Origins of Covid

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I never did see these "multiple accidents" from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, but I haven't followed the thread here close enough. Google isn't helping me.
There have been no reported accidents at the WIV.
The point is that 2 incidents in 2004 in Beijing are not an argument for unsafe WIV labs. They were detected, thus it is probable that any WIV incident would be detected. They were reported, thus it is probable that any WIV incident would be reported. There is the extra awareness of safety from the accidents. There is 15 years of improved safety technology.
 
Reporting all biosafety errors could improve labs worldwide – and increase public trust in biological research
Without a standardized, international framework for reporting laboratory incidents and responses, the task of mitigating such risks is quite difficult. If laboratories were more open about when things go wrong, others could learn from their mistakes and lessen the chances of a future accident. ...

By contrast, when an accident occurs with a biological material, it is not a spectacular event like an explosion or meltdown. A disease caused by a biological organism takes time to appear. It may take days or weeks for symptoms to present after infection. ...

Here in the U.S., several well-documented laboratory errors have resulted in potential exposures, including the 2014 unintentional release of potentially viable anthrax bacteria, the 2014 potential exposure of a laboratory technician to Ebola virus and the 2015 discovery of improperly inactivated anthrax bacteria that was shipped around the globe. In each case, medical care was provided and no one became ill.

Biological incident reporting
In the U.S., a standardized system to report all biological incidents and potential exposures does not exist. ...

Outside the U.S., the robustness of biosafety and biosecurity oversight varies significantly from country to country.


Laboratory-Acquired Infection (LAI) Database [note the SARS CoV 2 exposure/infection I cited above is not yet on the list.]

The following are from the database, occurring in China between 2003 and 2021 with 2 earlier incidents that were detected by later serosurveillance. Each quote below was taken from separate incidents using the search term, "China". Keep in mind, these are only reported incidents.

World Health Organization. 2004. "China confirms SARS infection in another previously reported case; summary of cases to date. Update 5." http://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_04_30/en/print.html Accessed on 5/5/2008.


How LAI / exposure occurred: This paper has identified a number of instances in China in which laboratory personnel were infected with epidemic hemorrhagic fever, caused by hantavirus. They use this information to create a fault tree diagram, which can be used to identify ways to prevent future LAIs. Details on the individual LAIs were not identified in the paper.


Date(s) of LAI / exposure: 04/03/2021, 06/03/2021

Location where LAI / exposure occurred: Beijing, China

Occupation(s) of affected personnel: veterinary surgeon, veterinarian ...

Agent(s) involved: Monkey B virus, Herpes B virus, Macacine alphaherpesvirus 1 ...

How LAI / exposure occurred: The veterinarian performed necropsies on two "monkeys," two days apart. ...

Follow-up procedures taken: The veterinarian experienced symptoms approximately 1 month after the potential exposure, and died on May 27, 2021. Cerebrospinal fluid taken before death showed viral load to monkey B virus but not to other viruses. ...

References
Wenling Wang, Wenjie Qi, Jingyuan Liu, Haijun Du, Li Zhao, Yang Zheng, Guoxing Wang, Yang Pan, Baoying Huang, Zhaomin Feng, Daitao Zhang, Peng Yang, Jun Han, Quanyi Wang, Wenjie Tan. First Human Infection Case of Monkey B Virus Identified in China, 2021J. China CDC Weekly, 2021, 3(29): 632-633. doi: 10.46234/ccdcw2021.154


How LAI / exposure occurred: A "sheep anatomy experiment" (possibly dissection?) was performed in an animal medical school. At least 30 students were present; 27 students and one teacher were found to be positive for brucellosis. ...

References
Yanyu, L. 2011-09-04. "Dean, secretary deposed after group infection." Retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-09/04/content_13614791.htm


Follow-up procedures taken: Researcher was hospitalized. Since this case was reported on 22 April 2004, Chinese authorities confirmed a diagnosis of SARS in five persons. Testing was completed on another four patients who have SARS-like symptoms and a history of close contact with a known case.

Actions that may have been taken to prevent exposure: Investigation of the source of the outbreak focused on lapses in biosafety procedures at the National Institute of Virology. The institute was closed on 23 April 2004 and its staff were placed in isolation. ...

References
China confirms SARS infection in another previously reported case; summary of cases to date – Update 5 - https://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_04_30/en/


How LAI / exposure occurred: This article is actually about diagnostic techniques used on cases of SARS, but mentions in passing and provides references to other articles about 13 SARS LAIs: "6 exposed while working in the laboratory and 7 contacts of a patient with a laboratory-acquired case." ...

