Russia invades Georgia

[Matteo Martini]

edited to add:
And before you describe 2000+ dead as "very nasty", it kind of pales in comparisson with a nuclear holocaust or WWII-scale conflict.

Again, so the attacks on the Twin Towers are of little/no importance for you as that, too, "kind of pales in comparisson with a nuclear holocaust or WWII-scale conflict"

 

[geni]

2000+ deaths in South Ossetia
2800 deaths on Sept. 11
I do not see much difference.
Do I?

Second Congo War 3.9 million dead. Mass targeting of civilians and the Pygmies kept getting eaten. I see a slight difference.

 

[egslim]

I would really understand from you why America (you included, I assume) still sees the attacks on Sept. 11 as one of the major crimes that happened in the recent past,

Bolding mine, that's where you are wrong.

I'll make it simple - partly hypothetical figures, just to illustrate the point:
- 2000 Georgians dead, Georgia pissed at Russia, Georgia impotent to do much against Russia, nothing else happens.
- 2000 Russians dead, Russia pissed at Georgia, Russia stomps on Georgia, little else happens.
- 2000 Americans dead, America pissed at Al Qaeda, America invades Afghanistan and Iraq, causes massive trouble.

See the difference? In each case 2000 people die, but 2000 dead Americans leads to far more international trouble than 2000 dead Georgians.

Georgia and the US have pretty much equally poor self-restraint - like most any other nation, but the US has a far greater capability to cause chaos.

 

[HAL 9000]

The Russians are doing everybody a favour by leaning heavily on the Chechens. They're Europe's Pashtuns, and must be held in check. What you mustn't do is hand them the keys to a sovereign nation and hope you can still be friends.

I find it quite offensive that you lump all Chechens as some kind of lawless people, and use this as a justification for the iron fist ruling of Ramzan Kadryov. You're doing Putin's job quite well for him. Why don't you take a look at the human rights abuses commited by Kadryov and his secret police. It's quite a bit more severe than just "leaning heavily".

 

[Darth Rotor]

OK: on Poland. Your use of threat was ambiguous. Poland, due to the relative power relationship with Russia, is no threat to Russia. That Poland prefers the West to the Russians is too effing bad for the Russians. They made their bed with their fifty years of being complete pricks to the Poles.

While the EU is not formally a security organization, the close political en economic integration within the EU means that if a member is invaded the organization will have to respond militarily. The organization is too intra-dependent to allow any of its members to be lost that way, especially in the Euro-area. And the EU has over three times the population and a much bigger economy than Russia, its military potential is far greater.

You have it completely backwards.

This potential is precisely why the EU is a paper tiger, in fact, unlike in your fantasy land of having the mobilized resources, leadership, and political will necessary to conduct collective security operations.

NATO on the other hand is in danger of becoming a paper tiger.

That is you playing with a crystal ball. It isn't one NOW, and while it may be on its way out (something I have suggested due to its nature as a coalition, and coalitions only sticking together for as long as they have common interest) it is presently one of the few collective security organizations that funcitons.

If the US had had its way Georgia would have been on its way to become a NATO member by now.

Stop it with the fantasy. NATO rules are clear: all must vote for, or new members don't arrive. So what if US is pro Georgia? If anyone else in NATO says no, it is no. It is that simple. That does not make NATO irrelevant. It makes it what it is, a coalition.

But I don't believe for a second that any other NATO member would have been willing to wage war with Russia over the lousy speck of real-estate that is Georgia. And such a refusal would be the end of NATO as a relevance.

Wrong again, on your last sentence. The rest of that paragraph I heartily concur with.

NATO continues, regardless of what out of area military operations it chooses to undertake, or not undertake. As a collective security organization, it retains, for the time being, the capacity to act, and the resources to do so. These resources include force offerings, standing forces, infrastructure of some depth, and the doctrine, embedded TTP and C2 resources to apply them, when the political will aligns.

That does not mean that in any case where it MIGHT act it MUST act. Otherwise, the Iraq war, a potential NATO out of area operation, would have ended NATO as a relevance. It didn't, even though NATO did not go there together. Yet NATO remains. Your assertion was empty.

Might it fold? Yes. Some of us have been predicting its demise since the mid 1990s', (which means I guessed wrongly, so be it) but like any large organization, it seems to find ways to justify its existence to those paying for it. The bigger it gets, the more like the UN, and thus more unable to act, it will become. That is another argument against letting Georgia in.

