"New" book on Pearl Harbor, attack analysis.

[Jules Galen]

Because Yamamoto insisted on it, and threatened to resign if Imperial General Headquarters didn't approve the plan. Why he wanted it is the subject of brisk debate in some circles.

What? All you are just saying is that someone invaded because that's what they wanted to do. This has applied to 100% of all invasions ever undertaken (well...unless the soldiers and Generals and Political Leaders were turned into Zombies under the control of some warlock.)

Anyways...how about if I suggested to you that the attacks on Pearl harbor and the Phillipines were just a "Side-Show" to keep America busy - that they were not the main objective? Would you consider?

 

[Garrette]

What? All you are just saying is that someone invaded because that's what they wanted to do. This has applied to 100% of all invasions ever undertaken (well...unless the soldiers and Generals and Political Leaders were turned into Zombies under the control of some warlock.)

Anyways...how about if I suggested to you that the attacks on Pearl harbor and the Phillipines were just a "Side-Show" to keep America busy - that they were not the main objective? Would you consider?

Depends where you're headed with it. Conquest of the United States was never a Japanese goal, nor was war with the United States. Regional hegemony along with resource access and control was their goal, and their thinking was that the attainment and retention of such required development of a defensible perimeter and the ham-stringing of American military power to prevent an unstoppable intervention, an intervention that came anyway.

It was a miscalculation, not a non-sequitur. Sort of like me slicing the tires of the big brother's car so he doesn't interfere when I beat up little brother, not realizing that big brother has a tire factory in his garage.

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

What? All you are just saying is that someone invaded because that's what they wanted to do. This has applied to 100% of all invasions ever undertaken (well...unless the soldiers and Generals and Political Leaders were turned into Zombies under the control of some warlock.)

Yamamoto thought up the attack and pressed it home against the wishes of many other high ranking officers in the Navy. This was not a national policy decision, it was his pet project. The IJN was hoping to lure the US Fleet into home waters where they could fight the Great All-out Battle to decide who controlled the Pacific. Yamamoto's strike meant that the USN wouldn't be able to take the bait for at least six months to a year. (And the USN wasn't stupid enough to sail into that kind of trap anyway, something the Japanese never seemed to plan for.)

Anyways...how about if I suggested to you that the attacks on Pearl harbor and the Phillipines were just a "Side-Show" to keep America busy - that they were not the main objective? Would you consider?

They needed to neutralize the Philippines, or at leas the military forces there, or leave their flank unprotected.

Pearl Harbor was a raid, nothing more.

 

[Corsair 115]

A short explanation, if practicable, would be gratefully received.

I'll just quote the relevant passages from the book.

[QUOTE="Shattered Sword" by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tuly]

... Japanese doctrine prescribed attacking targets with groups of aircraft containing elements of all three disciplines—fighters, dive-bombers, and carrier-attack planes (acting in either a torpedo- or level-bombing capacity). In multidivision attacks, an entire carrier division would contribute matched air groups to the overall effort, launching both of its dive-bomber units (for instance), while a second division would launch its two carrier attack bomber units. These four squadrons—seventy or more combat aircraft—would be escorted by fighters contributed by all four carriers. On follow-up strikes, the air group compositions would be reversed, with the first division sending up its torpedo bombers and the second contributing its dive-bombers. The result was that Japanese carriers could launch large, well-balanced strikes against their enemies.

To support this favored mode of attack, the Japanese evolved a practice known as "deckload spotting," wherein a carrier would launch about half its air group at any one time—a complete attack unit of some sort (torpedo- or dive-bombers) and usually a chutai [a group of 6-9] of fighters. With this initial force launched, the carrier would still retain half of its striking power for follow-up operations. This practice probably grew out of the impracticality of launching the carrier's complete air group. Such a group would need to be spotted and launched in two separate deck cycles, thus keeping the first half of the strike package waiting in the air over the force (and burning precious fuel) while the second portion was spotted and launched—an operation that could take at least half an hour to complete. With a deckload strike, though, the Japanese launched a group that fit comfortably on the flight deck and still had sufficient tactical weight ...

Deckload strikes had worked well for the Japanese thus far in the war, because they left little question as to each carrier's contribution and lent themselves well to aggregating aircraft for an initial strike. Interestingly, this practice stood in direct contrast with how the U.S. Navy ran its carriers. U.S. flattops could, and occasionally did, send their entire air group aloft, although the complications this introduced into the deck cycles of their carriers would plague them throughout the coming battle.

