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Materialism and Immaterialism

gentlehorse said:


If pain is a neural event, and we're not talking about the neural correlates of pain, what are we talking about? How do you scientifically describe or discuss "pain itself", a neural event, without referring to its neural correlates?

The phrase "correlates of" generally presumes and refers to different objects that are correlated with an original. My point is that this presumption is not established for pain, and that we have no evidence to reject the idea that there is nothing beyond the neural events to correlate them with.
 
Dancing David said:


I think that you should read up on the way that the visual cortex is arranged to see why I feel that it would be impossible to cause someone to percieve the same red flower as another person. The way that the retina and the visual cortex developes is totaly arbitrary and organic.

...snip...

I don't disagree. It's one of those ideas that whilst perhaps theoretically possible appears to be practically impossible.

(We should however be a little humble. Our scientific and technological history is full of things that wise men have said would be “impossible”.)
 
drkitten said:


You have not yet demonstrated that the pain per se is not itself an inferrable neural event. Not "neural correlates of the pain," but the pain itself.


What is an "inferrable neural event"?

Please explain precisely what is wrong with my refutation of materialism.
 
drkitten said:


The phrase "correlates of" generally presumes and refers to different objects that are correlated with an original. My point is that this presumption is not established for pain, and that we have no evidence to reject the idea that there is nothing beyond the neural events to correlate them with.

Ah! So you are asserting that pain (as experienced) doesn't exist?? And no other conscious states either?? Well sure, my argument presupposes consciousness exists. Isn't this rather desperate to claim that no-one has ever been conscious??
 
drkitten said:


The phrase "correlates of" generally presumes and refers to different objects that are correlated with an original. My point is that this presumption is not established for pain, and that we have no evidence to reject the idea that there is nothing beyond the neural events to correlate them with.

drkitten, I'm still not entirely sure that I'm understanding you. The fact that pain and certain neural events might be one and the same thing does not mean they are synonymous. There are neural events in the brain, and there is pain. We can be intimately acquainted with a pain, but know nothing about the neural activity which is supposed to be ontologically identical to the pain. Likewise, we could know everything about the neural activity, but have no experience of the pain and have no idea of the qualitative feel of the particular pain.

If we objectively know absolutely everything there is to know about the neural activity, we would still not know what it is like to experience the pain. Thus pain cannot be one and the same thing. Nor can pain be logically inferred. To know the pain one has to experience it. In other words the pain is only known from the first person perspective.

I don't think you have said anything at all to call into question my argument. But still, I'm pleased with your contributions. It might help me explain my position better in my web site and counter all possible arguments against it.
 
Win said:
Wrath:
What this view fails to encompass is that there is a class of observables which are observable by me but not by you, to wit: the content of my phenomenal consciousness.

My own definition of reality is that phenomina which can be observed by any (rational) viewer. Thus, subjective
observation is irrelevant.
 
I think we have come to a swift turn on the semantic hiway...

A twitch, pain, emotional response... feelings based in tangible, empirically observable biochemical responses.

"I feel that god/spirits/little green men exist.... in this case, feelings mean assumption.

By the way, I personally believe the only crime against nature that deserves Capital Punishment is solipism.
 
Re: Re: Re: Re: Darat

Darat said:


I understand! (And don’t say ‘about time’.) However I don’t see a clear division between the two (in my personal experience). Often “I” find I am “summoned” as “me” is undertaking an activity; this is why I say that for me “I” is not a continuous, ever present feature of the bag of chemicals that contains everything I seem to be.
Actually, I'd say *I* is continuously "on-call". Most of the time the meat machine is on autopilot, plus it contains lots of what if scenarios -- stuff like emotions. If *I* doesn't make a decision, *me* responds as best it can anyway. Note that *I* can re-direct what *me* automatically is programmed for though, just most decisions don't require it.

I'd posit Zen enlightenment may have something to do with *I* actually being involved on a full-time basis ... (er, yes that is highly speculative and totally unfounded wilda$$guess).


My view is again a simplistic one, tell me how I can know the difference between a reality of stuff and a reality of ur-stuff because if I can’t discern a difference then there isn’t one.
Apparently personal logic applied to one's personal worldview is the only way to answer the question.


I wonder if you have ever heard of a concept that science fiction writers started popularising dubbed “The Singularity”? It perhaps suggests there is a concept that could approach your god=I/ I=god oneness that is routed firmly in a monistic reality. See http://www.ugcs.caltech.edu/~phoenix/vinge/vinge-sing.html for the details.
I don't see that approaching god/oneness; looks more like The Terminator sceanario to me. I think we are a lot farther than a few decades from finding out if the idea has truth-value, millenia is more like it.


I just see particular bits of stuff acting in ways which other bits label life and contend that the HPC is only “hard” because it makes an assumption that there has to be more then stuff!
And some say we are back to the boulder rolling down hill (until it expends all energy available to it and "dies").


