Materialists......

[chriswl]

It is 'due' nothing. Should you wish to base your worldview on the assumption materialism=True, I've mentioned the statement you should be willing to make; either do so, or choose a worldview you are willing to feel comfortable defending -- or demonstrate what I say in this case is illogical and/or incorrect.

I don't start out from the position that the material world is all that exists. Just that the material world (at least) clearly does exist.

Neither dualism, materialism, neutral monism, subjective idealism, nor objective idealism address what human consciousness is, or is not. All agree that the neural system as we perceive it is necessary for it.

Neurons seem to be necessary for the existence of minds. Minds don't seem to be necessary for the existence of matter, in fact far from it. There is an important asymmetry there that is glosssed over when philosophers talk about mind and matter as equal candidates for fundamental substances.

 

[hammegk]

What is it you don't understand about the sillyness of any dualism?
Why not Choose a monism, and defend it...

 

[Robin]

Sure, jump from the first to the last post and ignore the 40-odd pages in between. Nothing like an gross oversimplification to wrap things up.

Well no, as I will show I have not ignored anything in between, in fact I have, over the last 7 or so pages, steered the debate back to the OP and asking for an answer to a question I asked on page 4. Forgive me for keeping the thread on track.

Simplification? No, I have made a number of attempts to clarify that when you say that you cannot define the word "physical" you include the times you use it in a specific context and specifically in the context of the central claim in the OP. I have been getting you to clarify this since page 35.

I cannot be bothered to continue repeating myself over and over and over again, even to respond to this sort of misrepresentation and failure to acknowledge the numerous occasions I have already responded to your point. This thread should have died two weeks ago and I very much doubt anybody else is still reading it. It was a foregone conclusion that this thread would end with a bunch of people claiming to have refuted everything I said. This always happens. Strangely enough, exactly the same thing occurs in the threads I start on creationist forums. It must be me.

Misrepresentation? OK, lets examine that. I first asked the question on page 4 referring to your original post:

And if you claim that you have reason to believe that subjective experience is “over and above a physical process”, state your reasoning and define in which sense you are using the word “physical”.

You did not respond to this as far as I can see. When you continued to employ the word physical I asked you again on page 35:

And are you ever going to get around to telling me what definition you are using when you use the word "physical"?

You answered:

Probably not. FPRIVATE "TYPE=PICT;ALT="

It depends who I am talking to and what the context is. It is not my fault that the definition of physical is all over the place. Perhaps if the people who defend physicalism actually understood what they were defending it would not be such a problem.

I responded:

I don't care what meaning other people might invest in it. I ask you only what you mean by it.

You reply:

I cannot establish a consistent meaning of it because the physicalists themselves use it in more than one way. I have my own understanding of what "physical" means - it is the world of the objects of perception.

Ok, here is the crucial point where I again link it back to the OP:

And is this the sense in which you are using it in your replies to me? Is this the sense in which you are using it in the OP?

To which for some reason you respond by telling me what materialist mean by the word "material":

No.

I have already explained this over and over. Materialists use the word "material" to refer to two things : (1) the objects of perception and (2) the perception-independent world. There is only one way this can be valid, and that is if direct realism is true. However, not one of the people who conflates these two usages on this board knows how to coherently defend direct realism, they just assume it is true without thinking about it.

And to my question:

You cast this in terms of experience being something other than physical. So it is in your court to define what you mean by physical.

You reply:

I cannot do this. I cannot fix the physicalist's double definition. All I can do is point out that they are using the word to refer to two different things, or that they are assuming direct realism is true without knowing how hard it is to defend that position. If I actually try to define "physical" as one of these things and not the other then the physicalist will object to my definition. If I define "Physical" as the objects of perception, the physicalist will claim my definition doesn't refer to the perception-external "real world". If I define "Physical" as the perception-external world then we will have to introduce a new term, such as "qualia" to refer to the objects of perception.

So here is the problem. Physicalists want to use "physical" to refer to both things, but this is only valid if they can defend direct realism, and this they cannot do. Instead, when faced with the strength of the arguments against direct realism (especially the argument from hallucination) they will try to defend indirect realism instead. What then for their overloaded term "physical"?

So this is very clear - when asked what you mean when you use the term "physical" in a specific context you reply that you cannot answer because Physicalists (whoever they might be) do not have a definition.

So to ensure I don't misrepresent you on this position I ask you for clarification:

And again, I did not ask you to fix anybody elses definition. I asked you what you meant when you used the term.

