Materialism and Immaterialism

[hammegk]

please pretend this "edit perceived endedit" post is deleted

 

[Darat]

please pretend this post is deleted

Only in the material world!

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
"It is only necessary that we are familiar with physical laws and the state of the environment, and the physical state of the organism in order to predict behaviour.

Such internal states are not the real cause of our behaviour, otherwise you're not talking about reductive materialism. You have to maintain it's the correlates of mental states which is causally efficacious, not the mental states themselves.


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You're misunderstanding at least two points. First, "internal states" are not necessarily mental;

I assumed you must mean mental states, rather than physical states, otherwise your argument was clearly false.

the (unobserved) interior of an box is not generally considered to be mental, but it's still an internal state with respect to an observer.

Internal states of boxes has absolutely nothing to do with consciousness.

Second, mental states are not necessarily non-physical. I'm not talking about "correlates of mental states". I'm talking about mental states themselves as being physical-but-unobservable states in the human brain,

If they are physical then they must in principle be observable. If mental states are not detectable by any means whatsoever; that is to say they can neither be directly seen, or indirectly seen (ie play some fruitful role in a theory describing the world), then they are not physical.

To briefly recap : physical states can be unobservable because they derive from processes "with memory"

Only selves have memories. Physical states cannot be unobservable in principle, otherwise they are not physical.

and the starting state of the process was not observed. This does not make these physical states causally ineffective, but it does make state-based systems potentially unpredictable. Mental states, with propositional content, derive at least in part from other mental states, and thus are an example of such a system based upon unobservable states. There is no evidence here to support the claim that mental states themselves are non-physical.

I never assumed that mental states are not physical. I'm trying to get to grips with your argument, and why you don't believe boulders are conscious. What *I* believe is wholly irrelevant.

Thus, I specifically question your statement that "Such internal states are not the real cause of our behaviour, otherwise you're not talking about reductive materialism."

If internal states are physical, then clearly they can be the real cause of our behaviour. This I absolutely do not dispute. This doesn't help you one iota though in your claim that you know rocks are not conscious (or have good reasons for supposing so).

[mod2=Upchurch]This post has been reported for personal attacks. The attacks have been edited out.[/mod2]

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

That is another statement of the reason interactive dualism is illogical, and the choice remains -- material, or immaterial.

There is no choice. The options are identical.

 

[jj]

I assumed you must mean mental states, rather than physical states, otherwise your argument was clearly false.


Please show us that you have some reason to presume that mental states are not just a result of physics.


Internal states of boxes has absolutely nothing to do with consciousness.


That's a "proof by blatant assertion". Now, Ian, it's time for you to actually show that memory has nothing to do with conciousnessness, since that's what you just asserted.

What is conciousness without memory, Ian? Does it exist?


If they are physical then they must in principle be observable. If mental states are not detectable by any means whatsoever; that is to say they can neither be directly seen, or indirectly seen (ie play some fruitful role in a theory describing the world), then they are not physical.


Ever seen an EEG?


Only selves have memories. Physical states cannot be unobservable in principle, otherwise they are not physical.


My computer has memories. It remembers when it was invaded by the last virus, for instance.

Does my computer have a self? No, I don't think so.

QM "states" are not observable (thank you, Walter Heisenburg) either in reality or in principle. Their results are. Are you saying that QM isn't physical?


I never assumed that mental states are not physical.


Your argument above suggests that you do. Could you clear this up, please?


I'm trying to get to grips with your argument, and why you don't believe boulders are conscious. What *I* believe is wholly irrelevant.


Does a boulder have a brain? Can you show some evidence?


If internal states are physical, then clearly they can be the real cause of our behaviour. This I absolutely do not dispute. This doesn't help you one iota though in your claim that you know rocks are not conscious (or have good reasons for supposing so).


Have we observed rocks with brains? Perhaps some silicon-based species will some day be a boulder with brains, but until we meet this alien species, you're stuck here on earth, and your ridiculous question about boulders is unsupported until you show me the boulder's brain.


I don't think you have a clue what I'm saying.


Perhaps, then, you need to explain yourself better.


jj, needless to say, as always, has even less of a clue.

I thought personal attacks were not permitted here.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I thought personal attacks were not permitted here.

I forgot this was the critical thinking forum.

 

[hammegk]

There is no choice. The options are identical.

Assuming that all questions worth asking can be correctly answered under the epistemologically privileged position some scientists assert exists for Science, I'd agree.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

It doesn't matter whether science can answer all the questions worth asking; what matters is whether science can answer all the questions that can be answered.