References
Liang, G., Q. Chen, J. Xu, Y. Liu, W. Lim, J.S.M. Peiris, L.J. Anderson, L. Ruan, H. Li, B. Kan, B. Di, P. Cheng, K.H. Chan, D.D. Erdman, S. Gu, X. Yan, W. Liang, D. Zhou, L. Haynes, S. Duan, X. Zhang, H. Zheng, Y. Gao, S. Tong, D. Li, L. Fang, P. Qin, and W. Xu. 2004. "Laboratory diagnosis of four recent, sporadic cases of community-acquired SARS, Guangdong Province, China." Emerg. Infect. Dis. 10(10):1774-1781. doi:10.3201/eid1010.040445


Follow-up procedures taken: Regulatory concerns are described in the Government Accountability Report [Chinese students in the US]. Some individuals had elevated titers to C.burnetii.

Actions that may have been taken to prevent exposure: The location of the exposure is disputed by the research institution. An individual with a high titer worked for many years in a clinical laboratory in China, and C. burnetii was present in that laboratory. ...

References
High Containment Laboratories National Strategy for Oversight is Needed. United States Government Accountability Office. GAO 09-574. Available online https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-09-574-09-574.


Setting in which LAI / exposure occured: vaccine production factory

Device or equipment involved: waste gas decontamination unit ...

How LAI / exposure occurred: A company producing brucellosis vaccines used expired disinfectant, resulting in incomplete sterilization of the "waste gas" from the fermentation tank. This gas was released outside the facility, and exposed the population downwind. At the time of publication, 3245 people had tested positive for brucellosis. ...

Follow-up procedures taken: The facility has lost its licenses to produce brucellosis vaccines. At the time of publication, 21,847 people had been tested for brucellosis, and those who tested positive (3,245) are being given medical treatment. Counseling, telephone hotlines, brochures, and other methods are being used to provide information to the public. ...

Agency(ies) LAI / exposure reported to: Federal government agency ...
References
ProMED-mail. Brucellosis - China (Gansu). ProMED-mail 2020; 15 Sep: 20200917.7789740. <http://www.promedmail.org>. Accessed 19 Sep 2020.


Setting: Veterinary research...

How LAI / exposure occurred: Little information about this outbreak is available, but according to various press releases and websites, "dozens" (96 according to two sources) of Chinese researchers from the Lanzhou Veterinary Research Institute (Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences) have tested positive for brucellosis antibodies. These reports claim that none of the researchers, at least some of whom worked in a food-and-mouth disease prevention lab, have shown clinical symptoms (there is some conflicting information there), and it is not known how they were exposed. One source claims that research mice were infertile, and the cause of that infertility was determined to be Brucellosis. Upon discovering that, personnel who worked in that lab were tested and also found to be positive for Brucella antibodies. ...

References
ProMed mail. 2019. "Brucellosis-China: (GS) veterinary institute, RFI." http://promedmail.org/post20191209.6831365 AND Paulk, D. (ed). 2019. "96 Chinese veterinary researchers infected with Brucellosis." https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1004935/96-chinese-veterinary-researchers-infected-with-brucellosis AND Popescu, S. (ed) 2019. "Investigations into Chinese lab outbreaks." The Pandora Report. December 20, 2019. https://pandorareport.org/2019/12/20/pandora-report-12-20-2019/


I cited the following lab accident above:
Setting in which LAI / exposure occured: Laboratory ...

Procedure being performed: Research with laboratory rats and mice

How LAI / exposure occurred: Transmission of hantaviruses among rodents and from rodents to humans generally occurs through inhalation of aerosolized excreta. All 8 students conducted their research in the same department and had direct contact with a colony of laboratory rats and mice in the animal facility in the pharmaceutical laboratory building. ...

Follow-up procedures taken: All patients met the national clinical criteria of HFRS, required hospitalization, and were treated in Shenyang Infectious Hospital. Fever, proteinuria, and mild hemorrhagic complications were observed in all patients, but without the distinct clinical stages seen in the severe form of the disease caused by HTNV.

Actions that may have been taken to prevent exposure: Serologic and genetic analyses suggest that the HFRS outbreak was caused by transmission of SEOV, which was circulating among local wild rats; the wild rats passed the virus to laboratory rats, which then infected humans. ...

References
Zhang, Yong-Zhen, et al. "Seoul virus and hantavirus disease, Shenyang, People’s Republic of China." Emerg Infect Dis 15.2 (2009): 200-206.


Date(s) of LAI / exposure: 2006-2016

Location where LAI / exposure occurred: China

Occupation(s) of affected personnel: Microbiological technicians, laboratory cleaners, ...

Agent(s) involved: Brucella spp. ...

Procedure being performed: Routine diagnostics on patient samples

How LAI / exposure occurred: Brucella spp Infections - Five patients were infected by handling suspect Brucella strains. - Two patients were infected by handling blood culture samples from patients with brucellosis. - Two patients were infected while cleaning up the microbiology laboratory waste. - All accidental infections occurred due to substandard laboratory safety conditions, manipulations outside biological safety cabinets, or inadequate personal protective equipment. ...

Follow-up procedures taken: Eight patients were first diagnosed with brucellosis by bacteriology test. A serology test was used in one case.

