Materialism and Immaterialism

[Wrath of the Swarm]

1) There is no "certain" in the physical universe, period. Ergo, you are chosing a definition wherein everything is, in fact, "random". This is absurd, as it makes the word useless and redundant. Since everything is random, why bother use the word at all.

Because it wasn't obvious that the world works that way, and we need a word to describe the possibility. Because the world can still be that way, and only appear random. Because it is possible to conceive of non-randomness, even if everything in the universe turns out to be partially random.

If you'd like to have a discussion, please save the ad-homs, and stop using useless, redundant definitions, please.

I think it would be more productive to direct you to the "Fallacy" thread (where you could learn the definition of an ad hominem attack) and then put you on ignore.

 

[hammegk]

Is there any particular reason why you tacked 100% certainty of the non-existence of god onto each of these definitions?

Sure. If you don't buy in at 100% you are at worst a dualist and at best an idealist.

So much for any idea of determinism, eh? Well, I agree on that part.

Any materialist (or idealist too, unfortunately) should be ok with the real possibility of Super Determinism; of course it is as sterile as solipsism or nihilism.

 

[apoger]

Sure. If you don't buy in at 100% you are at worst a dualist and at best an idealist.

This does not address the issue at hand.

Wrath asked you to justify your definitions.
I asked you if the definitions were yours or merely conjecture.
Furthermore if not conjecture I pointed out errors in the definitions.
Lastly I asked why you tacked on the additional requirement of 100% certainty of the non-existence of god.

The statement you make above, does not seem to answer any of these concerns. If I am wrong, please explain how.

I invite to you to justify your definitions, explain the value of using non-standard definitions, and explain the need to insert the non-existence requirement.

 

[Upchurch]

What don't you like about that definition? Or you could try every existent has the capability to re-act, or not re-act, to a stimulus.


Wrong. The question is "what is the essence of the monism"? Non-life, or life?

[modu]This post has been reported.

On the surface, this post does not seem to be breaking any forum or CT rules. I will be reading the thread more closely so I can have a better understand who is saying what. Unless I missed something when I scanned the thread, hammegk hasn't broken any rules.

The reporter of this post seems to be asking for a higher level of moderation of this thread (applicable under #3 in the Critical Thinking board rules). I don't think it is fair to apply a new set of rules in the middle of a discussion, but if the reporter will PM me, I will discuss starting a new thread that I would consider moderating more closely.[/modu]

 

[jj]

Any materialist (or idealist too, unfortunately) should be ok with the real possibility of Super Determinism; of course it is as sterile as solipsism or nihilism.

Not sure what you mean by "super-determinism", but unless you're reaching outside this universe and, for instance, postulating hidden-variable QM, determinism of any sort is dead, that appears to be the way that material behaves.

Of course, that appearance could change with understanding, but that would require some very interesting changes in explaination for some basic physical experiments.

 

[Interesting Ian]

What, evolutionary processes can't select between different designs?

It seems to me that evolution can only explain our ability to survive and reproduce. Not our ability to work out how, say, black holes work etc.

If it takes a mystical consciousness to choose the correct answers to problems, how does the world manage to reach the right answer? What guarantees that this mystical consciousness chooses correctly? And what does 'choice' mean if it's not the result of any process?

A so called mystical consciousness might implicitly recognise and understand something is correct. A mindless algorithm doesn't. The right choice may be recognised by reasoning. They may be physical correlates, but they might follow the mental reasoning rather than such mental reasoning following a deterministic algorithm.

 

[hammegk]

This does not address the issue at hand.

Wrath asked you to justify your definitions.
I asked you if the definitions were yours or merely conjecture.

At the moment I will call them hypothetical.

Furthermore if not conjecture I pointed out errors in the definitions.

I see. And I suggest that your assertion of error is your opinion rather than fact.

Lastly I asked why you tacked on the additional requirement of 100% certainty of the non-existence of god.

What don't you understand about the answer I already provided: "If you don't buy in at 100% you are at worst a dualist and at best an idealist."? Meaning and intent seem clearcut to me, in that we are discussing rather subtle aspects of philosophy.

Or would you care to provide a working definition of immaterial? Perhaps that would plow some new ground.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
How on earth could you conclude it's a physical thing? Obviously you can't do it by science, right? Certainly, at the very minimum, you must agree that science could never distinguish between materialism and epiphenomenalism, right? So how philosophically will you achieve this miraculous end?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bill
Do you really wish to claim that science can not test a claim of a one-sided interaction? How so?