Any system capable of accepting and reacting to external inputs would therefore be alive, which would include some electronic systems, is this what you mean?
No, for the same reason the space shuttle is machinery, not life.


We may not do because even though we are all made of the same stuff its arrangement in each individual may be too peculiar to each individual to ever duplicate. But as you point out this uniqueness does not require anything but stuff to explain it.
Yup; and stuff of the non-life kind provides marionettes.
 
drkitten said:


The phrase "correlates of" generally presumes and refers to different objects that are correlated with an original. My point is that this presumption is not established for pain, and that we have no evidence to reject the idea that there is nothing beyond the neural events to correlate them with.

You seem to be saying that "pain itself" (the experience) is indistinguishable from neural events. Pain (the experience) is not an emergent property of neural events, but is the the neural events themselves. Am I understanding you correctly?
 
I think what is being suggested is that the first-person experience is immaterial, as it is unobservable and unmeasurable. Yet, I invariably insist that it will be possible eventually to observe and measure the first person experience of each person.

"Here, I want you, the members of the jury, to know exactly what our client felt, the night her husband left her." *jury members slip their fingers and earlobes into complex machines. Several, in unison, cry an identical cry of pain and anguish. Most look betrayed, bewildered...*

I think it's just a matter of time. Eventually, we CAN and WILL reduce the totality of our universe to measurable and comprehensible facts - nothing AT ALL will exist beyond it.

After all, the first person experience is nothing if not the near-infinitely complex interactions of neurons and other bits passing energy this way and that, forming and reforming protein chains, and zapping each other with energy. All this forms the 'first person experience' and could probably be adequately duplicated, eventually.

I'll have to find it again, but there was a very interesting study done, where rats were taught how to navigate through a maze, using peanut butter as incentive and electrical shocks as detractors. RNA from their brains was extracted, and injected into new rats - who took considerably less time learning the maze than the original test subjects. This suggests to me that some experience of the first person is stored in a physical materia and could be transferred.

What you seem to me to be doing, is making an assumption based on the state of knowledge as it stands right now - which is certainly nowhere near complete, accurate, or total. "We cannot measure singular experience right now, so it must be immaterial." Well, we cannot measure LOTS of things, but since we experience the effect they have on the world, we know they exist and are therefore materia. Likewise, each of us experiences the first person view, so we know it exists and has materia. If it didn't, we wouldn't know it exists.

Believe me, I've been where you are right now, wondering about hte dynamics of such concepts as 'I see red' or 'I feel pain'... But shortly thereafter, I ditched this immaterialism in favor of the pursuits of puberty, and when I returned to the philosophos, I found the concept sophomoric and juvenile. Of course we feel pain, of course we see red. But given time, we will all know how to feel and see as others do. All we lack right now is a frame of reference and the tools to apply this transfer.

Another thing to consider, is that we're tackling a project that relies heavily on semantics. If I say I see red, you don't know exactly what it is I see, but since we share a common experience as to what red is, you can be safe to assume that my optic nerve is detecting light refracted into red wavelengths, and know what that color looks like. But if you tell me you see puce, I have NO idea what you're talking about. Is it green? Blue? Purple? I don't know - I can't share your experience. Is puce, therefore, immaterial? Of course not. Is our perception of puce immaterial? Of course not.

To use the 'I feel pain' example, the fact is that each of us comes with our own definition of pain. This complicates the matter considerably. But when we further define what we feel, 'I feel a burning, focused pain in my shoulder', this helps further define the feeling, and pinpoint exactly what in our experience this pain must be like. When we have a) the exact language or method to transfer the data and b) a broad enough experience base to interpret the data, we'll learn that our 'subjective' view ammounts to nothing more that physical, chemical, and neurological interpretation of materia input - nothing mystical or immaterial about it.
 
zaayrdragon

Yup; no doubt about it. Assume materialism True and most 3rd party experients can be rationalized.

Sorry you choose to ignore the only objective data you have; that being Thought Exists. Or we wouldn't be chatting would we?

I think a couple of other things but will refrain sharing them with you in this thread. Perhaps when you finish high-school?
 
Even after fifteen pages, we've yet to establish that the word "materialism" implies anything about the nature of a philosophy. If anything, the available usage would suggest that it doesn't imply anything in particular.

Since science does not assert that "matter" as a category has any particular properties, "materialistic" ways of looking at the world are indistinguishable from "nonmaterialistic".

The word has more meaning in a moral sense, when it's used to refer to objects, properties, and valued commodities. A person can be "materialistic" if they value objects and not states. But that isn't the context in which we're speaking.
 
zaayrdragon said:
I think what is being suggested is that the first-person experience is immaterial, as it is unobservable and unmeasurable. Yet, I invariably insist that it will be possible eventually to observe and measure the first person experience of each person.

