"New" book on Pearl Harbor, attack analysis.

Tolls said:
The war warning was given some 2 weeks prior to the attack, so some attempt should have been made to move out of a peace-time mindset.
Click to expand...

That is something I've always wondered about: Tensions between the U.S. and Japan had increased over a period of months, and were at a high level in the last few days before the attack. There might have been good reasons not to disperse the fleet, but why weren't air and sea patrols ordered? Even an hour's advance notice, even less, could have reduced the losses dramatically.
 
Bob001 said:
That is something I've always wondered about: Tensions between the U.S. and Japan had increased over a period of months, and were at a high level in the last few days before the attack. There might have been good reasons not to disperse the fleet, but why weren't air and sea patrols ordered? Even an hour's advance notice, even less, could have reduced the losses dramatically.
Click to expand...

The estimate was that 150 B-17s would be needed for a full-circle patrol that spotted the enemy before they could get into position for a dawn attack. This means spotting them the day before, or about 500-700 miles from Oahu. There were only 117 Fortresses in the world at that time, IIRC. Short decided that since he couldn't do that he would do what he could. That seems to have degenerated into "do what we've been doing". Lack of air patrol was one of the points listed in Gen. Short's relief. Whether he did everything he could or not is still being debated.

As for the Navy, they weren't tasked with scouting the area around T.H., but would have provided planes if asked. They weren't asked.
 
Gawdzilla said:
Tossing out a question: If Yamamoto had consolidated his forces, adding a few dozen more destroyers, several cruisers and the BBs the carrier screen, would it have improved the IJN chances?
Click to expand...

Probably not. Japanese AA was pretty abysmal at Midway.
 
Gawdzilla said:
The estimate was that 150 B-17s would be needed for a full-circle patrol that spotted the enemy before they could get into position for a dawn attack. This means spotting them the day before, or about 500-700 miles from Oahu. There were only 117 Fortresses in the world at that time, IIRC. Short decided that since he couldn't do that he would do what he could. That seems to have degenerated into "do what we've been doing". Lack of air patrol was one of the points listed in Gen. Short's relief. Whether he did everything he could or not is still being debated.

As for the Navy, they weren't tasked with scouting the area around T.H., but would have provided planes if asked. They weren't asked.
Click to expand...

So was it a case of all or nothing? I can certainly understand that putting eyes on a circle 1000 to 1400 miles across would be an impossible undertaking. But as I understand it, the first warning about the attack was when bombs actually started falling on Pearl Harbor. A couple planes in the air or boats in the water 50 miles out might have given sailors enough warning to get to their guns and get the boats underway.
 
Bob001 said:
So was it a case of all or nothing? I can certainly understand that putting eyes on a circle 1000 to 1400 miles across would be an impossible undertaking. But as I understand it, the first warning about the attack was when bombs actually started falling on Pearl Harbor. A couple planes in the air or boats in the water 50 miles out might have given sailors enough warning to get to their guns and get the boats underway.
Click to expand...
Were radar signals of the approaching Japanese planes not received, albeit from an experimental installation? According to Tora Tora Tora (assuming that to be a credible source) the signals were reported but ignored.

Ii's a bit like the German invasion of the Soviet Union, earlier that same year, when Soviet frontier units signalled their HQ: We are being fired on, what will we do? Response: You must be insane, and why is your signal not in code?
 
Craig B said:
Were radar signals of the approaching Japanese planes not received, albeit from an experimental installation? According to Tora Tora Tora (assuming that to be a credible source) the signals were reported but ignored.
Click to expand...
The Air Information Center was not yet functioning. It was run at the same time as the radar posts, to give the plotters some practice, but at 7 AM everybody went home except for a telephone operator and a fighter jock that had been given some bum dope. (He was told to be there from 4 to 8, and he was a good trooper, despite everybody else leaving.) He knew there were B-17s coming in from CONUS and thought Opana Point had spotted those planes, so he said "Forget it", rather than saying "It's a flight of bombers you and I aren't supposed to know about, so don't worry."
Ii's a bit like the German invasion of the Soviet Union, earlier that same year, when Soviet frontier units signalled their HQ: We are being fired on, what will we do? Response: You must be insane, and why is your signal not in code?
Click to expand...
Except that in this case the message dead-ended before it got above the next level. Never made it to HQ.

