Question for Gawdzilla

[Craig B]

Please explain how the "fascist" armies would invade American? That was nothing more than fantasy and fear mongering.

Gawdzilla didn't use the word invade, but "fight" the fascists in the US. And that's exactly what happened, for the Nazis in 1942 had one weapon that could strike at the USA in its own territorial waters, and they made effective use of it. See http://www.uboat.net/allies/ships/us_10thfleet.htm

When Admiral Doenitz launched Operation Paukenschlag in December of 1941, the five U-boats (U-125, U-123, U-66, U-130, U-109) of the initial wave sent against the United States found the east coast, for all practical purposes, un-defended. Admiral Andrews commanding Eastern Sea Frontier, had at his disposal:
4 Yard Patrol Boats, 4 Subchasers, 1 Coast Guard Cutter, 3 WW I "Eagle" boats, 103 aircraft, five of which were combat ready ...

The Paukenschlag boats arriving on the United States east coast in January 1942 found the merchant fleet sailing unescorted and with lights on at night. There was no radio discipline; ship and shore stations operated as if in peace time, broadcasting time signals and weather reports. Shoreside cities blazed with lights at night. The U-boats, hardly believing the bonanza offered them, rampaged up and down the coast with impunity, sinking everything in sight ...
Ladislas Farago, in his book "The Tenth Fleet", states the situation succinctly; "In the next fifteen months, the United States was to suffer a defeat compared with which Pearl Harbor was but a slap on the wrist."

My argument in a previous post was that such lack of preparedness was both surprising and unwarranted. Whether it can be blamed on isolationism, I don't know, but if anyone has an opinion, I would be happy to read it.

 

[Corsair 115]

My argument in a previous post was that such lack of preparedness was both surprising and unwarranted. Whether it can be blamed on isolationism, I don't know, but if anyone has an opinion, I would be happy to read it.

Part of the problem stemmed from an adherence to prewar theories on how to combat submarines. The USN still thought in terms of offence, with 'hunter-killer' groups which go out and actively seek enemy subs, a proposition which the RN had already found to be useless. Fighting subs is essentially a 'defensive' operation: you defend the likely targets, waiting for the enemy to strike. There was also a resistance to the use of convoys in spite of all the evidence indicating that was the best way to protect vulnerable merchant vessels (the negatives to convoying were given more weight than their positives).

 

[Craig B]

The USN still thought in terms of offence, with 'hunter-killer' groups which go out and actively seek enemy subs, a proposition which the RN had already found to be useless.

Well, if that was the doctrine, and I have read that it was, the resources made available to apply it were woefully inadequate: 4 Yard Patrol Boats, 4 Subchasers, 1 Coast Guard Cutter, 3 WW I "Eagle" boats, 103 aircraft, five of which were combat ready. I'm also baffled at the reluctance to organise convoys. The British, at first equally reluctant, learned the hard way in 1914 to 1918, but the lesson once learned was very clear. Moreover it had been known and practiced in the French wars more that a century before that.

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

http://mises.org/misesreview_detail.aspx?control=122

Silly, silly story.

 

[Craig B]

Silly, silly story.

Earlier in this thread we were examining the thesis that the war policies of Japan and the USA were determined by Stalin via the superhuman powers of cunning commie agents, later unmasked by HUAC. Now it seems they were also manipulated by equally devious British operatives straight out of Kipling and Buchan, but with alluring seductresses thrown in.

Dear God! Did the Russkies and the Brits have some kind of demarcation deal about what bits of the US government they would take charge of? What was FDR doing about all this?

 

[catsmate]

I avoid alternate history, you can "prove" anything.

Well of course, that's part of the fun. Of course you can't get a successful Nazi invasion of Britain without the ASBs.

That’s because it is true. British intelligence had a hand in faking Gallop poll results on American isolationist sentiments and Gawdzilla fell for it.

Now, now, we're talking about real history, not alternate history.

From the inside, via useful idiots like yourself.

Look it up.

