Materialism and Immaterialism

[Dancing David]

Not that Ian will see it, but I do agree to the irreducable nature of personal experience, with the limited amount of neuro-biology I have I think that it will be impossible to replicate an experience and transfer it to another.

This however is very different from saying that the emotions and associations are brain events, they are unique to each person, but they are objective events. You can sever the optic nerve and reduce the number of visula qualia to zero for that eye.

The issue is not the ability to reduce the consiousness to a single event, something I think science will do. But for Ian and some others it is that each individual has a unique experience and therefore this violates materialism. I think that the notion that you can exhaust the knowledge of the material world is a flawed one. And so I don't feel that it is nessecary to materialism at all. The question becomes can a material/energy be given an approximate role which we can demonstrate to have adequate theorhetical power.

The potential already exists to stimulate the brain and create brain events very similar to those held so dear by the immaterialsist.

 

[Darat]

Not that Ian will see it, but I do agree to the irreducable nature of personal experience, with the limited amount of neuro-biology I have I think that it will be impossible to replicate an experience and transfer it to another.


...snip....

I (with my limited knowledge of neuro-biology) would disagree.

I can give a group of people a certain electrical stimulation and every single one of them will "feel" a tingle as well as experience a "physical twitch".

Primitive yes but I can make a group of people all report a feeling.

Slightly less distinct, but I can give the group of people a drug and they will all claim "euphoric" feelings, so a “physical” substance creates one of these "irreducible" feelings.

And even less clear cut but I can run an experiment on the group and I can make a significant number of them "remember" something that didn't happen to them.

You put all that together a feeling of a tingle, a feeling of euphoria and a memory of something that didn’t happen and I think we are well on the way of being able to create a "synthetic" experience.

If we can do that then I can’t understand why (at least theoretically) we won’t be able to isolate a specific personal experience in someone and then manufacture the correct “stimulus” that will duplicate that experience in someone else.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I (with my limited knowledge of neuro-biology) would disagree.

I can give a group of people a certain electrical stimulation and every single one of them will "feel" a tingle as well as experience a "physical twitch".


Primitive yes but I can make a group of people all report a feeling.

So what? What is this supposed to prove.

Slightly less distinct, but I can give the group of people a drug and they will all claim "euphoric" feelings, so a “physical” substance creates one of these "irreducible" feelings.

Oh well, that's that then. What the hell are we all arguing about if smoking a joint or drinking a swift couple of pints of lager logically necessitates materialism is correct??

And of course it logically necessarily is the case that my TV set generates ex nihilo the TV programmes shown. It logically necessarily must be the case because when I bang the top of my TV set the picture flickers.

And even less clear cut but I can run an experiment on the group and I can make a significant number of them "remember" something that didn't happen to them.

Can you make anyone think they've actually lived 10,000 years and fill in all the appropriate experiences of everything they've ever done in this timespan?

You put all that together a feeling of a tingle, a feeling of euphoria and a memory of something that didn’t happen and I think we are well on the way of being able to create a "synthetic" experience.

If we can do that then I can’t understand why (at least theoretically) we won’t be able to isolate a specific personal experience in someone and then manufacture the correct “stimulus” that will duplicate that experience in someone else.

Sure, you can probably duplicate a pain. But it's not the same pain but a different pain. We can never even know if the characteristic subjective sensation is even similar.

 

[Darat]

...snip...

Sure, you can probably duplicate a pain. But it's not the same pain but a different pain. We can never even know if the characteristic subjective sensation is even similar.

It has been explained in this thread several times, in different ways, that this is only an issue if as a starting position you assume there is something other then "stuff". If you don't there is no reason or evidence to suppose there would be a difference.

Now I understand you always make an assumption that there is something else other then "stuff".

(Evdidence for this claim - your statement that: " I've always known there is an ultimate purpose to life and the Universe, and a life after death. I'm also pretty convinced that reincarnation occurs. Yeah. Seems like I'm different from everyone else. Other believers always seem to claim they started to believe due to something or other. Not me. I've always known ")

Therefore of course under your assumptions you are correct but you cannot prove using logic or evidence that your assumptions are correct. In fact because of your assumptions in your worldview it will always be a question that you will believe cannot be answered.

