Materialists......

Okay, that helps emphasize one of my complaints, anyway:

Either that, or we're postulating a nonphysical, nonrandom, acausal, nondeterministic thingamabob for which we have absolutely no logical definition, never mind no evidence.

Definately not a thingamabob. Neti neti. Nothing is not a thing. But it's certainly NONphysical, NONrandom, NONcausal, NONdeterministic, NONexistent, NONempirical, NONdefinable......

And how does this infinity determine which values to insert into the hidden variables?

It doesn't. It just wills, and stuff happens. :)

And what sort of effect do the hidden variables have?

They load the quantum dice.

Geoff
 
It could be that the problems aren't real.

They are pretty persistent for things that aren't real.

The physicists are using the theory as it was intended, as a scientific theory, and the philosophers are confusing themselves by asking invalid questions about it.

Why are they invalid?

I just mean understand the workings of the brain in an empirical sense.

Then you appear to be excluding any possibility of ruling out quantum-metaphysical effects in the brain.

Quantum mechanics applies to brains as much as it applies to anything else.

If free will is something that is forever trapped inside an unknowable consciousness, unobservable to science, then it's not really free will at all.
Free will can make its presence known by (at least sometimes) being acted upon.

You cannot act upon free will. Free will is the absolute example of something which acts on things. It is itself not a thing. Therefore it cannot be acted upon. It is the non-thing which instigates acts on things.

We can empirically tell whether or not a subject has libertarian free will.

How, precisely? :shocked:

It will sometimes introduce an element of unpredictability into their behaviour which we can observe.

Humans being entirely driven by unfree-will are quite capable of behaving unpredictably. Hurricanes can behave unpredictably.

If zombies were possible, yes. But if consciousness necessarily accompanies the right kind of complex agent-like behaviour then we don't need to explain it separately.

How did you arrive at "necessarily"?

We can't say the same for libertarian free will because this actually implies changes in behaviour, and thus requires an evolutionary explanation.

The changes in behaviour have a dual explanation. It is partly evolutionarym because it requires the evolution of enough cognitive capacity to start reasoning about good/evil/right/wrong. But it also requires the capacity to alter the course of history rather than just being swept along in the deterministic tide.

As Dawkins put it, in the infamous last sentence of the Selfish Gene "We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of our selfish replicators."

That is about the most philosophically-informed statement he has ever made. Perhaps he read some Kant after all. :)

But, as many people have pointed out, he never explained how that was possible....

Maybe he hoped other people had also read Kant?

, why evolution would work against itself in this way....

That is a very good question. Why would it? It's a very, very good question.....

, how it could favour creatures that were unoptimised for their own survival in this way over more "selfish" creatures.

It couldn't. I cannot overstate the important of these questions.

Besides, it seems to me that rationality, in itself, does not make us altruistic. If our biologically programmed instincts are selfish then we will act rationally in pursuit of them. Being rational doesn't provide us with new goals.

No, but it opens the possibility of knowing the difference between what is moral, and what is not.
 
Hammegk said:
Sorry. No can do; could that be a function of intractability, do you suppose?
No, I think it's a function of undefinability. Can we fill in any of these blanks?

Libertarian free will is different from compatibilist free will by virtue of ______.

Besides determinism and randomness, free will uses _______.

The source of willing is ________.

A thing that is acausal can still be nonrandom because _______.

Free will has ______ to do with quantum mechanics.

The interface between acausal will and causal action is ______.

Geoff said:
But it's certainly ... NONexistent, ..., NONdefinable
I'll go with those two.

They [hidden variables] load the quantum dice.
I'm waiting to see the math. You know, hidden doesn't mean that we can't find it in the math.

How? Feeling smug usually leads to falling out of the tree you're sitting in.
Smug shmug. If I feel that I will my actions, then I am more likely to plan future actions to my benefit. Lacking such a feeling, why would I bother to think about the future?

~~ Paul
 
I'm waiting to see the math. You know, hidden doesn't mean that we can't find it in the math.

Oh yes it does. According to the math it is random. That's what it's hidden by. As an aside, the latin for "hidden variable" is "discrepo occultus".