 

[Dancing David]

This is itself an incorrect statement. To witness an effect, there has to be an interaction of some sort with some medium - photons, sound waves in air, etc. - which are themselves disturbed by some material effect. Energy is not immaterial - it consists of interactions of particles (or waves of particles) that we may yet lack the ability to detect, but their existence is still quite material. Magnetic waves and fields will one day yield the existence of detectible material just as light consists of detectible photons - we may not see these bits now, but we will in time.

Nothing immaterial can ever be detected, thus is irrelevant, even assuming it exists.

Welcome Zaaydragon!

Matter is always a wave and always energy, it is only when constrained that it acts like matter.

My point was that the materialist POV has what may be labeled as immaterial effects. And while many posit an immaterial consiousness it has no discernable evidence in the material or immaterial realm.

I don't think that magnetic fields are any more immaterial than a photon, but something that has a rest mass of zero does sound immaterial to me. And when you think about an electron being diffuesed over an area bounded by the spped of light, well more immaetrial than material I would say.

The unobservable inertia and 'space' sure seem to be immaterial, how about vacuum energy?

(Just so you know I am a materialst to the core, I am pointing out that while materialism has observable immaterialism, immaterialism has no observable effetcs.)

 

[Z]

"observable immaterialism" is a semantic illusion. We don't sense 'nothing' - we sense a lack of 'something'. This isn't sensing 'immaterial stuff' - the idea is purely a word-game. The vacuum is just that - a vacuum. Emptiness. Nothing. (Although, of course, the 'vacuum of space' is full of photons, radiation, hydrogen, etc...)

As to a 'rest mass of zero', you should consider that mass is itself a flawed measuring system - mass is relative as is speed, etc. but doesn't mean a particle without mass is immaterial - only that it lacks mass in a certain state. (No, I do not equate 'material' with mass - rather, with substance, a more open-ended term that encompasses matter, energy, and anything in-between - anything measurable, observable, or inferrable from interference and interaction with other things).

Anyway, a lot of what's being argued here are really semantic points of view - The view I take is, if it exists, it's material. Period. In fact, I'd wager (a gentlemen's bet at best) that when we get below the quantum level, we'll find that EVERYTHING is made of exactly the same particle in infinite combinations - either that, or we'll discover micro-universes like our own macro-universe. Mind-boggling. Or perhaps mind-scrabbling - I can never tell.

 

[hammegk]

"observable immaterialism" is a semantic illusion.

Not for objective idealists. It's been pointed out earlier "immaterial" is not the only choice; ~material could be a better description.

Anyway, a lot of what's being argued here are really semantic points of view - The view I take is, if it exists, it's material. Period.

Why not. If you wish to declare yourself a Materialist, that's how to do it.

I agree the "stuff" that exists is a monism. I just prefer to call it ~material. Again, in common parlance, "mind" is a word often used (at human level); I'd say "life" at lower levels, and finally, the ability to act or not, or to react (or not) to a stimulus. Materialists think that choices have some (or are all) random components. I'm not willing to agree that is necessarily true, and in my own case choose to claim that what would we usually term libertarian free-will exists.

Although no one seems willing to accept the point, perhaps you can explain how your position does not entail the 100% belief that "god/spirituality/~material" cannot exist.

 

[Interesting Ian]

This is itself an incorrect statement. To witness an effect, there has to be an interaction of some sort with some medium - photons, sound waves in air, etc. - which are themselves disturbed by some material effect. Energy is not immaterial - it consists of interactions of particles (or waves of particles) that we may yet lack the ability to detect, but their existence is still quite material.

You mean physical, assuming no ontological implications in thereby describing it as "physical".

Magnetic waves and fields will one day yield the existence of detectible material just as light consists of detectible photons - we may not see these bits now, but we will in time.

Nothing immaterial can ever be detected, thus is irrelevant, even assuming it exists.

If one is an idealist then obviously the immaterial can be detected. Namely the entirety of what we call the "physical" world, in other words tables, chairs, stars, farts etc.

Unless you're referring to the self, or consciousness? Well it can be detected if one believes the self is causally efficaceous. Arguably it cannot be detected under materialism, and certainly not under epiphenomenalism.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Anyway, a lot of what's being argued here are really semantic points of view - The view I take is, if it exists, it's material. Period.

Certainly this is what materialists assert. I have argued countless times that this is unintelligible. Here is my argument since you probably haven't seen it.

