"New" book on Pearl Harbor, attack analysis.

Siege warfare on land is probably not a good idea, although it sometimes works. But siege warfare at sea? That sounds nuts. Unless it means blockading a fleet in harbour as the Japanese did to the Russians at Port Arthur, and the Royal Navy to the German "High Seas" Fleet at Kiel. But the Japanese had no prospect of doing such a thing because they couldn't even reach the US Coast in strength, let alone bottle up a fleet there.

The idea behind siege warfare is to force your opponent to either tie up his forces blockading your strongholds, or suffer higher losses than your defenders by taking them.

But that only works if your enemy cannot simply ignore the strongholds altogether, for example because the garrisons can sortie and attack enemy supply lines if the enemy leaves intact strongholds in his rear.

So, creating island stronghold could have worked, IF the Japanese had been able to base and supply credible bomber forces on each island, making it impossible for the USN to attack past them because the Japanese could have interdicted USN supply lines past the fortresses. But the Japanese were never able to keep these bases supplied with either bombers or supplies.
 
So, creating island stronghold could have worked, IF the Japanese had been able to base and supply credible bomber forces on each island, making it impossible for the USN to attack past them because the Japanese could have interdicted USN supply lines past the fortresses. But the Japanese were never able to keep these bases supplied with either bombers or supplies.
And they would have had to prevent the USN from establishing bases of its own on other islands and supplying them by protected convoy or aircraft. I don't think they could have prevented this. The periphery of such a Japanese network of Islands could have been nibbled away by US forces, as happened in reality.
 
The only frontal assault, prior to the breakout in the Ardennes, was an abject failure. And those after the breakout involved heavy casualties against defences that were in the process of being evacuated. Casualties that, had the Germans not found a copy of the orders for the French withdrawal, would have resulted in First Army calling off the offensive.

So, I'm not convinced. Besides, as I said, it did the job of pushing the German offensive north. So it succeeded in its purpose.

Sorry for the derail. Back to the other side of the world...:)

That was only the diversion though to pull Allied forces north. Guderians thrust through the Ardennes was the main attack.
 
That was only the diversion though to pull Allied forces north. Guderians thrust through the Ardennes was the main attack.

That was still north of Maginot.
:)

That the French plan, as finally enacted, was (as I believe was pointed out to Gamelin) possessing of a fairly large flaw opposite the Ardennes is by the by.
 
And they would have had to prevent the USN from establishing bases of its own on other islands and supplying them by protected convoy or aircraft. I don't think they could have prevented this. The periphery of such a Japanese network of Islands could have been nibbled away by US forces, as happened in reality.

And, of course, there were gaps in the chains of islands that only a few planes could cover. If the USN had concentrated on taking out those planes the gap would have been an open road. Alternatively, if they had made an all out effort to take one of the fortress island it would have, I have no doubt, fallen. No amphibious assault by US forces was driven back into the sea. (Admittedly, "the situation is in doubt" was sent at least once.)
 
And they would have had to prevent the USN from establishing bases of its own on other islands and supplying them by protected convoy or aircraft. I don't think they could have prevented this. The periphery of such a Japanese network of Islands could have been nibbled away by US forces, as happened in reality.

I suggested elsewhere that we should have been the first forces on Guadacanaru. Henderson Field could have been built and backed strongly if we moved first. Note that we were the first to fly out of it.
 
Interesting. Have ordered it from my public library. (They don't have it, but one can order from any library in the country, and they will get it)

Hans
 
I suggested elsewhere that we should have been the first forces on Guadacanaru. Henderson Field could have been built and backed strongly if we moved first. Note that we were the first to fly out of it.
If they hadn't been stopped there, they'd have been stopped somewhere else. The Gettysburg syndrome!
 
If they hadn't been stopped there, they'd have been stopped somewhere else. The Gettysburg syndrome!

For sure. But an Allied airbase on the Solomons would have moved our zone of control well north earlier. I picture an anchorage at either Alite or San Cristobal where the OBBs could hover ready to respond to a big-gun threat from the Japanese. It was a missed opportunity IMHO.
 
To be honest, I am shocked you have not already read "Shattered Sword". It has pretty much revolutionized the way that Naval Historians view the way the Japanese Navy fought at Midway. Highly recommended.

Time demands. I tend to bookend the war. The beginning and the end are the areas I study when I have recreational reading time. This is why Eri Hotta's book in battery right now. Otherwise I'm 99% primary source documents.
 
To be honest, I am shocked you have not already read "Shattered Sword". It has pretty much revolutionized the way that Naval Historians view the way the Japanese Navy fought at Midway. Highly recommended.


Can you give a brief synopsis of what it revolutionizes so as to whet the appetite for those interested in the subject matter?
 
Can you give a brief synopsis of what it revolutionizes so as to whet the appetite for those interested in the subject matter?

