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Question for Gawdzilla

And the air force still needs supply and somewhere to launch from. The Czech airfields were the first target.
Did the German army have the capability to bomb them out of operatoin?
As I say, though. It would have been a very different war. Note that Britain and France would really have not had much in the way of useful airpower.
The relative strengths (GB and F vs G) were very much in the German favour at that point.
Another factor to look at is the strength of the German army in 1938 versus that in 1939. It was still in the process of expanding, and also profited from the Czech possessions, e.g., in tanks.

What do you make of the numbers put forth by Carroll Quigley here? He says that the Czech army alone outmanned the German army and severely outgunned it in tanks.
 
As I say, though. It would have been a very different war. Note that Britain and France would really have not had much in the way of useful airpower.
The relative strengths (GB and F vs G) were very much in the German favour at that point.
The Entente powers had modern planes either already in production, or at least as flying prototypes. Could they not have put them into mass production during the course of hostilities? The Germans did not have heavy bombers that could have demolished French or British industry in a swift strike at the beginning of a war.

Also, the Soviet Union would have had its defences intact along its border. By 1941 these had been more or less abandoned, but defensive works on the new border were not yet complete. The successes enjoyed by the Germans in 1941 would not have occurred in 1938.
 
Did the German army have the capability to bomb them out of operatoin?
Pretty much, as they did with the Poles the following year.
All the Czech airfields were within range of German bombers, barring one or two in Slovakia.
Another factor to look at is the strength of the German army in 1938 versus that in 1939. It was still in the process of expanding, and also profited from the Czech possessions, e.g., in tanks.

What do you make of the numbers put forth by Carroll Quigley here? He says that the Czech army alone outmanned the German army and severely outgunned it in tanks.

For the tanks he talks of the Czechs having hundreds of tanks with 75mm guns.
The 35(t) had (IIRC) a 37mm gun, the same as its German opposition.
Indeed I don't get where he has the idea they were 38 ton tanks. They were 12 tons (or less?).
Ah, good old wiki...10.5 tons.

His figures for allied aircraft seem inflated as well. And I'm not sure 1500 aircraft for the Germans is correct either.

But the tank side ignores how they were expected to be used, which was to be a key factor in 1940.
 
The Entente powers had modern planes either already in production, or at least as flying prototypes. Could they not have put them into mass production during the course of hostilities? The Germans did not have heavy bombers that could have demolished French or British industry in a swift strike at the beginning of a war.

Production was stepped up in '38, but most of the aircraft used by Britain and France in the first few months of the war were built in 1939.

The first 4 Hurricanes to enter service entered it in December 1938.
500 were to enter service up to September 1939.

So we're talking about a war in which the Germans start with bf109s and the British have no active Hurricanes.

The French position was no different.

Basically the Entente were a couple of years behind Germany. We could out produce Germany, but the expected turn around point was 1941.

Also, the Soviet Union would have had its defences intact along its border. By 1941 these had been more or less abandoned, but defensive works on the new border were not yet complete. The successes enjoyed by the Germans in 1941 would not have occurred in 1938.

Yeah, in a war starting in Czechoslovakia I'm not sure the Russian defences would matter all that much.
However, note that we're all talking about the soviets moving to aid the Czechs...which means they're no longer in their defences.

But, yes. Again, a very different war. And once you go much beyond "would Czechoslovakia have fallen" the variables make it almost impossible to come to any conclusion.

Well, apart from the likelihood of a German defeat.

There's the question of US involvement as well, which I was thinking about this morning. And Japan. After all, they hadn't suffered a Khalkin Gol in 1938.
 
For the tanks he talks of the Czechs having hundreds of tanks with 75mm guns.
The 35(t) had (IIRC) a 37mm gun, the same as its German opposition.

It's not really the same as the opposition, though. The main German tanks in '38 were the Pz-I (machinegun) and Pz-II (autocannon, IIRC using HE ammo)
 
It's not really the same as the opposition, though. The main German tanks in '38 were the Pz-I (machinegun) and Pz-II (autocannon, IIRC using HE ammo)

That's as may be, but the article is clearly trying to talk up the Czech forces in order to bolster his argument. And he's plain old wrong.

