Materialists......

[Dark Jaguar]

I've added more to my post regarding your idea that if you can conceptually disentangle two things than they therefor ARE two different things that need their own explanation.

I can seperate lots of things into two parts, but a lot of the time it'll be a very silly thing.

For the longest time in a crime investigation "the killer" is conceptually different than the actual person who committed it who may or may not be a suspect. But once all the evidence is in, they are conceptually the same entity. Just because I can say "the killer" is different than "James McCloud" conceptually doesn't mean they actually are two different things and the police are forced to keep searching until they finally have a suspect that is entirely "the killer" concept without any reference to another concept.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I've added more to my post

See long Nagel quote above. Even better, read the paper. It's very good.

That is directed at everyone, BTW....we would save a lot of time and words if the main contributors in this thread spent 15 minutes reading that paper. ESPECIALLY ARTICULETT. And Mercutio.

 

[hammegk]

If we start from scratch, we are not "denying a mind exists"; rather, we are examining our experience, and not making up entities that are not needed. If we cannot do without "mind", then that will become obvious in our examination. If, however, we can get along just fine without it, we are not "denying" it, we are simply recognising that there is no need for it.

Yeah, I believe I see it now.

1) I perceive
2) Including the perceiver who perceives, I perceive "matter"
3) It's obvious, the perceiver that perceives does not exist, but matter does.

Hmmm. Something about that seems strange. How do we -- as you say -- "start from scratch"?

 

[Robin]

Did you think I claimed minds can exist without brains? Because I never said anything of the sort.

And I never claimed that you did. Clearly I was pointing out to you that the position you stated was identical to the materialist position.

My position allows for reality to appear dualistic from our point of view. Zombies only cause a problem for materialism because it has no way of coping with the apparently dualistic nature of our experience of reality.
It claims that reality is monistic but offers no explanation at all of what mind is - it simply claims it is a brain process and expects people to believe this.

My position is completely different to this because it fully accepts that reality appears dualistic.

Therefore it is immune to zombie arguments designed to establish that reality appears dualistic without actually being resigned to cartesian dualism.

And Materialism allows for reality to appear dualistic from our point of view. Materialism allows for many things to be appear one way and actually be another.

But I would have to see your version of the zombie argument in full before I can tell if it demonstrates anything at all.

Then your example was invalid.

Not sure what you mean by this. Are you saying that if I cannot distinguish between the properties of a water molecule and the properties of a water molecule then I cannot distinguish between the properties of a water molecule and the properties of water?

Clearly I can.

What difference does any of this make?

You are the one that claimed the ability to know WHY made a difference. So you tell me why the ability to know WHY makes a difference.

So what?
So what?
None of these things correspond to the mind/body problem.

No, as I clearly stated more than once they correspond to the logic of your argument.

Remember, it was your claim that "x can be distinguished from y" implies "x can exist without y". I merely showed that this logic is inadequate.

I never made that claim. I never claimed that minds can exist without matter. I said we can distinguish between mind and matter.

I never said that you claimed that minds can exist without matter. Never. I merely represented the argument you explicitly stated. Here is what you said:

I only ask whether you can distinguish between a brain process and a mind. If you can, then p-zombies are possible.

You claimed that the ability to distinguish between brain processes and minds made p-zombies possible.

Ok, so set x=brain process. set y=mind and p-zombie is a thing that has x and not y.

So your logic breaks down to "if x can be distinguished from y then x can exit without y"

I wonder why I bother sometimes. I've been discussing this stuff with you for months now, and you still don't seem to have a clue what I actually believe.

Er.. yes I already know that you believe that minds supervene on matter. You had simply jumped to the conclusion that I was saying one thing, without bothering to read what I wrote.

I'm not even saying "X can exist without Y". I simply never said anything of the sort.

You need to clarify then. You appear to be stating that p-zombies are possible. P-zombies are functioning brain processes without qualia. So is it possible for functioning brain processes(x) to exist without qualia or not????

 

[UndercoverElephant]

And I never claimed that you did. Clearly I was pointing out to you that the position you stated was identical to the materialist position.

Yes, but you actually seemed to think this was going to be news to me.

And Materialism allows for reality to appear dualistic from our point of view.

How?

Materialism allows for many things to be appear one way and actually be another.

How in this case, exactly? See Nagel paper.