Actions that may have been taken to prevent exposure: - Educating clinicians and laboratory staff on hazards of Brucella spp - Education on the appropriate PPE for protection when working with isolates suspected or confirmed for Brucella spp. - Avoiding the manipulation of unknown patient samples and isolates on an open bench - Using biosafety cabinets - Avoiding performing procedures that generate aerosols (e.g. vortexing) - Promoting the use of biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories when handling specimens from patients suspected of Brucella infection ...

References
https://www.authorea.com/users/3530...tion-and-s2-vaccine-infection-events-in-china


Hantavirus antibodies found in 2 animal handlers in routine surveillance. ...

References
Wong, T.W., Y.C. Chan, E.H. Yap, Y.G. Joo, H.W.Lee, P.-W. Lee. R. Yanagihara, C.J. Gibbs, and D.C. Gajdusek. 1988. "Serological evidence of hantavirus infection in laboratory rats and personnel." Int. J. Epidemiol. 17(4):887-890.


More SARS:
How LAI / exposure occurred: At least four individuals may been infected with SARS at the Institute. These include the two laboratory workers reported in April, and two additional laboratory workers. These two additional laboratory workers appear to have suffered from SARS-like illnesses in early February 2004. Recent laboratory tests performed at a national reference laboratory were positive for SARS antibodies. The use of inactivated SARS coronavirus, which was not tested to determine the effectiveness of the inactivation, in a general laboratory at the Institute appears the most cause of the outbreak. ...
Follow-up procedures taken: During the investigation, it became apparent that all the positive workers worked in the same general laboratory at the Institute. Although no research involving live SARS virus was known to have taken place in this laboratory, SARS coronavirus that had been inactivated in a BSL-3 laboratory in the Institute was used on several occasions during the early months of 2004 in experiments carried out in this area. The timing of the use of inactivated SARS coronavirus in the general laboratory coincides with the presence there of all the positive workers and with their likely incubation periods. ...

References
WHO/WPR - Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Investigation into China´s recent SARS outbreak yields important lessons for global public health. 2 July, 2004. http://www.wpro.who.int/sars/docs/update/update_07022004.asp


SARS and polio virus type 1; the article that appeared in the Lancet included additional lab exposures in Taiwan and Singapore:
How LAI / exposure occurred: At the time this article was written, the exposure to SARS that resulted in infection of 2 researchers was not known. Secondary and tertiary cases were linked to the LAI; including the fatal infection of the mother of the infected researcher. The article includes a good description of the first incident, which occurred in Singapore, in which a graduate student was infected while working in a BL3 facility to grow West Nile virus."Inappropriate laboratory procedures led to cross-contamination of the West Nile virus with SARS. There is also a good description of the second incident resulting in a SARS LAI in Taiwan. The researcher had been working in BL4 for long hours each day over a long period, and was exposed from droplets when cleaning a spill in the laboratory transport chamber. The threat of polio reintroduction was described when a reference strain of poliovirus type ! was isolated from a child with diarrhea. The child's parent worked at a factory where inactivated polio vaccine was produced from that strain; an accident had occurred at the plant. The child was fully immunized, but was a carrier. SARS exposure in Chinese CDC Lab Normile, D 2004: unknown, the individuals developed symptoms on 25/3/2004, and 17/4/2004, respectively ...

Follow-up procedures taken: SARS exposure in Chinese CDC Lab Normile, D 2004: Once SARS was recognized, the Chinese government ramped up response immediately. The lab was closed and more than 200 institute employees were quarantined. Additional contacts outside the workplace were also quarantine

Actions that may have been taken to prevent exposure: SARS exposure in Chinese CDC Lab Normile, D 2004: Monitoring the health of the individuals who work in the SARS labs. One individual travel by train between Beijing and Anhui, and visited different hospitals in both locations. ...

References
Heyman, D.L., R.B. Aylward, and C. Wolff. 2004. "Dangerous pathogens in the laboratory: from smallpox to today's SARS setbacks and tomorrow's polio-free world." The Lancet 363(9431):1566-1568 Normile, Dennis. “Mounting Lab Accidents Raise SARS Fears.” Science, vol. 304, no. 5671, 2004, pp. 659–661. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3836788. Accessed 17 May 2020.


More anthrax:
Occupation(s) of affected personnel: unknown number of undergraduates and faculty...

Agent(s) involved: Bacillus anthracis ...

Biological Safety Level (BSL) for work being performed?: BSL-1 ...

Setting in which LAI / exposure occured: undergraduate experiment in a common laboratory (not BSL-2 or higher) without a BSC ...

