Materialists......

[chriswl]

Exactly. I am not contradicting physical evidence by proposing non-deterministic metaphysical theories. It just doesn't follow, for the very simple reason that the laws of physics allow for indeterminism, thanks to QM. Empirical evidence is indeed a constraint about what we can believe and it is a contraint to which I comply 100%. Nothing I believe contradicts empirical evidence.

OK, so your belief in libertarian free will depends on the existence of so far undiscovered quantum effects in the brain. If these turned out not to exist then libertarian free will would contradict empirical evidence and thus you would abandon your belief in it. Right?

 

[Belz...]

Sure, but we are not in a position to say what the relationship is between that brain activity and the phenomenological experience of willing.

No activity is necessary. Activity comes after will, not with it.

What I am calling "will" is not composed of other things. It certainly isn't composed of material things. It is another manifestation of what I interchangeably call Zero/"I". When you will it is coming from the same place you might call "the subject of consciousness". But as you know from our previous discussions, this "thing" isn't a thing at all. So in a way, the remaining pile is indeed empty...

Are we saying that there is NO way to even define free will ? If so, how could we possibly even know that it exists or not ?

Oh, I think I see what's going on here. The Zero doesn't decide anything at all. "Deciding" is a thoroughly cognitive act and it requires a brain. But knowing what is right and what is wrong - what one should do or should not do - is absolutely not the same as actually doing it

Again, how do you know this ?

You then end up not being able to do so, which isn't surprising because it is quite impossible to fit free will into a deterministic view of reality, and say we can write it off.

Whether it's deterministic or not doesn't matter. Paul is simply asking you to explain what other possible "mechanism" or whatnot could account for free will if it can't be accounted for by deterministic processes or random processes.

It just doesn't follow, for the very simple reason that the laws of physics allow for indeterminism, thanks to QM.

Indeterminism, yes. Free will, no. Not until you've provided a better explanation for how this "will" works.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

OK, so your belief in libertarian free will depends on the existence of so far undiscovered quantum effects in the brain.

Something along those lines, yes.

If these turned out not to exist then libertarian free will would contradict empirical evidence and thus you would abandon your belief in it. Right?

Yes, but I am not expecting it to happen. Our knowledge of both quantum mechanics and neuroscience are woefully inadequate at this point in time, certainly regarding providing an answer to a question like this. If, via some method I cannot imagine, science could prove a negative of this sort, then it would introduce a serious inconsistency into my belief system. I suppose it would require both a completed neuroscience and a completed physics - little short of a theory of everything. Having said all that, it may be the case that an explanation of QM which doesn't resort to metaphysics may be completely impossible. If so, it may be impossible to prove there are no quantum effects in the brain.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Chris, I'm not sure why you don't understand this. I was being asked for a mechanism underlying libertarian free will. Libertarian free will, by definition, involved a denial that determinism is true. So there cannot possibly be a "valid materialistic [read: deterministic] description" of what is going on.

Materialistic is certainly not equivalent to determinstic. Be that as it may, I am not asking for either a materialistic or deterministic description of what is going on. I am asking for any description of what is going on.

It is not an admission I am wrong, nor is it armwaving. It is an analytically/deductively true statement. Libertarianism and determinism are logically incompatible. Period.

But that has nothing to do with my question.

Then you are claiming that libertarian free will must be non-existent simply on the grounds that nothing could possibly exist which defies scientific description. You are defining it to be impossible. I can't argue with that, so I am not even going to try.

I am not defining it as impossible. I am asking for a (not necessarily scientific) description of how free will works.

Exactly. I am not contradicting physical evidence by proposing non-deterministic metaphysical theories. It just doesn't follow, for the very simple reason that the laws of physics allow for indeterminism, thanks to QM. Empirical evidence is indeed a constraint about what we can believe and it is a contraint to which I comply 100%. Nothing I believe contradicts empirical evidence.

What sort of indeterminism does QM allow that will help this free will problem? Do we agree that eventually, as with the rest of QM, free will shall be described mathematically?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Yes, but I am not expecting it to happen. Our knowledge of both quantum mechanics and neuroscience are woefully inadequate at this point in time, certainly regarding providing an answer to a question like this. If, via some method I cannot imagine, science could prove a negative of this sort, then it would introduce a serious inconsistency into my belief system.