But I would have to see your version of the zombie argument in full before I can tell if it demonstrates anything at all.

See Nagel paper.

Not sure what you mean by this. Are you saying that if I cannot distinguish between the properties of a water molecule and the properties of a water molecule then I cannot distinguish between the properties of a water molecule and the properties of water?

Water is just a bunch of water molecules, Robin. It's all the same stuff. See Nagel paper - he goes into considerable detail about this example.

No, as I clearly stated more than once they correspond to the logic of your argument.

Sure, you keep claiming it. Are you actually going to demonstrate it? Or just keep claiming you have demonstrated it?

The logic you provided bore no resemblance to the zombie argument, and has a mistake in its definitions. I am waiting for you to have another go.

Ok, so set x=brain process. set y=mind and p-zombie is a thing that has x and not y.

OK, I'm with you so far.

So your logic breaks down to "if x can be distinguished from y then x can exit without y"

You've lost me. This does not follow from the previous set of definitions. Mind can be distinguished from Brain. It DOES NOT FOLLOW that minds can exist without brains. I don't claim it does. Neither does the zombie argument. It claims that there is no neccesary connection we can find between brains and minds and we have no idea how to go about finding what neccessitates that connection. It must be neccesary, but we have no idea how this is conceptually possible. Read Nagel's paper!

You need to clarify then. You appear to be stating that p-zombies are possible. P-zombies are functioning brain processes without qualia. So is it possible for functioning brain processes(x) to exist without qualia or not????

In reality? Or conceptually? I've stated several times that I do not believe that p-zombies are actually possible. This is not the problem. The problem is that even though they probably aren't possible, we can't explain WHY they aren't possible.

So p-zombies seem to be both possible and impossible. They are conceptually very easy to construct, unlike "the parents of the number 327". But we have all sorts of persuasive-sounding arguments as to why we can't believe that a real p-zombie could actually exist. The core problem is a mismatch between the conceptual possibility of zombies and their actual impossibility. That is why Nagel's paper is called "Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem."

Please read the Nagel paper. It could save us weeks. You seem to be pointing to the mismatch and thinking it derails the argument. It doesn't. It's an integral part of the argument.

If anyone else asks me questions that are answered in detail in that paper, I'm going to post the whole text......

 

[Robin]

You've lost me. This does not follow from the previous set of definitions. Mind can be distinguished from Brain. It DOES NOT FOLLOW that minds can exist without brains. I don't claim it does.

OK now get this fixed idea out of your head. I did not say that you claimed that "minds can exist without brains". Read that last sentence three times and try to understand it. Rid yourself of the idea. OK?

Now let's start again and actually try to get your x's and y's in the right order. Let's start with your claim that I am examining:

I only ask whether you can distinguish between a brain process and a mind. If you can, then p-zombies are possible.

You claimed that the ability to distinguish between brain processes and minds made p-zombies possible.

Ok, so set x=brain process. set y=mind and p-zombie is a thing that has x and not y.

So your logic breaks down to "if x can be distinguished from y then x can exist without y"

Look at the last sentence carefully. It does not say "minds can exist without bodies", you have reversed the x's and the y's.

I've stated several times that I do not believe that p-zombies are actually possible.

You have clearly, explicitly stated (see above) that they are possible if we can distinguish between brain processes and the mind.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You have clearly, explicitly stated (see above) that they are possible if we can distinguish between brain processes and the mind.

OK Robin. At the risk of repeating myself ad infinitum there is a subtle detail here that Paul picked up on 200 posts ago but you have still missed. There is a difference between conceptual possibility and actual possibility (Paul called it "natural possibility", but it means the same thing.) If you recognise that you can distinguish between minds and brains then p-zombies are conceptually very easy to construct. This is in contrast to something like "The parents of the number 327", which cannot be constructed at all. However, Nagel, myself and pretty much everybody else all agree that in actual real reality, p-zombies aren't possible.

Until you recognise the difference between "conceptual possibility" and "actual/natural/real possibility" you aren't going to understand the zombie argument.

Having said that, Paul seems to understand this difference and still claims he doesn't understand the zombie argument.