Yet as several people have shown in this thread under different assumptions it may be a question that can be answered.

 

[Interesting Ian]

It has been explained in this thread several times, in different ways, that this is only an issue if as a starting position you assume there is something other then "stuff". If you don't there is no reason or evidence to suppose there would be a difference.

Now I understand you always make an assumption that there is something else other then "stuff".

(Evdidence for this claim - your statement that: " I've always known there is an ultimate purpose to life and the Universe, and a life after death. I'm also pretty convinced that reincarnation occurs. Yeah. Seems like I'm different from everyone else. Other believers always seem to claim they started to believe due to something or other. Not me. I've always known ")

Therefore of course under your assumptions you are correct but you cannot prove using logic or evidence that your assumptions are correct. In fact because of your assumptions in your worldview it will always be a question that you will believe cannot be answered.

Yet as several people have shown in this thread under different assumptions it may be a question that can be answered.

I do not know what you mean by stuff, or indeed anything you are talking about in this post. It's incoherent from start to finnish.

 

[Z]

Simple - you feel that I am wrong. I feel that you are wrong. You think your pain and love and feelings are infinitely private and completely unknowable by any other person through any means whatsoever. I think eventually every perception of pain, love, joy, loss, confusion, anger, etc. will be completely transferable because, by understanding the precise mechanism of these things, they will ultimately be fully understood.

You propose a mystical concept of singular experience and perception. I propose an extension of current science that will one day be all-encompassing. You think some things science will never get a grip on, I think science will eventually reduce the entirety of everything to understandable mechanisms.

The 'pain of a broken heart' certainly can be measured, given more advanced technology, as every emotion we feel has biological effects throughout the body and changes of all sorts within the brain.

But, then, I also feel there is such a thing as a person with broken emotions, too... just as flaws exist in the limbs, organs, and tissues, so do flaws exist in the mechanism of emotions, causing some to anger too easily, others to fall in love at the drop of a hat, still others to feel almost nothing at all. For my own part, I lack grief and sorrow - not altogether, but I certainly don't feel these things as deeply as I know I should. The death of loved ones doesn't consume me or leave me weeping uncontrollably - I have a few moments, maybe an hour or so, and then I'm over it. I feel there is a mechanism at work behind it that causes this apparent deficiency within me, and I feel that, in the future, I would be able to go to a specialist, who would take readings and suggest a course of treatment for balancing my emotional states. (Not psychology, which is as much guesswork as psychicism)

What would differentiate us? Practically nothing.

But, no amount of argument either way will prove or disprove this idea - only continued development of science.

 

[Darat]

I do not know what you mean by stuff, or indeed anything you are talking about in this post. It's incoherent from start to finnish.

For a definition of "stuff" look earlier in the thread.

 

[Interesting Ian]

For a definition of "stuff" look earlier in the thread.

no

 

[Darat]

no

That you do not wish to debate is your choice.

 

[hammegk]

Darat

Your comments imo conflate the experiences of the perceived & perceiving *me*, which obviously uses brain wiring, and *I*, which is for objective idealists thought itself (I'd guess ditto for subjective idealists too, but I don't see how they avoid dualism). Again I actually have 1 datapoint: "thought exists".

If *me* is physical, and that's all folks, yes, we can rationalize human level thought. Rationalizing "life" is more difficult; the point is "life" seems to exist quite nicely without neural circuitry per se. Now does this quality begin at boson level/field level (sorry, semantic problems arise here), or does something "emerge" that is deterministic/random but greater than the sum of its' parts?

If you accept that as the correct answer, how do you escape nihilism, being just a randomized wind-up toy??

 

[Darat]

Re: Darat

Your comments imo conflate the experiences of the perceived & perceiving *me*, which obviously uses brain wiring, and *I*, which is for objective idealists thought itself (I'd guess ditto for subjective idealists too, but I don't see how they avoid dualism). Again I actually have 1 datapoint: "thought exists".

Well I'm still hoping you can clarify for me the "And I would say you are confusing *I* (the immaterial Thinker) and *me* (the perceived and perceiving which includes ego/id/whatever)." problem that I have. (Visualise a winking smilie.)

