New Book on Pearl Harbor Puts Blame on Washington and Exonerates Kimmel

Err, I'm sure you didn't mean that. The Japanese attacked in two waves,

1st Wave TOT 7:53 am: 88 Kate Bombers, 48 Val dive bombers, 41 Zeros

2nd wave TOT 8:06am: 54 Kate Bombers, 75 dive bombers, 35 Zeros

It was the third wave that they abandoned.

You beat me to it. That was a huge mistake on the part of Nagano: The third wave would have targeted infrastructure, which was essentially undamaged. They left the USN with a functioning shipyard. Perhaps he was conspiring with Roosevelt.
 
I'd say we'd only have been in a somewhat better position. We'd probably have two or three more obsolete battleships available. And a couple of cruisers. And some more aircraft on Oahu, where they weren't going to be doing any more fighting anyhow. The Japanese would have a few less naval aircraft, but it's unlikely we'd have found their carriers. And it wouldn't have gone well if we had.

I dunno about obsolete. Certainly not to someone considering their value on Dec 6th 1941. Except for their slower speed the Standard type Battleship was as good as anything Japan had except the 2 Nagato's and of course the newly commissioned Yamato. And the Colorado class was about equivalent to the the Nagatos. What could they have done though? Stop the invasion of the Philippines maybe? The question is could we have gotten logistical support that far out for a fleet that big, in time. There's no doubt they would've been useful during the Solomons/Guadalcanal campaign.
 
Last edited:
You beat me to it. That was a huge mistake on the part of Nagano: The third wave would have targeted infrastructure, which was essentially undamaged. They left the USN with a functioning shipyard. Perhaps he was conspiring with Roosevelt.

Yep, and the obvious result was that with untouched shipyards and infrastructure, they were able to get the bulk of the Pacific Fleet back fully operational in a very short time; much much shorter than would have been the case if the shipyards had been razed.

Also of vital importance was that the third wave would have destroyed the oil storage tanks – which held 4.5 million gallons of fuel. Without that, the US Army would have struggled to fight any kind of war for a long time.

Here is a really good assessment of what the third wave would have achieved for Japan, how it would have impacted on the US ability to fight a war, and why cancelling it was such a colossal blunder by Nagano

https://pearlharbormemorials.com/pearl-harbors-third-strike-what-could-have-been/
 
Last edited:
Err, I'm sure you didn't mean that. The Japanese attacked in two waves,

1st Wave TOT 7:53 am: 88 Kate Bombers, 48 Val dive bombers, 41 Zeros

2nd wave TOT 8:06am: 54 Kate Bombers, 75 dive bombers, 35 Zeros

It was the third wave that they abandoned.

Oops my mistake I meant the third wave attack was cancelled not the second
 
Also of vital importance was that the third wave would have destroyed the oil storage tanks – which held 4.5 million gallons of fuel. Without that, the US Army would have struggled to fight any kind of war for a long time.

Actually this is not very likely. The simple fact is that the oilfields were tough and fully of redundancy systems. The tankers would need a direct from an AP bomb to be breached (the 20mm cannon might punch a hole on its best hit ever), and the fuel was mostly fuel-oil which is notoriously hard to ignite. In addition, the fuel depot could pump the oil to other locations that would minimize losses and the pipes were pretty robust. To destroy it, the IJN would have to flatten it and that needed more bombs & skill than they had.

This assumes they have a free hand, which with all AA manned and ready is unlikely.
 
Do you think it was wise for local commanders to park their aircraft wingtip to wingtip on the flight lines at Hickam making them easy to strafe given that Pearl Harbour was a likely target at a time when belligerency with Japan was ramping up.

Kimmel and others acted stupidly. Even if they didn't know of any specific threat, doing what they did made their charges dangerously exposed and vulnerable.

Do you have any idea how many non-conspiracy authors have debunked this nonsense? The aircraft were parked wingtip to wingtip to guard against sabotage. They were concentrated in one place and placed under 24-hour guard. After the vague, weasel-worded "war warning" messages were sent to Hawaii, Short advised Marshall that he was assuming that the main threat was sabotage, and Marshall approved that course of action. This episode highlights the fact that in the two months leading up to the attack, Washington never said one word about the possibility that Pearl Harbor would be attacked by air, even though they had clear indications that the Japanese were, at the very least, considering an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

Which leads me to the dismissal of the bomb-plot messages: It is beyond lame to argue that those messages were not for bombing targeting. Here, too, even many non-conspiracy authorities have said that the only possible use of those messages was preparation for a bombing attack. We know that intel analysts in the Philippines recognized the bomb-plot messages as bombing preparation. We know that some intel analysts and military officials in Washington recognized this fact as well. That's why there was a royal battle over whether the messages should be forwarded to Kimmel. Stark intervened to prevent Kimmel from receiving the messages.