All that assumes a conventional military attack. But those are expensive and hold great risks for the attacker. Therefore an economic offensive is a much more likely threat.

I agree, economic suasion is typically resorted to first in power plays. Your economic offensive is a sloppy metaphor for the standard uses of leverage that happen day in and day out on the international political scene.

And that's where EU-membership offers much greater protection than NATO. Poorer nations are more vulnerable to economic pressure.

You are attempting once again, as you do time and again, to pretend that elements of power can be isolated.

They can't, they are inextriciably entwined. Which is ascendant at a given time is situation dependent. Economic protection is a different kind of security and power issue than is the protection offered by collective security, NATO's bread and butter for a very long time. The EU as an economic entity most certainly provides economic benefits to its members, yes. As I stated before, it is rubbish, a paper tiger, as a collective security organization. Your protestations on potential are not ever paper, they are vaporware.

Yes, poor nations are vulnerable to economic pressure, to INCLUDE the economic pressure exerted by the EU on them as a condition to join.

DR

 

[Darth Rotor]

War is diplomacy by special means. The killing is incidental.

Not quite, you are paraphrasing Clausewitz incorrectly here. His position in Vom Krieg was that war was an extension of policy by other means:
other meaning kinetic and physical means, versus talking and deal making
policy being the direction and aims of a political body (he tended to model those as led by kings or emperors.)

What war is, particularly in the modern age, is an act of politically initiatied force. The threat of this force is often used as leverage behind diplomatic moves and initiatives. Diplomacy involves deal making. War isn't a deal maker, it is pure suasion. (I'll keep beating you over the head until you do as I like, so to speak.)

DR

 

[Darth Rotor]

Tell me, why would former Soviet states entering NATO be a bad thing?

Why is diluting my beer with water a bad thing?

 

[Darth Rotor]

Unlike Georgia, Russia has enough brains not to cause entirely unnecessry trouble for itself.

Aye.

The first priority if you go to war is always to have a clearly defined, achievable objective. So far, the US doesn't have one in Iraq, only some vague ideas about ideal outcomes.

Without having such an objective it's impossible to say whether leveling Baghdad will help accomplish it.

After defining that objective, you should only go to war if you're willing and able to do what it takes to accomplish it. Otherwise, don't bother invading.

Aye. Weinberger Doctrine, differently stated.

The EU is able to defend itself, but it does not do force projection.

Right. Go back to where you were pretending EU wasn't a paper tiger. You actually agree with me, and don't realize it.

And you're quite wrong, the Caucasus is not in the EU's part of the world.

I agree completely.

The EU's core is Western Europe, we're still having difficulties digesting especially Bulgaria. The Caucasus is firmly in Russia's part.

Aye.

Your remark a post later on about hegemons is filled with a delightful paradox. In a unipolar world, wars tend to be small or gone. In a multipolar world, wars tend to flare up. The balance is a real bugger to manage. The more poles or nodes of power, the more potential for conflict by actors who deem that they have the odds of starting and finishing successfully a power move.

Georgia's leadership mistakenly seems to have considered Georgia itself as a node of power, or a channel for a node of power.

DR

 

[Darth Rotor]

It was actually an American who advised speaking with a soft voice while carrying a big stick. Cheney's screaming, with nothing more than a rolled up newspaper to back it up. Of course it sounds good for the US electorate, but to the rest of the world it's just stupid. As is McCain, by the way.

Never make a threat unless you can credibly back it up. Russia actually mentioned Ossetia as an example of what could happen if Kosovo declared independence.

Aye.

As for Russia's rights, the only universal right in international politics is "might makes right". Which is why the US could invade Iraq against overwhelming international opposition. In the Caucasus modern Russia has pretty much the same ability.

Aye. And about time the US reasserted its control over the Nueces strip.

The US has no business getting involved in the Caucasus. The US should have stayed out of that place.

Yes and no. There is no reason not to make friends and allies all over the world. The mistake is to assume no one else will care.

The US got involved because of the America-centric worldview that the US needs to be involved everywhere. Now the situation has become an embarassment for the US, and those who point out the America-centric worldview as the cause of this are accused of anti-Americanism.

