Materialists......

[Apathia]

As soon as "behaviour" is split into "observable by one person" vs "observable by many persons" we are back to a linguistic dualism. You are correct to say that at this point no metaphysics has been specified, but the same is true of the first stages of the zombie argument. It starts by establishing a linguistic/conceptual dualism which it claims is unavoidable. Mercutio wants to claim that this is just down to my personal biases. But when asked for a scheme which avoids this linguistic dualism he offers us "observable only by you" and "observable by everyone". In what way is that not a linguistic/conceptual dualism?

It is such. It merely removes the heart of being a Subject. The liguistic dualism is watered down a bit and given a scientific frame.

But, if it's Science you want to do, that's the frame you probably want It's just not the frame for metaphysics and philosophy.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It is such. It merely removes the heart of being a Subject.

As did Wittgenstein, who also said that what is not in the tractatus is more important than what is in it.

And the dualism remains anyhow.

The liguistic dualism is watered down a bit and given a scientific frame.

How can science objectify things which are observable only by me?

But, if it's Science you want to do, that's the frame you probably want It's just not the frame for metaphysics and philosophy.

I don't see how it's any use for science either. Science still only operates on one side of the dualism, because it demands objectivity and objectivity demands observability by multiple persons.

 

[chriswl]

Er, yes it does. What do you think quantum mechanics is if it is not full of explanatory gaps?

What exactly isn't explained? Quantum theory has been described as the most succesful scientific theory ever devised. All we need to understand the structure of matter is the wavefunction. In what real life instances, other than those we deliberately contrive, do we find quantum randomness interfering with our ability to make sense of the world and predict things? The only people who think it might affect brain function are those who are searching for a way of freeing the mind from physical determinism - they start off assuming their answer and are now trying to find the evidence. It is not an idea anyone has come to through a disinterested study of the brain.

But some do. See Kuhn. We've been round this loop before, Chris.

So Kuhn had a PhD in Physics, along with many thousands of others. That doesn't make him an authority on quantum physics. Anyway what are you claiming - that Kuhn believed that quantum randomness was integral to consciousness?

Yep. It ripped that straightjacket wide open. But some people seem to like the straightjacket. Can't think why, personally.

Because people jump on the slightest uncertainty as an excuse to just believe whatever crazy thing they want. Your attitude to QM is like that of ID'ers to the theory of evolution.

Right. So which intepretation of QM will that be?

I don't need to "interpret" QM. It's perfectly straightforward unless you ask stupid questions like "what is a particle, really?". Philosophers should understand better than scientists (and some do) that some questions are just not valid.

No, it was a refuation of the claim that you can define materialism in terms of supervenience.

I'm not making any such claim. I'm not trying to define materialism any more than you've defined what you mean by mind. I'm just saying that mind supervening on the brain is the closest thing we have to an explanation of the relationship between the two things, as we understand them. Obviously that explanation cannot be declared false simply on account of it being compatible with (but not requiring) the existence of something else.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What exactly isn't explained?

The role of the observer. Whether there is an observer. The relationship between before and after the collapse of the wave function. The relationship between QM and consciousness. All of the different interpretations spin around these questions.

Quantum theory has been described as the most succesful scientific theory ever devised. All we need to understand the structure of matter is the wavefunction. In what real life instances, other than those we deliberately contrive, do we find quantum randomness interfering with our ability to make sense of the world and predict things?

That isn't the point. The question is the implications of QM on metaphysics, and science cannot answer it.

The only people who think it might affect brain function are those who are searching for a way of freeing the mind from physical determinism....

Does that include Sir Roger Penrose?

- they start off assuming their answer and are now trying to find the evidence.

Does that include Sir Roger Penrose?

It is not an idea anyone has come to through a disinterested study of the brain.

What about a disinterested study of QM?

So Kuhn had a PhD in Physics, along with many thousands of others. That doesn't make him an authority on quantum physics. Anyway what are you claiming - that Kuhn believed that quantum randomness was integral to consciousness?

You were claiming "most physicists believe X". You disregarded the fact that there is a Kuhn-style revolution in the offering regarding precisely this subject. I am not saying it will happen, but it could, quite easily.

Because people jump on the slightest uncertainty as an excuse to just believe whatever crazy thing they want.

Does that include Sir Roger Penrose?

Your attitude to QM is like that of ID'ers to the theory of evolution.

Is the same true of Sir Roger Penrose?

I'm not making any such claim. I'm not trying to define materialism any more than you've defined what you mean by mind.