[/QUOTE]

 

[Corsair 115]

To follow up the above, the Japanese strike on Midway illustrates the efficiency of their approach. The first carrier division (Akagi and Kaga) each launched 9 fighters and 18 dive bombers. The second carrier division (Soryu and Hiryu) each put up 9 fighters and 18 torpedo bombers (fitted with bombs and which would attack as level bombers). That's a combined total of 108 strike aircraft: 36 fighters, 36 dive bombers, and 36 torpedo bombers operating as level bombers. From the time the signal was given to begin launching the aircraft, those 108 strike aircraft, in addition to 11 fighters for CAP and 2 torpedo bombers acting as scouts, were all put into the air in only about seven minutes. (It took another twelve minutes or so for the strike aircraft to assemble into their formations and climb to the appropriate altitudes before heading off towards Midway).

 

[John Nowak]

To follow up the above, the Japanese strike on Midway illustrates the efficiency of their approach. The first carrier division (Akagi and Kaga) each launched 9 fighters and 18 dive bombers. The second carrier division (Soryu and Hiryu) each put up 9 fighters and 18 torpedo bombers (fitted with bombs and which would attack as level bombers). That's a combined total of 108 strike aircraft: 36 fighters, 36 dive bombers, and 36 torpedo bombers operating as level bombers. From the time the signal was given to begin launching the aircraft, those 108 strike aircraft, in addition to 11 fighters for CAP and 2 torpedo bombers acting as scouts, were all put into the air in only about seven minutes. (It took another twelve minutes or so for the strike aircraft to assemble into their formations and climb to the appropriate altitudes before heading off towards Midway).

That is absolutely fascinating.

What would be the benefit of launching all the aircraft from one carrier? Is it just that the squadrons involved can be assumed to have worked together in the past?

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

Too many cooks spoil the broth. By having one squadron you have one squadron commander. The fliers under him know him, they had supper with him last night. The principle of unified command is a principle for a reason. (And our gull-winged fellow JREFer will expand on that, I'm sure.)

 

[Garrette]

Too many cooks spoil the broth. By having one squadron you have one squadron commander. The fliers under him know him, they had supper with him last night. The principle of unified command is a principle for a reason. (And our gull-winged fellow JREFer will expand on that, I'm sure.)

This, though I have never piloted any flying craft. It's an interesting phenomenon in board style wargames, particularly the older style that rarely demanded retention of unit cohesion. Players (including me; I was young) would fling sub-units around the board willy-nilly, putting these battalions from different brigades together one turn then immediately separating them to have them join yet other battalions from yet other brigades. Games that had rules and mechanics to either eliminate or penalize that practice turned a lot of heretofore unbeaten champions into frothing complainers.

But the practice is so ill understood (or discarded for theatrical purposes) that I had to make myself stop noticing when television shows would have NCIS members lead an FBI Swat Team into a house without ever having met the team, let alone practiced the raid with them.

It's a surefire formula for miscommunications and mission failure at best and for friendly fire incidents and tactical disaster at worst.

 

[John Nowak]

Too many cooks spoil the broth. By having one squadron you have one squadron commander. The fliers under him know him, they had supper with him last night. The principle of unified command is a principle for a reason. (And our gull-winged fellow JREFer will expand on that, I'm sure.)

Thanks -- I don't know much about carrier operation but that makes sense to me.

 

[Craig B]

Too many cooks spoil the broth. By having one squadron you have one squadron commander. The fliers under him know him, they had supper with him last night. The principle of unified command is a principle for a reason. (And our gull-winged fellow JREFer will expand on that, I'm sure.)

I suppose also if half a carrier's planes are launched and a further launch is required, it is very difficult to launch the second wave while the first one is returning. Chaos would surely ensue. But if vessel A launches all its planes, then vessel B can do so later if need be, without preventing the return of the first wave.

I note however the point made above about the time taken to launch an entire complement requiring the first planes in the air to hang about until the others have joined them. That would be a drawback.

 

[Corsair 115]

I suppose also if half a carrier's planes are launched and a further launch is required, it is very difficult to launch the second wave while the first one is returning.

Well, that was the issue facing Nagumo during the Midway battle in conventional accounts. But as Shattered Sword lays it out, the debate about launching a strike against the U.S. carriers or recovering the Midway strike first was largely moot. It was too late for the Japanese in any event—they were going to get hit first no matter what once they had been located by Midway-based PBYs.

Indeed, reading the book, what comes across is that it really ought not to be surprising that the U.S. won at Midway. What would have been surprising is if it had lost—that's how much of an advantage the USN had going into the battle.

 

[Craig B]

Indeed, reading the book, what comes across is that it really ought not to be surprising that the U.S. won at Midway. What would have been surprising is if it had lost—that's how much of an advantage the USN had going into the battle.