Here is your central claim for the post - with my emphasis:

The real situation, whether you are a materialist or not a materialist, is that we can indeed tell the difference between a physical process and a subjective experience

If this were true then you must be able to define what you mean by physical when you use it within this sentence. What materialists of physicalists might mean by it is irrelevant.

What do you mean by physical when you use it in this sentence. If you cannot answer then the claim you make is false.

I could not be more clear than that, could I? "What do you mean by physical when you use it in this sentence. Again you respond:

I have repeatedly responded to that question in the only way possible. I cannot use "physical" consistently because the physicalists themselves do not use it consistently. You can ask me the same question fifty more times and you will get the same answer.

So you have very clearly and unambiguously stated that you do not know what you mean by physical when you use it in the central claim of the OP.

And when I make the obvious point:

We cannot tell the difference between a physical process and a subjective experience if we do not have a coherent definition for "physical".

You more or less agree:

True. But at such a point, physicalism has disappeared off the map. If "physical" can mean "something entirely external to us" then it has just replaced the term "noumenal". If "physical" now means "noumenal" then you might as well call me a physicalist!

Do you see the problem?

Since I am asking you what you mean by the word and nobody has suggested or implied these meanings, I am not sure where they came from or what the relevance is.

But you do appear to be agreeing that the central claim in your OP, made so ostentatiously, could not be justified.

But again, I ask to make sure that I understand you and am not misrepresenting you:

Fine - so when you use the word "physical" in this context...

The real situation, whether you are a materialist or not a materialist, is that we can indeed tell the difference between a physical process and a subjective experience

...you don't actually know what you mean by it.

You answer:

Erm....I didn't use the word "physical" in that context.

I used the word "materialism".

Naturally I point out that you did indeed use the word "physical"

So far from misrepresenting you, I have asked you several times to clarify that this is in fact what you meant.

As far as I can see you are claiming that you cannot define the word "physical" even when you use it in a specific context. I defined that context as the central claim in your OP a number of times.

So where is the misrepresentation? Where is the simplification? Either you do know what you mean by "physical" when you use it in this sentence, or you don't. You have said a number of times that you don't. You are tired of answering the question. If I ask you fifty times you will still not know what it means in this specific context.

All your answer would have to be is "Yes I do know what I mean by physical in the context of this question, what I mean is ..."


Again, the central claim of your OP:

The real situation, whether you are a materialist or not a materialist, is that we can indeed tell the difference between a physical process and a subjective experience

But we cannot do that unless we can first define what "physical" means in this context. If we cannot then the claim cannot be justified. I cannot see how you can possibly deny that.

 

[Robin]

What is it you don't understand about the sillyness of any dualism?
Why not Choose a monism, and defend it...

I am not sure that I have ever seen where you or Geoff have ever even defined your Monisms. Objective Idealism remains just a couple of words. Perhaps you could start a thread and set out the principle ideas of this thesis and the reasons that you hold to it. (Perhaps you did and I missed it, if so please point me to it).

Or should we just go to the other sources and assume that they accurately reflect what you mean by the term?

I have, on a number of occasions, presented what I believed to be the metaphysical propositions that I would accept and the degree of certainty that I attach to them.

From you I know "thought exists" which has been a standard starting point in philosophy since Lichtenberg in the 18th century. Can you go beyond that?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Robin,

To be honest, I had rather lost track of the specific line of discussion I was having with you amidst the rest of what has been going on in this thread. But since you have gone to the bother of collecting together that line of discussion.....

Misrepresentation? OK, lets examine that. I first asked the question on page 4 referring to your original post:

Originally Posted by Robin :
And if you claim that you have reason to believe that subjective experience is “over and above a physical process”, state your reasoning and define in which sense you are using the word “physical”.

I mean "material". I mean things existing in space and time and made of things like atoms and vibrating electromagnetic fields.

There is a question mark over quantum mechanics, and the entities it describes because there is no agreement about their metaphysical significance and status.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Yes, but it is metaphysical model-building, not scienticis model-building.

What is metaphysical model building? Why does it matter, for example, that optical illusions pose a problem? Addressing such issues sounds like scientific model building.

They can analyse the concepts we are using when we try to describe what "observing the real world" actually means.

I'm not using concepts. I'm using observations. So I guess those philosophers are working for someone else.

If whatever philosophers come up with does not match what neuroscientists learn as time goes by, philosophers will have no choice but to constantly revise their model. They cannot help but be affected by science.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What is metaphysical model building?

An attempt to construct a coherent metaphysical system.

Why does it matter, for example, that optical illusions pose a problem?

