203. For the President being informed at 9:05, see White House record,President’s Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001. For Card’s statement, see White House transcript, Card interview with Ron Fournier,Aug. 7, 2002. For the President’s reaction, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
204.For the President’s activities, see Education Channel videotape,“Raw Footage of President Bush at Emma E. Booker Elementary School,” Sept. 11, 2001 (remaining in classroom); Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004) (in the holding room). For his calls, see White House record, President’s Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001 (9:15 call to Vice President); Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004) (call to Rice); President Bush andVice President Cheney
meeting (Apr. 29, 2004) (call to Pataki); White House record, Secure Switchboard Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (call to Mueller). For the decision to make a statement, see Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). For the Secret Service’s perspective, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004).
205. On the return to Washington, see Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004);Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). On consulting with senior advisers, see Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). On information about
additional aircraft, see, e.g.,Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). On decisions and the focus on the President’s speech, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004);Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004);Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004).
206. On the motorcade, see USSS record, shift log, Sept. 11, 2001 (departing 9:35, arriving 9:45);USSS record, Command Post Protectee Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (departing 9:36, arriving 9:42).Fleischer deduced from his notes that the President learned about the Pentagon while in the motorcade.Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). For the President’s actions and statements to the Vice President, see Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004);White House notes,Ari Fleischer notes, Sept. 11, 2001.
207. On not returning to Washington, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004);USSS memo, interview of Edward Marinzel,Oct. 3, 2001;Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). For additional sources on the President’s
desire to return, see White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek,Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5. For the Vice President’s recollection, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For
time of departure, see USSS record, Command Post Protectee Log, Sept. 11, 2001. On Air Force One’s objectives on takeoff, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004).
464 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
208.USSS memo, interview of Gregory LaDow, Oct. 1, 2001,p. 1. Shortly after the second attack in NewYork, a senior Secret Service agent charged with coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with
his counterpart at the FAA, who soon told him that there were more planes unaccounted for—possibly hijacked— in addition to the two that had already crashed.Though the senior agent told someone to convey this information
to the Secret Service’s operations center, it either was not passed on or was passed on but not disseminated; it failed to reach agents assigned to the Vice President, and the Vice President was not evacuated at that time. See Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004); USSS memo, interview of Nelson Garabito, Oct. 1, 2001; see also Terry Van Steenbergen interview (Mar. 30, 2004).
209.American 77’s route has been determined through Commission analysis of FAA and military radar data. For the evacuation of the Vice President, see White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek,Nov. 19, 2001, p. 2;USSS memo, interview of Rocco Delmonico,Oct. 1, 2001 (evacuation of the White House); see also White House notes, Mary Matalin notes, Sept. 11, 2001. On the time of entering the tunnel, see USSS report,“Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Events, September 11–October 3, 2001,” Oct. 3, 2001, p. 2. Secret Service personnel told us that the 9:37 entry time in their timeline was based on alarm data, which is no longer retrievable. USSS briefing (Jan. 29, 2004).
210.White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 4; President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
211. On Mrs. Cheney, see USSS report,“Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Events, September 11–October 3, 2001,” Oct. 3, 2001, p. 2 (time of arrival);White House transcript, Lynne Cheney interview
with Newsweek, Nov. 9, 2001, p. 2 (joining the Vice President). For the contemporaneous notes, see White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. 11, 2001. On the content of the Vice President’s call, see White House
transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek,Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5.According to the Vice President, there was “one phone call from the tunnel. And basically I called to let him know that we were a target and I
strongly urged him not to return to Washington right away, that he delay his return until we could find out what the hell was going on.”For their subsequent movements, see White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5;White House transcript, Lynne Cheney interview with Newsweek,Nov. 9, 2001, p. 2.
212. On communications problems, see, e.g., President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). On lack of an open line, see, e.g., Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004).
213. On the Vice President’s call, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For the Vice President’s time of arrival in the shelter conference room, see White House record, PEOC Shelter Log,
Sept. 11, 2001 (9:58); USSS memo, OVP 9/11 Timeline, Nov. 17, 2001 (9:52; Mrs. Cheney arrived White House and joined him in tunnel);White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes (9:55; he is on phone with President);White House transcript, Lynne Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 9, 2001, p. 2 (“And when I got there, he was on the phone with the President . . . But from that first place where I ran into him, I moved with him into what they call the PEOC”); White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 4 (9:35 or 9:36 arrival; he estimated a 15-minute stay); Carl Truscott interview (Apr. 15, 2004) (arrived with Rice and the Vice President in conference room; called headquarters immediately; call logged at 10:00); President Bush
and Vice President Cheney meeting,Apr. 29, 2004 (Vice President viewed television footage of Pentagon ablaze in tunnel);White House transcript, Rice interview with Evan Thomas, Nov. 1, 2001, p. 388 (Rice viewed television
footage of Pentagon ablaze in Situation Room). For the Vice President’s recollection about the combat air patrol, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004);White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 17, 2001, p. 16