"Here, I want you, the members of the jury, to know exactly what our client felt, the night her husband left her." *jury members slip their fingers and earlobes into complex machines. Several, in unison, cry an identical cry of pain and anguish. Most look betrayed, bewildered...*



This of course completely misses my argument. Do you understand this? How does the pain itself play a fruitful role in our theories about the world rather than it being something which is simply tacked on to certain physical processes?
 
zaayrdragon said:
I think what is being suggested is that the first-person experience is immaterial, as it is unobservable and unmeasurable. Yet, I invariably insist that it will be possible eventually to observe and measure the first person experience of each person.



Even if you could do this, how do you know just what it is you're measuring.

If subject X is experiencing love, and subject X is the only one who has knowledge of this experience to the exlusion of all others, then how do you objectively verify that you are observing love, let alone asign any causal agent.

For any test to have any validity whatsoever, you would need to do this...which is logically impossible.
 
gentlehorse said:


?

If pain is a neural event, and we're not talking about the neural correlates of pain, what are we talking about? How do you scientifically describe or discuss "pain itself", a neural event, without referring to its neural correlates?

I believe that neural events are what we call pain. And while there may not be an objective way of sharing an exact duplicate of someone's experience, the question for materialism is wether the physical model makes testable predictions about the neural events.

I believe that th error Ian is making is saying that materialism must account for all events when I feel that it must merely make observable predictions.

I still find awareness to be a wonderful thing, I just believe that it is a series of material events.
 
Darat said:


I don't disagree. It's one of those ideas that whilst perhaps theoretically possible appears to be practically impossible.

(We should however be a little humble. Our scientific and technological history is full of things that wise men have said would be “impossible”.)

I agree, but after thinking about it a while, I believe that qualia are irreducable in the sense that they can not be directly transmitted. It could be possible in the future that they would want to devote that much computing power to transfering qualia.

I agree we should be humble , but trying to transfer the unique patterns from 20 million neurons to another unique set of twenty million neurons would be mind boggling to say the least.
 
Interesting Ian said:


This of course completely misses my argument. Do you understand this? How does the pain itself play a fruitful role in our theories about the world rather than it being something which is simply tacked on to certain physical processes?

Pain can be very useful to the organism that experiences it. It would be like asking what a theory of why water seeks the lowest level is useful. Water simply does.

Pain is not tacked onto certain physical processes , it is certain physical processes, although pain is a weird thing, I have had pressure applied to my nerves to create pain, which kind of change your perspective on pain.
 
And since we can already see that our senses can be fooled, then I think by extension they can be made to experience what others experience.

Look at spicy food, for example. Are peppers reall "hot", or are the nerves responsible for measuring temperature in the mouth fooled by the presence of capsaicin? Likewise, is eating "hot" food really painful, or once again, are nerves receiving false signals that transmit "pain"? Why does eating chocolate satisfy that part of the brain that desires love and/or lust?

My point being, since various stimuli can induce sensations and emotions that are unrelated, careful use of stimuli can induce desired states of experience and feeling in the subject. This causes the necessity of inferring materialism to these states of experience and feeling. In fact, the very fact of feeling infers materialism - emotions and feelings (like pain) don't just come from nowhere. You don't just 'fall in love' with nothing at all, or become 'angry' without any provocation whatsoever - your body reacts to stimuli - i.e. material or media trigger reactions within you - and you 'feel'. The only difference is you are a sensory package designed to read WAAAY more into these sensations than, say, a voltimiter or radiometer.

For that matter, what's to say that sensors don't 'feel' about the things they experience? Or that plants 'feel' much of anything - being they seem to lack most of the senses that we consider necessary for feeling or any organized nervous bundle to consider or store them.

If the biochemical makeup of your body lacked some key ingredient, would you still feel a certain way? Behavioural scientists already admit that a few people, for whatever reason, have emotions so out-of-whack as to be considered 'inhuman' - yet one can always find a material cause for such wildly abnormal behavior.

I have to say, no matter how you look at it, the entire human experience is material in nature.

Ian, I would like to ask one question specifically, though - what definition are you using to seperate 'material' from 'immaterial'? In my own case, I choose 'material' meaning that which is capable of affecting matter/energy/other substance in some form, and 'immaterial' as affecting nothing in any form... which means, by semantics alone, I'm stuck with the idea that there is no such thing as immaterialism. That which affects something else possesses some material form - whether matter, energy, or some plasmatic in-between state, or some sub-Quantum particle state.

If it can be inferred or observed, it is material. If it cannot be inferred or observed, it is immaterial. BUT, if it can neither be inferred nor observed, then its existance is entirely inconsequential. Fnords, for example, might well exist - yet being completely immaterial, it doesn't matter that there are a million of them for every one of us - they don't exist materially, and therefore are inconsequential.

I just don't see where your view contradicts this basic concept. You observe your own feelings - thus they are of material origin. Others can infer your feelings - again, causing them to be of material origin.
 

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