I am not defending materialism. Never was; don't know why you would think that.
Then
why have you spent so much time posting in this thread?????
Why not just agree with Wittgenstein and be done with it????
What I have been doing in this thread is challenging your assumptions, and your claim not to be making them. You tell me, is this making a metaphysical claim?
Yes, because of the way you challenge my assumptions. It went like this:
Mercutio: You are assuming dualism, because you are choosing to use archaic terms which are loaded with dualistic assumptions.
Geoff: So what is your alternative?
Mercutio: Behaviour, observable by one and observable by many?
Geoff: Looks like this is the same dualism given a different name, what makes it different?
Mercutio: My definitions do not assume dualism because I have explicitly stated that they are making no claims about ontology.
Geoff: So what has this got to with a zombie argument about ontology?
Mercutio: [Cannot answer the question].
My usage of subjective/objective or physical/mental do not, in fact, make any claims about ontology. But I have also NOT explictly denied that they can
lead to conclusions about ontology. In order to defend your position, you need to make an explicit denial that you are making any claims which can be interpreted as ontological or used later in an argument about ontology. If so, you can't use them in an argument about ontology. As soon as you try to use them in an argument about ontology, I will point out the fact that they are indeed dualistic, and that you have now offered them in an argument about ontology - in which case they support
my position, not yours, because they are as inherently dualistic as all the other terms. If you take away you ontological disclaimer, your terms are as dualistic as subjective/objective and you've gained nothing. You certainly have not demonstrated that there is no unavoidable conceptual dualism. You've just offered another example of that dualism.
If your sole means of claiming your dualism is different to the others is that it explicitly denies any relevance to ontology, you cannot subsequently then claim it has any relevance in an argument about ontology. It speaks about psychology and behaviour ONLY, precisely because you have explicitly defined them in that way, and you cannot avoid doing so because there is no other way to claim they are different to the other dualisms. In effect, you have assumed your conclusion again (that linguistic/conceptual dualisms do not lead to epistemological and ontological dualisms), but this time I let it go because this time you are assuming a conclusion which also happens to derail your own argument by explicitly disconnecting your claims from having any relevance to ontology.