How LAI / exposure occurred: During an undergraduate experiment, an anthrax vaccine strain was cultured. After incubation at 5% carbon dioxide for 20 h, a faculty member found a smooth colony on the plate and suspected that the strain recovered its virulence. The experiment was conducted in a common laboratory, defined as not BSL-2 or higher, and without a BSC. PPE worn was gowns, gloves, masks, but no other personal protection. PPE used was not sufficient to protect operations or environment if anthrax vaccine strain recovered its virulence. Upon receiving the incident response, a rapid investigation was undertaken and 12 samples were collected. No virulence recovery was identified and the university returned to normal functioning. ...

References
Zhang EM, Wang JQ, Gao LD, Zhan ZF, Zhang H, Hu YH, Wei JC, Liang XD, Wan KL, Wei Q. Emergency response for a laboratory biosafety incident. Biomed Environ Sci. 2019 Mar; 32(3): 231-33. DOI: 10.3967/bes2019.032.
 
And if this could happen here, why would the WIV be so much safer?

I think one or both of these was/were cited upthread:

Propublica: Near Misses at UNC Chapel Hill’s High-Security Lab Illustrate Risk of Accidents With Coronaviruses
Reports indicate UNC researchers were potentially exposed to lab-created coronaviruses in several incidents since 2015. These incidents highlight the risks even in the most secure and respected research facilities.


Here Are Six Accidents UNC Researchers Had With Lab-Created Coronaviruses
From Jan. 1, 2015, through June 1, 2020, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill reported 28 lab incidents involving genetically engineered organisms to safety officials at the National Institutes of Health, according to documents UNC released to ProPublica under a public records request. The NIH oversees research involving genetically modified organisms.

Six of the incidents involved various types of lab-created coronaviruses. Many were engineered to allow the study of the virus in mice. UNC declined to answer questions about the incidents and to disclose key details about them to the public, including the names of viruses involved, the nature of the modifications made to them and what risks were posed to the public, contrary to NIH guidelines.

UNC said in a statement that it “notified the proper oversight agencies about the incidents and took corrective action as needed.”
 
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A Yahoo news report irrelevant to the fact that the 2004 Beijing incidents were reported.

Laboratory-Acquired Infection (LAI) Database of course lists reported lab incidents. This is repealing evidence that China acta o0n and reports lab incidents and would act on and report an WIV lab incident :eye-poppi!
There is no "More SARS". There are multiple entries in that list related to the 2004 Beijing incidents.
  • Date(s) of LAI / exposure: March 2004
  • Date(s) of LAI / exposure: 07/03/2004–22/03/2004
    Actions that may have been taken to prevent exposure: Investigation of the source of the outbreak focused on lapses in biosafety procedures at the National Institute of Virology. The institute was closed on 23 April 2004 and its staff were placed in isolation.
  • Date(s) of LAI / exposure: 16/12/2003-8/1/2004 (references in a article about diagnostic techniques used on cases of SARS)
  • Date(s) of LAI / exposure: 03/2004, 04/2004 has the action of the Chinese government that they would apply to a WIV lab leak:
    SARS exposure in Chinese CDC Lab Normile, D 2004: Once SARS was recognized, the Chinese government ramped up response immediately. The lab was closed and more than 200 institute employees were quarantined. Additional contacts outside the workplace were also quarantine
    Taiwan and Singapore are not China! The references containing the LAI cover incidents in several countries.
  • Date(s) of LAI / exposure: February and April, 2004
 
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Why should the WIV labs be less safe because lab incidents happen

And if this could happen here, why would the WIV be so much safer?....
Lab incidents happen all over the world. No one disputes that. The fact that they happen is the only actual evidence that there could have been a WIV lab leak. Some concerns about staffing in 2017 is not evidence for a lab leak. Baric's opinion that gain of function research should not be done in a BSL-2 lab is not evidence.
Lab incidents being reported and acted upon in China is evidence that a WIV lab incident would be reported and acted upon.
 
On lab safety, I posted on patents before but I'll quote them again...

2019-12-11
Application filed by Wuhan Institute of Virology of CAS, Suzhou Institute of Biomedical Engineering and Technology of CAS

Biocontainment improvement:

Biosafety protection during transport outside the world is particularly important except in the laboratory. For dangerous equipment, national standards require that a gas circulating device can realize secondary efficient filtration, more efficient filter manufacturers are mainly applied in the directions of pharmacy, environmental detection, metering and the like at present, and special requirements for biological protection pay less attention.
At present, the joint of a common high-efficiency filter mainly takes a chuck joint as a main part, and needs to be fixed by adding a multi-stage connecting pipe when being used in biological protection equipment, especially the stability in the transportation process, the multi-stage connection means multi-stage risks, and also needs multi-stage detection, so that a stable high-efficiency filtering device in a module form is urgently needed. The pipe in the biological protection process is generally in a negative pressure environment, the thickness of the pipe is larger than the space occupied by a normal rubber pipe, and the equipment is messy due to the fact that the pipe is externally connected with a filtering device alone. In addition, when an accident occurs in the transportation process, an effective monitoring device is not available for judging whether the equipment is normal or not.
------------------------------------------------------------