But the reason, I believe you think I’m conflating two different things is that for me they aren’t two distinct “I”s. My personal experience doesn’t give me any way to distinguish between the two. I just don’t see any difference.

I'm not being deliberately obtuse here but I really don't understand, from my own personal experience, the distinction between the "I"s that you seem to be saying exists.

(As a slight aside I even have issue with your "thought exists" since it seems to assume more then my personal experience reveals to me. To re-cap "I" don't exist all the time, I am a “process” that has different states, some are more what I label as "I" then others - but that is just a matter of convenient labels.)

If *me* is physical, and that's all folks, yes, we can rationalize human level thought. Rationalizing "life" is more difficult; the point is "life" seems to exist quite nicely without neural circuitry per se. Now does this quality begin at boson level/field level (sorry, semantic problems arise here), or does something "emerge" that is deterministic/random but greater than the sum of its' parts?

My arguments, such as they are, are not dependent on any peculiar properties of any particular monistic understanding of reality. That’s why I choose to use such a simplistic term as “stuff” rather then obviously flawed labels such as “matter” or “energy” to avoid getting drawn into the “how” it all works.

And as for the "mystery of life" - we seem to be going in a circle! I don't see any mystery arising from a label we use to define certain processes we observe around us.

To perhaps make any headway can you please, clearly and as simply as possible define what you mean by "life" in case I am missing something.

If you accept that as the correct answer, how do you escape nihilism, being just a randomized wind-up toy??

Others have explained this much better in this thread then me but my view is that “I” may very well have no freewill and no choices, but it doesn’t feel that way to me. (We also see all around us processes that use their own outputs as inputs, if you want to use an algorithmic analogy.)

 

[drkitten]

But what is the physical? It seems to me that it should be everything, that, at least in principle, can be observed by anyone with appropriate faculties and suitable instruments. In other words all that is objective exists, or to put it another way, all that is discernable from the third person perspective exists. This will also include things which can only be indirectly seen (although strictly speaking I reject the direct/indirect dichotomy). This then includes such entities as electrons, because although they can only be "indirectly" seen they nevertheless play fruitful roles in our theories describing the world ie we need to hypothesise electrons in order to explain certain aspects of reality.

Now there is something peculiar about conscious experience which marks it off from all other existents. It is simply this. It cannot be observed or detected by anyone with appropriate faculties and/or suitable instruments! Thus according to my prior definition of the physical it is not a physical existent. Thus I may have toothache to take an arbitrary example. But you cannot observe that toothache, all you can observe is the effects of the toothache, the grimace of pain for example. Conscious experiences in other words are irreducibly private.

And here's the problem. You admit that you cannot yourself see the electron, but you admit its reality, and even perceptibility, because you can see it "indirectly," i.e., infer its existence.

I can similarly indirectly observe and infer the existence of your toothache.

There is no difficulty here with postulating that a toothache is exactly as material as an electron.

 

[Interesting Ian]

And here's the problem. You admit that you cannot yourself see the electron, but you admit its reality, and even perceptibility, because you can see it "indirectly," i.e., infer its existence.

I can similarly indirectly observe and infer the existence of your toothache.

There is no difficulty here with postulating that a toothache is exactly as material as an electron.

No problem. You failed to real the whole of my argument, or you failed to understand it. I also say:

". Nor can we infer the sensation of pain since, unlike an electron, the (phenomenological) pain does not play a part in any description of our behaviour. The pain per se cannot play a part because pain per se is not part of the objective publicly accessible realm. Only the neural correlates of the pain can play any fruitful role in our theories".

Now you need to maintain that conscious experiences such as toothache (ie the actual sensation of the toothache) plays an actual fruitful role in our theories describing the world. An electron clearly does (or at least all possible properties/attributes of electrons do). But if you maintain the totality of our behaviour can be explained by reference to objective facts (ie that anyone with unimpaired senses with suitable instruments can in principle establish), then the toothache cannot be considered to be on the same ontological footing as an electron.

Conscious experiences must be simply tacked onto the materialist metaphysic.