You appear to be saying that your metaphysic is a huge argument from ignorance.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Interesting article:

http://www.emergentmind.org/corredoiraI3.htm

The case we are interested now is the second one, that of indeterminism. Let us imagine that quantum mechanics gives a correct theoretical framework in which to defend ontological indeterminism (not merely unpredictability). What about freedom of will in this case? Here, there might be free will but not necessarily because "indetermism does not imply free will." Of course, indeterminism is a necessary condition for freedom of will but it is not sufficient. The incompatibilist tradition long thought about the determinism when the question of free will arose and argued against determinism; this led many people to believe that determinism is the opposite of freedom of will. Among those authors confused by these implications were those who quickly applauded the achievements of quantum mechanics because it opened a new door on free will.
...
For example, let us imagine building a robot that follows random laws. Is it free? Of course not. Indeterminism is not an absence of causation but the presence of non-deterministic causal processes (Fetzer 1988).

My kingdom for those nondeterministic causal processes.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Do we agree that eventually, as with the rest of QM, free will shall be described mathematically?

~~ Paul

Only if you include infinity in the mathematical explanation. No infinity, no free will.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You appear to be saying that your metaphysic is a huge argument from ignorance.

~~ Paul

Not at all. I am saying there is no empirical evidence to contradict it.

 

[69dodge]

Just look at someone trying to quit smoking. They know exactly why they want to quit, they know its stupid, they know that they've only given it a week and if they give in now they are back to square one. They don't "decide" to smoke a cigarette. What happens, as correctly described by the layman, is that their will caves in. The laws of physics take over.

It sounds like you're saying that, when someone does successfully quit smoking, their brain violates some law of physics. What makes you think so?

The smoker who succeeds in quitting has done so because he has decoupled the agent of will from the biological impulses compelling him to smoke a cigarette. The smoker who fails to quit doesn't really have free will in this respect.

I agree that he doesn't really have free will.

But I think the same about someone else who does quit. Are the impulses that cause someone to quit smoking not equally biological? I guess you'd say no. How do you know that?

 

[hammegk]

I am not defining it as impossible. I am asking for a (not necessarily scientific) description of how free will works.

No one has one, scientific, or otherwise.

You may answer the question "Do I have, or does anything have, libertarian freewill?", whatever that means, as you choose.

Materialists/determinists must answer "no"; compatibilistic is your final solution. Ergo, it meets the needs for you and Stimpy.

Do you agree computer programs in operation also fall completely within any definition of "compatibilistic freewill"? If not, why not?

If so, your "choice", so to speak.

What sort of indeterminism does QM allow that will help this free will problem? Do we agree that eventually, as with the rest of QM, free will shall be described mathematically?

~~ Paul

I'd say no, it is not describable by math. That is within the purview of science.

BTW, for specific events, QM is not described mathematically either.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It sounds like you're saying that, when someone does successfully quit smoking, their brain violates some law of physics. What makes you think so?

I didn't say that. The laws of QM allow indeterminism in.

Are the impulses that cause someone to quit smoking not equally biological? I guess you'd say no. How do you know that?

The impusles are physical - in so much as they are the result of cognitive activity in the brain - the decision to quit smoking. This is not the same as actually having the raw will to carry it through.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Only if you include infinity in the mathematical explanation. No infinity, no free will.

Ah, so now we need zero and infinity. I could offer a few transcendental numbers, too.

Meanwhile, if you can't describe it mathematically, then it ain't part of QM.

~~ Paul

 

[nescafe]

OK, so your belief in libertarian free will depends on the existence of so far undiscovered quantum effects in the brain.

Yes, but I am not expecting it to happen. Our knowledge of both quantum mechanics and neuroscience are woefully inadequate at this point in time, certainly regarding providing an answer to a question like this. If, via some method I cannot imagine, science could prove a negative of this sort, then it would introduce a serious inconsistency into my belief system.

You appear to be saying that your metaphysic is a huge argument from ignorance.

Not at all. I am saying there is no empirical evidence to contradict it.

Ah, but at this point there is no emperical evidence for it, either. Last I heard, Max Tegmark pretty well proved that the timescale of any quantum effects in microtubules were several orders of magnitude too short to have any meaningful effect on the functioning of a neuron (10^-20 (more realistic) to 10^-13 (beng very generous) seconds for quantum superpositions to appear and collapse, vs the 10^-3 second timeframe that the fastest neurons polarize and depolarize). If you could chill a functioning brain to near absolute zero it might be another story.

And with no evidence for or against, Ockham's Razor says ditch it for now.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You may answer the question "Do I have, or does anything have, libertarian freewill?", whatever that means, as you choose.