Since the US has, from before its inception, been inolved in global/international trade, and international trade has been its life blood since inception, it is indeed a sound policy to be involved, in some way, in as many places as possible. That does not require having collective security deals with everyone, and the mix of styles of relationships in a given region isn't simple. See Africa for a better example than the Caucasus.

Americanism is NOT America-centrism. The Fouding Fathers supported the former, but they warned against the latter. In the modern world isolationism is a bad idea, but interventionism does not mean "intervening all over the world, all of the time".

Agree enough not to comment. The founding fathers were also not a world power. Time changed that, to the benefit of Europe on 1917 and 1941. Being a Power changes things for the political leadership.

Actually I want multiple counterparts to US power. And I prefer organizations like the EU, with their focus on political and economic development instead of military power - the latter is often too tempting to use. But since we can't always get what we want, others will have to suffice.

Your obsession with soft power au outrance surfaces again. It's a mix of hard and soft, always has been, that is the most effective in the long term.

Let me see: The US got us entangled in an intervention in Afghanistan, where the situation is now deteriorating. The US also brought us the conflict in Iraq, which is a major stability risk in an area vital for its oil supply. With accompanying higher oil prices, and no end in sight either.Russia stomped on Georgia, where we don't really care about.

Who is we?

Anyone interested in the global balance of economic power, to play your soft power line for a moment, has an interest in the entire Caucasus region, as it is a significant energy supply source for multiple nations who participate in the global economy.

It's safe to say that Bush has caused us more problems than Putin has.

Who is us? The Dutch?

That doesn't make me anti-American, but I am anti-American-centric. Big difference.

Noted. You prefer the risks of a multipolar world, which means more conflict, than the risks of a single global hegemon. Six of one, half a dozen of another, each has its perils. Not everyone was happy with the Pax Romana either.

DR

 

[Darth Rotor]

{from earlier post}But it is important that people realize Russia is a natural ally against Islamic terrorism. The fact that Russians are a bit less squeemish than most of the West also opens "interesting" possibilities for cooperation.

Yes. Funny, you agree with Bush, a few years back, on precisely what should have been a great bridge to US/Russian relations improving. That he departed from that line is a tragedy, IMO.

The first problem is that few, if any, NATO countries would really be willing to wage war against Russia to defend Georgia.

Yep.

For most of us Georgia is far from home. And it's not exactly a shining beacon of democracy either - to put it mildly. Among others, the country includes a number of seperatist regions - South Ossetia is only one of them. It's not worth fighting for the protection of a country that is in serious danger of falling apart all by itself.

Yep.

Second, I believe eastern Turkey has lousy logistics.

True, in spades.

Defending it against invasion is one thing - the mountains do most of that for you, and there is little worth conquering anyway. But using the area as a supply line to first send and then supply an army fighting in Georgia is a whole different kettle of fish.

The maritime option to run ships for logistic support through the Turkish Straits is fraught with political friction, due to the Montreux Convention of 1936. (Still in force, as far as I know.) Over land MSR's from Med ports to Eastern Turkey is not a trivial bit of friction.

DR

 

[Darth Rotor]

No but there are some really strong words coming from unusual places such as Sweden

How many divisions does Stockholm have, and what will to use them?

1. "The way in which the situation in South Ossetia has deteriorated is cause for profound concern.
2. It is extremely important that all those involved show restraint and play their part in bringing about a political solution," ...
3. "I am particularly concerned about the impact of the conflict on civilians. Georgia and Russia are dangerously close to war and there is a great risk of this spreading to other parts of the Caucasus."
4. Bildt further stated that the crisis is due to "provocations from the South Ossetian side" and that the Georgian forces are trying to "restore the constitutional order",and that the Russian bombing of Georgia is "very worrying and will demand a forceful reaction from the United Nations and the European Union."
5. [58] "No state has the right to intervene militarily in the territory of another state simply because there are individuals there with a passport issued by that state or who are nationals of the state.
   [*]GODWIN
   [*]On August 12 Bildt said in a telephone interview from the Georgian capital Tbilisi that: "Russia's military attacks on Georgia will damage both Moscow's and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's image abroad"
   [*]"Russia will sooner or later have to pay a high price for this,"
   [*]"It changes Russia's image, there is no doubt about it," he said, adding that the attacks bore witness to "a strong element of revenge, particularly from Prime Minister Putin."[]
   