I'm quite convinced that my argument is correct, and I'm going to expand upon it a little and put it on my forthcoming website.

If anyone can find any genuinely find any faults with my argument I would be delighted to hear them. But I honestly don't think anyone has done anything to call into question my refutation of materialism. Indeed I don't think it is possible to refute my argument.

 

[hammegk]

Re: Re: Darat

But the reason, I believe you think I’m conflating two different things is that for me they aren’t two distinct “I”s. My personal experience doesn’t give me any way to distinguish between the two. I just don’t see any difference.

Perhaps you too are a p-zombie? *I* is the only first-person experient I am aware of. *Me*, again, is the sensors/servos/wetware. Note there are not 2 I's, rather the thinking I and the wetware *me*.

(As a slight aside I even have issue with your "thought exists" since it seems to assume more then my personal experience reveals to me. To re-cap "I" don't exist all the time, I am a “process” that has different states, some are more what I label as "I" then others - but that is just a matter of convenient labels.)

I didn't say anything about your "thoughts", or mine. I do contend "something" thinks or we wouldn't be having this conversation that seems quite real to me, and to you also.

Avoiding solipsism gets us to *I* think (and *you* too).

My arguments, such as they are, are not dependent on any peculiar properties of any particular monistic understanding of reality. That’s why I choose to use such a simplistic term as “stuff” rather then obviously flawed labels such as “matter” or “energy” to avoid getting drawn into the “how” it all works.

I agree we are discussing stuff -- a monism. Materialism & ~Materialism are 2 ways to consider it. Epistemologically, science cannot answer either way. Do you see why I also contend that the choice Materialism negates the possibility of ~Material? Will you contend you can find the slightest chance for god/spirit existing in Material?

And as for the "mystery of life" - we seem to be going in a circle! I don't see any mystery arising from a label we use to define certain processes we observe around us.

And I don't see how you miss the circularity in accepting you are alive (with HPC or we wouldn't be discussing this), and that what most call "matter" is ~life by the definition you use science & HPC to classify.

To perhaps make any headway can you please, clearly and as simply as possible define what you mean by "life" in case I am missing something.

Again, the ability to act, or not act, and react, or not react to a stimulus.

Others have explained this much better in this thread then me but my view is that “I” may very well have no freewill and no choices, but it doesn’t feel that way to me. (We also see all around us processes that use their own outputs as inputs, if you want to use an algorithmic analogy.)

And I continue to agree, a choice of Material allows us to rationalize a very high percentage of 3rd party observables.

As drkitten mentioned "There is no difficulty here with postulating that a toothache is exactly as material as an electron."; the problem continues that you will never have my toothache, or I yours; neither will ever know how the other experiences pain, or the color red, as a 1st person experience. Those are qualia as idealists (& interactive dualists) see it.

 

[drkitten]

". Nor can we infer the sensation of pain since, unlike an electron, the (phenomenological) pain does not play a part in any description of our behaviour. The pain per se cannot play a part because pain per se is not part of the objective publicly accessible realm. Only the neural correlates of the pain can play any fruitful role in our theories".

Now you need to maintain that conscious experiences such as toothache (ie the actual sensation of the toothache) plays an actual fruitful role in our theories describing the world.

You have not yet demonstrated that the pain per se is not itself an inferrable neural event. Not "neural correlates of the pain," but the pain itself.

 

[Dancing David]

If we can do that then I can’t understand why (at least theoretically) we won’t be able to isolate a specific personal experience in someone and then manufacture the correct “stimulus” that will duplicate that experience in someone else.

I think that you should read up on the way that the visual cortex is arranged to see why I feel that it would be impossible to cause someone to percieve the same red flower as another person. The way that the retina and the visual cortex developes is totaly arbitrary and organic. And so I suggest that they are irreducable qualia, in that it is unlikely that they can ever be directly transfered. You would first have to discover the neural networks of each individual and they even vary from time to time in an individual. Much easier to use a TV screen.

That doesn't mean that they are objective events, my argument would state that you could study which neurons in an individual will fire in response to a particular stimuli. But I think that the huhe number of neurons and there basicaly random aggregations is going to make the tranfer of qualia very difficult.