And I'll say again. It's not the types of tank you have, but how you use them. And air superiority (which I keep coming back to as well).
 
Someone mentioned the S&T wargame of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
I found a TOAW scenario of it (for those of you that might have that computer game).

No idea how accurate it would be in terms of force balance.

TOAW = The Operational Art Of War.
 
Indeed I don't get where he has the idea they were 38 ton tanks.

Ooh, I think I figured out that one.

The Czech tanks captured by the Germans were renamed to Pz-38(t) and Pz-35(t). Obviously he thinks the "t" in Pz-38(t) stands for "tons". It actually stands for "czech". (Which is written with a "t" in German.) :p

He also obviously fails to distinguish between the LT-35 (which would be renamed to Pz-35(t)) and the LT-38 (a.k.a., Pz-38(t)) which the Czech army didn't even have already. But that's less funny than someone pretending to be an expert thinking it means 38 tons :p

By '42, most of the remaining Pz-38(t) had their turret removed and were converted into Marder III vehicles, some of which did have a German 75mm gun. (And others had a Soviet 76mm gun.) I think it's obvious he thinks the high-velocity 75mm gun was there from the start in the Czech tanks.

Geeze. That's so funny :p
 
... once you go much beyond "would Czechoslovakia have fallen" the variables make it almost impossible to come to any conclusion.

Well, apart from the likelihood of a German defeat.
I often think of this: in exercises of this kind we consider probable outcomes of conflicts based on the resources and weapons available to the belligerents. On that basis, who would have predicted the outcome of the German offensive against France in 1940?
 
For the tanks he talks of the Czechs having hundreds of tanks with 75mm guns.
The 35(t) had (IIRC) a 37mm gun, the same as its German opposition.
Indeed I don't get where he has the idea they were 38 ton tanks. They were 12 tons (or less?).
Ah, good old wiki...10.5 tons.

His figures for allied aircraft seem inflated as well. And I'm not sure 1500 aircraft for the Germans is correct either.

But the tank side ignores how they were expected to be used, which was to be a key factor in 1940.
Germans:
Pzkpf I 810
Pzkpf II 932
Pzkpf III 239
Pzkpf IV 57

Czech:
Model 35 1030
Model 38 212

The P-I was a machine gun carrier in all but name, vulnerable to every ATW in service, even anti-tank rifles. The P-II and P-III were better armoured but vulnerable to 37mm cannon-fire; the P-IV was in service in small numbers, scattered in the infantry support role.
Both Czech tanks carried the 37mm Skoda cannon though the M38 has far better front/side armour, nearly immune to 37mm fire.
The main problems with the Czech tanks were poor doctrine and lack of radios. However their armoured force was vastly superior to that of Poland.

The Czechs did have a superior medium tank, the ST39, in prototype; this had armour superior to any of the German or Czech tanks in service, plus a powerful 47mm gun. It was also faster than them and had a power/weight ratio superior to all but the P-IV.
 
PzKw-I and -II were primarily intended to train truppen and to learn how to lead/use/supply tank forces. After the -IVs were well into service some of the -Is and -IIs were turned over to the "peacekeeping" forces for police use.
 
PzKw-I and -II were primarily intended to train truppen and to learn how to lead/use/supply tank forces. After the -IVs were well into service some of the -Is and -IIs were turned over to the "peacekeeping" forces for police use.
True, but for the earlier campaigns and especially an allohistorical Case Green, they'd saw front line use. As long as they only encountered infantry they did OK. The Czechs had ~150 MG armed tankettes in service also.
BTW the Wiki comparison of early WW2 tanks may be useful.
 
Thanks for that. The impression that isolationism was very strong on the eve of Pearl Harbour is still quite widespread.

That’s because it is true. British intelligence had a hand in faking Gallop poll results on American isolationist sentiments and Gawdzilla fell for it.
 
Two different topics there. FDR wanted to get into the European War to save England and prevent us from eventually having to fight the Fascists here. The convoy problem was bad management on the part of the Navy.

Please explain how the "fascist" armies would invade American? That was nothing more than fantasy and fear mongering.
 