Exactly. Pelley and his Silly Shirts, Coughlan, the DAB and similar.

http://mises.org/misesreview_detail.aspx?control=122

Really? A nonsensical book and a dubious "historian"?
Oh and the von Mises institute is about as reliable source as metapedia.

Silly, silly story.

Exactly. But it supports his opinions so...........

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

Exactly. But it supports his opinions so...........

So does the Völkischer Beobachter.

 

[SpitfireIX]

Part of the problem stemmed from an adherence to prewar theories on how to combat submarines. The USN still thought in terms of offence, with 'hunter-killer' groups which go out and actively seek enemy subs, a proposition which the RN had already found to be useless. Fighting subs is essentially a 'defensive' operation: you defend the likely targets, waiting for the enemy to strike. There was also a resistance to the use of convoys in spite of all the evidence indicating that was the best way to protect vulnerable merchant vessels (the negatives to convoying were given more weight than their positives).

Of course, it became a lot more effective later in the war, with improvements in weapons, sensors, equipment, tactics, doctrine, intelligence, [ETA: training,] and numbers.

ETA: That's not to say that the need for strong convoy escorts ever went away.

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

Of course, it became a lot more effective later in the war, with improvements in weapons, sensors, equipment, tactics, doctrine, intelligence, [ETA: training,] and numbers.

ETA: That's not to say that the need for strong convoy escorts ever went away.

The H-K groups built around jeep carriers was, I believe, important in the later improvement in the success rate. Which leads me to a question: Did any aircraft from a jeep carrier intercept and down a Condor?

 

[HansMustermann]

TBH, when comparing tanks, we should probably take into account more than gun caliber and mm of armour. E.g., off the top of my head,

- steel quality. Actual tank crews found the hard way that the Czech steel in the Pz-38(t) tended to shatter on impact and cause a lot of shrapnel inside the tank, even for non-perpendicular hits, more so than the face-hardened armour on German tanks. So maybe the raw comparison of mm of steel is misleading a bit.

- suspension. The British got a prototype Czech tank to evaluate whether to buy some, and they rejected it because it was too bumpy a ride to shoot the gun even at 5mph. You had to do a full stop to fire, if you wanted to hit anything.

Though it should be said that NO WW2 tank was really able to fire accurately while moving, and the Germans didn't seem to have much trouble using the Pz-38(t). So maybe it was just the British. Or maybe just for the Germans it was better than driving a Pz-II against a T-34.

- optics. A handicap Soviet tanks had against the German ones, and one reason why their losses were higher, was that basically the Germans could aim their gun better. I have no idea how good the Czech optics were, so it's hard to say how well they'd fare.

- ammo. The Soviets are a prime example there too, as they were pretty much the last to figure out that APHE anti-tank ammo is crap. Whereas on the other side, the Germans had their penetration limited by an acute lack of tungsten for making better AP cores. I have no idea what the ammo situation was for the Czechs in '38, so it's hard to say how it would influence the outcome.

- radios. You guessed, this was a major problem for the Soviets, whose tanks had to act on their own instead of any semblance of coordination. The Czechs did have radios though, so at least theoretically they could have coordinated just as well as the Germans.

- crew. A lot of early tanks had very small crews, leaving the commander too busy loading and shooting the main gun, to actually concentrate on using his periscope and commanding the tank. In all fairness, other nations (e.g., France) had the same problem. But so did the Czechs. The tank commander had to load and fire the main gun and the turret machinegun, leaving him with pretty much no time in combat to look around the tank and command. The Germans actually added another crew member to fix that problem. So basically the Pz-35(t) would have fared worse in that aspect for the Czechs than it did for the Germans.

- crew communication. It shouldn't even be a separate category, because you'd think it's obvious that the tank commander should be able to command the other guys effectively. But in the Czech version of the Pz-35(t), the commander couldn't actually talk to the crew. He was alone in he turret, with the other guys in the hull, and all he could do to signal them was to press a button so a coloured light turns on in the hull. It's as incredibly stupid as it sounds, and as much of a handicap. The Germans replaced that with an intercom. So, again, it would have performed worse for the Czechs than for the Germans.

