IT IS NOT STRAIGHTFORWARD. FIRST OF ALL, WE ARE ONLY LOOKING AT VIRAL FAMILIES THAT INCLUDE THOSE THAT HAVE GOTTEN TO PEOPLE FROM ANIMALS. WE HAVE NARROWED IT DOWN FROM THERE. THEN, WHEN YOU GET A SEQUENCE, AND IT LOOKS LIKE A RELATIVE TO THE KNOWN NASTY PATHOGEN, JUST LIKE WE DID WITH SARS -- WE FOUND VIRUSES IN BATS. SOME OF THEM LOOKED VERY SIMILAR TO SARS. WE SEQUENCED THE SPINE [Correction, he says spike not spine.] PROTEIN, THE PROTEIN THAT ATTACHES TO CELLS, AND THEN YOU CREATE PSEUDO-PARTICLES, INSERT PROTEINS FROM THE VIRUSES THAT COMBINED TO HUMAN CELLS. EACH STEP OF THIS, YOU MOVE CLOSER AND CLOSER TO COULD THE VIRUS BECOME PATHOGENIC IN PEOPLE? YOU NARROW DOWN THE FIELD. YOU REDUCE THE COST, AND END UP WITH A SMALL NUMBER OF VIRUSES THAT REALLY DO LOOK LIKE KILLERS. AND YOU LOOK AT THE PEOPLE, AND THE PEOPLE IN THE REGION THAT LIVE WHERE THE ANIMAL LIVES, DO WE
Then when you get a sequence of a virus, and it looks like a relative of a known nasty pathogen, just like we did with SARS. We found other coronaviruses in bats, a whole host of them, some of them looked very similar to SARS. So we sequenced the spike protein: the protein that attaches to cells. Then we…
Well I didn’t do this work, but my colleagues in China did the work. You create pseudo particles, you insert the spike proteins from those viruses, see if they bind to human cells. At each step of this you move closer and closer to this virus could really become pathogenic in people.
“You end up with a small number of viruses that really do look like killers,”
C -SPAN 2016 panel discussion on pandemics (1 hour 35 minutes).
Here is what Peter Daszak had to say at one point in the discussion (1 minute 27 seconds).
Here's the transcript from that clip, the all caps is the way all C-SPAN transcripts are written:
Here's a more complete transcript:
So here is Daszak in 2016 saying his colleagues in China were manipulating coronaviruses, changing the spike proteins to ones that bind to human cells step by step. And in 2019 a virus just like Daszak is describing in 2016 shows up and results in a pandemic.
C -SPAN 2016 panel discussion on pandemics (1 hour 35 minutes).
Here is what Peter Daszak had to say at one point in the discussion (1 minute 27 seconds).
Here's the transcript from that clip, the all caps is the way all C-SPAN transcripts are written:
Here's a more complete transcript:
So here is Daszak in 2016 saying his colleagues in China were manipulating coronaviruses, changing the spike proteins to ones that bind to human cells step by step. And in 2019 a virus just like Daszak is describing in 2016 shows up and results in a pandemic.
The spike is engineered onto lentiviral or vesicular stomatitis virus backbones. They aren’t making modified coronaviruses.
Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk
Does this not refer to the pseudotype viruses that were made at BSL-2 that we have already discussed numerous times?
I think this is all referring to well-known public statements, and DRASTIC have been showing clips of this meeting for some time now, particularly noting that Amy Maxmen was sitting next to Peter Daszak.
The only thing that is a little surprising to me is that Ian Lipkin is sitting on the other side of Daszak and I think he recently said he was unaware of this being done at BSL-2 which he thought was completely inappropriate.
Making Pseudotyped viruses is done at BSL-2
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
Right, so I wonder why this is being brought up as if it is a big problem. It seems to me more that people are looking into this and saying, "Oh, my God! Can you believe what they were doing here?!?" then a lot of virologists saying, "That's pretty standard..."
And why is it not a problem that virologists regard BSL-2 for this research as pretty standard?
Well. Not sure but it is off-topic in that nobody is seriously claiming the research in question led to SARS-CoV2.
Well, I can only say that even if SARS-Cov-02 has not been created in a lab, it still worries me that such research is conducted under such lax conditions.
Yeah right.Not lax at all. BSL-2 is still a regulated containment laboratory. ...