If you want to read the testimony of the parties involved I can post links. It's interesting that the pilot, 2nd. Lt. Kermit Tyler, was not dinged in any way for what he did, pointing out nicely that he was not in the chain of command at the time.
 
Craig B said:
Was this a technological advantage, or foreknowledge of Japanese intentions derived from decipherment, or something else?
Click to expand...


The codebreaking by the U.S. which allowed them to have a good idea of what the Japanese were up to was a key element. But there were a host of other contributing factors which Shattered Sword discusses in varying degrees:

  • A complicated, inflexible Japanese battle plan which left little room for contingencies and which dispersed, rather than concentrated, Japanese strength
  • IJN doctrine, which was fixated on attack (once three of the carriers were all but gone, and the Hiryu's first strike against the Yorktown had been dispatched, it was probably time to begin withdrawing rather than risking that last operational carrier against long odds)
  • IJN air group policy which treated a carrier's air group as belonging to only that carrier, which meant Zuikaku couldn't take part in the operation as its air group was still reforming after its losses at Coral Sea (the USN, in contrast, frequently shifted air groups from one carrier to another as needs dictated)
  • Below-strength Japanese carrier air groups (the preceding months of operations had inflicted some measure of attrition on carrier air strength which had not yet been replenished)
  • A rather lackadaisical air search plan at the outset of the battle, compounded by subpar performance on the part of some of its air search aircraft crews
  • Lack of radar, which robbed the Japanese of early warning of incoming air raids, especially high-altitude (i.e. dive bomber) attacks, which were difficult to spot in any sort of cloudy conditions
  • Lack of good radio communication equipment aboard its aircraft
  • Lack of central, organized fighter direction for its CAP (which ties in with the lack of radar and good radio equipment)
  • Low amounts of cannon ammunition (just 60 rounds per cannon) on its Zero fighters, which meant CAP fighters had to be cycled frequently
  • Relatively low priority given to damage control procedures and training
  • Minimal anti-aircraft weapon suites on escorting ships
  • Enclosed hangar design on its carriers, which resulted in longer deckload cycles and which exacerbated the damage caused by bomb hits
  • Generally poor handling of/response to intelligence acquired during the battle (e.g. the IJN had clear indications that Midway was alerted to its presence and was more heavily protected than anticipated, which perhaps should have given them some concern that things were not going according to plan)
These are the ones that immediately come to mind, but there are probably a few other contributing factors I'm forgetting.
 
Last edited:
Gawdzilla said:
Tossing out a question: If Yamamoto had consolidated his forces, adding a few dozen more destroyers, several cruisers and the BBs the carrier screen, would it have improved the IJN chances?
Click to expand...


Book quote time again it seems. :D

[QUOTE="Shattered Sword" by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tuly]The four [Japanese] carriers between them mounted more than half the total usable AA barrels in the formation. In terms of "throw weight"—the actual weight of shells that could be fired within a given amount of time—the carriers accounted for nearly 60 percent of the force's total. Each of the carriers individually had twice the throw weight of light cruiser Nagara and all eleven of the force's destroyers combined. The only other ships in the force with any meaningful AA firepower were the two battleships and the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma. However, unlike a destroyer, the handling characteristics of these large vessels made them less useful for taking up station close to a carrier, even if they had wanted to. To add to this basic problem, Tone's and Chikuma's duties as floatplane mother ships, as well as indicating incoming raids to the CAP by firing their main batteries at intruders, meant that they had their own matters to attend to. The battleships were high-value targets in themselves and maneuvered independently. The result was that the only help that each carrier could likely expect in the event of an attack would come from its division partner, assuming it was close by.[/QUOTE]


The main way the Japanese carriers defended themselves, other than with the CAP, was by evasive maneuvering in the face of an attack.
 
The First Carrier Striking Force of the Midway Operation is the formation in question.
 
