Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

Care then to explain why MacArthur's air force was almost entirely caught on the ground by a Japanese air raid more than eight hours after the Pearl Harbor raid?

Ooo Ooo Pick me I know this one. McArthur got most of his aircraft up pretty quick but could not get permission to attack. Ultimately they began to need to land again to refuel....and bang the Japanese bounced them
 
Questions for you to answer:

  • Why do Japanese sources state that the task force sailed under strict radio silence?
  • If the task force didn't follow radio silence, then why do Japanese accounts lie about this?
  • If the task force did transmit radio messages, what was the content and purpose of such messages?
  • Why would a task force engaged on a secret, risky mission be required to or otherwise choose to transmit radio messages?
How many times must I pose these same questions before getting some sort of reply?

When a CTer gets caught and can't figure out how to get out of a thread instead of just not posting, he fabricates and ignores.
 
Here is what I would do if I was a task force commander sailing under radio silence and I had to get an urgen message back to my base.

I would choose one of my fast destroyers and get it to steam at full speed away from my task force for 24 hours or so and then get it to send the message in as brief a form as possible.

In the real world a ship very rarely has to transmit anything. What is more usual is to receive signals.

What would the Japanese fleet be transmitting so often that they could be tracked across the Pacific and how many ships were transmitting it for the claim of it being a huge target etc?

Were they all at it? Is it like the Trawlers in the North Sea used to be, singing songs and playing records to each other all night?
 
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=8677778&postcount=374

A = Adcock aerial system
F = Fixed frame coil aerial system
L = loop aerial system
R = Rotating frame coil aerial system
SECOND LETTER
A = Alternative HF/DF or MF/DF
C = Common aerial. For simultaneous reception on HF and MF but alternative DF.
H = HF/DF only
M = MF/DF only
S = Simultaneous HF/DF and MF/DF.

This appears to be a (partial) list of radio equipment available to the Canadian Navy at various times throughout the war.

You've referred to it twice, but even so neither you, nor bobtaftan, nor the rest of us seem to be any closer to knowing what advanced military radio equipment (if any) was installed on Grogan's cruise ship on the dates in question.

The list is data. What information, exactly, are you trying to communicate with that data?
 
When a CTer gets caught and can't figure out how to get out of a thread instead of just not posting, he fabricates and ignores.


That's okay, I can be as stubborn as a mule at times, so I'm likely to be repeating my questions often as long as the claim that the task force transmitted gets raised. :)
 
What would the Japanese fleet be transmitting so often that they could be tracked across the Pacific and how many ships were transmitting it for the claim of it being a huge target etc?
Once again, a CT unravels in the face of common sense.
 
This appears to be a (partial) list of radio equipment available to the Canadian Navy at various times throughout the war.

You've referred to it twice, but even so neither you, nor bobtaftan, nor the rest of us seem to be any closer to knowing what advanced military radio equipment (if any) was installed on Grogan's cruise ship on the dates in question.

The list is data. What information, exactly, are you trying to communicate with that data?

Exactly. What equipment a fighting ship had in the War has nothing to do with what a Cruise Liner would have had pre-war.
 
Strange that direction finding using VHF equipment (common frequency range for comms) without the use of a loop aerial is very succesfull in the african bush.

Sure, if you use a high gain beam antenna, you can get a good idea of the bearing something is from you.
Consider a Yagi: a half-wave dipole with a passive element about 5% longer (the reflector) on one side of it, and a series of passive slightly shorter dipoles (the directors) on the other side of it. The longer they are, and the more directors they have, the more directional they are. A typical 3 element Yagi on the 2M band (VHF) will be about half a wavelength wide and half a wavelength long. At a two meter wavelength, this is about three feet long and three feet wide. A pretty reasonable thing to rotate, or even put a handle on and carry around in the bush.

At 400 kHz, the wavelength is around 2450 feet -- nearly half a mile. The halfwave dipole, though, is only half that, so it will only need to be around 1200 feet wide and 1200 feet long. That's still hard to put on a ship.
 
Nagumo had permission to break radio silence for contact with a strong USN force or something similar. There was no need. Kido Butai did not transmit.

(I need to put that in my sig.)

Thats a conversation I would love to have heard lol
 
Sure, if you use a high gain beam antenna, you can get a good idea of the bearing something is from you.
Consider a Yagi: a half-wave dipole with a passive element about 5% longer (the reflector) on one side of it, and a series of passive slightly shorter dipoles (the directors) on the other side of it. The longer they are, and the more directors they have, the more directional they are. A typical 3 element Yagi on the 2M band (VHF) will be about half a wavelength wide and half a wavelength long. At a two meter wavelength, this is about three feet long and three feet wide. A pretty reasonable thing to rotate, or even put a handle on and carry around in the bush.

At 400 kHz, the wavelength is around 2450 feet -- nearly half a mile. The halfwave dipole, though, is only half that, so it will only need to be around 1200 feet wide and 1200 feet long. That's still hard to put on a ship.

Google Adcock aerial, loop aerial,fixed frame aerial and rotating frame aerial.
All of these are ship mounted and are not of the huge dimensions you posit.
The Adcock antenna was patented in 1919.

Exactly. What equipment a fighting ship had in the War has nothing to do with what a Cruise Liner would have had pre-war.
I certainly did not assert that the liner had the same equipment as a warship.
What I did assert was that the technology was available and not only to the Canadians.