Even the JCC admitted that the bomb-plot messages indicated preparation for a bombing attack, and the committee lamely claimed that no one recognized their importance until afterward. Non-conspiracy defenders of Kimmel and Short make a similar argument: that Washington simply and inexcusably failed to appreciate the importance of the messages, but that there was no conspiracy to keep the Hawaiian commanders in the dark.

So it's a big surprising to see folks here drudging up the claim that the bomb-plot messages gave no indication of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. It makes one wonder what you folks have read on the subject.

I see no one tackled the long list of government officials, military personnel, and others who provided evidence that Washington had advance knowledge of the attack. The Hoover and Ladd FBI memos are especially devastating. Perhaps this is why traditionalists have been so noticeably silent about them.

Finally, as for the silly comments about whether or not I read Summers and Swan's book before I posted my OP, wow, I just assumed it would be taken as a given that I had read the book, especially in light of my Amazon review of the book. Find me another review, anywhere, that is as detailed as my review.
 
Last edited:
Bomb Plot messages lol. Hitting a town was considered good.

For the type of attack the Japanese were planning, that is low level fighter bombing, dive bombing and strafing plots weren't needed. The pilots had visual on targets of opportunity.
 
The JCC Majority Report quoted Kimmel at length on the bomb plot messages, then blandly admitted that the messages indicated unique interest in Pearl Harbor, but then claimed that, gosh, nobody in Washington recognized this at the time (which we know is not true):

Referring to the indicated messages, Admiral Kimmel testified:

"In no other area was the Japanese Government seeking information as to whether two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the dispatch of September 24, the information which the Japanese sought and obtained about Pearl Harbor followed the general pattern of their interest in American Fleet movements in other localities. One might suspect this type of conventional espionage. With the dispatch of September 24, 1941, and those which followed there was a significant and ominous change in the character of the information which the Japanese Government sought and obtained. The espionage then directed was of an unusual character and outside the realm of reasonable suspicion.

"It was no longer merely directed to ascertaining the general whereabouts of ships of the fleet. It was directed to the presence of particular ships in particular areas; to such minute detail as what ships were double-docked at the same wharf. In the period immediately preceding the attack, the Jap Consul General in Hawaii was directed by Tokyo to report even when there were no movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor.

"The information sought and obtained with such painstaking detail had no other conceivable usefulness from a military viewpoint. Its utility was in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port."​

Then the majority weakly, blandly admitted that the bomb plot messages indicated unique interest in Pearl Harbor, interest that was not shown in any other harbor:

In endeavoring to evaluate the intercepted dispatch of September 24 and related dispatches, it is to be borne in mind that the Japanese were insistent in their desire to secure information concerning the location and movements of American vessels everywhere and not merely at Pearl Harbor. There are no other dispatches before the committee, however, in which *Tokyo* manifested an interest concerning the disposition of ships *within* a harbor, as in the case of the "berthing plan," as distinguished from the desire to know whether a vessel was at a particular harbor. Viewing the September 24 instructions to her Honolulu consul in this light, it would appear that Tokyo was manifesting an unusual interest in the presence of our Pacific fleet and the detailed location thereof in Pearl Harbor.​

After making this understatement, the majority then offered the lame claim that nobody in Washington recognized the importance and implications of the bomb plot messages, which we know (and knew then) was not true.

Here is what the JCC Minority Report said about the bomb plot messages:

In the "bomb plot" message of September 24, 1941, the Japanese Government gave detailed instructions to its consul general in Hawaii as to the character of report it required concerning vessels in Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor was to be divided into five subareas. An alphabetical symbol was given each area. The Japanese Government instructed the consul:

"With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. (Designate type and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.)

This dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington on October 9,1941 (exhibit 2, p. 12).

On September 29, 1941, the Japanese consul in Hawaii replied to his government. He established a system of symbols to be used in designating the location of vessels at key points in Pearl Harbor. This dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington on October 10, 1941.

On November 15,18,20, and 29 the Japanese Government urgently called for information about the location of ships in Pearl Harbor (exhibit 2, p. 13-15). On November 15 the Japanese consul in Honolulu was directed to make his "ships in harbor report" irregular but at the rate of twice a week (exhibit 2, p. 13). The reports were to give vessel locations in specific areas of the harbor, using the symbols established in September (exhibit 2, p. 15). The greatest secrecy was enjoined because relations between Japan and the United States were described as "most critical." On November 18 the Japanese consul general reported to Tokyo the locations of the ships in the various subareas of Pearl Harbor, giving minute descriptions of the courses, speed, and distances apart of destroyers entering the harbor (exhibit 2, p. 14). On November 29 reports were requested even though there were no movements of ships. These dispatches were intercepted, decoded, and translated in Washington on December 3, 4, 5, and 6, 1941.

The "bomb plot" message, and those messages relating to Pearl Harbor which followed it, meant that the ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor were marked for a Japanese attack. No other American harbor was divided into subareas by Japan. And no other American harbor had such a large share of the fleet to protect.