We should sort this out, then start from there. This is an argument about whether our concepts of mind and matter are good enough. That is why conceptual possibility matters and why mismatches between conceptual possibility and actual possibility cause severe problems. Our current concepts seem to prevent us from ever being able to explain WHY brains and minds are neccesarily connected. They remain neccesarily connected. You seem to be confused as to whether I think they are neccesarily connected or not. I'm not. I'm pointing out that even though they are neccesarily connected, our current concepts do not appear to allow us to explain the nature of this neccessity, even in principle.

 

[Robin]

Please read the Nagel paper. It could save us weeks.

I read it the first time you posted it. Even commented on it to you here earlier in this thread.

But oddly you posted the link when I asked for the precise reasoning that a p-zombie was possible, yet you didn't quote the part where he discusses p-zombies. Let me quote part of it:

The following things seem prima facie conceivable which are pretty certainly impossible in a very strong sense, namely:
(1) a living, behaving, physiologically and functionally perfect human organism that is nevertheless completely lacking in consciousness, i.e. a zombie;
(2) a conscious subject with an inner life just like ours that behaves and looks just like a human being but has electronic circuitry instead of brains.

To repeat, I believe the apparent conceivability of these things reveals something about our present concepts but not about what is really possible. Analytic psychophysical reductionism is false, but there is independent reason to believe that these are not true logical possibilities, and if so, our concepts are missing something. Our current concepts don't lead to contradiction -- it's not as bad as that -- but they fail to reveal a logical impossibility.

Now I fail to see how he is somehow "refuting materialism". I am not sure what he means by "analytic psychological reductionism" and he fails completely to identify just which argument he is "refuting". In any case he says:

Conceivability and inconceivability are the main evidence we have for possibility and necessity, but they can be misleading, and conceivability that depends on the relation between first and third person reference is particularly treacherous terrain.

Personally I do not find p-zombies conceivable. A being without qualia who would receive the nerve impulses of a popular song on radio but not "hear" it but would nevertheless have some programming that told it to go to a certain shop and exchange money for a recording that delivers the same nerve impulses.

For some reason.

I do not find it conceivable that if we were to suddenly somehow deprive a person of his qualia he would nevertheless continue to behave exactly the same as he had when he still had his qualia.

I do not find it conceivable under any metaphysical position.

That is the problem with conceivability as the basis for a logical argument. It is entirely personal. What you or Thomas Nagel find conceivable, I don't.

So you need something a lot stronger than "some people find p-zombies concievable" in order to refute materialism.

 

[Robin]

OK Robin. At the risk of repeating myself ad infinitum there is a subtle detail here that Paul picked up on 200 posts ago but you have still missed. There is a difference between conceptual possibility and actual possibility (Paul called it "natural possibility", but it means the same thing.) If you recognise that you can distinguish between minds and brains then p-zombies are conceptually very easy to construct. This is in contrast to something like "The parents of the number 327", which cannot be constructed at all. However, Nagel, myself and pretty much everybody else all agree that in actual real reality, p-zombies aren't possible.

But what you or Thomas Nagel can conceive, I cannot. So the term is totally subjective. You cannot any more base an argument on what certain individuals may or may not be able to conceive than you can on what they might believe.

And the ability to distinguish between two phenomena is still inadequate to establish even conceptual possibility.

Until you recognise the difference between "conceptual possibility" and "actual/natural/real possibility" you aren't going to understand the zombie argument.

What you have completely missed is that Nagel's version of the argument is completely different to the versions we started discussing.

In the standard version of the argument that I linked earlier conceivability is only a step into establishing possibility.

In Nagel's version conceivability of impossible things is used to question the concepts that led to an impossible thing being conceivable. In fact Nagel's version is not really an argument, it is merely a set of observations.

Having said that, Paul seems to understand this difference and still claims he doesn't understand the zombie argument.

Perhaps for the same reason.

We should sort this out, then start from there. This is an argument about whether our concepts of mind and matter are good enough.

Well then that is bait and switch since the Zombie argument we were discussing earlier was the classic Zombie argument that claimed to refute materialism. But you have claimed that this argument poses some serious problem for materialism. I do not see this. Most versions of materialism presuppose that our concepts of mind might be inadequate.

That is why conceptual possibility matters and why mismatches between conceptual possibility and actual possibility cause severe problems. Our current concepts seem to prevent us from ever being able to explain WHY brains and minds are neccesarily connected. They remain neccesarily connected.