- engine. Since we talked about gasoline being a disadvantage, yeah, the Czech tanks had gasoline engines too. The engine also wasn't packed in its own compartment, so, yeah, one good shot towards the back of the hull would cook the crew. Then again, the German tanks usable in Fall Grun ran on gasoline too. So no advantage for either side there.

Etc.

 

[MaGZ]

Silly, silly story.

In a previous thread you said you had no intention to reading the book. I think I understand why. All that research you did on Gallop polls as evidence Americans were not isolationist would prove a waste of time.

If you never read the book how would you know it was silly?

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

In a previous thread you said you had no intention to reading the book. I think I understand why. All that research you did on Gallop polls as evidence Americans were not isolationist would prove a waste of time.

If you never read the book how would you know it was silly?

I don't waste time on garbage.

 

[HansMustermann]

My argument in a previous post was that such lack of preparedness was both surprising and unwarranted. Whether it can be blamed on isolationism, I don't know, but if anyone has an opinion, I would be happy to read it.

Hmm, well, we'll probably never know, but at a wild guess, it may be just a matter of priorities.

While for the UK and Japan shipping was essential, by virtue of having a moat around the country , shipping along the coast of the USA seams somewhat less important. The USA had a pretty good road and railway network to get just about anything from point A to point B, so even complete interdiction of maritime trading along the coast (which never actually got THAT far), would not be as crippling.

I'm also guessing that the sheer lack of ships made it necessary to prioritize. The USA had given most of its destroyers to the UK, and while they weren't very well suited for sub hunting, they were still better than nothing. This left the USA rather short on destroyers, and with even fewer in the production pipeline. So, you know, between coastal shipping, trans-atlantic convoys, and the whole war in the Pacific, SOMETHING had to draw the shorter straw. As I was saying in the previous paragraph, shipping along the coast seems like the most obvious choice for leaving unprotected.

Then there's the issue that the destroyers they still did have, were piss-poor designed for sub hunting anyway. They were designed as fleet screening ships, which means among other things that high speed counts, turning rate not so much. For sub hunting it's the other way around. Anyway, since you're comparing it to the brits, the UK had good ASW destroyers, the USA pretty much didn't. Even when they did start sticking destroyers in the convoys, it would be some time until they started actually making all that much of a difference.

I'm also guessing that it was a matter of guessing wrong. The Type VII submarine, which comprised almost ALL the German sub fleet, just didn't have enough fuel to go all the way to the USA and back even on the surface. (Except maybe if you put a mast and a sail on it)

Only the very new Type IX had enough fuel for that, and even that one had to make most of the way on the surface. There's a reason why Germany sent only 5 subs there: because it had 6 of those new subs total, at the time. The sixth was having mechanical problems.

Since those were new, I'm guessing the USA might have thought that it's simply outside the range of German submarines at first. Which means they also hadn't planned to build good ASW escort ships either.

 

[HansMustermann]

Also, I think that saying it was fifteen months, is a little misleading. The real unprotected phase was more like January 1942 to about April 1942, since by the end of March the USA had actually received some ASW ships and airplanes from the UK and was starting to take measures to minimize ship losses. Plus, for all the quips about the Canadian military, they actually did have ASW ships and started escorting American convoys around the same time.

By May 1942, actually the USA did have a full convoy system, and Germany was starting to look for easier pickings elsewhere, after losing a few submarines.

And the whole problem continued at a lower intensity until August 1942 at most, and after may, mostly elsewhere than simply going along the eastern coast. After May, they were actually going for the shipping in the Caribbean, and in July they were shifted back to the middle of the Atlantic.

So basically while the USA were not prepared for that, they also weren't, you know, completely retarded. The fact that they didn't have protected convoys at first, doesn't mean that continued for 15 months. It's really more like 3 months.

 

[Craig B]

... I'm also guessing that the sheer lack of ships made it necessary to prioritize. The USA had given most of its destroyers to the UK, and while they weren't very well suited for sub hunting, they were still better than nothing.