Smug shmug. If I feel that I will my actions, then I am more likely to plan future actions to my benefit.

Why? I see no evolutionary benefit in that. Evidence? :D

Lacking such a feeling, why would I bother to think about the future?

Because you were hungry or fancied a ◊◊◊◊? :rolleyes:
 
No, I think it's a function of undefinability. Can we fill in any of these blanks?

Libertarian free will is different from compatibilist free will by virtue of ______.

contradicting determinism

Besides determinism and randomness, free will uses _______.

everything

The source of willing is ________.

Zero/Nothing/Infinity

A thing that is acausal can still be nonrandom because _______.

it is influenced by Will/fate/karma

Free will has ______ to do with quantum mechanics.

indirect connections with metaphysical interpretations of

The interface between acausal will and causal action is ______.

********

Actually, this is the wrong question. It should have been:

The relationship between acausal will and causal action was described by ______.

And the answer is:

Kant, in the most important philosophical book ever written.
 
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mechanics,_philosophy_and_controversy

Quantum mechanics has had many detractors including Albert Einstein and Erwin Schroedinger. Quantum mechanics has had a profound affect on philosophy. Determinism is a philosophical view that the universe is governed by determinism if given a specific state of the universe at a specific time, the future state of the universe is fixed as a matter of natural law. The philosophy of determinism was derived from science, from Newton's laws, and pre-Newtonian physics, in that the ability to predict future outcomes in the universe (such as future position of planets) was made possible by science. Quantum mechanics took away predictability and therefore was a blow to philosophy. However, the main founder of quantum mechanics, Niels Bohr, is said to have a philosophy of determinism similar to the rationalization by Immanuel Kant. This article will attempt, without going into religious implications which are personal matters, to explain the position of many physicists on quantum mechanics and the profound effect that quantum mechanics has had on philosophy.
 
Geoff said:
Oh yes it does.
No, it doesn't. A hidden variable is one that is not observed, but is inferred from other observation. It's still in the math. If it wasn't in the math, it wouldn't have an effect at all.

Why? I see no evolutionary benefit in that. Evidence?
No evolutionary benefit to thinking about the future with the assumption that I could have some effect on it? If you say so.

The relationship between acausal will and causal action was described by ______.
Nope, that's not what I want. I want to know how the nonphysical interfaces with the physical.

So let me see if I can summarize:

Libertarian free will differs from compatibilist free will in that it contradicts determinism. Presumably this means that it is nondeterministic, yet nonrandom, whatever that might mean logically. Free will uses everything as its means of operation. The source if will is the infinite zero of nothingness. Free will is acausal, yet it is influenced (contradiction?) by Will (capitalized), fate, and karma. We defer the definitions of these three things for a later conversation. Free will has indirect connections with metaphysical interpretations of quantum mechanics, which is of interest to those who think metaphysical interpretations of QM are worth anything. The interface between nonphysical will and physical reality is, at present, a complete mystery. It is postulated that hidden variables are involved, which is reasonable considering that there is little hope of finding observable variables. These hidden variables do not yet participate in the mathematics of QM, since that would require something to be discovered in the domain of QM that QM does not currently describe accurately. You should read Kant.

~~ Paul
 
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They aren't quite interchangeable but they are closely related.

It spins on the difference between material and physical. "Materialism" really responds to an older view - the newtonian one and maybe also the relativistic one. In this case, materialistic and deterministic are interchangeable.

That sort of materialism implies determinism.
So what is the point of even using a term that has been overtaken by scientific knowledge?
Only QM changes the picture. But if you introduce QM and call QM "a purely physical

theory" then you are introducing the inherent acausality of QM into your notion of physical and physicalism. At this point, free will is not incompatible with the laws of physics, because the laws of physics have expanded enough to encompass acausality. That help?
I don't think there is a notion of physical. It is something that will change as we discover new things. It certainly changed a lot in the last century. I looks like the notion of physical will change a lot this century too.

The problem is not that free will is incompatible with the laws of physics. The problem is that free will has no intelligible definition. The physics or even metaphysics are irrelevant, nobody has proposed what ~determinate && ~arbitrary means.