...and theres also this one... on effective disinfectants:

2020-11-13
Application filed by Longly Biotechnology Wuhan Co ltd, Wuhan Institute of Virology of CAS


....in the existing disinfectants, the disinfectants with low corrosivity to metals such as stainless steel and the like have poor disinfection effect, cannot be used in high-grade biosafety laboratories due to the fact that highly pathogenic microorganisms cannot be completely killed, and the disinfectants with killing effects on the highly pathogenic microorganisms have different degrees of corrosion effects on the metals such as the stainless steel and the like, and can cause the corrosion of metal components such as the stainless steel and the like after long-term use, so that the biosafety protection effect of the facility equipment is reduced, the service life of the facility equipment is shortened, economic loss is caused, and even the highly pathogenic microorganisms are caused to escape into the external environment of the laboratory, and further the loss of lives and properties of people is caused, and serious social problems are brought. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a disinfectant which can effectively kill highly pathogenic microorganisms and has no corrosivity or low corrosivity on metals such as stainless steel, and the like.
 
On lab safety, I posted on patents before but I'll quote them again...

2019-12-11
Application filed by Wuhan Institute of Virology of CAS, Suzhou Institute of Biomedical Engineering and Technology of CAS

Biocontainment improvement:


------------------------------------------------------------

...and theres also this one... on effective disinfectants:

2020-11-13
Application filed by Longly Biotechnology Wuhan Co ltd, Wuhan Institute of Virology of CAS

Sorry, but what is this supposed to be evidence for?
 
Lab incidents happen all over the world. No one disputes that. The fact that they happen is the only actual evidence that there could have been a WIV lab leak. Some concerns about staffing in 2017 is not evidence for a lab leak. Baric's opinion that gain of function research should not be done in a BSL-2 lab is not evidence.
Lab incidents being reported and acted upon in China is evidence that a WIV lab incident would be reported and acted upon.

Keeping in mind that the same could be said for EVERY disease outbreak whether it's really a lab leak or not. Therefor, it's not useful in helping descending what disease outbreaks are lab leaks and which are not so in my opinion it can't be called evidence.
 
Keeping in mind that the same could be said for EVERY disease outbreak whether it's really a lab leak [spillover zoonosis] or not. Therefor, it's not useful in helping descending what disease outbreaks are lab leaks [spillover] and which are not so in my opinion it can't be called evidence.
Just to be clear I ftfy so you can see that by your own reasoning there is no evidence for the spillover hypotheses.

And in fact, the absence of evidence where there should be evidence, an animal trail, favors the lab leak regardless of other missing evidence. Given COVID had to have existed in at least a small group of animals be they bats, an intermediate species, or humans, it had to have been passed around in a small population in order for it to have evolved such efficient person to person spread. It has been 2 years and there isn't so much as a hint how/where said spillover trail occurred.

There were no unexplained pneumonia outbreaks anywhere in China per the WHO analysis of surveillance data in the year prior to the cases which turned up in Wuhan.

Given there is no evidence of COVID evolving to have efficient person to person spread, the only explanation is it achieved this ability in a lab before it was released into the human population.

We know 1 reason there is no direct lab leak evidence: the Chinese government is refusing to cooperate and give access to specific evidence like the first few cases and the database they took offline.

Then we have Shi lying for no apparent reason that the miners in Yunnan in 2012 died of a fungal infection not a viral infection as both the contemporary theses concluded.

Another fact which is more and more being left out of accounts of bat spillover events is that only a very small percentage of locals near the Yunnan mine/caves had evidence of past SARS-L CoV. If spillovers from bats in the area with coronavirus had been regularly occurring one would expect to see a larger number of people in the area with these specific antibodies.
 
A "one would expect to see a larger number of people ..." ignorance

And in fact, the absence of evidence where there should be evidence, an animal trail, favors the lab leak regardless of other missing evidence.
Any absence of evidence says that we cannot say anything because there is no evidence :eye-poppi!
You are wrong. There is evidence for a spillover event such as the fact that it is basic biology that has happened before and there are genetic links to bat coronavirus. There is an absence of evidence for a lab leak. If anything there is evidence against a lab leak such as previous lab leaks were reported and acted upon, the new WIV BSL-4 lab shows an awareness of safety, no one has expressed concern about WIV lab safety in 2019, the virus has no signs of genetic manipulation produced by gain of function research, and most importantly no cluster of WIV people becoming ill before the outbreak. There was no one working with the virus becoming ill, their colleagues becoming ill, and family, friends and other contacts becoming ill.