Given most of its destroyers? The deal is well remembered in the UK, where it is felt that the USA did quite well out of it. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Destroyers_for_Bases_Agreement

fifty mothballed destroyers were transferred to the United Kingdom from the United States Navy in exchange for land rights on British possessions. The destroyers became the Town-class, and were named after British towns if there was a United States town of the same name, as the agreement contained rigid clauses regarding naming ... In exchange, the US was granted land in various British possessions for the establishment of naval or air bases, on ninety-nine-year rent-free leases, on:
Newfoundland (today part of the Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador), Eastern side of the Bahamas, Southern coast of Jamaica, Western coast of St. Lucia, West coast of Trinidad (Gulf of Paria), Antigua
British Guiana (present day Guyana) within fifty miles of Georgetown
The agreement also granted the US air and naval base rights in:
The Great Sound and Castle Harbour, Bermuda, South and eastern coasts of Newfoundland ...
Britain had no choice but to accept the deal, but it was so much more advantageous to America than Britain that Churchill's aide John Colville compared it to the USSR's relationship with Finland.

Please do not read this as criticism of the USA. Like any country it made the best arrangements it could in its own interest.

 

[HansMustermann]

I'm not saying it was a bad deal for the USA, or anything. I'm just saying that for all their faults -- chief of which being that they weren't any good against subs -- they could have still dropped a few depth charges or shot their guns at subs in that coast shipping screw-up. Some of the waters where those attacks in very early '42 happened were too shallow for a sub to even go below periscope depth, much less to do much dodging a destroyer.

And a lot of the attacks on unprotected convoys were on the surface with the guns. Having a few more destroyers to return the fire with a lot more guns if you even try a surface attack, well, it might have, if nothing else, limited the attacks to how many torpedoes that sub carried.

 

[Craig B]

I'm not saying it was a bad deal for the USA, or anything. I'm just saying that for all their faults --

Problem wasn't only that they were destroyers, but that they were obsolete and dilapidated. See wiki

The US ... transferred in return 50 US Navy destroyers "generally referred to as the twelve hundred-ton type" (also known in references as "flush-deck" destroyers, or "four-pipers" after their four funnels). ... The destroyers were in reserve from the massive US World War I shipbuilding program, and many of the vessels required extensive overhaul due to the fact that many were not preserved properly when inactivated; one British admiral called them the "worst destroyers I had ever seen", and only 30 were in service by May 1941. Churchill also disliked the deal, but his advisers persuaded the prime minister to merely tell Roosevelt that: We have so far only been able to bring a few of your fifty destroyers into action on account of the many defects which they naturally develop when exposed to Atlantic weather after having been laid up so long.

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

I wonder if part of the problem wasn't that the RN didn't want the ships in the first place. Negative expectations and all that.

 

[Craig B]

I wonder if part of the problem wasn't that the RN didn't want the ships in the first place. Negative expectations and all that.

Yes. Perhaps the RN were a bit unhappy, given their glorious traditions, to have to depend on Uncle Sam's hand-me-downs. However, they weren't very good ships, by all accounts; and the price paid for them, even if only in imperial prestige, was not negligible.

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

Yes. Perhaps the RN were a bit unhappy, given their glorious traditions, to have to depend on Uncle Sam's hand-me-downs. However, they weren't very good ships, by all accounts; and the price paid for them, even if only in imperial prestige, was not negligible.

They did get them going eventually and they served well enough for coastal convoying and harbor patrols.

A thought on the state of preservation. The Reserve Fleet was laid up after WWI ended and the Washington Naval Treaty made the large number of escorts unnecessary. To keep the ships sea-worthy the Navy rotated them into active service, no ships were laid up and not moved for the entire inter-war period. The purpose was to make sure the ships were ready if there was a sudden need for them, as in this case. I'd love to see the actually reports on the condition of the ships when they arrived. It would also be informative to see when those ships had last seen active service (how long had they been laid up?), etc.