Because they are useful case studies. Asking questions about specific situations helps to clarify issues that may otherwise remained obscured.

Addressing such issues sounds like scientific model building.

In some cases it is.

I'm not using concepts. I'm using observations. So I guess those philosophers are working for someone else.

You cannot use complex language without using concepts. You use concepts all the time, especially on this board.

If whatever philosophers come up with does not match what neuroscientists learn as time goes by, philosophers will have no choice but to constantly revise their model. They cannot help but be affected by science.

Sure, science is one of many restricting factors. Others are self-consistency and consistency with other forms of knowledge or other components of a philosophical system.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I don't start out from the position that the material world is all that exists. Just that the material world (at least) clearly does exist.

That could be taken to mean "it exists, in some form" or "it self-exists, entirely independently of anything observing it, in the same form as it exists when observed by us". The former I agree with, clearly it does exist - unless you are lifegazer. The latter is not clear at all. That is just naive realism - a pre-philosophical position.

Neurons seem to be necessary for the existence of minds. Minds don't seem to be necessary for the existence of matter, in fact far from it.

Yes, naive realism seems to be true.

There is an important asymmetry there that is glosssed over when philosophers talk about mind and matter as equal candidates for fundamental substances.

There is an asymmetrical inter-dependence. You are attacking the well-beaten straw man which is substance dualism. Very few of the people who are attacking materialism are defending substance dualism.

Mind and matter are indeed equal candidates for fundamental substances. They both fail.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I am not sure that I have ever seen where you or Geoff have ever even defined your Monisms.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=54825

 

[chriswl]

What is it you don't understand about the sillyness of any dualism?
Why not Choose a monism, and defend it...

I suspect physicalism will turn out to be completely defensible. But we need to know more about how the brain works.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Sure, science is one of many restricting factors. Others are self-consistency and consistency with other forms of knowledge or other components of a philosophical system.

I don't know what those other forms of knowledge are, but I agree the model has to be logical, consistent with science, and consistent with any other philosophical models.

I predict that the models of perception will bifurcate and become much more complex as neuroscience advances. Consider a nice, simple model of visual perception and what happens to it when someone mentions blindsight.

~~ Paul

 

[chriswl]

That could be taken to mean "it exists, in some form" or "it self-exists, entirely independently of anything observing it, in the same form as it exists when observed by us". The former I agree with, clearly it does exist - unless you are lifegazer. The latter is not clear at all. That is just naive realism - a pre-philosophical position.

I just mean the physical world, the mathematised world as conceived by Descartes, exists. It is real. And it continues to exist when we don't observe it.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

That is just naive realism - a pre-philosophical position.

Is "real realism" taken?

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

I am not sure that I have ever seen where you ...have ever even defined your Monisms. Objective Idealism remains just a couple of words. ....

Or should we just go to the other sources and assume that they accurately reflect what you mean by the term?

I'd say a basic split is cartesian mind / body.

Monism just states that if it can effect or affect 'what-is', it's made of the same stuff.

Objective idealism meets the criteria by assuming mind, rather than body, as the primary attribute.

I have, on a number of occasions, presented what I believed to be the metaphysical propositions that I would accept and the degree of certainty that I attach to them.

And as a materialist, as long as you deny mind at zero probability, you have a coherent and logical position.

From you I know "thought exists" which has been a standard starting point in philosophy since Lichtenberg in the 18th century. Can you go beyond that?

I offer no solace in objective idealism over physicalism other than I have no reason to assign zero probability to either god, or free will, yet remain with a coherent position. I'm not forced to contend with the mathematization problem -- random or determined -- that concepts both god and free will expose for physicalists.

I just mean the physical world, the mathematised world as conceived by Descartes, exists. It is real. And it continues to exist when we don't observe it.

And I just mean "The objective world, the mathematised world ...exists. It is real. And it continues to exist when we don't observe it.".

So your point is?

Is "real realism" taken?

~~ Paul

We seem to agree "real reality" exists. We are just discussing your greatest love, "The Defintion".

 

[Robin]

I'd say a basic split is cartesian mind / body.

Monism just states that if it can effect or affect 'what-is', it's made of the same stuff.

Objective idealism meets the criteria by assuming mind, rather than body, as the primary attribute.

But if the primary attribute is mind then the primary attribute must possess the property of intention. But if you examine the concept of intention it can only be a complex thing. So you must be asserting that the primary substance is a complex thing - which would appear to be a contradictory position.

And as a materialist, as long as you deny mind at zero probability, you have a coherent and logical position.