In no other area did Japan seek information as to whether two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the "bomb plot" message, Japanese espionage in Hawaii was directed to ascertain the general whereabouts of the American Fleet, whether at sea or in port. With the "bomb plot" message Japan inaugurated a new policy directed to Pearl Harbor and to no other place, in which information was no longer sought merely as to the general whereabouts of the fleet but as to the presence of particular ships in particular areas of the harbor. In the period immediately preceding the attack Japan required such reports even when there was no movement of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor.

The reports which Japan thus sought and received had a useful purpose only in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port. These reports were not just the work of enthusiastic local spies gathering meticulous details in an excess of zeal. They were the product of instructions emanating from the Government of Japan in Tokyo. Officers of the high command in Washington have admitted before us that the "bomb plot" message, if correctly evaluated, meant an attack on ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor (Tr., Vol. 18, p. 3026; Vol. 23, p. 4014; Vol. 27, p. 4874; Vol. 12, p. 2100-2102; Vol. 59, p. 11313-11314; Vol. 35, p. 6390, 6394; Vol. 30, p. 5378).

On October 9th, 1941 (ex. 2, p. 12), Lieutenant Commander Kramer of Naval Intelligence in Washington promptly distributed the Pearl Harbor "bomb plot" message to the President, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the Director of Naval Communications, the Director of War Plans, and the Director of Naval Intelligence (Tr., Vol. 59 p. 11209). It bore the notation "interesting message" on a gist or flag (Tr., Vol. 59, p. 11207). It was accompanied by a summary of its contents as follows:

"Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations (Tr., Vol. 69, p. 11207)."

Military Intelligence through Colonel Bratton delivered the "bomb plot" message to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the chief of the War Plans Division (Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12083). The message was discussed several times by Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, with his opposite numbers in the Navy Department (Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12105). They discussed possible significance of the message, as implicating a plan for an air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor (Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12105). . . .

The commander of a fleet (in this case Admiral Kimmel) has custody of the fleet; he is at all times materially interested in its safety. The commander of a naval base (in this case General Short) has the duty of protecting the fleet when it is at his base. Any information showing specific hostile interest in that fleet or in the harbor where the fleet is anchored is basic information for the commander of the fleet and the commander of the naval base. In Washington, long prior to December 7, 1941, Army and Navy Intelligence officers, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Army Chief of Staff, and other high authorities gained vital information (the bomb- plot messages) from intercepted Japanese communications affecting the fleet and the defense of the naval base at Hawaii. They gained it from sources of information not available to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

In these circumstances, it was the express duty of the Washington authorities to pass this information in its original form on to Admiral Kimmel and General Short. The information was of such a specific character and so directly related to the fleet and naval base that Washington authorities were not justified in keeping to themselves or in evaluating it in any manner which would dilute or generalize the significance of the messages in their original form. Washington authorities failed in this, a prime responsibility in their relations with the outpost commanders.​

Of course, we now know that Amy intelligence analysts in the Philippines recognized the bomb plot messages as indicating preparation for an air attack.

There was a reason that the White House and the War Department fought hardest to keep the bomb plot messages from being released. They knew that even non-military novices would recognize that the messages were obviously indicating preparation for an air raid. Luckily, the messages were released to the Army and Navy boards of inquiry and were made public a few years later.
 
Last edited:
Do you have any idea how many non-conspiracy authors have debunked this nonsense? The aircraft were parked wingtip to wingtip to guard against sabotage. They were concentrated in one place and placed under 24-hour guard.

Its not "nonsense". Any military or ex-military personnel will tell you that you do not need to park aircraft together wingtip to wingtip in order to guard them. In fact, that is the worst thing you can do, because should one saboteur be successful in planting and detonating a bomb in or on a single aircraft, there is likely to be damage to any nearby aircraft... if a subsequent fire gets out of control, you could lose the whole line of them!

The correct way to arrange aircraft that may be under threat from saboteurs and/or air strike is to park them spaced well apart in "Aircraft Dispersal Areas" (areas on a military installation designed or arranged primarily for the dispersal of parked aircraft)... and then you guard the perimeters of the dispersal areas as well as having patrols that run through those dispersal areas. There was ample room at Hickam to have 10-15 such dispersal areas of 25 to 40 aircraft each A properly arranged guard unit would have been able to guard all 400 or so aircraft 24/7 with less than 150 guards in any given 24 hour period.

The key word here is "dispersal"; you park them some distance apart so that a successful saboteur only gets ONE aircraft and ground attack pilots cannot line up dozens of aircraft in a single strafing run. This is fundamental... Airfield Security 101.
 
Last edited:

ISF - Join now!

Every member here is approved by hand. No bots, no spam, just people who care about evidence and honest debate.

Membership is free!

Create your free account

Back
Top Bottom