Going on memory, most of the book busts myths that were actually perpetuated by Japanese historians and accepted by Americans, such as:

1) The crucial attack on Japanese carriers was brought about purely by the sacrifice of earlier attacking planes drawing the Japanese fighter defense down to sea level.

In fact, the most that can really be said is that those planes did nothing like that and at best merely made the Japanese fighters waste a lot of their 20mm ammo.

1a) The American planes that eventually hit the Japanese carriers only were able to do so because there was nothing to stop them except the carrier anti-aircraft.

In fact a lot of the attack planes had to deal with enemy fighters but use of new tactics (such as the 'Thatch Weave") or staying in formation (It is hard to attack Torpedo/Bomber planes when they still in formation) allowed them to get through. There a point in the book where, while it is never explicitly said, you can almost hear the Japanese pilots saying "This isn't fun anymore!"

2) Lucky America: Lucky, lucky USA in Midway. It was pure luck that the Japanese scout plane had a radio failure, it was pure luck that American planes found the Japanese carriers, luck was simply with the US all day long. Without this luck the US fleet was doomed.

In reality, both sides had their share of luck, although one could argue with Japan making some luck for the US via sheer arrogance (such as altering outcomes when wargaming the battle). In fact most 'luck' would have had no bearing on the battle (such as the radio message) or was made by tenacity (such as finding the enemy fleets). Japanese historians often overlook some luck on their part - such as the USS Nautilus' torpedoes failing, the Midway plane that almost slammed into a carrier's command tower, etc)

3) Carrier decks of death - It is often alleged that the reason the carriers were so vulnerable was due to Nagumo's indecision about arming the planes to attack Midway again or enemy carriers. This resulted in the deck being covered with munitions and fueled planes.

In fact these conditions hardly mattered. Poor (and arrogance-based) damage control and attack preparations doomed the carriers once hit. Japanese carriers never pumped AVGAS out of the fuel lines during attacks resulting in infernos waiting to happen.

4) Had Japan one, Midway would have been easily stomped by Japanese Maritime troops and turned into an 'unsinkable carrier'.

In fact, the attacks on Midway didn't do nearly enough damage to soften them up and there was little indication a series of further raids would do any more. In addition, Japanese naval ships were not very good at shore bombardment The defenses were in place for an invasion, and the coral reef conditions were such that the only attack zone was a small beach area. With all the firepower on the island and the limited number of troops most of the landing craft would likely have never even reached the shores of Midway. The result would have been a siege that Japan did not have the logistics to maintain.
 
As I understand it from Zimm, Fuchida's version of the attack is rather at odds with reality.

I am presently reading the book and what has struck me so far is the haphazard method the Japanese used in planning the attack. They were improvising on the run rather than following a carefully prepared plan which is fine for a field officer, bad in a strategic planner, what plans they did have were more wishful thinking than actual assessments of risks. "The Americans will not discover us, Japanese worriership will conquer all", these along with their fixation on the One Big Battle led them to underestimate the enemy and overestimate themselves.

Reminds me of Lee before Gettysburg.
 
I am presently reading the book and what has struck me so far is the haphazard method the Japanese used in planning the attack. They were improvising on the run rather than following a carefully prepared plan which is fine for a field officer, bad in a strategic planner, what plans they did have were more wishful thinking than actual assessments of risks. "The Americans will not discover us, Japanese worriership will conquer all", these along with their fixation on the One Big Battle led them to underestimate the enemy and overestimate themselves.

Reminds me of Lee before Gettysburg.

Zimm makes pretty much the same points about the Pearl Harbor Attack.
 
Zimm makes pretty much the same points about the Pearl Harbor Attack.

Yes the idea seemed to be to get your soldiers in sight of the enemy then let them fight with no command or control even trying to be exercised.

I was surprised at how few bombs/torpedoes actually got to their targets, when you consider the amount of time, money and lives expended it seems like a very paltry payback.

He gives you a staff officers look at battle where it's all a numbers game.
 
Yes the idea seemed to be to get your soldiers in sight of the enemy then let them fight with no command or control even trying to be exercised.
That's Napoleon's "On s'engage et puis on voit" but whether that is a sensible course of action in the management of a naval engagement involving hundreds of aircraft and fleets of aircraft carriers is rather doubtful.
 
Shattered Sword is available in the library system here, so I'll be putting in a request to have a copy sent to my local branch. It's been awhile since I read a book on WWII. This one looks to fit the bill nicely. Thanks for bringing it up, everyone! :)
 
That's Napoleon's "On s'engage et puis on voit" but whether that is a sensible course of action in the management of a naval engagement involving hundreds of aircraft and fleets of aircraft carriers is rather doubtful.

It ceased to be overly meaningful even during Napoleons career. Once the coalition commanders stopped allowing themselves to panic whenever Napoleon disrupted their communications, or struck from somewhere unexpected, and started leading him on a merry dance instead it all sort of fell apart.
 

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