Was this a technological advantage, or foreknowledge of Japanese intentions derived from decipherment, or something else?

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

Well, that was the issue facing Nagumo during the Midway battle in conventional accounts. But as Shattered Sword lays it out, the debate about launching a strike against the U.S. carriers or recovering the Midway strike first was largely moot. It was too late for the Japanese in any event—they were going to get hit first no matter what once they had been located by Midway-based PBYs.

Indeed, reading the book, what comes across is that it really ought not to be surprising that the U.S. won at Midway. What would have been surprising is if it had lost—that's how much of an advantage the USN had going into the battle.

Hey, no spoilers!

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

Was this a technological advantage, or foreknowledge of Japanese intentions derived from decipherment, or something else?

From my reading it would come down to the USN knowing the IJN was coming and the IJN hoping the USN was coming. That puts the laurels on Rochefort's boys.

 

[Garrette]

From my reading it would come down to the USN knowing the IJN was coming and the IJN hoping the USN was coming. That puts the laurels on Rochefort's boys.

I haven't read Shattered Sword yet, but hope to do so at some point, but the interpretation of the US as having the advantage doesn't lessen the impressiveness of the victory for me; it probably enhances it.

As portrayed in Tora Tora Tora, US victory was due to pluck sprinkled with large amounts of luck, but being impressed with that is like being impressed with the the lucky gambler who bets it all on one spin of the wheel.

If we (the USN) were smart enough, hard-working enough, and gutsy enough to learn what was out there, what it was doing, and where it was going to be and then to plan accordingly so as to stack the odds in our favor, then good on us. That's how I would prefer we fought our wars.

 

[Craig B]

As portrayed in Tora Tora Tora, US victory was due to pluck sprinkled with large amounts of luck, but being impressed with that is like being impressed with the the lucky gambler who bets it all on one spin of the wheel.

Was that not about Pearl Harbor?

If we (the USN) were smart enough, hard-working enough, and gutsy enough to learn what was out there, what it was doing, and where it was going to be and then to plan accordingly so as to stack the odds in our favor, then good on us. That's how I would prefer we fought our wars.

Also big enough and rich enough and technologically advanced enough. The Japanese were out of their minds to attack the USA. Moreover the USA had broken the Japanese codes and ciphers, and Rochefort elicited the information about the intended Japanese attack on Midway by a clever ruse described here. http://www.faqs.org/espionage/Vo-Z/World-War-II-United-States-Breaking-of-Japanese-Naval-Codes.html

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

I haven't read Shattered Sword yet, but hope to do so at some point, but the interpretation of the US as having the advantage doesn't lessen the impressiveness of the victory for me; it probably enhances it.

I didn't intend to lessen anything.

As portrayed in Tora Tora Tora, US victory was due to pluck sprinkled with large amounts of luck, but being impressed with that is like being impressed with the the lucky gambler who bets it all on one spin of the wheel.

You probably mean the movie "Midway". Movies are not a good source for historical information.

If we (the USN) were smart enough, hard-working enough, and gutsy enough to learn what was out there, what it was doing, and where it was going to be and then to plan accordingly so as to stack the odds in our favor, then good on us. That's how I would prefer we fought our wars.

Agreed. The advantage the US had was we knew what quadrant the Japanese would be coming in from. They had to assume that the USN carriers could be anywhere on a 180 degree arc.

 

[Garrette]

Oops. Blame poor memory exacerbated by being in a rush. I meant whatever the Midway movie was, which may simply have been Midway. Robert Mitchum was in it, I think.

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

Tossing out a question: If Yamamoto had consolidated his forces, adding a few dozen more destroyers, several cruisers and the BBs the carrier screen, would it have improved the IJN chances?

 

[Garrette]

I didn't intend to lessen anything.

Also the result of rushed posting. Yesterday when I checked out Shattered Sword on Amazon and read the reviews, I skipped to the negative ones first, which I usually do. Their sum and substance was that the book is revisionist history because it takes away the greatness of America in fighting back as the underdog (my words, not the reviewers, but that's the gist).

Sorry for not being clear.

You probably mean the movie "Midway". Movies are not a good source for historical information.

I know, believe it or not, though Midway stayed closer to the outline than many military movies. I said earlier in the thread that I am not as informed as many here on the details of the planning and execution of the Pearl Harbor attack; that extends to Midway, but it does not mean I am completely unversed. I am a military man, after all, with a fair amount of knowledge on such things. Just not your level of knowledge on these things.

Agreed. The advantage the US had was we knew what quadrant the Japanese would be coming in from. They had to assume that the USN carriers could be anywhere on a 180 degree arc.

I will definitely have to get the book.