Materialists/determinists must answer "no"; compatibilistic is your final solution. Ergo, it meets the needs for you and Stimpy.

Dude, d00d! I haven't answered no, because I don't know what the question means. What is libertarian free will?

Do you agree computer programs in operation also fall completely within any definition of "compatibilistic freewill"? If not, why not?

I haven't felt any need to use any definition of free will in the domain of computer programs.

BTW, for specific events, QM is not described mathematically either.

Certain sorts of microscopic events are nondeterministic. Are you going to hang your free will on the peg of random microscopic events?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

This elusive libertarian free will cannot be an entirely random process. Surely no one would call such a thing free will. There must be a (not necessarily physically) causal component that is nevertheless nondeterministic.

Either that, or we're postulating a nonphysical, nonrandom, acausal, nondeterministic process for which we have absolutely no logical definition, never mind no evidence. I agree with Nescafe's appeal to Ockham.

Furthermore, we haven't even settled on which part of our inner experience is our will. Experiments show that the feeling of willing an action can even come after the action is initiated. So that feeling can't be our free will, because surely our free will comes before the action? So which feeling is our free will? Or is it nonconscious?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

This elusive libertarian free will cannot be an entirely random process. Surely no one would call such a thing free will. There must be a (not necessarily physically) causal component that is nevertheless nondeterministic.

All correct.

Furthermore, we haven't even settled on which part of our inner experience is our will.

It's not really part of your inner experience, anymore than your "I" is a part of your inner experience, where "I" is the thing which is observing the content of your mind. It comes from the subject itself, rather than being part of our subjective experiences. It is you.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Ah, but at this point there is no emperical evidence for it, either.

Fine. No empirical evidence either way.

And with no evidence for or against, Ockham's Razor says ditch it for now.

It does from your perspective, sure. But you can't necessarily apply your own standards for deciding how to apply the razor to other people who do not share your other beliefs about the nature of reality. What appears probable to you doesn't necessarily appear probable to me.

 

[69dodge]

I didn't say that. The laws of QM allow indeterminism in.

I didn't say anything about QM or determinism. I was responding to your statement that "[t]he laws of physics take over" when someone ends up smoking a cigarette even though they want to quit. That makes it sound like the laws of physics aren't operating if the person doesn't end up smoking the cigarette. If the laws of physics operate in both cases, then what point were you trying to make?

The impusles are physical - in so much as they are the result of cognitive activity in the brain - the decision to quit smoking. This is not the same as actually having the raw will to carry it through.

I still don't see why not smoking the cigarette requires something called "will" whereas smoking the cigarette is simply the result of the laws of physics taking over. If the person's brain doesn't violate the laws of physics in either case, why describe the two cases differently?

 

[hammegk]

Dude, d00d! I haven't answered no, because I don't know what the question means. What is libertarian free will?

Congratulations on pointing out what has been for millenium, and will be for many more if not forever, one the most intractable philosophical problems, viz. "What Is Free Will?".

My magic 8-ball says ask again later (as many times as you wish, too).

I haven't felt any need to use any definition of free will in the domain of computer programs.

Hmm. Then you need to explain how you interpret compatibilistic free-will. To me it means that a machine uses all or a subset of available inputs and computes a result based on the coding available to it at the time and in the time available for computation.

Certain sorts of microscopic events are nondeterministic. Are you going to hang your free will on the peg of random microscopic events?

I won't. You may choose to do so, although I find no difference in that choice and declaring one acts in a random manner.

Last I heard, Max Tegmark pretty well proved that the timescale of any quantum effects in microtubules were several orders of magnitude too short to have any meaningful effect on the functioning of a neuron (10^-20 (more realistic) to 10^-13 (beng very generous) seconds for quantum superpositions to appear and collapse, vs the 10^-3 second timeframe that the fastest neurons polarize and depolarize).

And I have read elsewhere that quantum effects do come into play as ions move across synapses. I don't have a citation handy.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

All correct.

Then I presume you agree with:

Either that, or we're postulating a nonphysical, nonrandom, acausal, nondeterministic process for which we have absolutely no logical definition, never mind no evidence.

It's not really part of your inner experience, anymore than your "I" is a part of your inner experience, where "I" is the thing which is observing the content of your mind. It comes from the subject itself, rather than being part of our subjective experiences. It is you.

Are you just using the term free will as a name for the part of Being/Zero that is differentiated into my self?

~~ Paul