Repeating unsupported fantasies does not make them true.
6 September 2021: Shi was correct that the miners [probably] had fungal infections (the bats did not have SARS-CoV or SARS-CoV 2 :eek:!)
Shi did not lie about Mojiang (Yunnan is the province, presumably with many bat caves) miners from 2012. A bit of stupidity about contemporary theses when science did not stop in 2012! The miners blood samples were tested later and there was no evidence of coronaviruses or antibodies to them. A reason that Shi stated a fungal origin is that it was her labs that did that.
CALL OF THE WILD Why many scientists say it’s unlikely that SARS-CoV-2 originated from a “lab leak”
Shi has reported that her lab tested blood from the miners and did not find evidence of coronaviruses or antibodies to them. Wang, who helped with these analyses, finds the assertion that the team suppressed evidence of SARS-CoV-2’s link to the Mojiang mine preposterous. “We wanted to prove that a coronavirus caused the deaths,” says Wang, who grew up in Shanghai but is now an Australian citizen. “If we proved that another SARS-like virus was in humans in China that would have been scientifically brilliant,” he says. “It’s a Science or Nature paper. No scientist is going to wait for this to leak.”


"one would expect to see a larger number of people in the area with these specific antibodies" ignorance. The number of people with antibodies is comparable with the expected number of people with antibodies.
23 September 2021: The preprint and paper with Daszak as an author give comparable numbers of people expected and detected to have coronavirus antibodies.
 
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From 2 months ago, probably posted before... Even with the supposed US perfect standards and safety record with coronavirus research, accidents and near misses have occurred.

Near Misses at UNC Chapel Hill’s High-Security Lab Illustrate Risk of Accidents With Coronaviruses
Reports indicate UNC researchers were potentially exposed to lab-created coronaviruses in several incidents since 2015. These incidents highlight the risks even in the most secure and respected research facilities. ...
The article leads off with this incident:
The mouse infected with a lab-created type of SARS coronavirus was squirming upside down, dangling by its tail as a scientist carried it to a weighing container one day in February 2016. But the mundane task turned dangerous in seconds inside the North Carolina laboratory, which has drawn scrutiny for its partnership on similar research with China’s Wuhan Institute of Virology.
In that moment, it wasn’t enough that the experiment was taking place inside a biosafety level 3 lab, the second-highest security level, which was layered in high-tech equipment designed to keep dangerous pathogens from escaping. Or that the scientist was covered head-to-toe in gear to protect against infection: a full-body Tyvek suit, boot covers and double gloves, plus a powered air-purifying respirator.

As she carried the mouse, it climbed up its tail and bit her hard, breaking through the gloves and plunging its teeth — and potentially the virus — into her ring finger.

Then, instead of quarantining to wait for signs of infection, the scientist was allowed to go about her life in public for the next 10 days, wearing a surgical mask and reporting her temperature twice daily, newly obtained records show.



Here Are Six Accidents UNC Researchers Had With Lab-Created Coronaviruses
From Jan. 1, 2015, through June 1, 2020, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill reported 28 lab incidents involving genetically engineered organisms to safety officials at the National Institutes of Health, according to documents UNC released to ProPublica under a public records request....

Six of the incidents involved various types of lab-created coronaviruses. Many were engineered to allow the study of the virus in mice. UNC declined to answer questions about the incidents and to disclose key details about them to the public, including the names of viruses involved, the nature of the modifications made to them and what risks were posed to the public, contrary to NIH guidelines.

UNC said in a statement that it “notified the proper oversight agencies about the incidents and took corrective action as needed.” ...
The Feb 2016 was described in the first link.

April 2020: A UNC scientist underwent 14 days of self-quarantine at home after a mouse bite caused potential exposure to a strain of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, that had been adapted for growth in mice. The incident in a biosafety level 3 lab happened when a researcher attempted to read the ID number on a tag on a mouse’s ear. The mouse flipped over in the researcher’s hand and bit an index finger through two layers of gloves.

Only the 2 bites were significant exposures given in the other incidents worker respiratory PPE remained intact so I didn't quote those. But here they were in BSL3 and protection was simply not perfect. And as has happened in other near misses in the US, the procedure of quarantining potentially infected workers is much less than ideal. Consider, for example, that SARS CoV 2 is infectious before symptoms occur, checking a person's temperature 2X/day would not have contained the potentially infectious virus had the worker become infected.
 
Apparently this needs a review of the facts:

2018: Serological Evidence of Bat SARS-Related Coronavirus Infection in Humans, China
In this study, we performed serological surveillance on people who live in close proximity to caves where bats that carry diverse SARSr-CoVs roost. In October 2015, we collected serum samples from 218 residents in four villages in Jinning County, Yunnan province, China (Fig. 1A), located 1.1–6.0 km from two caves (Yanzi and Shitou). ...

This region was not involved in the 2002–2003 SARS outbreaks and none of the subjects exhibited any evident respiratory illness during sampling. ...

As a control, we also collected 240 serum samples from random blood donors in 2015 in Wuhan, Hubei Province more than 1000 km away from Jinning (Fig. 1A) and where inhabitants have a much lower likelihood of contact with bats due to its urban setting. ...