Texas, let me address this point by point.
1. Of course. It has led to a small war.
2. Of course he calls for peace, he has no dog in the fight, and he has an image to maintain. Also, the war risks the oil pipeline in Georgia, which can have an effect on people in a lot of places.
3. He doesn't care if soldiers die, but if civilians do. Thanks, mister Swede. "Dangerously close to war" is a weird way of saying "their soldiers are shooting at one another, and Russian tanks are rolling into Georgia." UH, declared or not, seems to be a war, if a small one. Yes, there is a risk of escalation.
4. The EU and UN are paper tigers, and forceful reaction is most likely limited to trade sanctions. Bank assets frozen. Etc. That the SO's started this is news to me. I am interested in hearing about how that analysis was arrived at.
5. Might makes right, and it seems the SO's were appreciative of Russian help due to their distaste for Georgians. Likewise, the Bosnians were appreciative of the help from elsewhere thanks to their distaste for Serbs. And so on.
6. Tired of idiots doing this.
7. Damage Putin's image abroad? How? Medvedev is the president, and Putin's been playing "Hey, guys, we are back" for about three years. See his resumption of Bear flights near NATO and other Western airspace a while back. He wants his image and Russia's to change. They want to be once again reckoned with as A Power not to be trifled with. Seems he's doing a good job of that.
8. This is possible, but sounds like an empty threat to me.
9. Impotent whinging from the Swedes.
(I like Swedes, but this pol is letting his mouth outrun his lightweight arse.)

I realize that you fancy yourself as a master of realpolitik but Russia has miscalculated and is now reduced to its usual bluster but it will withdraw without achieving its objective of overthrowing the Georgian government and intimidation of its former satellites.

I respectfully disagree, Tex. Russia will use current position to negotiate a deal, it has already intimidated any number of neighbors, to one degree or another, and need not overthrow Georgia's government to make Putin's point, nor to achieve a local aim.

DR

 

[CapelDodger]

I seem to remember the Americans played some minor role in WWII.

They did nothing to help over Czechoslovakia in '38. When the Nazis rolled over it, Britain and France guaranteed Poland's integrity. The US did nothing. When the Nazis attacked Poland, Britain and France went to war with Germany. The US did nothing. When the Nazis invaded and occupied Denmark and Norway the US did nothing. When the Nazis invaded and occupied Holland and Belgium guess what the US did. (These were all democracies, byt the way, of which the US is famously a champion).

The US finally came into the war when the Japanese attacked it and Hitler declared war on it. At which point they were left with no choice.

the most racist thing I have read all day.

I'm too old to be politically correct.

You go up into those hills and tell me that's not the way things are. Mountain tribes are like that all over the world, it sort of comes with the territory. It's not true for all of them, of course, but it's a general rule.

There's nothing racist about that, is there?

 

[Whiplash]

Why can't we all just get along?

Some people don't want to.

 

[CapelDodger]

OK: on Poland. Your use of threat was ambiguous. Poland, due to the relative power relationship with Russia, is no threat to Russia. That Poland prefers the West to the Russians is too effing bad for the Russians. They made their bed with their fifty years of being complete pricks to the Poles.

Long enough for them to forget what the Germans had been like. Poor Poland. It's in such a terrible location for a country.

 

[egslim]

This potential is precisely why the EU is a paper tiger, in fact, unlike in your fantasy land of having the mobilized resources, leadership, and political will necessary to conduct collective security operations.

According to wikipedia "paper tiger" means something which seems as threatening as a tiger, but is really harmless.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paper_tiger

The EU does not match that description. First, because the EU does not seem threatening to anyone, second, because it does have sufficient military capability to defend itself. A paper tiger appears (militarily) stronger than it really is, the EU is the other way around: It appears to lack almost any military power, but its close integration means that if threatened its members are pretty much forced to defend each other.

That is you playing with a crystal ball. [...] it is presently one of the few collective security organizations that funcitons.

Which is why I said it is in danger of becoming, instead of stating it already is.
And how well does NATO actually function? As a defense against Russia it's not particularly useful anymore, and it barely operates as a collective in Afghanistan.

Stop it with the fantasy. NATO rules are clear: all must vote for, or new members don't arrive. So what if US is pro Georgia? If anyone else in NATO says no, it is no. It is that simple.

