Interesting Ian
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- Feb 9, 2004
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BillHoyt said:Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Well, for a kick off it would maintain that phenomenal consciousness is the same type of existent as all other existents. Necessarily this is an ontological commitment, despite what Stimpson J Cat might maintain.
Comments anyone?
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I don't get how one can claim it is an ontological commitment when scientists clearly both state and act to test it as a conclusion.
How on earth could you conclude it's a physical thing? Obviously you can't do it by science, right? Certainly, at the very minimum, you must agree that science could never distinguish between materialism and epiphenomenalism, right? So how philosophically will you achieve this miraculous end?
We have no reason to asume it is different from other existents.
My phenomenal conscious experiences are only accessible to me. All other existents are potentially accessible to anyone.
We keep testing and keep finding no reason.
Please name anyone who experiences my experiences? What testing has established that another person can literally partake of someone else's experiences??