All virus cultivation was performed in a biosafety level (BSL) 3 laboratory with redundant fans in the biosafety cabinets, as described previously by our group2. All personnel wore powered air purifying respirators (Breathe Easy, 3M) with Tyvek suits, aprons and booties and were double-gloved. ...
BSL3 users are subject to a medical surveillance plan monitored by the University Employee Occupational Health Clinic (UEOHC), which includes a yearly physical, annual influenza vaccination and mandatory reporting of any symptoms associated with CoV infection during periods when working in the BSL3. All BSL3 users are trained in exposure management and reporting protocols, are prepared to self-quarantine and have been trained for safe delivery to a local infectious disease management department in an emergency situation. All potential exposure events are reported and investigated by EHS and UEOHC, with reports filed to both the CDC and the NIH....
All experiments using live virus was conducted under biosafety level 2 (BSL2) conditions.
The genetic code of SARS-CoV-2 does not resemble that of any virus the WIV was known to be culturing in its lab, such as WIV1, and Baric says he still believes a natural spillover is the most likely cause. But he also knows the intricate risks of the work well enough to see a possible path to trouble. That is why, in May of this year, he joined 17 other scientists in a letter in the journal Science calling for a thorough investigation of his onetime collaborator’s lab and its practices. He wants to know what barriers were in place to keep a pathogen from slipping out into Wuhan’s population of 13 million, and possibly to the world.
“Let’s face it: there are going to be unknown viruses in guano, or oral swabs, which are oftentimes pooled. And if you’re attempting to culture a virus, you’re going to have novel strains being dropped onto culture cells,” Baric says. “Some will grow. You could get recombinants that are unique. And if that was being done at BSL-2, then there are questions you want to ask.”
The paper by Daszak and Shi at WIV was done with recombinant viruses not wild type and BSL-2 would be appropriate. What is the context of Baric's quote you highlighted? Is he criticising WIV or is it a general statement? Are bat viruses sent to WIV cultured in their BSL-3 labs?Yeah right.
Consider what Baric described in his work with chimeras at the UNC:
2015, authors include Shi and Baric: A SARS-like cluster of circulating bat coronaviruses shows potential for human emergence
And at the WIV:
Daszak and Shi in 2016: Bat Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-Like Coronavirus WIV1 Encodes an Extra Accessory Protein, ORFX, Involved in Modulation of the Host Immune Response
And what did Baric have to say about the work his colleague was doing at the WIV?
https://www.technologyreview.com/20...bat-virus-engineering-links-america-to-wuhan/
And your idealism is unrealistic, especially how you assume because there are safety standards in the US the same applies to China.... Your cynicism of the regulation of containment labs is painful to read given the amount of work that is needed to keep these labs safe and operational .
You do need to list those "multiple accidents" that show that the WIV labs were unsafe.And your idealism is unrealistic, especially how you assume because there are safety standards in the US the same applies to China.
If the labs are so safe why have there been multiple accidents that resulted in people getting infected? Do I need to list them again? The latest one was an employee getting infected with COVID-19.
Baric was very clear: he had concerns about the WIV using level 2 BSL when there might be unknown coronaviruses resulting from their work.
Note the safety protocols at the Beijing lab in 2004 limited the outbreak to 8 people. Note that this incident was reported. An incident releasing SARS-2 is likely to be reported and tracked.Two researchers at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention contracted the virus in Beijing, China around April 2004, and then spread the infection to around six other people. The two researchers contracted the virus in two incidents, two weeks apart.[31]
And why is it not a problem that virologists regard BSL-2 for this research as pretty standard?
I came here to post that as well. The discussion of the Monjiang mine starts at around one hour three minutes or so. Maybe 1:06 at the latest.There's quite a bit of discussion about the origins of Covid on The Decoding the Gurus podcast. In this one, they talk with Stuart Neil who is a virologist based at King's College London.
Link
There's some discussion about a lot of issues related to SARS-CoV2, but mostly debunking or arguing against non-mainstream views such as GoF, the Monjiang mine etc... and other stuff such as ivermectin.
I never did see these "multiple accidents" from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, but I haven't followed the thread here close enough. Google isn't helping me.You do need to list those "multiple accidents" that show that the WIV labs were unsafe.