Here is a good example of where your concepts do not match mine. You are assuming here that brains and minds are different things that are connected. I don't assume that at all. They might be, but then again a mind might simply be a property of a brain.

You seem to be confused as to whether I think they are neccesarily connected or not. I'm not. I'm pointing out that even though they are neccesarily connected, our current concepts do not appear to allow us to explain the nature of this neccessity, even in principle.

Again - "your" concepts. Don't speak for me. I don't have a dualistic concept of mind and brain in the first place. Never have had. Even when I was a little kid I assumed that my mind was merely something my brain did.

If your concept of a mind/body dichotomy leads to the conceptual possibility that there could be a p-zombie then perhaps you should ditch it in favour of a concept where they are just different aspects of the same thing.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

Exactly what I'm saying. Just because you can imagine it doesn't make it logical. A lot of people can concieve of an all knowing all powerful all loving god and the world as it currently exists right now without any contradictions at all, but well we've discussed that to no end so we already know that being able to concieve of something doesn't really mean it actually makes sense.

Let me use my example of the killer above to really point out the problem I see.

The main issue with convicting someone of the crime of murder is that it doesn't FULLY explain the murder! Now I'm not saying the guy they arrested wasn't needed for the crime to take place, I'm just saying they need to go further than that to find the real culprit. I will show that investigation alone isn't enough to explain the phenomenon of the killer and that we need to use philosophy to attain a new method. You see when the investigation starts, all they have is "the killer". This conceptual killer could be anyone, by defition. That's the only logical way they can refer to so many different suspects as "the potential killer". The actual killer they find is different from this concept. They may say "this person is the killer" but it is NOT the concept they originally used. How can it be? They had no idea who that person even was and weren't referiing to him specifically when they started the investigation. I can concieve of the guy who killed seperate from "the killer" of the investigation. This is important! It MUST mean, for some reason, that "the killer" aspect is beyond the person! We must search beyond that person to find the true "killer of the investigation"! Since I can conceive of "the killer" as seperate from "the convicted suspect", then I can easily concieve of a p-murderer, a person who kills that is not "the killer". That person is devoid of that aspect. How can you all not see how amazingly true and perfect this logic is? If we can concieve of "the killer" in the sense of searching for the person who committed the act as seperate from the actual person eventually found and convicted, then there is in fact the possibility, at least conceptually, of nonkiller killers, and so there has to be some other part of the average murderer. The actual person is not the only one responsible for the act, but there's something deeper. I suspect quantum mechanics and the nature of how the observer seems to play a role in that should be involved in a truer understanding of criminal investigations. Why are you all looking at me like that? You're the ones who are crazy!

End scene!

 

[Mercutio]

I understand you perfectly, Mercutio, I just think you're wrong.

I am not saying you do not understand me. I am saying you are not demonstrating that you do. You continue to say that you understand me; perhaps you do. It is quite clear, though, that you cannot demonstrate, through a coherent answer, that you understand.

I'm not saying that at all. All of those things happen. Sunsets happen. They just aren't actually "the sun going down". I can replace "the sun going down" with "the earth turning" and still make sense of the situation. I cannot replace "mind" with "brain process" and make sense of the situation. Until you can explain how this is possible, I'm not going to believe it. You can if you like. Blind faith is not my cup of tea.

I am not the one replacing "mind" with "brain processes". So it seems that you do not understand me. It would be much closer (albeit simplified for the occasion) to replace "mind" with "behavior". Not merely what the brain does, but what I do. What you do. There is considerably more there, but it is nothing new. You just dismiss it as "silly" because it does not fit your preconceived notion of mind.

No, Merc, you don't explain it at all. You promise that one fine day an explanation will be forthcoming. I don't buy it. It's that simple.

Where have I promised that an explanation will be forthcoming? I have not promised an explanation; I have no need to explain a fiction.

Sure, they just aren't "sun sets". You are dead right that we don't eliminate the experience of the setting sun. But you aren't talking about replacing one physical event with another physical event. You are talking about replacing mental things with material things. That is a whole new ball game. If you want to make the rather extraordinary claim that science can overcome the mind-body problem then you are going to need more than promises that a future neuroscience can make sense of it. You are going to need actual evidence. You don't have any and don't believe you ever will have any. Therefore I do not believe that the word mind can be eliminated.

