- I might finally have an effective way to express my dichotomy.
- The SM holds that any self that comes to exist will have only one, finite existence. The NSM (the complement) holds that any self that comes to exist will either exist continuously, or will exist more than once.
- Many of you will believe that it's the same thing I've been saying -- and I agree that it is what I've been trying to say -- hopefully, I'll be satisfied with this rendition.
Good evening, Mr. Savage.
I am sorry, but I agree with neither of your formulations above; further, they represent the same mistake you have been making all along with regards to
p and
~p.
1. Unless and until you can demonstrate that any scientist makes the claim that "any self that comes to exist will have only one, finite existence", I refuse to agree that that represents the "scientific model" (your SM). The "scientific model" is that consciousness (what you are celling the "self", but by which you mean the "soul") is an
emergent property of the neurosystem, that is, consciousness if a by-product of the structure of the brain. (
p)
2. The complement of that statement (
~p) is that consciousness is
not an emergent property of the brain. Full stop. Any description of consciousness that does not involve consciousness being a by-product of the structure of the brain will be included in that
~p. Do notice, please, that a description such as "the "soul exists independently of the body, and is immortal" is only a
part of
~p;
~p includes
anything and
everything that is not
p.
3. The complement of your "SM" is
not, as you have it, that "any self that comes to exist will either exist continuously, or will exist more than once". Instead, if your "SM" is
p,
~p can only be stated as , "any 'self' that comes into existence will not have only one, finite existence". Anything that fits that description (two finite existences; three; the illusion of existence at all; a non-infinite existence at the will of the Hairy Thunderer; an unspecified number of non-infinite existences based on random chance; etc.) is
part of
~p; is subsumed in
~p. It is, as you have been told, the fallacy of false dichotomy to pick only your desired case, that the "soul" is immortal, and call that inevitable. Instead, any condition where the self does not have only one finite existence is a small part of
~p.
As long as you continue to mis-state
~p, there is no ground for agreement. You are correct in that you are still saying what you have been saying all along; it is, however, still wrong.