Let me address the reason why I think materialism is unintelligible. What we need to do is take a look at materialism to see if it is internally consistent. Now the particular question I would like to address is why should we suppose that other peoples’ bodies are "inhabited" by conscious minds (or why phenomenal consciousness is associated with brains). Your argument no doubt will be that materialism stipulates this to be so; it is an axiomatic premise of materialism. But this makes your definition of materialism an arbitrary one. A metaphysic which glosses over awkward facts. Allow me to explain.

It seems to me that materialism should stipulate that the physical exhausts reality. That once we have completely described the Universe in physical terms then we have said all that can be said about the Universe or reality.

But what is the physical? It seems to me that it should be everything, that, at least in principle, can be observed by anyone with appropriate faculties and suitable instruments. In other words all that is objective exists, or to put it another way, all that is discernable from the third person perspective exists. This will also include things which can only be indirectly seen (although strictly speaking I reject the direct/indirect dichotomy). This then includes such entities as electrons, because although they can only be "indirectly" seen they nevertheless play fruitful roles in our theories describing the world ie we need to hypothesise electrons in order to explain certain aspects of reality.

Now there is something peculiar about conscious experience which marks it off from all other existents. It is simply this. It cannot be observed or detected by anyone with appropriate faculties and/or suitable instruments! Thus according to my prior definition of the physical it is not a physical existent. Thus I may have toothache to take an arbitrary example. But you cannot observe that toothache, all you can observe is the effects of the toothache, the grimace of pain for example. Conscious experiences in other words are irreducibly private.

Now you will no doubt say that by observing the grimace, or at least by observing the neurons fire, then you are observing the toothache since materialism holds that the toothache and its neural correlates are one and the same thing, or at least aspects of the same thing. But an objective examination of this toothache will necessarily leave out the subjective irreducibly sensation of pain. The actually sensation of pain does not figure into the physical facts about the pain according to our prior definition of the physical. Nor can we infer the sensation of pain since, unlike an electron, the (phenomenological) pain does not play a part in any description of our behaviour. The pain per se cannot play a part because pain per se is not part of the objective publically accessible realm. Only the neural correlates of the pain can play any fruitful role in our theories.

In short then either a materialist has to concede his metaphysic is internally inconsistent, or he must arbitrarily include phenomenological consciousness within his world picture. But if he opts for the latter then the whole prima facie plausibility of his world view crumbles away. No longer can he say that for something to exist it must be in principle be directly observable or play a fruitful role in some theory about the world, because this then necessarily precludes phenomenological consciousness. He
has to expand the notion of the physical to even include things that cannot be directly or even indirectly detected, even in principle!

This is what materialism entails and is just one of many reasons why we should reject this metaphysic.

 

[Z]

I'm not even sure of the question - I suppose I am definitely a materialist, in that I am certain that, on some level we have yet to discover, all action, thought, motion, will, etc. are governed by precise laws working in material processes. Therefore, I postulate from this concept that 'free will' and 'conscious thought' are a form of subtle illusion. But it's akin to saying that we don't actually 'see' something; rather, we detect the photons striking the appropriate receptors in our eyes blah blah blah... On a practical level, in other words, we have all the free will we need or want. On a theoretical level, there's no such thing... but the complex interactions involved are sufficient to allow us this belief anyway, and that's enough for most folks. It's enough that I can see, I don't need to dwell on the fact that all I'm doing is experiencing a bombardment of photons on my eyes or mentally work through the fact that any, if not all, of my senses could well be being fed by sources other than those I believe - I see, hear, taste, etc. and I don't care if the Matrix is telling me this, or photons and sound waves, or little purple angels - it's enough that I have these senses.

Likewise, I theorize the existance of some Grand Unified Particle/Energy/Wave/whatever theory and the idea that even will and choice are governed by specific laws, but in practice it really doesn't matter. I have as much will as I need, and I don't care if my choices are being dictated by nano-micro-particle physics, the unchangable destiny of some bearded and petty Gods, or Gloria Estefan - it's enough that I have these choices.

The real question with free will comes in when one looks at responsibility for actions. Should someone be held responsible for their actions if, in fact, their actions are inevitable, the consequence of complex laws beyond our understanding? I hold that maintaining a level of blame and punishment is just another part of those complex laws. Just like playing a video game, there are complex laws governing character movement, but at the same time, other factors can be entered by players to alter those laws (again, in cohesion with other complex laws - systems within systems, etc).

So I deny free will, but accept that such as we have is enough; I deny free will, but accept that punishment and judgement are reasonable and rational, as part of the system. Contradictory? Maybe - maybe not. But immaterialism? Perhaps I misunderstand what immaterialism is. Seems to me the idea of 'immaterialism' is dealing with concepts that have no observable interaction - 'imaginary' stuff, if you will - and I maintain that nothing unreal exists. It's like claiming that such-and-such is 'all natural' - Sorry folks, EVERYTHING in the universe, man-made or not, is all natural. Unnatural would denote something not of our reality - immaterial, if you will.