Everything you speak of here is couched in dualistic terms. It is patently clear what conclusion you desire; it has determined the premises you use. Again, you do not demonstrate that you understand my point. You are arguing against a strawman once again.

It is experience itself that you are trying to eliminate. You seem to have forgotten this little fact. You aren't eliminating a word for one component of your experiences of a physical reality. You are trying to eliminate the one word which refers to ALL OF THEM!

No. Please do not try to tell me what I am trying to do; you are failing miserably at that. Oh, and the word that refers to everything you are speaking of is "behavior". Yes, there is more to the explanation than that, but you have not demonstrated an understanding of even the simplest aspects, so I will save details for when you can do so.

Trouble is, in the case of mind, there is nothing but "prescientific baggage". You don't have any scientific alternative. All you have is promises. You can keep them. I don't need them, thankyou.

*sigh* Once again...no. You have not demonstrated that you understand (that is, perhaps you do understand, but if so you are doing a remarkable job of hiding it). It appears (of course I could be wrong) that you are once again accepting "mind" without question, and arguing from there. And you accuse me of promises I have not made. Did your strawmen make promises? Perhaps you could share them with us...

Err.....the etymology of sunset was indeed the bedrock of the origin of that word. That was the prescientific baggage, remember?

Heh...you don't think the geocentric worldview was based on observations of sunsets, of the motion of stars through the night sky? No, the bedrock was the observed that-which-we-currently-call-a-sunset. Not the theory.

Do you think that if you say that enough times it will magically become true?

There is no magic needed. And it was true before I said it.

For the billionth time, eliminativism is about eliminating a word, not an experience. The trouble is, you can't eliminate that word because you've got nothing to replace it with. You can replace "sunset" with "the earth turning". You cannot replace "mind" with anything at all. That's not good enough. I do not take suspect claims to be the truth on nothing but blind faith.

No. We cannot replace "sunset" with "the earth turning", because they are not the same. The phenomenon is not the explanation.

As for replacing "mind"...Two answers. One: I cannot replace it if you do not define it. Two: for all practical purposes, we can replace it with "behavior". You may find it silly, but since you can't back that up, it is not such a big problem.

That's pretty bad news for me, because you don't actually understand it all.

Funny...there appears to be a consensus developing here among posters in this thread who are not you. (I think hammy qualifies as a separate thread for these purposes. His inquiry is quite independent of yours.)

Can we have a debate instead of a p*ss*ng contest, please?

I doubt it. I don't think you are up to it.

Sure. He can't.

It was purely a hypothetical example. I wanted to see whether you would answer honestly. I got my answer.

 

[Robin]

I would just like to know whether the zombie argument is:

... an argument about whether our concepts of mind and matter are good enough.

or:

...a valid argument which falsifies materialism.

Even though the same argument proves that 7 is not a prime number.

 

[Mercutio]

Gosh. I really missed reading your posts, man.

Today...I really needed to hear that. You got the first real, genuine smile all day. Thanks.

It's been a while. Have you finally defeated Iacchus ?

His Achilles heel was incorrect info in his profile. Otherwise, he'd probably be posting in this thread, making as little sense as ever. Fitting right in.

 

[articulett]

I understand you perfectly, Mercutio, I just think you're wrong.

And I understand you perfectly, Mercutio, and I know you are right.

Justgeoff plays the same game as all woos--if it agrees with me it's right and true and meaningful, and if not, it's biased, close-minded, illogical, irrelevant, meaningless and bodes poorly for all humanity.

The colorblind cannot see the patterns I can see. That does not mean the patterns don't exist or that they freely chose not to see it--it just means they are short on a brain stucture called "cones". I am a materialist...I don't care about philosophy, I care about facts. I may care that some people can't see some colors...but I realize the difference between what they perceive...and what can objectively be measured. In science we do not say the mind is "nothing at all"--we just would use it to describe the former (a person's perception) rather than the latter brain matter. It isn't illogical, it isn't dualism, it isn't zombie-esqe--having known and worked extensively with those who have both Tourette Syndrome and OCD, I can assure you that people have some strong misunderstandings as to what will is and what degree of control they exercise over it. I have a great deal of transcendent experiences...often just in appreciating just how much we've come to know about the mind...and how it evolves...and how it tells us a coherent story of the world--even when we humans are brain damaged they confabulate fascinating explanations for what they are perceiving (Capgras syndrome: "you're not my mom, spouse, dog--but a perfect replacement...a p-zombie").

