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Materialism and Immaterialism

Hammegk said:
I sure agree, and can not understand why you think that failure to choose the essence of the monism (ontological) proves no ontological dichotomy exists.
If the choice is nothing other than a coin flip or personal preference, then there is no reason to make it. The question means nothing.

Ability, will, intent: Can anyone define how this works? We've been waiting for a definition of free will for months.

~~ Paul
 
Wrath said:
Did you check out the Game of Life link? It's an amusing toy AND a subtle mathematical subject all in one.
I haven't played with the Game of Life for years. Man, the toys have become more sophisticated since I last looked. It's eerie watching the Unit Cell in operation.

~~ Paul
 
Wrath,

Meaningless. Either the mechanism of will is determinate, or random.
Meaningless in terms of practical effect? I agree.

Meaningless in terms of philosophical definition? Not at all.

And how is this choice made? If there is causality, it's determinate; if there isn't, it's random. There is no third possibility that can arise from the unformed.
You obviously never met the poster called "Rusty The Boy Robot" and his "self Willing Agent".
 
How is it meaningful even as a philosophical concept? Do we get to say "Well, it's self-willing via a nondescribable mechanism that is neither algorithmic nor random, so there!"? If so, I want my invisible pink hamster orbiting Neptune to be considered for inclusion in the Great Philosophical Ideas of All Time Parade.

~~ Paul
 
Paul,

How is it meaningful even as a philosophical concept?
Well, because it allows you separate the two philosophical terms "materialist" and "immaterialist" for starters! Apart from that, I guess it simply offers the equivalent of a "thought experiment" that lubricates the wheels of philosophical thought - delving into the nature of "the meaning of...", for example.

In a nutshell (and trying to simplify) it seems that attempting to compare "materialism" and "immaterialism" in terms of "what do they say about interactions" is sort of missing the point (or assuming the conclusion?) if you want to eliminate the issue of "why" the interactions exist. Afterall, IMO materialism says "there is no 'why'" and immaterialism says "yes there is - it's just ineffable".

In short, they may make identical claims in terms of "what" and "how", but they make different assertions about "why". And this is why (ha!) I find immaterialism so annoying - it DEMANDS a "why", and then admits to having no way of supplying it. What's the point of that????
 
The immaterial is a common theme running throughout all of mysticism. The immaterial posesses these qualities:

  • It is in some sense considered more "real" than material things.
  • It is undetectable, since detection involves the interaction of material with material.
  • In most versions, it "accounts for" personalities because the inate actions of human bodies is presumed not complex enough to account for personalities.
  • Because it can only be hypothesized and never observed or tested in any way, it provides a handy way of explaining phenomena such that the explanations are also untestable, and some people demonstrably find this an attractive way of avoiding such pesky tasks as verification and testing.

The Zohar, the scripture of Kabala, begins with an attempt to reconcile Genesis I (which speaks of Elohim, the godS, in the plural) with Genesis II (which speaks of Yehovah, the eternal, in the singular). Without taking a position on whether Yehovah is material or immaterial, the opening of the Zohar supposes that in the act of creating material things, creativity is delegated by Yehovah to a number of "emanations" which are explicitly immaterial and which subsequently are responsible for the material world.

The Qi or Chi in Qigong is explicitly immaterial.

The soul in dualist explanations of personality is explicitly immaterial, and often is alleged to exist before and after the living body.

Prior to Dalton's findings in chemistry, Democritus's "atom" may have qualified as immaterial. WIth the advent of modern chemistry, the concepts embodied in "atom" became testable and refinable, and, in fact, have been refined several times over. Modern atomic theory is unambiguously materialistic.
 
DrMatt said:
  • It is undetectable, since detection involves the interaction of material with material.
  • In most versions, it "accounts for" personalities because the inate actions of human bodies is presumed not complex enough to account for personalities.
Are these points contradictory?
 
DrMatt said:
Prior to Dalton's findings in chemistry, Democritus's "atom" may have qualified as immaterial. WIth the advent of modern chemistry, the concepts embodied in "atom" became testable and refinable, and, in fact, have been refined several times over. Modern atomic theory is unambiguously materialistic.
The story I'd always heard is that he came up with the idea after noticing that the odor of freshly-baked bread took some time to cross a room and seemed to be carried on the air.
 
Wrath:

I submit that 'physicality' is not limited to a set of specific interactions, but is determined by whether something can interact with something else. If it can, that thing - and that interaction - is a physical one. Postulating a previously unknown form of interaction doesn't and can't mean it's not physical, just that it wasn't previously present in our understanding of the physical world.

This is the definition, if I'm not mistaken, favoured by Stimpy. In other words, if I can observe it, it's physical.

What this view fails to encompass is that there is a class of observables which are observable by me but not by you, to wit: the content of my phenomenal consciousness.

So, while I can observe the content of my phenomenal consciousness, such that "I" can "interact" with that content, you can't.

And, since we've already established that phenomenal consciousness doesn't logically supervene on the physical ....
 
Hi Win,

You know, when Paul wrote this earlier ...
How is it meaningful even as a philosophical concept?
...I was tempted to make an attempt at wit and post something along the lines of "well, how meaningful is philosophy as a concept?". But I thought "No, best not to be too cheeky - you never know, Win might be watching". And there you are!

Would you care to have a stab at elaborating some practical difference between materialism and immaterialism, or are you content to simply play Stimpy's Advocate ?
 
Loki:

Speak of the devil, as they say.

Would you care to have a stab at elaborating some practical difference between materialism and immaterialism, or are you content to simply play Stimpy's Advocate ?

Of course.

First of all, I have to say I dislike the term "immaterialism." Perhaps "contra-materialism" would better capture the distinction that is at issue here.

That being said, the most important practical difference is that some form of contra-materialism is true.