Apologies - I am not a very good wordsmith, and lack the ability to really express what I think well. Still, this subject is one of those that is fun to debate, nearly endlessly - because it's impossible to claim right or wrong (as of yet, anyway).

 

[Z]

It seems to me that it should be everything, that, at least in principle, can be observed by anyone with appropriate faculties and suitable instruments.

And this is where I believe the flaw lies in your theory. This alone creates the situation, as time progresses, in which the immaterial is slowly reduced to the material - as the facilities and instruments in use become more complex. Remember a time when the molecule HAD to be the smallest particle? Or when the Atom was the absolute bottom of the chain? Well, according to instruments and facilities we had at the time, that was as material as things got. Simarly, what about a time when stars were mere pinpoints of light in the sky? Without suitable instruments, we were left to theorize about them - and I'm sure, to conclude some pretty awkward things about them.

Such it is with subjective reality. As of yet, we possess no means of measuring or observing that which is subjective. But that isn't to say that, in 100 million years of technological evolution, we won't find the means. In fact, there's really no evidence to suggest we WON'T find the means, given enough time. This, then, is my theory of materialism - that there is no such thing as a purely subjective reality - that every subjective experience is only the complex interplay of materia (energy, matter, whatever) that is governed by some natural laws and will follow predictable patterns of behavior. Our understanding of these things as of yet is flawed, minimal, and primative, but I think, given enough time, we will develop facilities and instruments for sharing subjective experience - psi-bonding equipment, you might suggest.

SO - Materialism AT THE PRESENT is a lovely and flawed metaphysic BASED ON CURRENT SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND CAPABILITY - much the way astronomy was once a lovely and flawed metaphysic based on ancient scientific knowledge and capability. Sounds a lot like the early sailor declaring that the World had to be flat, because no instruments could claim otherwise, or that air was just empty space and wind, the breath of the gods.

Now, I'm not saying that all things fall into this kind of category - but as near as I can tell, there's really nothing that solidly denies the possibility of what I'm saying (unlike homeopathy, that is solidly denied by a lot of good science). And don't start quoting quantum theory or Schroedingy's cat at me - that's all a mental exercise, and really absurd at best. Nothing unreal exists, and all things are material things. I see immaterialism to be a metaphysic, because it postulates the existence of immaterial, undetectable things that influence their environment - faeries, gods, free will. If you believe in one immaterial but functioning force, why not all of them? Is that an invisible pink unicorn in your head playing your 'subjective awareness'? Might as well be by that theory.

 

[Dancing David]

posted by Interesting Ian

But an objective examination of this toothache will necessarily leave out the subjective irreducibly sensation of pain. The actually sensation of pain does not figure into the physical facts about the pain according to our prior definition of the physical.

And that is absurd by your definition, an oblective viewpoint could also through nerve induction and measurement state that there is nerve conduction in facial cranial nerves that is associated with the pain reported. And that therefore there is an objective experience that is associated with the irreducable pain.

I as a materialist do not rule out introspection as a tool.

 

[Z]

God, I hate double posting...

and Triple, at that!

Anyway, I see your concept - that subjective phenomenological experience can never be duplicated, analyzed, experienced, etc. But I deny this theory and say that, given time, we will be able to do so. Eventually, we will so completely understand interactions of particles, energies, etc. that we will know exactly what a person 'feels' under a condition - say, that toothache - because we will have an exact map of the neuron-firing, the actions within the brain, how the action maps against experience, how memory affects the feeling, the associated biophysical effects of that pain... in fact, everything there is to know about that pain. At that point, yes, the universe will be exhausted, and yes, we will know everything about it. I don't think it's an unreachable goal - only a difficult one. The only flaw that I find to be valid with this idea is the fact that you can never fully describe a closed system without extending your language one system higher - in other words, our 'complete' knowledge of the universe will be actually incomplete, because we will be one system too short of the actual data needed. Perhaps - perhaps - this is subjective reality - but even then, it's possible that we might be able to overcome even this obstacle, given enough time.

 

[csense]

Eventually, we will so completely understand interactions of particles, energies, etc. that we will know exactly what a person 'feels' under a condition - say, that toothache - because we will have an exact map of the neuron-firing, the actions within the brain, how the action maps against experience, how memory affects the feeling, the associated biophysical effects of that pain... in fact, everything there is to know about that pain.