Theoretical possible but I think highly unlikely, they are still objective events.

 

[Dancing David]

posted by HammGK

If you accept that as the correct answer, how do you escape nihilism, being just a randomized wind-up toy??

there is no way out other than through belief, I can't prove that I am not a p-zombie. And I like Mecrutio believe that I am a p-zombie.

I also operate under the illusion of free will.

However even a nihilist can believe that there is order in the world.

 

[Dancing David]

You have not yet demonstrated that the pain per se is not itself an inferrable neural event. Not "neural correlates of the pain," but the pain itself.

Ian will Ignore the point and hammeGK will ask if you like the idea of being replaced by a computer and some servos.

Ian will state that no one else can understand his actual pain because it is unique and that if you shared his pain then you will 'actualy be him' and that just won't do.

 

[gentlehorse]

You have not yet demonstrated that the pain per se is not itself an inferrable neural event. Not "neural correlates of the pain," but the pain itself.

Dancing David's response:

Ian will Ignore the point and hammeGK will ask if you like the idea of being replaced by a computer and some servos.

Ian will state that no one else can understand his actual pain because it is unique and that if you shared his pain then you will 'actualy be him' and that just won't do.

?

If pain is a neural event, and we're not talking about the neural correlates of pain, what are we talking about? How do you scientifically describe or discuss "pain itself", a neural event, without referring to its neural correlates?

 

[Darat]

Re: Re: Re: Darat

Perhaps you too are a p-zombie? *I* is the only first-person experient I am aware of. *Me*, again, is the sensors/servos/wetware. Note there are not 2 I's, rather the thinking I and the wetware *me*.

I understand! (And don’t say ‘about time’.) However I don’t see a clear division between the two (in my personal experience). Often “I” find I am “summoned” as “me” is undertaking an activity; this is why I say that for me “I” is not a continuous, ever present feature of the bag of chemicals that contains everything I seem to be.

I didn't say anything about your "thoughts", or mine. I do contend "something" thinks or we wouldn't be having this conversation that seems quite real to me, and to you also.

Avoiding solipsism gets us to *I* think (and *you* too).

I think this is a fundamental difference in the way we think about things, I have no problem with the concept that “thoughts” are what do the “thinking”, I don’t believe something has to “do” the thinking, the thoughts are enough to explain the process.

I agree we are discussing stuff -- a monism. Materialism & ~Materialism are 2 ways to consider it. Epistemologically, science cannot answer either way. Do you see why I also contend that the choice Materialism negates the possibility of ~Material? Will you contend you can find the slightest chance for god/spirit existing in Material?

My view is again a simplistic one, tell me how I can know the difference between a reality of stuff and a reality of ur-stuff because if I can’t discern a difference then there isn’t one.

Will you contend you can find the slightest chance for god/spirit existing in Material?

I wonder if you have ever heard of a concept that science fiction writers started popularising dubbed “The Singularity”? It perhaps suggests there is a concept that could approach your god=I/ I=god oneness that is routed firmly in a monistic reality. See http://www.ugcs.caltech.edu/~phoenix/vinge/vinge-sing.html for the details.

And I don't see how you miss the circularity in accepting you are alive (with HPC or we wouldn't be discussing this), and that what most call "matter" is ~life by the definition you use science & HPC to classify.

I just see particular bits of stuff acting in ways which other bits label life and contend that the HPC is only “hard” because it makes an assumption that there has to be more then stuff!

Again, the ability to act, or not act, and react, or not react to a stimulus.

Any system capable of accepting and reacting to external inputs would therefore be alive, which would include some electronic systems, is this what you mean?

And I continue to agree, a choice of Material allows us to rationalize a very high percentage of 3rd party observables.

As drkitten mentioned "There is no difficulty here with postulating that a toothache is exactly as material as an electron."; the problem continues that you will never have my toothache, or I yours; neither will ever know how the other experiences pain, or the color red, as a 1st person experience. Those are qualia as idealists (& interactive dualists) see it.

We may not do because even though we are all made of the same stuff its arrangement in each individual may be too peculiar to each individual to ever duplicate. But as you point out this uniqueness does not require anything but stuff to explain it.