QM may allow for randomness, but it does not allow for something which is not determinate and also not random. That idea still does not make sense.
That's still being argued about.
But what is not argued is that if it turns out that real randomness exists, then real randomness will be part of physics. Nobody has ever suggested that there is some area of reality where physicists will simply throw up their hands and say "not our department".
....or acausal free will or fate/karma.......
It does not matter what you call it, if it is not determined and not arbitrary, what is it?

Giving it a name does not help.
Sure, without some degree of determinism, free will couldn't operate. There is an analogy available with a car. Free will is like your hands on the driving wheel. But without the rigid deterministic mechanisms inside the body of the car, your attempts to impose your free will on the movement of the car would fail. You need the car to behave deterministically in order to be able to drive the car. Now just think of the your body as an extension of the car and the thing doing the driving to be your "I".
That is merely to push the problem further back. Without some degree of determinism your driver could not work. Then without some degree of determinism your "I" could not work.

You must finally address the problem that when you have sorted out all the determinate parts and distil a - something - an entity or a principle - that is purely indeterminate.

So if the purely indeterminate is not arbitrary, then what is it?
It wasn't nonsense. Multiverse theory is proposed because otherwise you have to explain why the cosmological constants look fine-tuned for life. If there are lots and lots of Universes, it ceases to be a problem. It's a metaphysical answer. Not an empirical one.
Let's get this clear. Multiverse theory is proposed because the maths in String Theory suggests that there are many universes.

That makes it empirical, not metaphysical.

Originally it was believed that the maths was simply wrong or incomplete, but others have suggested that in fact the maths is right and there are many universes.

Some debate about the anthropic principle has arisen from the mathematical problem, but it would have never been proposed if the maths did not suggest it in the first place.
 
No, it doesn't. A hidden variable is one that is not observed, but is inferred from other observation.

Where did you get that definition from?

It's still in the math. If it wasn't in the math, it wouldn't have an effect at all.

All that is in the math is a variable. What makes it vary is occulted. It is hidden.

Nope, that's not what I want. I want to know how the nonphysical interfaces with the physical.

The question is the wrong question. See: Kant.

Libertarian free will differs from compatibilist free will in that it contradicts determinism. Presumably this means that it is nondeterministic, yet nonrandom, whatever that might mean logically. Free will uses everything as its means of operation. The source [of] will is [infinity/zero/nothing]. Free will is acausal, yet it is influenced (the difference is?) by Will (capitalized), fate, and karma. We defer the definitions of these three things for a later conversation. Free will has indirect connections with metaphysical interpretations of quantum mechanics, which is of interest to those who think metaphysical interpretations of QM are worth anything.

Yes to all of that, with minor corrections.

The interface between nonphysical will and physical reality is, at present, a complete mystery.

No, lots of philosophers have helped to demystify it. However, the proportion of human beings who have read Kant is not high. It is still somewhat mysterious. But it is isn't completely beyond all hope of comprehension.

It is postulated that hidden variables are involved, which is reasonable considering that there is little hope of finding observable variables.

Observable hidden things? Square circles.

You should read Kant.

~~ Paul

Actually, reading somebody-else's interpretation of Kant would probably be a better idea. The Routledge guidebook is good. Reading Kant himself is recomended only for sado-masochists.
 
Geoff said:
Where did you get that definition from?
That's the definition. Either a variable is observed or it is inferred. There is no reason just to make them up. What you want is a metaphysical excuse variable.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hidden_variable

All that is in the math is a variable. What makes it vary is occulted. It is hidden.
Yes, fine, but it's still in the math. Or it should be. But it isn't. Will it be soon?

Yes to all of that, with minor corrections.
See Hammy, I told you it is undefined.

No, lots of philosophers have helped to demystify it. However, the proportion of human beings who have read Kant is not high. It is still somewhat mysterious. But it is isn't completely beyond all hope of comprehension.
Then explain it to me or point me at a site.

Observable hidden things? Square circles.
But it's not hidden! If it were hidden, we would have no concept of free will at all. Or did you mean observable undefined things? I'm so confoosed.

~~ Paul
 
So what is the point of even using a term that has been overtaken by scientific knowledge?