The 2.7% seropositivity for the high risk group of residents living in close proximity to bat colonies suggests that spillover is a relatively rare event, however this depends on how long antibodies persist in people, since other individuals may have been exposed and antibodies waned. During questioning, none of the 6 seropositive subjects could recall any clinical symptoms in the past 12 months, suggesting that their bat SARSr-CoV infection either occurred before the time of sampling, or that infections were subclinical or caused only mild symptoms.


@Capsid: Detailed specifics of the antibody testing are described in the letter. Not sure if this is the one you were asking about earlier.
 
Literally nobody claims perfect standards.
I was addressing these posts:
Not lax at all. BSL-2 is still a regulated containment laboratory. ...

...
Your cynicism of the regulation of containment labs is painful to read given the amount of work that is needed to keep these labs safe and operational .

So which is it, we can rule out a lab-leak because biosafety labs are perfect or rare accidents do happen?

And from my post above:
link said:
The 2.7% seropositivity for the high risk group of residents living in close proximity to bat colonies suggests that spillover is a relatively rare event,

Spillover events from a concentration of bats near a population that encounters them frequently are rare, yet a number of people in this thread keep citing that a spillover event from a bat or an intermediate species is more likely because said events are so common.

Which is it, both hypotheses are just as unlikely based on the evidence, or only a spillover event is likely based on????
 
I was addressing these posts:




So which is it, we can rule out a lab-leak because biosafety labs are perfect or rare accidents do happen?

False dichotomy. There's no claim that biosecurity is perfect. Capsid was responding to someone who said BSL-2 is "lax". He pointed out that it is not lax, but that it is the appropriate BSL for what was being done. I know you have your own idiosyncratic idea about what BSL should go with what virus, but that is not the industry standard. So you misrepresent Capsid.

Anyway, you make a false inference as well. It is the lab leakers who are claiming that a history of lab leaks raises the possibility that this is also one. It is not an argument from biosecurity that points to spillover, however. The argument instead comes from the fact that there is no evidence that SARS-CoV2 was in the WIV. If it wasn't there to begin with it can hardly leak regardless of the BSL.

The lab leakers have made BSL the focus of one of their lines of argument. First it was:

"Hmmm, isn't it suspicious that the only BSL-4 lab in China is in Wuhan??? Hmmmm...isn't that suspicious"

"Then it was: OMG get this! The research on coronaviruses was mostly done at BSL-3!!!!"

"Then it was: OMG! There was other research done at BSL-2!"

What was considered unusual was first considered evidence, then what was totally normal became evidence.

The point that Capsid is making (I think) and which I agree with is that none of this is evidence at all. If you point to SARS-CoV2 being in the lab to begin with then the entire equation changes. For me, it would swing to being almost certainly a lab leak. But until then, the more obvious route from bat to human is in nature because nature has NO BSL WHATSOEVER!
 
False dichotomy. There's no claim that biosecurity is perfect. Capsid was responding to someone who said BSL-2 is "lax". He pointed out that it is not lax, but that it is the appropriate BSL for what was being done. I know you have your own idiosyncratic idea about what BSL should go with what virus, but that is not the industry standard. So you misrepresent Capsid.
First, you're wrong. My issue as a person involved in infection prevention compliance in healthcare facilities is that what one finds on the ground, so to speak, is never close to what is on accreditation or legal guidelines. It's not the industry standard that is the issue.

That isn't relevant at all to what I perceived the exchange to be. I said it's idealistic and inconsistent with the record of lab leaks leading to infection to insist lab safety is the same around the world. What CAPSID observes in the lab(s) he works in is not what one is going to find in a lab in China. It's probably not even the same in other labs around the US.


Anyway, you make a false inference as well. It is the lab leakers who are claiming that a history of lab leaks raises the possibility that this is also one. It is not an argument from biosecurity that points to spillover, however. The argument instead comes from the fact that there is no evidence that SARS-CoV2 was in the WIV. If it wasn't there to begin with it can hardly leak regardless of the BSL.
The point of the history of lab leaks isn't that it is strong evidence per se, it's the denial said history is relevant while touting the history of spillovers as strong evidence of the pandemic being a spillover. You can't have it both ways.

And you can claim all you want that the issue is no evidence of anything close to COVID 19 in the WIV lab. But you can't call that a fact. You are confusing evidence based 'facts' about what we do know with the actual fact that all we have are people with significant conflicts of interest who said there were no related SARS CoV 2 viruses in their lab. The WHO investigative team was not allowed to see any actual records from the lab, the lab's data bases of coronavirus genomes or the lab test results on employees.


In addition, there is also the CCDC lab we aren't talking about much in this thread. Apparently China didn't allow any access to that lab or its records either.

The CDC lab in Wuhan was also carrying out research with horseshoe bats, according to Embarek.
“It is interesting that the laboratory moved on December 2, 2019,” he said. “This is the period when it all started, and you know that when you move a laboratory, it is disruptive to everything.” ...

