Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

Look, it's pretty clear what really happened: the U.S. let the Japanese successfully attack Pearl Harbor. The Japanese found out about this, felt bad about winning an unfair fight. So in return they let the U.S. win at Midway to balance the scales. (I mean, really, how else can one plausibly explain how the Japanese lost that battle? Letting a critical search plane be delayed for thirty minutes while the rest are all sent off on schedule? Needing a second strike to knock out Midway's airfield? A search plane which finds the U.S. carriers but which then has a radio failure? Loading, unloading, and loading aircraft for an anti-ship strike? Clearly, such actions can only be explained by Japanese complicity to deliberately lose the battle, thus giving the U.S. a "false" victory like the one the Japanese had at Pearl Harbor. It's blindingly obvious, I tell ya!)

Nice, but you're gonna have to somehow work the Battle of the Coral Sea into that one.
 
Look, it's pretty clear what really happened: the U.S. let the Japanese successfully attack Pearl Harbor. The Japanese found out about this, felt bad about winning an unfair fight. So in return they let the U.S. win at Midway to balance the scales. (I mean, really, how else can one plausibly explain how the Japanese lost that battle? Letting a critical search plane be delayed for thirty minutes while the rest are all sent off on schedule? Needing a second strike to knock out Midway's airfield? A search plane which finds the U.S. carriers but which then has a radio failure? Loading, unloading, and loading aircraft for an anti-ship strike? Clearly, such actions can only be explained by Japanese complicity to deliberately lose the battle, thus giving the U.S. a "false" victory like the one the Japanese had at Pearl Harbor. It's blindingly obvious, I tell ya!)

Which means that all of WWII was a setup so the NWO/aliens/Illuminati could kill off a lot of people and consolidate their power.
 
I've sort of been baiting a little trap in regard to the argument that FDR and his fellow conspirators would have warned Pearl Harbor the day before. It turns out that at least one of the group agreed with this approach: Frank Knox. One of Knox's close friends, James Stahlman, wrote to Admiral Kemp Tolley in 1973 that Knox told him that the night before the attack, he (Knox), Stimson, Marshall, Stark, and Hopkins met at the White House to discuss the impending attack on Pearl Harbor, that they knew Pearl Harbor was about to be attacked (Toland, Infamy, pp. 319-320).

Now this is revealing and especially important because it was this same Frank Knox who was absolutely certain that a warning message had been sent to Pearl Harbor on the night of December 6. When he arrived in Hawaii a few days after the attack to conduct an investigation, he and his aide, Captain Frank Beatty, repeatedly asked Kimmel and Layton if they had received the warning message that "we" had sent them late at night on December 6. Knox was literally stunned when he learned that no such warning had been received. He mentioned this warning several times in a memo to FDR a few days later, and FDR never contradicted him on the matter. In his memo to FDR, he assumed the warning that was received after the attack was the one that he knew had been sent late at night on December 6.

What most likely happened was that Colonel French, at Marshall's direction, nixed the late-night warning but of course didn't inform Knox of this action. So when Knox arrived in Hawaii a few days after the attack, he was certain that a late-night warning had been sent and was baffled as to why Kimmel and Short had not received it.

Admiral Theobald was in the room when Knox asked Kimmel about the December 6 warning and saw the look of shock come over Knox's face when Kimmel said he had not received that message. Theobald relates that Knox turned to Beatty and asked in stunned disbelief how this could be, and Beatty was so surprised that he was speechless. Theobald recounts this in The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor. Admiral Layton recounts in And I Was There how Beatty and Knox were so surprised when he told him that he, as the Fleet Intelligence Officer, was unaware of any 12/6 late-night warning from Washington, that he'd neither seen nor heard of any such warning.

So Knox and perhaps one or two other plotters wanted to warn Kimmel and Short the night before to give them enough time to put up a decent fight. But FDR and others in the group refused to let that warning go out, just as they had blocked warnings to Pearl Harbor about the bomb plot messages (which clearly showed a unique Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor's defenses--the kind of info that the Japanese requested about Pearl Harbor was not requested about any other harbor).