???? I'm losing my grasp of this part of the debate. Don't understand the question. :genuinely confused:

I don't think there is a notion of physical. It is something that will change as we discover new things. It certainly changed a lot in the last century. I looks like the notion of physical will change a lot this century too.

?? Then we are in unknown territory, because I have no idea what limits you place on the potential domain of what is "physical".

The problem is not that free will is incompatible with the laws of physics. The problem is that free will has no intelligible definition.

I think it might be that we are talking about a very, very difficult subject and that getting to the intelligible definition takes a lot of hard work.

The physics or even metaphysics are irrelevant, nobody has proposed what ~determinate && ~arbitrary means.

OK, I'll have a go, in memory of Franko:

It means the cosmos [edit: Logical Goddess] conspires to make this the best possible world.

QM may allow for randomness, but it does not allow for something which is not determinate and also not random. That idea still does not make sense.

I disagree. I think it does allow for this, because it does not explain what randomness is. It has nothing to say on the topic.

But what is not argued is that if it turns out that real randomness exists, then real randomness will be part of physics.

How can randomness mean anything for physics?

Nobody has ever suggested that there is some area of reality where physicists will simply throw up their hands and say "not our department".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Mysterianism

It does not matter what you call it, if it is not determined and not arbitrary, what is it?

Neti, neti.

Giving it a name does not help.

I agree.

That is merely to push the problem further back. Without some degree of determinism your driver could not work. Then without some degree of determinism your "I" could not work.

I agree.

You must finally address the problem that when you have sorted out all the determinate parts and distil a - something - an entity or a principle - that is purely indeterminate.

I don't understand this question, in a grammatical sense.

So if the purely indeterminate is not arbitrary, then what is it?

Very hard to describe. :(

Let's get this clear. Multiverse theory is proposed because the maths in String Theory suggests that there are many universes.

Have you seen this?

http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/susskind03/susskind_index.html
 
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You're way on top now since you left me
Youre always laughing way down at me
But watch out now, I`m gonna get there
We'll be together for just a little while
And then I`m gonna put you way down here
And you'll start crying ninety-six tears
Cry, cry, cry

---? and the [Old] Mysterians
 
???? I'm losing my grasp of this part of the debate. Don't understand the question. :genuinely confused:
You said:
"Materialism" really responds to an older view - the newtonian one and maybe also the relativistic one.
It is a simple question. If “Materialism” only responds to a pre QM view then why are you still using the term?
?? Then we are in unknown territory, because I have no idea what limits you place on the potential domain of what is "physical".
Of course we are in unknown territory, if we were not then there would be no need for science now would there?

Science is the process of attempting to map this unknown territory.
How can randomness mean anything for physics?
I don’t understand your question, if randomness is real then how could physics not include randomness?

In fact science seems to be able to do quite a lot of things with QM so it does not appear to have been a problem.
I don't understand this question, in a grammatical sense.
I would have to deal with this in a separate post.
Have you seen this?
Yes, have you seen this quote from it?
"On the theoretical side, an outgrowth of inflationary theory called eternal inflation is demanding that the world be a megaverse full of pocket universes that have bubbled up out of inflating space like bubbles in an uncorked bottle of Champagne. At the same time string theory, our best hope for a unified theory, is producing a landscape of enormous proportions. The best estimates of theorists are that 10500 distinct kinds of environments are possible.
"Very recent astronomical discoveries exactly parallel the theoretical advances. The newest astronomical data about the size and shape of the universe convincingly confirm that inflation is the right theory of the early universe. There is very little doubt that our universe is embedded in a vastly bigger megaverse.
In other words the maths is “demanding” multiple universes and some observations appear to be supporting this. No scientist would be suggesting it if the maths and/or observations did not suggest it.

Empirical, not metaphysical - even if scientists are usually greatly interested in the metaphysical implications of physical theory.
 
You said:

It is a simple question. If “Materialism” only responds to a pre QM view then why are you still using the term?

Because it involves slightly less typing than "physicalism" and most of the time it doesn't make any difference.

Of course we are in unknown territory, if we were not then there would be no need for science now would there?

No, I meant we are in unknown territory in terms of this debate, because I have no idea how you delimit science.