Given this, when combined with the fact that the materialist metaphysic is such a monolith, to tear its edifice down does a service to critical thinking and scepticism.

Finally, given that materialism, here, has become a stick with which to beat the unpopular, putting an end to its effects would serve a practical good.
 
Win,

That being said, the most important practical difference is that some form of contra-materialism is true.
*cough* ... *splutter*...

... to tear its edifice down does a service to critical thinking and scepticism.
And replace it with...?

Finally, given that materialism, here, has become a stick with which to beat the unpopular, putting an end to its effects would serve a practical good
Damn but I wish you'd post here more often!

By the way ... since I have your ear (momentarily) ... the reports here in Australia say that the change of government in Spain is due almost entirely to a voter backlash against attempts to blame the Madrid train bombs onto the Basque separatists. Is this true? Or are we being fed the 'party line' here at the moment?
 
Loki said:

Well, because it allows you separate the two philosophical terms "materialist" and "immaterialist" for starters! ...Afterall, IMO materialism says "there is no 'why'" and immaterialism says "yes there is - it's just ineffable".
Umm. no. Were it ineffable, we are back to dualism.


In short, they may make identical claims in terms of "what" and "how", but they make different assertions about "why". And this is why (ha!) I find immaterialism so annoying - it DEMANDS a "why", and then admits to having no way of supplying it. What's the point of that????
To point out that questions (currently seem to) exist that science cannot answer. For example:

Should we bomb Hirojima?

Why should any human be accountable for his deeds if they are either determined or random.

Does libertarian free-will exist?

Is reality a local phenomena?



Win: perhaps ~materialism is a better meme.
 
hammegk,

Umm. no. Were it ineffable, we are back to dualism
So you know the "why"? Or you know the process that will lead to the "why"? Please, continue...

To point out that questions (currently seem to) exist that science cannot answer. For example:
Do you mean "cannot answer at this time" or "cannot answer, even in theory"?

Should we bomb Hirojima?
An issue of "insufficient data" rather than "cannot be answered", surely?

Why should any human be accountable for his deeds if they are either determined or random.
Because they are the deeds of that human, and no other. To effect a change in behaviour in the future, we introduce a new set of interactions now. This new set is called "consequences", and flow from the deeds we are accounting for. Is there a problem here?

Does libertarian free-will exist?
No. That was easy!

Is reality a local phenomena?
If you mean what I think you mean, then yes, this is the one question that is unanswerable even in theory.
 
Stimpy:

Indeed. See, I told you that I didn't just pull that definition out of thin air. That is, in fact, the scientific definition.

Never thought that you did. Still, it's not the "scientific" definition. It's the positivist definition.

Of course, I realise that all positivists maintain that scientific = positivist. I also know that just ain't so.

Really? How so? It just does not affect me in the same way it affects you. Your phenomenal consciousness affects your thoughts, your decisions, and your actions. In other words, it affects your brain processes (even if you don't think it is one itself). It therefore affects my by virtue of the effects you have on me. Just because I do not observe it in the same way you do, does not mean that I do not observe it.

My phenomenal consciousness doesn't have any effect on my brain processes at all. My zombie twin would have all the same brain processes as I do. The difference between him and me is the world we live in. In Zombie world, you're right. In this world, I am.

Clearly false. I can interact with the content by interacting with you. There is just another level of indirection, which comes about by virtue of the fact that your phenomenal consciousness is a part of you, but not of me.

Nope.

You can interact with *me, but you can't interact with me.

In any event, not "clearly" false.

Hardly. I can only assume you are referring to the p-zombie argument here. That argument is unsound. Even if this is possible, there is no reason to think that it is true. At least, no logical reason.

I am gratified that you have learned the difference between sound and valid.

That being said, of course there is a reason to belive that phenomenal consciousness doesn't supervene on the physical ... apart from the p-zombie and Mary ... let's offer failure of explanation.

If by "metaphysical materialism" you mean the view that our current scientific theories are an exact description of everything that "is", then you don't need to appeal to consciousness to tear it down. It is all ready self-contradictory, since our two most fundamental theories (QM and GR) contradict each other.

I think that, were I in a less eleemosynary mood, I might take exception to your transposition.

Nevertheless, I think that the tension between GR and QM provides an excellent exemplar of the future accepted tension between C and P.

This is ridiculous, especially since the person you have most consistantly accused of such behavior (Hal), is not even a materialist (metaphysical or otherwise). Such accusations also have no place in this thread.

Rgardless of whether anything you say in this paragraph is so, it constitutes an attack on me, and I demand that it be removedd from this thread.
 
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:


Ability, will, intent: Can anyone define how this works? We've been waiting for a definition of free will for months.
Wittgenstein again. Do you assert that you do not have any such attribute? Loki has taken that stance.

Do you find your (private in the Behaviorist sense) thoughts & actions more deterministic or more random?
 
hammegk,

Wittgenstein again. Do you assert that you do not have any such attribute? Loki has taken that stance.
Nice try! Unfortunately, that's not correct. My stance would be more accurately descrived as

Will, Intent - "what it seems to be" and "how it actually is" are not necessarily the same thing.

Do you find your (private in the Behaviorist sense) thoughts & actions more deterministic or more random?
Often overwhelming influenced by the past, occasionally surprisingly unpredictable, and ALWAYS mine. Your mileage differs?
 
Loki said:
.... My stance would be more accurately described as

Will, Intent - "what it seems to be" and "how it actually is" are not necessarily the same thing.
Well, at least you didn't say "goddidit". :p

But that does seem to me another look at the Material vs ~Material dichotomy.


Often overwhelming influenced by the past, occasionally surprisingly unpredictable, and ALWAYS mine. Your mileage differs?
Again, the 'ALWAYS mine' highlights the question under discussion.
 

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