My mind is the totality of my subjective experiences. My mind is my world. I have defined this many times.

I'm just saying that mind supervening on the brain is the closest thing we have to an explanation of the relationship between the two things, as we understand them.

Agreed.

Obviously that explanation cannot be declared false simply on account of it being compatible with (but not requiring) the existence of something else.

I didn't declare it false. I agreed with it. I disputed the claim that it was a meaningful way to define materialism.

 

[Mercutio]

Hammy, bless your heart, you are using "subjective" (and perhaps "objective"; I will have to think about that) in the way it *should* be used, but not in the way it has been traditionally used and defined. If more people used it as you do, this would be a good thing.

Sorry, Merc. Whatever is perceived via hammegk & photon/graviton exchange is subjective to hammegk. Merc will never share it.

I would change merely one word of that; "is private to hammegk" is, I would argue, more accurate. It expresses the fact that Merc will never share it, without adding the assumption that it is in a separate realm from "objective" things (which is in both the definition and the history of usage of "subjective".)

Things that are objective can be and are perceived simultaneously (although that opens another can'o'worms) by multiple perceivers, each perception viewpoint being in-itself subjective to the specific perceiver.

Again, I think the word "public" fits your sentence much better than "objective" does. Definition and historical usage add assumptions about the "reality" of an objective thing, and place it in a separate category from subjective. As you note, these objective things are actually inter-subjective things anyway, which would be a real (pardon the pun) problem if subjective and objective were understood to be two separate stuffs. "Public", however, says what you want it to say, without adding that baggage (well, Geoff will add the baggage no matter what word we choose, but for other people....)

You do understand I have no problem accepting everything your school of behaviorism states, yet I remain a (100% logical) objective idealist?

You do understand that your objective idealism is not incompatible with behaviorism? Nor is materialism. Dualism is. The definitions of public and private do not depend upon whether behavior is seen as ultimately mental, ultimately physical, ultimately light blue with green stripes. Except to Geoff. The question of material/ideal is not one that matters to this view. Again, except to Geoff. The question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin may be very important to some people...others can safely ignore the question and get on with things that actually matter.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You do understand that your objective idealism is not incompatible with behaviorism? Nor is materialism. Dualism is. The definitions of public and private do not depend upon whether behavior is seen as ultimately mental, ultimately physical, ultimately light blue with green stripes. Except to Geoff. The question of material/ideal is not one that matters to this view. Again, except to Geoff.

This is stupid. Either your claim here is correct, or it isn't, yes?

1) The claim is correct.

If the claim is correct, then the behaviourism you are describing is a pyschological theory. It is a claim about what the legitimate study area is for psychology. It is a claim that is disputed by some people, including by Hyparxis. But it is not disputed by me on the grounds that arguments within the field of psychology are not my concern, certainly not in a thread about metaphysics. But if this is the case then I am deeply mystified why you keep posting about it in a thread about metaphysics. It has nothing to do with metaphysics, as you say. So why is it relevant to this thread?

2) The claim is incorrect.

If the claim is incorrect then the behaviourism you are describing is a metaphysical theory that has been debunked many times from Berkeley, via Kant to Heidegger and Wittgenstein.

You are defending (1), yes? If so, then why do you think it is relevant to this discussion?

 

[Mercutio]

Please explain very clearly why "single observer" and "multiple observers" does not map perfectly on to "subjective/objective" or "mental/physical". I can see no difference whatsover. Don't tell us to look it up. Post the answer yourself, please. We don't understand. Please educate us. Where are the mismatches? What is the difference between the two pairs?

I know you can see no difference. You demonstrate that with each misunderstanding.

Mental...by definition and historical usage, is "what the mind does." Physical is, by definition and historical usage "what the body does, as distinguished from the mind or spirit". Both definition and historical usage (it should come as no surprise that they agree) dichotomize, make separate these two realms (more than merely separate like dogs and cats, Descartes and others have our language community convinced that these are realms that cannot interact, that are profoundly, essentially, separate, distinct, and different). Subjective, by definition and historical usage, refers to events that take place in the mind. So once again we have "what the mind does". This is contrasted with Objective, which exists "independent of individual thought". Again, consistent with "distinguished from the mind or spirit".

These words presuppose dualism. By definition and by historical use, these terms beg the question you pretend to explore.