Science is the process of attempting to map this unknown territory.

What limits/defines science?

I don’t understand your question, if randomness is real then how could physics not include randomness?

"real" != "physical" unless you are a physicalist.

What can physics do with randomness? Physics describes how X affects Y. When you have randomness you have a situation where Y is being affected but there is no X. You can describe the relationship between X and Y but you cannot describe the relationship between [void] and Y.

Yes, have you seen this quote from it?

Yes, do you understand the implications?

The following is stripped from an old essay:

However, there is another form of inductive cosmological argument that could be constructed based upon the need to invoke the anthropic principle as means of explaining apparent cosmological design. There are at least two reasons for suggesting this. The first is explained by Martin Rees in a book called “Just Six Numbers”. There are a several important physical constants, such as level of charge on one electron, which appear to be entirely arbitrary (or contingent), yet needed to be precisely the value they are in order for any stable life-supporting Universe to exist at all (making their values necessary as far as we are concerned – if they were anything else, we wouldn’t exist). An explanation of exactly why these constants are as they are has completely evaded physics, which would require a theory which actually predicts their values in order to be able to provide one. It is not at all clear that such a theory is possible. Physical theories do not usually predict constants in this way.

The second reason was provided by Leonard Susskind, in a recent paper called “The Anthropic Landscape of String Theory”. Susskind has a legendary reputation (he was the originator of this field of physics) and therefore it caused a great deal of controversy when in 2003 he surprised the physics world with the following claim:

“In this lecture I make some educated guesses, about the landscape of string theory vacua. Based on the recent work of a number of authors, it seems plausible that the landscape is unimaginably large and diverse. Whether we like it or not, this is the kind of behavior that gives credence to the Anthropic Principle.

Susskind is pointing out the string-theory correlate of Rees’s “just six numbers”. The link between the two cases is made clear in a 2003 article in a physics journal:

This points to an anthropic approach to the cosmological-constant problem: out of the enormous number of solutions of string theory that represent different universes, we happen to live in one that allows our existence (see Physics World October 2001 pp23-25). This is an idea that Leonard Susskind of Stanford University has coined "the anthropic landscape of string theory". However, mentioning anthropic arguments in physics guarantees heated debates, and this is not an exception. At the moment we cannot deny the existence of these numerous solutions. “
 
Geoff said:
Yes, do you understand the implications?
No, what are the implications? There are a bunch of universes, some of which can support life. We happen to be in one that supports life. What is so interesting about this truism?

~~ Paul
 
Geoff said:
What can physics do with randomness? Physics describes how X affects Y. When you have randomness you have a situation where Y is being affected but there is no X. You can describe the relationship between X and Y but you cannot describe the relationship between [void] and Y.
That's life in the big city of reality. Except for the occasional check to make sure we haven't missed an underlying pattern, there is not much we can do.

http://www2.truman.edu/~edis/writings/articles/accident.html

~~ Paul
 
Paul:

Underlying patterns are crucial to this debate. There is an additional assumption in the text of that link you supplied. It assumes that if there is an underlying pattern to what we consider randomness that this pattern should be detectable objectively. But this is not the case. What if the pattern is embedded in reality, but only detectable within the context of the belief-system and life-situation of the viewer? If this were the case, some people would be able to see [bits of] the pattern and others would not. It would be a case of having to get yourself into the right place (existentially) to be able to see it, without knowing before hand exactly either what it is you are looking for or where to look. Not easy, but not impossible.

Geoff
 
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Paul:

Underlying patterns are crucial to this debate. There is an additional assumption in the text of that link you supplied. It assumes that if there is an underlying pattern to what we consider randomness that this pattern should be detectable objectively. But this is not the case. What if the pattern is embedded in reality, but only detectable within the context of the belief-system and life-situation of the viewer? If this were the case, some people would be able to see [bits of] the pattern and others would not. It would be a case of having to get yourself into the right place (existentially) to be able to see it, without knowing before hand exactly either what it is you are looking for or where to look. Not easy, but not impossible.

Geoff

You'll need provide a coherent example of this. I don't think what you have just suggested can be coherent.
 

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