That’s because it is true. British intelligence had a hand in faking Gallop poll results on American isolationist sentiments and Gawdzilla fell for it.
British intelligence faked the results of US opinion surveys published in the USA? Do you have a source for this? But it is true that the USA entered the war only when it was attacked by Japan, and when Germany declared war on it, so a desire to intervene voluntarily could not have been overwhelming.
 
British intelligence faked the results of US opinion surveys published in the USA? Do you have a source for this? But it is true that the USA entered the war only when it was attacked by Japan, and when Germany declared war on it, so a desire to intervene voluntarily could not have been overwhelming.

The polls that showed American support for violations of neutrality were rigged by British agents. "British intelligence had `penetrated' the Gallup organization.... British intelligence officer David Ogilvy later wrote about his days at Gallup: `I could not have had a better boss than Dr. Gallup. His confidence in me was such that I do not recall his ever reading any of the reports I wrote in his name'" (p. 75). By careful manipulation of the questions asked, results could be contrived to order. "In 1940 and 1941, BSC [British Security Coordination] rigged a series of polls...to project the notion that the members of prominent organizations were pro-British, avidly in favor of intervention, and intensely antagonistic toward America First" (p. 77).

http://mises.org/misesreview_detail.aspx?control=122
 
http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=285

The book is marred by careless errors. Misspellings abound, including the names of William Dudley Pelley, Allan Nevins, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, Eugene Roseboom, and Henry Morgenthau. Senator J. Bennett Clark is really Bennett Champ Clark. (Worst of all, the first name of this reviewer is misspelled on five separate occasions.)

At times language is sloppy and polemical. Pollster Elmo Roper is a “Henry Luce minion.” Dies committee investigator J. B. Matthews, admittedly a volatile figure in the world of ideological combat, is three times referred to as a drunk.

More significant, there is hardly an interventionist group that Mahl does not label a “British interventionist front,” basing his claim on a boast of British operations officer Sidney (Bill) Morrell. Similarly, prominent interventionists who cooperated with British operatives are portrayed as their instrument, and Mahl writes without inhibition that the New York Herald Tribune was “a tool of British intelligence” (p. 157). Certainly innuendo is clear in a sentence that reads: “[John J.] Pershing’s eloquent speech was written for him by Walter Lippmann, who was working with British intelligence and had pressed so hard for [Wendell] Willkie.” The British underground officer Richard Ellis might have been influential in the OSS, but one doubts whether he at any time actually ran the agency. Some public opinion polls were manipulated, if in no other way than the framing of the questions, and Mahl shows that some polling agencies had ardently pro-British staffers. It was, however, certainly unlikely that “all” the major published polls were “under the influence of British intelligence, its friends, employees, and agents” (p. 69).
Some contrary facts are not taken into account. If female British agents seduced Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg in hopes of converting him to interventionism, they were not entirely successful, for all during 1941 he continued to speak and vote against FDR’s proposals. One could agree with Mahl that Americans were deprived of a genuine choice in the 1940 presidential election, for Republican candidate Willkie was as interventionist as Roosevelt. The GOP standard-bearer, however, was not above pandering to anti-interventionist sentiment, as witnessed by his claim that a Democratic victory would lead to full-scale American belligerency within six months. The Cull study, mentioned earlier, shows that British propaganda efforts were severely weakened by bureaucratic rivalries, thus many efforts were highly ineffective.

Mahl does not does shy away from presenting a conspiratorial view. In fact, he asks,

How does the historian avoid the charge he is indulging in conspiracy theory when he explores the activities of a thousand people, occupying two floors of Rockefeller Center, in their efforts to involve the United States in a major war? What should we properly call the rigging of a public opinion poll, the planting of a lover, or a fraudulent letter by an intelligence agency in order to gain information or influence policy? (p. xi)

Certainly the British were involved in secret efforts, some of which were worse than shady. Anyone who worries about the health of a democracy cannot but be disturbed when any foreign power surreptitiously plays such a significant role in molding opinion and manipulating policy. At the same time, Mahl is wrong in his implicit assumption that the British played the crucial role in energizing American intervention, that most prominent FDR backers he discusses were little more than British puppets, and that Roosevelt’s policies usually lacked the support of his countrymen. Some line of distinction must be drawn between interventionist moves plotted by the British and those fostered by Americans on their own. By his overstatements Mahl mars what could have been a superb study.
 

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