Well I assume that by now you know (I've told you often enough) that I am not a materialist and you are just being obnoxious. But your comment is meaningless in any case. You are claiming illogic exists rather than demonstrating what it is that is illogical. A materialist who defends the existence of the mind is perfectly logical. Nobody has yet been able to define precisely what the "mind-body" problem is, without first assuming their conclusion.

What is it precisely about a conscious state that logically forbids it from arising from a non-conscious state?

I offer no solace in objective idealism over physicalism other than I have no reason to assign zero probability to either god, or free will, yet remain with a coherent position. I'm not forced to contend with the mathematization problem -- random or determined -- that concepts both god and free will expose for physicalists.

Again you can assert these things as often as you like. But you have never given any reasoning to show why this should be so.

You claim to have a logical and coherent position, but I have never seen any logic to support the claim.

You have never given any reasoning why "matter" stuff must be deterministic or why "mind" stuff cannot be deterministic.

Forgive me if I don't just take your word for it.

Your position appears to be "the alternative to order is freedom and Godhood".

I still can't see any other alternative to order than disorder.

 

[Robin]

I mean "material". I mean things existing in space and time and made of things like atoms and vibrating electromagnetic fields.

There is a question mark over quantum mechanics, and the entities it describes because there is no agreement about their metaphysical significance and status.

I would contend that the question mark is important. The question mark is the reason we have science in the first place and we will always have science until there is no more question mark. This state will probably never arrive, at least not for the human race.

The question mark is bigger than ever, with physics proposing that time and space might only be meaningful concepts in certain contexts and time-space as a superfluid, or "closed time-like curves" any prior definition of physical begins to look pretty quaint.

I would always contend that Materialism is not an incoherent or illogical metaphysic, on the contrary it is a trivial one. It is a tautology. All you can say with materialism is "Whatever is ... is".

If there is a God then Materialism would say "there is a God". (Because if there were a God then science could not say "there is not a God" )

If there was libertarian free will then Materialism would say "there is libertarian free will".

That is because Materialism is dependent on science and science describes rather than proposes.

 

[articulett]

I would contend that the question mark is important. The question mark is the reason we have science in the first place and we will always have science until there is no more question mark. This state will probably never arrive, at least not for the human race.

The question mark is bigger than ever, with physics proposing that time and space might only be meaningful concepts in certain contexts and time-space as a superfluid, or "closed time-like curves" any prior definition of physical begins to look pretty quaint.

I would always contend that Materialism is not an incoherent or illogical metaphysic, on the contrary it is a trivial one. It is a tautology. All you can say with materialism is "Whatever is ... is".

If there is a God then Materialism would say "there is a God". (Because if there were a God then science could not say "there is not a God" )

If there was libertarian free will then Materialism would say "there is libertarian free will".

That is because Materialism is dependent on science and science describes rather than proposes.

Whew...then it's not me. I can understand philosophy just fine when you or Dennet speak it. I feel like geoff is saying, "if it feels like deja vu, it is deja vu"--and others are saying, "well, we know the brain mechanism behind deja vu and sometimes the "re-remember area" hits the bell so-to-speak before the "make a memory area does"--"some people even have permanent deja vu". And geoff responds "whatever--that doesn't mean my deja vu isn't real true deja vu of the mystical kind. Science can't explain my deja vu...because if you look at reductivism and monism and whateosreisfwism then it's both redundant and illogical, not to mention epistemontologicromulent...so it can't be true".

Is that what he's saying basically?

That's what it boils down to, right? Except substitute "dualism" for deja vu--or substitute "synchronicity" for deja vu--or even "woo", right? And what about hammy--can you translate him for us?

 

[Belz...]

It could also mean that it is very difficult and potentially impossible to accurately describe. You are not going to get the sort of clear cut answer you are looking for.

Doesn't that trouble you ? That there's no clear definition or description of the thing you believe in ?

No, I'm not being sarcastic. I am assuming you have some sort of knowledge of mysticism and the central claims it has made throughout its long and complicated history, and it seems you don't.

I know what mysticism is. I just found it difficult to believe you'd bring it up in a logical debate.

 

[Belz...]

It does if the remainder of your worldview clings to materialism=True.

I think you're confusing open-mindedness and doubt. Just because you allow for your beliefs to be wrong doesn't mean you believe them to be.

Then do so. Here is as good a place as any.

I believe I just did.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I predict that the models of perception will bifurcate and become much more complex as neuroscience advances. Consider a nice, simple model of visual perception and what happens to it when someone mentions blindsight.

Bifurcate? Along what lines?