Now, let me guess what's going to happen: The traditionalists here are going to summarily reject Stahlman's disclosure and will claim that Knox was just "confused" about the late-night warning, even though it fits with what they've said would have been done as part of a plot to let the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor and even though Stahlman's disclosure gives it credence.
 
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The Japanese say their ships did not transmit. Are they lying? Are they wrong?

What exactly would prevent Knox and Stahlman from being confused, regardless of what narrative it fits? You have, at best, a third-order source. Does the book explicitly say that they knew, for a fact, that there would be an attack the next day?

Also, who are you talking to? Did you crosspost this on another forum?

What most likely happened was that Colonel French, at Marshall's direction, nixed the late-night warning but of course didn't inform Knox of this action. So when Knox arrived in Hawaii a few days after the attack, he was certain that a late-night warning had been sent and was baffled as to why Kimmel and Short had not received it.
Whoops, you're trying to present speculation as fact again. What were the other, "less likely" possibilities, pray tell?
 
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I've sort of been baiting a little trap in regard to the argument that FDR and his fellow conspirators would have warned Pearl Harbor the day before. It turns out that at least one of the group agreed with this approach: Frank Knox. One of Knox's close friends, James Stahlman, wrote to Admiral Kemp Tolley in 1973 that Knox told him that the night before the attack, he (Knox), Stimson, Marshall, Stark, and Hopkins met at the White House to discuss the impending attack on Pearl Harbor, that they knew Pearl Harbor was about to be attacked (Toland, Infamy, pp. 319-320).

Now this is revealing and especially important because it was this same Frank Knox who was absolutely certain that a warning message had been sent to Pearl Harbor on the night of December 6. When he arrived in Hawaii a few days after the attack to conduct an investigation, he and his aide, Captain Frank Beatty, repeatedly asked Kimmel and Layton if they had received the warning message that "we" had sent them late at night on December 6. Knox was literally stunned when he learned that no such warning had been received. He mentioned this warning several times in a memo to FDR a few days later, and FDR never contradicted him on the matter. In his memo to FDR, he assumed the warning that was received after the attack was the one that he knew had been sent late at night on December 6.

What most likely happened was that Colonel French, at Marshall's direction, nixed the late-night warning but of course didn't inform Knox of this action. So when Knox arrived in Hawaii a few days after the attack, he was certain that a late-night warning had been sent and was baffled as to why Kimmel and Short had not received it.

Admiral Theobald was in the room when Knox asked Kimmel about the December 6 warning and saw the look of shock come over Knox's face when Kimmel said he had not received that message. Theobald relates that Knox turned to Beatty and asked in stunned disbelief how this could be, and Beatty was so surprised that he was speechless. Theobald recounts this in The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor. Admiral Layton recounts in And I Was There how Beatty and Knox were so surprised when he told him that he, as the Fleet Intelligence Officer, was unaware of any 12/6 late-night warning from Washington, that he'd neither seen nor heard of any such warning.

So Knox and perhaps one or two other plotters wanted to warn Kimmel and Short the night before to give them enough time to put up a decent fight. But FDR and others in the group refused to let that warning go out, just as they had blocked warnings to Pearl Harbor about the bomb plot messages (which clearly showed a unique Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor's defenses--the kind of info that the Japanese requested about Pearl Harbor was not requested about any other harbor).

Now, let me guess what's going to happen: The traditionalists here are going to summarily reject Stahlman's disclosure and will claim that Knox was just "confused" about the late-night warning, even though it fits with what they've said would have been done as part of a plot to let the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor and even though Stahlman's disclosure gives it credence.

No, we're unlikely to give third hand information only told 32 years after the fact without any form of actual supporting evidence that at a meeting with the Secretaries of the Army and Navy, the Chiefs of Staff for both services the POTUS and his "go to guy" such a momentous decision was made, no official record was kept. Also, is it actually your contention that, after deciding to warn PH, that the Army Chief of Staff, on the direction of the POTUS countermanded the order to warn a military installation of an impending attack?
 