What of the pain, of a broken heart....wherein do you think that lies?

 

[Interesting Ian]

I'm not even sure of the question - I suppose I am definitely a materialist, in that I am certain that, on some level we have yet to discover, all action, thought, motion, will, etc. are governed by precise laws working in material processes. Therefore, I postulate from this concept that 'free will' and 'conscious thought' are a form of subtle illusion. But it's akin to saying that we don't actually 'see' something; rather, we detect the photons striking the appropriate receptors in our eyes blah blah blah... On a practical level, in other words, we have all the free will we need or want. On a theoretical level, there's no such thing... but the complex interactions involved are sufficient to allow us this belief anyway, and that's enough for most folks. It's enough that I can see, I don't need to dwell on the fact that all I'm doing is experiencing a bombardment of photons on my eyes or mentally work through the fact that any, if not all, of my senses could well be being fed by sources other than those I believe - I see, hear, taste, etc. and I don't care if the Matrix is telling me this, or photons and sound waves, or little purple angels - it's enough that I have these senses.

Likewise, I theorize the existance of some Grand Unified Particle/Energy/Wave/whatever theory and the idea that even will and choice are governed by specific laws, but in practice it really doesn't matter. I have as much will as I need, and I don't care if my choices are being dictated by nano-micro-particle physics, the unchangable destiny of some bearded and petty Gods, or Gloria Estefan - it's enough that I have these choices.

The real question with free will comes in when one looks at responsibility for actions. Should someone be held responsible for their actions if, in fact, their actions are inevitable, the consequence of complex laws beyond our understanding? I hold that maintaining a level of blame and punishment is just another part of those complex laws. Just like playing a video game, there are complex laws governing character movement, but at the same time, other factors can be entered by players to alter those laws (again, in cohesion with other complex laws - systems within systems, etc).

So I deny free will, but accept that such as we have is enough; I deny free will, but accept that punishment and judgement are reasonable and rational, as part of the system. Contradictory? Maybe - maybe not. But immaterialism? Perhaps I misunderstand what immaterialism is. Seems to me the idea of 'immaterialism' is dealing with concepts that have no observable interaction - 'imaginary' stuff, if you will - and I maintain that nothing unreal exists. It's like claiming that such-and-such is 'all natural' - Sorry folks, EVERYTHING in the universe, man-made or not, is all natural. Unnatural would denote something not of our reality - immaterial, if you will.

Apologies - I am not a very good wordsmith, and lack the ability to really express what I think well. Still, this subject is one of those that is fun to debate, nearly endlessly - because it's impossible to claim right or wrong (as of yet, anyway).

I do so claim, and you and the other materialists are simply wrong.

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
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It seems to me that it should be everything, that, at least in principle, can be observed by anyone with appropriate faculties and suitable instruments.
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And this is where I believe the flaw lies in your theory. This alone creates the situation, as time progresses, in which the immaterial is slowly reduced to the material - as the facilities and instruments in use become more complex.

If consciousness can be detected objectively, then this contradicts my argument. So, you think that at some future time this will be possible. Interesting. So people will literally partake in my conscious experiences. What would then differentiate us??

Remember a time when the molecule HAD to be the smallest particle? Or when the Atom was the absolute bottom of the chain? Well, according to instruments and facilities we had at the time, that was as material as things got. Simarly, what about a time when stars were mere pinpoints of light in the sky? Without suitable instruments, we were left to theorize about them - and I'm sure, to conclude some pretty awkward things about them.

Such it is with subjective reality. As of yet, we possess no means of measuring or observing that which is subjective. But that isn't to say that, in 100 million years of technological evolution, we won't find the means. In fact, there's really no evidence to suggest we WON'T find the means, given enough time.

I'm not sure you're understanding my argument. My point is that conscious experiences are irreducibly private. Anything you detect of my conscious experiences are necessarily perceptual experiences from your 5 senses. What you see, hear, smell, taste, or touch cannot themselves be equivalent to my conscious experiences.

Obviously, a lot of entities are only indirectly seen eg electrons, but we wouldn't say there is anything about them which we couldn't, in principle, detect through our instruments. But my experience of love is inaccessible in a way in which any electrons properties could never be. This is because pain is irreducibly private. If you say you indirectly detect my pain then you are denying that only 3rd person facts determine how reality operates, which is a denial of one of the major tenets of materialism. The experience of pain is only known through the 1st person perspective unless you claim that any of your perceptual experiences equate to or are identical to my pain.

Hmmm . .explained it better originally which I put a l;ot of thought into. So if you don't understand that . . . {shrugs}