Science certainly couldn't distinguish materialism from epiphenomenalism. Science only deals with existents which have some possible effect in the world. If phenomenal consciousness has absolutely no effect in the world whatsoever, then it cannot play any fruitful role in any scientific theory. Scientific theories only deal with entities which are causally efficacious.

 

[jj]

I think it would be more productive to direct you to the "Fallacy" thread (where you could learn the definition of an ad hominem attack) and then put you on ignore.

Don't teach a crone to suck eggs, jj.

Now, I'll grant you that statement isn't precisely ad-hom, but it's certainly a suggestion, and arguably a threat of retaliation (although not a credible threat of harm, certainly). Perhaps you'd be happier if I refered to it as attempted rhetorical extortion?

But since you've sworn to ignore me, I guess you won't respond.

A question for those who are reading:

What should the word "random" mean? Does it mean "any possibility no matter however slim of a different outcome", or is it a multivalued thing, i.e. there are degrees of randomness, say like Markov Processes, or thereabouts, state machines with probabilistic transitions, etc, that can be expressed as "partially random".

What do you think, should we use the word "random" for all of those, and (apparently) not distinguish between the degrees, or should we distinguish between degrees of random behavior from completely random (i.e. no correlation between events, stationary probability of outcome, etc) and completely predictable.

For instance, if a random process is defined as r where each output from r is gaussian with sigma 1 and mean zero, with all autocorrelations save 0th equal to zero, what do we call this process:

x( n) = alpha * x(n-1) + (1 - alpha) * r;

For alpha = each of { 0 .9 1}

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Now, I'll grant you that statement isn't precisely ad-hom, but it's certainly a suggestion, and arguably a threat of retaliation (although not a credible threat of harm, certainly). Perhaps you'd be happier if I refered to it as attempted rhetorical extortion?

You have no idea what the phrase signifies, do you?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Yes, immaterialism is logically incoherent-- [/B]

What do you mean by "immaterialism"? It actually means a denial of a material world, but people seem to understand it simply as a denial of materialism. Whatever. It doesn't matter. In my opinion such an assertion is driven by a gut reaction, indeed by emotion. I very much doubt you would be able to give any coherent reasons whatsoever to back up your claim. Indeed, as I have shown many times, it is materialism which is logically incoherent.

 

[hammegk]

Not sure what you mean by "super-determinism"

The possibility that everything has always been, is now, and always will be nothing but clockwork proceeding in the only possible way.

 

[jj]

You have no idea what the phrase signifies, do you? [/B]

A question for those who are reading:

What should the word "random" mean? Does it mean "any possibility no matter however slim of a different outcome", or is it a multivalued thing, i.e. there are degrees of randomness, say like Markov Processes, or thereabouts, state machines with probabilistic transitions, etc, that can be expressed as "partially random".

What do you think, should we use the word "random" for all of those, and (apparently) not distinguish between the degrees, or should we distinguish between degrees of random behavior from completely random (i.e. no correlation between events, stationary probability of outcome, etc) and completely predictable.

For instance, if a random process is defined as r where each output from r is gaussian with sigma 1 and mean zero, with all autocorrelations save 0th equal to zero, what do we call this process:

x( n) = alpha * x(n-1) + (1 - alpha) * r;

For alpha = each of { 0 .9 1}

 

[apoger]

At the moment I will call them hypothetical.

Very good.
My question is then "What is the use/value of presenting these hypothetical definitions"?

Furthermore if these definitions are hypothetical, perhaps you could answer Wrath's original question and provide definitions that you agree with.

I see. And I suggest that your assertion of error is your opinion rather than fact.

Yes it is my opinion. Is it yours? Do you or do you not agree with my opinion?

If you do disagree perhaps you can offer reasons as to why I am in error.

What don't you understand about the answer I already provided: "If you don't buy in at 100% you are at worst a dualist and at best an idealist."? Meaning and intent seem clearcut to me, in that we are discussing rather subtle aspects of philosophy.

In the context of defining materialist, athesist, and scientist, you included the requirement of 100% certainty in the non-existence of god.

I asked why you included this requirement and your response was "If you don't buy in at 100% you are at worst a dualist and at best an idealist."

I do not see how this reference to dualism and idealism in any way justifies defining materialists, atheists, and scientists, as requiring 100% certainty in the non-existence of god.

You claim that the meaning and intent is clearcut to you. Outstanding! Then perhaps you will have no problem explaining it. I understand that this may entail "subtle aspects of philosophy", however I assure you that I and the other JREF posters are up to the task.