No, we're unlikely to give third hand information only told 32 years after the fact without any form of actual supporting evidence that at a meeting with the Secretaries of the Army and Navy, the Chiefs of Staff for both services the POTUS and his "go to guy" such a momentous decision was made, no official record was kept. Also, is it actually your contention that, after deciding to warn PH, that the Army Chief of Staff, on the direction of the POTUS countermanded the order to warn a military installation of an impending attack?

"Hearsay evidence may be taken as gospel provided it supports the current theory. Otherwise it should be ignored."

CT Handbook. Chapter 3, verse 9.

BTW, we know where everybody was that night, so this meeting is a non-starter.
 
BTW, we know where everybody was that night, so this meeting is a non-starter.

That was the first question in my head.
Were these people actually all together on the 6th?

Bit like the Coventry conspiracy and Churchill, where the alledged meeting could not have taken place when it was claimed to have done.
 
... Knox told him that the night before the attack, he (Knox), Stimson, Marshall, Stark, and Hopkins met at the White House to discuss the impending attack on Pearl Harbor, that they knew Pearl Harbor was about to be attacked (Toland, Infamy, pp. 319-320).


How did they know Pearl Harbor was about to be attacked?
 
May I add the following for all those following Bob's sad tail of made up stuff?


Collective....yawn
 
I could be confused but wasn't radio communication with PH spotty at times and the direct communication not operational at the time of the attack? I seem to recall this from another PH thread. Can anyone clear this up?
 
I've sort of been baiting a little trap in regard to the argument that FDR and his fellow conspirators would have warned Pearl Harbor the day before. It turns out that at least one of the group agreed with this approach: Frank Knox. One of Knox's close friends, James Stahlman, wrote to Admiral Kemp Tolley in 1973 that Knox told him that the night before the attack, he (Knox), Stimson, Marshall, Stark, and Hopkins met at the White House to discuss the impending attack on Pearl Harbor, that they knew Pearl Harbor was about to be attacked (Toland, Infamy, pp. 319-320).

<snip>

Now, let me guess what's going to happen: The traditionalists here are going to summarily reject Stahlman's disclosure and will claim that Knox was just "confused" about the late-night warning, even though it fits with what they've said would have been done as part of a plot to let the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor and even though Stahlman's disclosure gives it credence.

Even if Stahlman did send such a letter, how can we know it was the truth? I find it quite incredible that he (an arch conservative newspaper publisher and segregationist) would have kept this information to himself for over thirty years, and then suddenly choose to reveal it in a letter to Adm. Tolley.
 
That was the first question in my head.
Were these people actually all together on the 6th?

Bit like the Coventry conspiracy and Churchill, where the alledged meeting could not have taken place when it was claimed to have done.

Lt. Cdr. Kramer had to chase all over DC to find these people. If there had been such a meeting it would have come out in the Congressional Hearings.

Oh, wait! Everybody, but everybody, lied to Congress. How could I have forgotten.
 
I could be confused but wasn't radio communication with PH spotty at times and the direct communication not operational at the time of the attack? I seem to recall this from another PH thread. Can anyone clear this up?

Solar flares were screwing up coms. Only the strongest xmitters could punch through. The Army and Navy had 20kw sets, Western Union had a 40kw xmitter. The alert messages went via W.U. to make sure they got through.
 
Another long post from Bob that offers nothing but what some book says about what someone else said about what some third party did. And every time I see some CT saying something like 'I've been baiting a little trap' it always seems to translate to: 'I made a mess of my previous argument but I'm going to pretend it was intentional.'
 
Another long post from Bob that offers nothing but what some book says about what someone else said about what some third party did. And every time I see some CT saying something like 'I've been baiting a little trap' it always seems to translate to: 'I made a mess of my previous argument but I'm going to pretend it was intentional.'

"Ah, you fell for my fiendish plot, Constable Dooright!"
 

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