Embarek told TV2 that the WHO-appointed team in Wuhan had no access to primary documentation related to laboratories – an issue the WHO said China needed to address. ...

Then you have the glaring problem with BSL2 labs. They don't necessarily have strict ventilation controls. If coronaviruses were considered droplet spread instead of airborne it could have been a serious issue.
Classified with a “Biosafety Level of 2,” the lab also has ventilation controls that aren’t as strict as other more secure facilities, according to the report.



[straw man argument snipped]

The point that Capsid is making (I think) and which I agree with is that none of this is evidence at all. If you point to SARS-CoV2 being in the lab to begin with then the entire equation changes. For me, it would swing to being almost certainly a lab leak. But until then, the more obvious route from bat to human is in nature because nature has NO BSL WHATSOEVER!
Your straw man description of the lab-leak evidence isn't relevant. The problem with China refusing to provide the evidence you claim you want to see has been addressed ad nauseum in this thread. Yet you cite it as some sort of evidence there were no COVID-like viruses being studied in the WIV.

All the while you either ignore or haven't mentioned the evidence cited in this thread that we are missing a whole slew of documented records from all the thousands of virus samples taken from the caves/mine in Yunnan including more than 100 of SARSlike CoVs, and the smaller number found to be sustainable in vitro.
 
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Just to be clear I ftfy so you can see that by your own reasoning there is no evidence for the spillover hypotheses.
No, you really didn't. The existance of lab accidents was presented as "evidence" for a lab leak not natural spillover. In fact they are not evidence of anything because because they would happen regardless.


And in fact, the absence of evidence where there should be evidence, an animal trail, favors the lab leak regardless of other missing evidence.
Given there is no evidence of COVID evolving to have efficient person to person spread, the only explanation is it achieved this ability in a lab before it was released into the human population.

Then we have Shi lying for no apparent reason that the miners in Yunnan in 2012 died of a fungal infection not a viral infection as both the contemporary theses concluded.



And in fact, the absence of evidence where there should be evidence, an animal trail, favors the lab leak regardless of other missing evidence.

No. The lack of an animal trail favors natural spillover. History has shown i takes track down original animal hosts, even in cases where it's possible to do so.

Conversely, a lab leak implies the virus must have been sampled, in which case the animal repository would have been easily found.



Given there is no evidence of COVID evolving to have efficient person to person spread, the only explanation is it achieved this ability in a lab before it was released into the human population.

Covid has become much more efficient at human to human spread since the start of the outbreak so clearly it started out in a suboptimal form for human-human transmission. The logic failure you are committing is that you are incorrectly assuming suboptimal virus still can't be highly transmissible in a naive population.

Also, if the virus was "tuned" for humans in a lab why would it be even more transmissible in Mink and why would related viruses with similar spike structures never spread among humans bind even more strongly to human ACE2 then their own host species? Your occlusion here simply doesn't follow from the facts.

Then we have Shi lying for no apparent reason that the miners in Yunnan in 2012 died of a fungal infection not a viral infection as both the contemporary theses concluded.

We've been though this and the conclusion is that your claim is false. A fungal infection is the most likely explanation and there is no reason to think Shi's statement is wrong let alone dishonest.

Frankly your disparaging of prominent and respected scientists makes you look bad. Attacking the credibility of scientists is the first principle in the right wing playbook.

The fact is that Dr. Shi came to prominence by ignoring the Chinese Government's position on SARS and by following the evidence back to it's real origin. Even if we subscribed to the somewhat racist view that her ethnicity makes her untrustworthy (which I d not subscribe to) her track record of following the science would surely outweigh it.
 
No, you really didn't. The existance of lab accidents was presented as "evidence" for a lab leak not natural spillover. In fact they are not evidence of anything because because they would happen regardless.

Could you explain this? I don't quite understand the "would happen regardless bit", but it seems like it would also apply to any evidence of something that happened in the past, including a natural spillover.

Why is the fact that natural spillover occurred in the past being used as evidence for a natural spillover theory, but the fact that lab leaks have occurred in the past discounted as evidence for a lab leak theory?
 
The fact is that Dr. Shi came to prominence by ignoring the Chinese Government's position on SARS and by following the evidence back to it's real origin. Even if we subscribed to the somewhat racist view that her ethnicity makes her untrustworthy (which I d not subscribe to) her track record of following the science would surely outweigh it.

Its not her ethnicity that is the issue, its the fact that she is a Chinese citizen and thus under the control of the CCP. China 2002 is not China 2021. If the CCP of 2021 tell her to hide evidence or delete databases or samples, or straight up lie, she will do those things or at best get jailed for "picking quarrels and causing trouble", "national security" or any other spurious charge; at worst she will get disappeared.

She may well be a paragon of scientific virtue. The CCP is not, and the sad fact is that we cannot really trust anything that comes out of China at the moment.
 
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