Which is why I said "If the US had had its way". The fact that the US did not have its way does not make it a fantasy.

NATO continues, regardless of what out of area military operations it chooses to undertake, or not undertake.

Defense of one of its members is not an out of area operation. The whole of NATO's credibility rests on the belief that an attack on any one of its members will be considered an attack on all. If that belief is proved wrong, NATO loses all credibility as a collective security organization.
That's why allowing members into NATO for whom the other members won't really be willing to wage war for is dangerous to the organization.

Without that belief its members will look to other alliances for their security. Gradually taking NATO's capabilities with them.

As for out of area operations I agree with you entirely. But defense of Georgia, had the US had its way to make Georgia a NATO member, would not have been an out of area operation.

That begs the question: The US wanted Georgia in NATO. Does that mean the US really would have been willing to wage war against Russia for defense of Georgia? Or was it a bluff?

Your remark a post later on about hegemons is filled with a delightful paradox. In a unipolar world, wars tend to be small or gone. In a multipolar world, wars tend to flare up.

I don't share your optimism about a unipolar world. It makes stability in the world pretty much dependent on the wisdom and sanity of the hegemon's leaders. I don't have that much confidence in the US's elected leaders. Then throw terrorist provocations in the mix, and the situation becomes very risky. Too much power in one nation's hands is dangerous, much like too much power in one person's hands is.

 

[OneShotKi11]

Ok i read that Russia is still pushing forward into Georgia.
Any truth to that, and why?
With this issue i am getting tons of mixed responses and mainly ******** from the media!
Dont know what to believe anymore...

 

[CapelDodger]

Georgia's leadership mistakenly seems to have considered Georgia itself as a node of power, or a channel for a node of power.

From what Bush said today that node of power is channeling in humanitarian aid and demanding open skies and open ports. They're also sending in Condie Rice .

The Russians seem to have let the mountain-men descend on Gori with their usual brutal enthusiasm. Bloody Russians should get a grip, but I doubt they'll bother. They're happily engaged in demolishing Georgia's military infrastructure and stealing all the copper wire they can spot.

I'm so glad I live in such a sensible place. South Wales isn't even on the way to anywhere important, and it's not worth anybody's trouble in itself.

 

[CapelDodger]

Ok i read that Russia is still pushing forward into Georgia.
Any truth to that, and why?
With this issue i am getting tons of mixed responses and mainly ******** from the media!
Dont know what to believe anymore...

It takes days at least to be sure of what's happened. It'll be weeks and months before we get the big picture; the before, the during, and the after.

There are definitely Russians on the move in Georgia proper. They seem to be engaged in destroying abandoned Georgian bases, blowing up or commandeering stores, and generally putting a severe crimp in the Georgians' ability to wage war.

 

[CapelDodger]

Not quite, you are paraphrasing Clausewitz incorrectly here. His position in Vom Krieg was that war was an extension of policy by other means:
other meaning kinetic and physical means, versus talking and deal making
policy being the direction and aims of a political body (he tended to model those as led by kings or emperors.)

What war is, particularly in the modern age, is an act of politically initiatied force. The threat of this force is often used as leverage behind diplomatic moves and initiatives. Diplomacy involves deal making. War isn't a deal maker, it is pure suasion. (I'll keep beating you over the head until you do as I like, so to speak.)

I'm misquoting Clausewitz deliberately, because I don't like the more usual form. Diplomacy is more than making deals, it's how governments influence events outside their own territories. It's how they communicate. Aggressive war influences events, so should be included in diplomacy, not in policies. Diplomacy acts in pursuit of national policies which are determined by governments.

That's how I see it, anyway. Long story short, modern war isn't (or at least shouldn't be) an end in itself. It has a political objective.

 

[OneShotKi11]

It takes days at least to be sure of what's happened. It'll be weeks and months before we get the big picture; the before, the during, and the after.

There are definitely Russians on the move in Georgia proper. They seem to be engaged in destroying abandoned Georgian bases, blowing up or commandeering stores, and generally putting a severe crimp in the Georgians' ability to wage war.

Ok thanks for the reply.

Then what the Russians are doing sounds logical. I see nothing wrong with it!
They won the battle now get to destroy their bases and go home.