 

[jj]

The possibility that everything has always been, is now, and always will be nothing but clockwork proceeding in the only possible way.

If that is "clockwork in a super-universe of which we are a subset" we can not reject that possibility.

If the clockwork is within our own universe, the idea of that determinism would seem to be contradictory to observations, unless those observations are somehow condemned by that "super determinism" to seem to contradict the idea.

I think it's more parsimonious to take QM at face value, and assume that at least inside this universe there is an unavoidable random element.

So unless we are talking about some very special, highly unparsimonious circumstances, we can more or less reject the idea that the clockwork is in this universe. As we can't observe another, speculation is difficult, although some degree of experiment may be possible by seeing what happens here, that's hardly definitive, and doesn't reject the idea of a cosmic muffin laughing hysterically as it twiddles the knobs.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I think you guys may be arguing over nothing.

Wrath's request for a definition of free-will was directed at Ian and Hammegk, in response to their claim that it exists, and is neither deterministic, nor random (nor any combination thereof).

The first problem being that this is not a definition of what free-will is, but rather what it isn't. The second problem being that under any conventional mathematical definition of "random" and "deterministic", this is self-contradictory.

Dr. Stupid

I rather think you need to demonstrate this "contradiction".

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Even a genuinely deterministic system will be perceived by a subset of that system to be unpredictable and random.

Constructing a perfect model of the universe within the universe is logically impossible. We can't ever rule out an irreducible uncertainty. So we really have no reason to presume that the universe contains random elements, and we have no reason to presume that it doesn't, either.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Then we can make statements like, "A rock has no "self-awareness" therefore cannot exercise "free-will".

A rock has no self-awareness?? How did you establish this??

 

[hammegk]

Very good.
My question is then "What is the use/value of presenting these hypothetical definitions"?

For some of us at least, and at this moment, apparently none.

Furthermore if these definitions are hypothetical, perhaps you could answer Wrath's original question and provide definitions that you agree with.

No, I'll just decline that challenge. Perhaps you would care to try your hand at it.

Yes it is my opinion. Is it yours? Do you or do you not agree with my opinion?

No.

If you do disagree perhaps you can offer reasons as to why I am in error.

Or better yet, ask you to justify your assertions of error.

I do not see how this reference to dualism and idealism in any way justifies defining materialists, atheists, and scientists, as requiring 100% certainty in the non-existence of god.

You claim that the meaning and intent is clearcut to you. Outstanding! Then perhaps you will have no problem explaining it. I understand that this may entail "subtle aspects of philosophy", however I assure you that I and the other JREF posters are up to the task.

Good. Please demonstrate some understanding of our discussion and ask a specific question. If not, most likely this will be my final response to you in this thread.

Your "assurances" you say. LOL.

 

[jj]

Even a genuinely deterministic system will be perceived by a subset of that system to be unpredictable and random.

Constructing a perfect model of the universe within the universe is logically impossible. We can't ever rule out an irreducible uncertainty. So we really have no reason to presume that the universe contains random elements, and we have no reason to presume that it doesn't, either.

That would seem to carry QM implications that sound very much like you're suggesting that QM does not imply an indeterminate result for each individual interaction, seen from the point of view of this universe. If it appears random from inside this universe, modeled or not, then from our point of view, there is irreducible uncertainty, even if in some uber-universe the gears and wheels are easily observed.

That clockwork may exist in a bigger, more inclusive universe, but we can't see it or observe it, and that's what QM seems to quite definitively say about OUR universe, the one we live in.

That would say that as far as WE can tell, regardless of model, or actual systems OUTSIDE this universe, what we observe *inside* the universe appears to have irreducible uncertainty. (BTW, I like that term as opposed to 'random'.) From our point of view, trapped inside this universe, THIS universe has irreducible uncertainty, then, yes, even if it's not irreducible in the uber-universe. If you're arguing otherwise, I think we need to get some discussion with the QM folks here going. Tez, are you listening in?

If we can never observe the mechanisms that create the uncertainty, but they exist, well, yes, that's an interesting statement indeed, and that would then create very interesting questions of the origin of the universe, as well.

On the other hand, if probabilistic behavior is all there is, we have very little trouble, eventually, having the universe exist. Then we have to ask 'why is that the actual way it works', and that's a question for another day altogether, indeed. One could propose the answer is "because" or even "that was probabilistic", but determining the truth value gets, well, complicated, eh?