Corsair 115 said:
The codebreaking by the U.S. which allowed them to have a good idea of what the Japanese were up to was a key element. But there were a host of other contributing factors which Shattered Sword discusses in varying degrees: (...)
Click to expand...
Thank you for that fascinating information. It seems that the IJN failed on all counts. Poor intelligence, poor tactics, inappropriate doctrine and inadequate technology. I presume that insane suicidal courage was supposed to make up for these deficiencies in some way, but it didn't. With a "shattered sword" even a hero will lose the fight.
 
Last edited:
Gawdzilla said:
Thanks. The suggested concentration of forces means a lot more AAA available.
Click to expand...


Wouldn't help much if a good portion of that is on battleships which, due to the standard procedure of the carriers using evasive maneuvers to foil enemy air attacks, cannot stay close to the carriers. Besides, as the USN learned, it takes A LOT of anti-aircraft guns to put up a large enough barrage to seriously impinge an aerial assault.
 
Craig B said:
Thank you for that fascinating information. It seems that the IJN failed on all counts. Poor intelligence, poor tactics, inappropriate doctrine and inadequate technology. I presume that insane suicidal courage was supposed to make up for these deficiencies in some way, but it didn't. With a "shattered sword" even a hero will lose the fight.
Click to expand...


It certainly has been interesting reading about the Japanese side of the battle. One definitely gets the sense they were fighting an uphill battle. Now, if the U.S. code-breaking hadn't given the the USN forewarning of what was to come, then of course the outcome might have been very different. (To that I'd add if the U.S. hadn't had radar. Radar proved invaluable in giving the USN carriers advance warning of incoming raids, which meant it was far less likely that enemy aircraft could sneak up on them without being detected.)
 
Last edited:
Corsair 115 said:
Wouldn't help much if a good portion of that is on battleships which, due to the standard procedure of the carriers using evasive maneuvers to foil enemy air attacks, cannot stay close to the carriers. Besides, as the USN learned, it takes A LOT of anti-aircraft guns to put up a large enough barrage to seriously impinge an aerial assault.
Click to expand...

It would be lacking on the BBs, but the DDs had an anti-air role to fill.
 
One thing Zimm notes is/was of relevance to the sidebar debate about the IJN's supposed failure to launch an attack on the infrastructure. Over and above the obvious inability of a carrier force to do any serious damage to the sprawling base's repair shops it would also have been futile to attack the oil storage tanks. Why? Zimm notes that 42 tankers were sunk during The Happy Time, and that ~30 tankers were needed to fully replace the oil that might have been lost if the IJN pulled some rabbit out of their hat to destroy the oil on hand within one month. So attacking the tank farms would have been an inconvenience at best. He further notes that a .50 cal. bullet might have penetrated the tanks, but the Japanese had 7.63mm machine guns. (Probably off on that exact number.) Some also had 20mm guns, but the shells were fused to explode when hitting the aluminum skin of an aircraft, and the .5-1.5 inch thick tank walls would have been unimpressed by them.
 
Gawdzilla said:
It would be lacking on the BBs, but the DDs had an anti-air role to fill.
Click to expand...


Except the Japanese destroyers had very little in the way of anti-aircraft armament at the time, often only a pair of twin 25mm cannon mounts. Due to the lack of radar, the Japanese used their DDs as air raid warning picket ships, locating them far from the centre of the formation. The idea of using the destroyers closer in as anti-air support wasn't in Japanese doctrine at the time of Midway:

[QUOTE="Shattered Sword" by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tuly]At this point in the war, the concept of a tight ring formation optimized for antiaircraft screening (i.e the active defense, via combined gunpower, of a capital ship), was unknown to the Japanese. While both the U.S. and Royal Navies were already using such defensive alignments, ring formations did not appear in Japanese doctrine until mid-1943. During the course of 4 June, those destroyers that were not assigned as plane guards were pushed out to the extreme perimeter of the formation to act as air-raid warning pickets ...

On the face of it, dispersing the escorting vessels might be considered poor doctrine on the part of the Japanese ... [T]he majority of the defensive firepower in the formation actually resided with the carriers themselves. Given this, the placement of the destroyers on the perimeter made good sense, because it bought time for the CAP to react to incoming threats. As much as possible, the Japanese wanted to reduce the number of times the carriers had to engage aircraft with their guns to an absolute minimum.[/QUOTE]
 
Last edited:
You must log in or register to reply here.

Back
Top Bottom