Private and public, on the other hand, make no such assumptions. If the essence of reality is mental, we still have private and public. If the essence of reality is material, we still have private and public. Hell, if the essence of reality is neutral, we still have private and public. (what we do not have is two independent and non-interacting stuffs. Dualism is incoherent and internally inconsistent.) It is a distinction that does not rely on monism. I am hopeful that hammy will agree with my adjustments to his post--I sincerely think that "private" and "public" are more in line with what he wished to say.

If there is indeed a distinction in what "stuff" comprises private and public behavior, that is not denied by the distinction between private and public; on the other hand, no distinction is assumed, a priori, to exist. If and when there is any actual evidence to suggest that private and public behaviors are different in kind, that will not change the fact that they differ in the number of people who may observe them. This distinction is, to the best of my ability to discern, free of ontological assumptions. It should offend none...save those who have reason to defend the assumptions they have made. If there is no actual evidence to suggest that private and public behaviors are different in kind...then it matters not whether you choose material as Stimpy did, ideal as hammy did, or neither.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Re: New avatar. This particular duck was standing on top of a narrowboat called "Uranus" at the time, moored next to ours outside a pumping station which was emptying the sewage tanks in our boat. It would not shut up. I am keeping this avatar until this thread finally expires.

http://www.cheeseandjamsandwich.co.uk/2003-05-10_ribble/

 

[Mercutio]

This is stupid. Either your claim here is correct, or it isn't, yes?
[snip]
You are defending (1), yes? If so, then why do you think it is relevant to this discussion?

Actually...I think the more accurate thing to say is that the discussion, and your arguments about metaphysics, are the things that are irrelevant. These deep, deep questions are not so much deep as silly. Angels, pinheads, that sort of thing.

Prediction: Geoff will use this as an opportunity to ignore the arguments that suggest that his ideas are irrelevant.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Mental...by definition and historical usage, is "what the mind does." Physical is, by definition and historical usage "what the body does, as distinguished from the mind or spirit". Both definition and historical usage (it should come as no surprise that they agree) dichotomize, make separate these two realms (more than merely separate like dogs and cats, Descartes and others have our language community convinced that these are realms that cannot interact......

Eh? Descartes claimed they DID interact?

And the definitions precede Descartes anyway.

, that are profoundly, essentially, separate, distinct, and different). Subjective, by definition and historical usage, refers to events that take place in the mind. So once again we have "what the mind does". This is contrasted with Objective, which exists "independent of individual thought". Again, consistent with "distinguished from the mind or spirit".

These words presuppose dualism.

The words were in use before dualism was defined.

By definition and by historical use, these terms beg the question you pretend to explore.

No they do not. In what way does the (pre-)historical development of language assume the conclusion of a metaphysical argument? How can they be begging the question when they predate philosophy?

Private and public, on the other hand, make no such assumptions.

In what way do they not correspond to subjective/objective or mind/matter? That was my question. You still have not answered it.

If the essence of reality is mental, we still have private and public. If the essence of reality is material, we still have private and public.

So you aren't making any claims about ontology? If so, why is what you are saying of any relevance to this thread?

Hell, if the essence of reality is neutral, we still have private and public.

So what has this got to do with ontology?

If there is indeed a distinction in what "stuff" comprises private and public behavior, that is not denied by the distinction between private and public; on the other hand, no distinction is assumed, a priori, to exist. If and when there is any actual evidence to suggest that private and public behaviors are different in kind, that will not change the fact that they differ in the number of people who may observe them.

So what?

This distinction is, to the best of my ability to discern, free of ontological assumptions.

If so, why is it relevant???????

It should offend none...

I don't agree. It is likely to offend all sorts of people. But it is no concern of mine, because it has no bearing on the main subject matter of this thread.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Actually...I think the more accurate thing to say is that the discussion, and your arguments about metaphysics, are the things that are irrelevant.

Why? It is a thread about metaphysics. You are posting theories about psychology.

These deep, deep questions are not so much deep as silly.

Then why have you wasted so much time following this thread?

 

[Mercutio]

In what way do they not correspond to subjective/objective or mind/matter? That was my question. You still have not answered it.

Wait for it....wait for it...

So you aren't making any claims about ontology? If so, why is what you are saying of any relevance to this thread?

Ah! There it is! Even you see the difference. Subjective/Objective and mind/matter both make claims about ontology. Private/public does not.

Very nice escape route you have...if they are different, you can say they are irrelevant to the thread.