Subjectivity may be a great way to motivate yourself or help you make sense of your world or give you comfort--but objectivity can teach you the facts. Objectivity can give you modified glasses so you can see as a colorblind person sees--it can show you the cones and how it is related to color vision and which animals and which of the sexes can discriminate variations in color better so that you can understand the "mind" (subjective experiences) of another. It can conjecture why these trait evolve...and design tests to confirm or negate the conclusions. It isn't a mystery...it has nothing to do with quantum mechanics--no guru or special text or lots of navel gazing is necessary--

I am annoyed at the endless banter of those convinced that they have some higher truth beyond the understanding of others--so what--Tom Cruise doesn't believe in chemical imbalances--and justgeoff believes that materialism is illogical and that he has mystical synchronous experiences related to quantum mechanics and Interesting Ian thinks "skeptics never learn". That's why facts and objective measurement is necessary--it separates all the insults, semantics, and narcissistic conviction of "higher knowledge" from the truth--the useful info. that you can use to explain, predict, control, and find out what the next thing to know is.

Every preacher wants an eager audience...every guru thinks he has a piece of the "higher truth"--I just want the facts...I can find my truths myself. Why is it that those so damn eager to convince others seem to be so damn short on the facts. In science you don't need to convince anyone of anything--the facts speak for themselves. You can think pi is whatever you want--it doesn't change pi.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

I would just like to know whether the zombie argument is:


or:

Even though the same argument proves that 7 is not a prime number.

As well as proving that the convicted murder is not "the killer".

 

[Bubo]

Eastern religion (tantrism) provides an interesting solution for the subject/object duality. In short, they are one in the same, really two sides of one same coin, but all "objective phenomena" are ultimately reducible to Mind. Not Mind in the sense of the mind-aggregate (self-perception), but rather, that in the sense of an all-pervasive cosmic principle. Light is a commonly used metaphor...

I think what geoff is ranting against is the rather dogmatic behavior of "behaviorists," who won't even give the consciousness question a moment's consideration. Hardly in the spirit of science; a Sunday school mentality.

 

[Mercutio]

I think what geoff is ranting against is the rather dogmatic behavior of "behaviorists," who won't even give the consciousness question a moment's consideration. Hardly in the spirit of science; a Sunday school mentality.

This has not been true of behaviorism since Watson. If we argue against only the original form of a science, and not against its current form, is that in the spirit of science?

Skinner's radical behaviorism includes private behavior (interesting Ian never liked that term) such as thinking, remembering, feeling, seeing...all the things you do that no one else but you can observe. Current behaviorism addresses the experiences that Geoff calls mind, or consciousness, or whatever... but refuses to make up fictional explanations for them. Evidence, please...very much in the spirit of science.

 

[Robin]

As well as proving that the convicted murder is not "the killer".

Yes, in fact practically anything.

 

[Bubo]

What clearer evidence than one's own awareness? I believe that is the issue. We won't find much in cutting up animals' brains, or in brewing up elaborate theories. The "laboratory" is really closer than our noses.

 

[articulett]

"Cartesian materialist" is generally an insult, and is applied to anyone who says they are a materialist but who is actually hopelessly mired in dualism. And for all your claims that it is somebody-else's fault, I believe this includes yourself - at least some of the time. It is technically used to describe anyone who thinks there is some place in the brain or some set of places in the brain where there is a load of information which corresponds to a "mind". Dennett seems to use it to describe crude indirect realists claiming to be materialists. There's no shortage of those round here - this board is full of them.

You are massively ignorant when it comes to neurology...I don't anyone who says that a place in the brain corresponds to mind...instead, we know that parts of the brain and the chemical and electrical reactions therein is the basis of what we perceive-- You are the one claiming that materialists are hopelessly mired in dualism per your weasly definitions designed to back up this assertion. Materialists don't seem philosophically confused...nor does Dennet. It seems that it's you who is confused or who imagines them confused--even as you insult us with your philosophy epithets designed to make yourself feel superior without having to examine a single fact or provide one in return.

I think you've been studying at the Interesting Ian school of narcissistic pedantry.