This appears to be a (partial) list of radio equipment available to the Canadian Navy at various times throughout the war.
You've referred to it twice, but even so neither you, nor bobtaftan, nor the rest of us seem to be any closer to knowing what advanced military radio equipment (if any) was installed on Grogan's cruise ship on the dates in question.
The list is data. What information, exactly, are you trying to communicate with that data?
If you look at the link I posted you will see a more complete list.
I first quoted the list to show that the technology was available in the 40's.
The second time i quoted it was to refute the assertion that HF/DF need to be of gigantic proportions and couldn't be fitted to a ship.
I made no assertions other than the DF argument is not relevant to refuting bobtaftfan's argument.
 
We know technology was available but what was fitted to a Merchant Cruise Liner in the 1930s?

Why would they need any kind of DF gear above the minimum required to find radio beacons sometimes?

Cruise Liners were better equipped to send and receive messages for passengers, They had well fitted telegraph stations. RDF was for finding fixed Navigation Beacons, not locating other ships.
 
RDF was for finding fixed Navigation Beacons, not locating other ships.

RDF can be used to triangulate the position of other ships who are transmitting radio signals.

It does not matter whether the source of the transmission is stationary or mobile.

You only require the ship to be transmitting.

Now whether or not the Japanese fleet was transmitting or not remains to be seen.

My point is if the Japanese were transmitting, then any ship in range with the most rudimentary RDF would be able to perform this triangulation.

This triangulation can be done with only one receiver whether the transmitter or receiver were mobile or stationary.

This is a fact as shown by the game tracking example I provided.
It does not matter whether you use VHF or HF, the principle remains the same.

I disagree with bobtaftfan's assertion that this direction finding could have discerned the number of ships in the Japanese fleet as not all of the ships would have been transmitting and the resolution of the RDF is not sufficient to make this distinction anyway.

ETA: History
John Stone Stone patented the first direction finding system in 1902 (U.S. Patent 716,134). Alternate and improved direction finding systems were invented by Lee de Forest in 1904 (U.S. Patent 771,819), and by Italian engineers Ettore Bellini and Alessandro Tosi in 1909 (U.S. Patent 943,960). In 1919, British Army Officer Frank Adcock proposed an improved direction finding antenna design Adcock antenna (UK Patent 130,490).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_direction_finder
 
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While the RF discussion is somewhat interesting, it is ultimately irrelevant in regards to the thread's subject unless some solid evidence is provided that the Japanese task force did actually transmit during its voyage. No such evidence has been provided. Surely the Japanese records on this point would be the most relevant, and those records indicate the task force sailed under strict radio silence. That leaves proponents of the theory to explain why (a) the Japanese accounts lied about the task force transmitting, and (b) what those transmissions which were made were about—why was a fleet engaged on a risky, secret mission making so many radio transmissions?

One has to remember the purpose of the ship-carried DF equipment of the time: It was meant for homing in on a target, or a port. Actually, it had ways of distinguishing between opposite bearings, without triangulation (using an auxiliary antenna, for those with technical interest), but then you simply headed in the indicated direction, taking new bearings on the way, till you had visual contact.

Hans
 
While the RF discussion is somewhat interesting, it is ultimately irrelevant in regards to the thread's subject unless some solid evidence is provided that the Japanese task force did actually transmit during its voyage. No such evidence has been provided. Surely the Japanese records on this point would be the most relevant, and those records indicate the task force sailed under strict radio silence. That leaves proponents of the theory to explain why (a) the Japanese accounts lied about the task force transmitting, and (b) what those transmissions which were made were about—why was a fleet engaged on a risky, secret mission making so many radio transmissions?

So true. Even if we choose to distrust Japanese records *), there is the question of common sense. Radio silence on the way to an attack was SOP for the era, to a degree still is. The reason is obvious: Notwithstanding the shortcomings of DF of the era, eager radio chatter will alert even the dumbest enemy that something is cooking. It is simply not plausible that some of the best Japanese commanders would fall into such a silly trap.


Hans

*) This might have some merit: In eastern culture there is a distinct tendency to report what you think your superiours want to hear, rather than what actually happened.
 
Strange that direction finding using VHF equipment (common frequency range for comms) without the use of a loop aerial is very succesfull in the african bush.

The key is VHF. With a short wavelenght, a directional antenna becomes small and nandy.

Have you ever seen a directional, turnable HF antenna? They exist; some radio hams use them, and some embassies still sport them. Imagine the skeleton of a 30 foot fish, made in thin metal pipes, and supported by stringers, and you have a good picture. Good lick with installing, not to mention operating, such a contraption on a sea-going vessel.

Hence the loop arials.

The USA must have been pretty thick if they believed Pearl Harbour was not a serious target for the Japanese.

The world was at war, the Japanese were allies with the Germans and the germans were already attacking the american liberty ships.

Oh, there were defenses, they just didn't consider it a very likely target. The Japanese strategy up to then (and afterwards, too) was one of piecemeal conquest, taking the nearest targets first. The idea that they might swoop in and try for a single, decisive battle was not very obvious.

There is no doubt that the Americans underestimated the Japanese capability. Up till Pearl Harbour, they had been mainly attacking enemies that were distinctly inferiour. Japan was a difficult territory, intelligence-wise, anf much too little was known of e.g. the performance of their aricraft. The Zero fighter was a very nasty surprise for the Americans.

Hans
 

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