Thank you, thank you, thank you, for illustrating my point. The only definitions you will accept are those which will, a priori, support your view. Language which is independent of ontology (independent--it does not support or refute your view per se) is rejected as irrelevant to your thread.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Wait for it....wait for it...
Ah! There it is! Even you see the difference. Subjective/Objective and mind/matter both make claims about ontology. Private/public does not.

Super! So you aren't defending materialism at all. You are defending a claim that the proper subject matter for pyschology is behaviour, not "mental things". Fine. You can argue with some psychologists about that. If you are making no claims about ontology then all is fine and dandy. We can wrap up this thread and I the duck can go.

QUACK!!!

Very nice escape route you have...if they are different, you can say they are irrelevant to the thread.

Glad you liked it.

I presume you agree with that assessment? If not, can you explain its relevance?

 

[Mercutio]

Super! So you aren't defending materialism at all. You are defending a claim that the proper subject matter for pyschology is behaviour, not "mental things". Fine. You can argue with some psychologists about that. If you are making no claims about ontology then all is fine and dandy. We can wrap up this thread and I the duck can go.

QUACK!!!

Glad you liked it.

I presume you agree with that assessment? If not, can you explain its relevance?

Your ideas are as irrelevant to philosophy as they are to psychology. My arguments were independent of a science of behavior; they were based on the philosophical underpinnings of same. You are stuck assuming things that need not be assumed; your "philosophy" will always suffer as a result.

I know you will ignore that (in the long run)...you are so predictable:

Prediction: Geoff will use this as an opportunity to ignore the arguments that suggest that his ideas are irrelevant.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Your ideas are as irrelevant to philosophy as they are to psychology.

Ah. So you are presumably going to provide a whole new defence of that claim, since your previous one turned out to be a theory about psychology which had nothing to do with philosophy. Fire away.

My arguments were independent of a science of behavior;

Eh? So you were making claims about ontology? Please explain.

they were based on the philosophical underpinnings of same.

I am confused. Are you defending a psychological theory or a theory about philosophy of mind? It makes a huge difference, and you seem to be unclear about which you are doing. It would help if you cleared up this confusion. You made quite clear that the difference between "observable by me" and "observable by everyone" was that it was a claim which was independent of ontology and metaphysics. That is what made it different to mind/matter or subjective/objective, remember? You are now claiming that your arguments were based on "the underpinnings of ontology". I am very confused. Are you making claims about ontology or are you not?

You are stuck assuming things that need not be assumed; your "philosophy" will always suffer as a result.

I know you will ignore that (in the long run)...you are so predictable:

No, I'm listening carefully, and looking forward to your next reply very much.

Please tell me whether you are merely making claims about psychology, or also making claims about philosophy, and if the latter is so, then which branches of philosophy are you making claims about?

 

[Mercutio]

Ah. So you are presumably going to provide a whole new defence of that claim, since your previous one turned out to be a theory about psychology which had nothing to do with philosophy. Fire away.

Um...Geoff...sorry, but your interpretation of my argument, and my actual argument, are enough different that I think I can safely say your "nothing to do with" claim is false. You have never demonstrated an understanding of my position; why start now?

Eh? So you were making claims about ontology? Please explain.

My claim, if you wish to call it that, is simply that yours is...what's the word? less than wrong...less than silly...ah...irrelevant.

I am confused. Are you defending a psychological theory or a theory about philosophy of mind? It makes a huge difference,

if indeed it makes a huge difference, then I will gladly capitulate. Please tell me what difference it makes. Please tell me even one thing that your theory allows us to do that we cannot do without it. Even one.

and you seem to be unclear about which you are doing. It would help if you cleared up this confusion. You made quite clear that the difference between "observable by me" and "observable by everyone" was a claim which was independent of ontology and metaphysics. That is what made it different to mind/matter or subjective/objective, remember? You are now claiming that your arguments were based on "the underpinnings of ontology". I am very confused. Are you making claims about ontology or are you not?

Please, if you are going to use quotes...point out where I say "the underpinnings of ontology". Otherwise someone might get the idea that you are putting words in my mouth to compensate for your misunderstanding of what I actually do say.

No, I'm listening carefully, and looking forward to your next reply very much.

You have not listened carefully yet; forgive me if I doubt that you will start now.

Please tell me whether you are merely making claims about psychology, or also making claims about philosophy, and if the latter is so, then which branches of philosophy are you making claims about?

Hmm...my own claims, or my response to yours? Which branches? Metaphysics and epistemology, I suppose.

