be, let me guess.. uhm.. the US of America?

Six of one, half a dozen of another, each has its perils. Not everyone was happy with the Pax Romana either.

DR

Pretty much nobody was happy with the Pax Romana, except for the Romans!!