What I find amusing is that when I google "branches of philosophy", I get major sites proclaiming 5, 13, 22, 10, 30 ...distinct branches of philosophy. Enough, easily, so that no matter what answer I give it will be inadequate.

My point is ... you have made fairly grandiose claims based on "natural language" that (surprise!) support your "neutral monism" philosophy, and you have attacked other views. Your own view, though, is buttressed by assumptions inherent in the language you choose (conspicuous by its absence in the language you reject). Your view is a house of cards. You support it by assumption of language, by dismissal of views that do not support it (whether logical or not), and by redefinition of terms used by those who disagree with you. If your view had merit, you would not need to do this. You are dishonest in your interpretations of others' views, or ignorant to such a degree that understanding is impossible. Your choice.

Now that you have seen a way out of arguing with me, you may well go on to claim that none have toppled your worldview. Fine...if you can do so without a little voice haunting you with "but this is dishonest"...then go ahead. Please, though, do not be so dishonest as to claim victory. You really don't want me showing up in all your threads, do you?

 

[Apathia]

A question, removed.
I'll wait and see.

 

[President Bush]

Behavior can be pragmatically divided into public and private simply in noting the number of observers.

Defined with a new pair of opposites? Relevant and irrelevant. I forget. Was that Skinner or Marx?

 

[articulett]

Now that you have seen a way out of arguing with me, you may well go on to claim that none have toppled your worldview. Fine...if you can do so without a little voice haunting you with "but this is dishonest"...then go ahead. Please, though, do not be so dishonest as to claim victory. You really don't want me showing up in all your threads, do you?

But none have toppled his worldview--it's ipervious to scientific logic. It's the game the philosphers and religious play--they say, "well they never presented a coherent argument, therefore, my "ism" is true"--it reminds me of, "you can't disprove god, therefore he exists". In post #2999 geoff sasid, "I do not think anybody actually knows what Dennetts position is on the reality of mental states. I find him incomprehensible much of the time. He may well not be a computationalist. He may well be a behaviourist."

In the world of science, Dennett makes sense. Outside of philosophy or religion no one seems to have a problem with what materilists believe. It came be summed up pretty easily. It seems to make sense to materialists. I went back to geoff's original post--I have no problem with subjective experiences--I have no problem with your explanations that that they have to do with the number of people aware with how many people are perceiving the event--I have no problem with the view that all individuals may have slight or major differences in perception--I have no problem with these peceptions being mental processes--and just like geoff find Dennett incomprehensible much of the time--I try and try and find geoff uncomprehensible. I mean I get whatever a dualist is--I don't really care what neutral monist is--It has to do with subjectivity--yes, I can never know exactly what he thinks or how he experiences red--but that doesn't make materialism illogical to me in any way--it doesn't make people or animals into zombies--it just makes them entities that "see through different eyes"--But that is not "illogical" as geoff posits--nor does anyone see them as zombies. In fact it's fabulously logical and gives us great insight. We may not have all the pieces, but the pieces we have fit nicely with the physical laws we know and nothing implies that subjectivity (what someone perceives).

I am glad for your sane arguments even though he doesn't comprehend--It makes me quite certain that it is geoff who is the one playing word games to keep his ism alive, and not some weakness on my part or your part or everyone elses' part as he long-windedly elaborates, insults, and claims that everyone else is illogical and doesn't listen. He keeps accusing others of not understanding him. But I think it's him who has comprehension problems per his statement above. I have no problems understanding Dennett. When I was going through a ""new age phase, though, I might have. But I don't know if that's because my framework for thinking was misaligned with reality or if it was because I needed to learn more and ask more questions...and geoff gets so garbled in old phisopheze that it just sounds like creationist mumbo jumbo after awhile. Hammy sounds like a droll, confused, philosophical ID promoter, but he doesn't write long diatribes, and I don't see others understanding him, so I shall assume that I'm not missing any deep wisdom there--nor that clarification of scientific thinking is sought.

Plus I just like to write because it pisses geoff off because he wants this thread to be about his isms and why materialism just doesn't make any sense and his ism does. I sometimes want to see what happens if someone swings by and says, "ah yes, now I see...I was a materialist but it truly doesn't make any sense--I am now an avid neutral monist and I finally see the light!

 

[Darat]

Defined with a new pair of opposites? Relevant and irrelevant. I forget. Was that Skinner or Marx?

That is entirely the opposite of Merc's point! He does not construct "a new pair of opposites".

Is an apple different when there is only one apple compared to when there are a dozen apples?