I spoke with a lawyer friend about this. As he told me, having evidence admitted does not mean that it's a slam dunk or gives the evidence legitimacy or value.
Indeed the first hurdle is admissibility. There are other hurdles.
Admissibility is a low hurdle. You have to show only that it is relevant and putatively reliable, i.e., that it has probative value and that its reliability can be tested in open court. The judge is a gatekeeper; he may rule spontaneously that evidence is inadmissible, but his omission from doing that does not enshrine the evidence forever thereafter as admissible or valuable. It may be heard but then later stricken upon motion or disregarded by the trier of fact. The judge in his gatekeeper role may hold pre-trial proceedings to hear arguments about the admissibility of evidence. But in some cases, such as for testimony in open court, the question of admissibility may not be justiciable on ripeness grounds until the testimony itself is heard.
In the case of expert testimony is it customary but by no means required that the qualification of the witness as an expert precede his testimony in open court. Typically the adverse party stipulates to the qualification, and will already have deposed the witness. In other (but few) cases
voir dire is appropriate, and the ripeness criterion applies.
Here's the background: Taitz has a standard bundle of 200-odd pages of illegible, disorganized, unindexed documents that she dumps in the laps of all her prospective defendants (when she can manage to serve them properly) as her response to a motion for discovery. She desperately wants this unholy mess admitted
in toto as evidence, sort of her attempt at throwing lots of mud against the wall and hoping some sticks. She has no clue what constitutes evidence or discovery.
It has come to light that she surreptitiously tried to get what was likely to be Sheriff Joe Arpaio's infamous affidavit admitted as evidence in open court in connection with Strunk's testimony. The defense caught the failed sleight-of-hand and asked what it was being submitted, whereupon Taitz withdrew it without comment. Keep in mind that Arpaio, misguided as he is on his own, wants nothing to do with this huge ball of crazy and has refused to cooperate with her. That didn't prevent her from locating and downloading Arpaio's affidavit from a public records website and trying to reopen a bunch of her previously-dismissed actions on the grounds of having "new evidence." The affidavit is inadmissible as hearsay and because it inappropriately draws its own conclusions of fact and law. It does not provide or allege any testable facts pertaining to Obama's eligibility, only proposes a theory for how the PDF copy "may have been" forged.
It's down to the opposing lawyers to challenge it and remove it as anything of substance in the trial, and it seems that there was no time for this to be done.
Indeed, it looks like the cross-examination was beginning to lay a proper groundwork to strike on the basis of relevance (i.e., that the properties observed in a digital copy of a document, and pertinent only to the digital medium, are irrelevant to the authenticity of the paper copy from which it was derived). I agree also with the commentators that the defense could have conducted a more effective
voir dire on expert qualifications, but I think there is sufficient grounds for disqualification.
As I said above, it is not necessary for the trier of fact to decide the question of expert qualification before testimony is rendered. That question may be decided after the presentation of evidence has concluded, in which case the trier of fact may disregard any subsequent testimony that requires qualification.
Full Faith and Credit allows Reid to cite other states that have ultimately stricken or disallowed as irrelevant evidence for forgery in the PDF on the basis of the Hawaii certification. She may also draw her own conclusions of fact and law. Even though the defense did not seek or obtain a motion to strike in the cases of Irey and Papa, as they did for Strunk, that does not compel Reid to give any weight to them in deciding the ultimate issue.
Strunk did not claim expert status. He is simply the originator of a FOIA request pursuant to which he received what he alleges to be a copy of Obama's passport application. It is the document, not Strunk, which is evidence here. The document is ruled inadmissible because it is being presented as a public record but has not been certified as a true copy of the record and hence is hearsay. The testimony of Strunk himself is stricken because he is merely the conveyor of hearsay and has no knowledge of any relevant facts.
In short, Taitz' utter incompetence over what constitutes evidence and how to present it in court is what sank Strunk and the passport application.
He also thinks it is funny that Orly is crowing about how huge it is to get evidence admitted into proceedings.
Taitz is crowing because this is the first time in any of her cases that she has managed to navigate the local rules correctly and have
any evidence admitted, and further have it heard in open court. Previously she has run afoul of trial rules or has failed to qualify the witnesses. Since this is a first for her, she has cause to crow. However it's akin to a kindergartener crowing about his newfound ability to finally sit facing forward on his tricycle.
She still has not qualified her expert witnesses. I'm somewhat puzzled by the judge's statement that the "motion to qualify" no longer exists in Indiana law. Normally the formal
voir dire of an expert witness (where it must occur) begins with a motion to qualify, proceeds with a presentation of the expert's qualifications and the challenge by the adverse party, and often concludes with a ruling on the motion or a deferral of same. While Indiana follows the federal rules for expert testimony, it appears there may not be a separate qualification. I will research this further.
Taitz' direct examination of Papa is a shambles. She has no clue how to examine an expert witness. She launches into his findings with a bunch of leading questions without first laying an expert foundation. The defense objections to this may constitute a sufficient
voir dire to allow Reid to disqualify Papa. She attempts a foundation about halfway through his testimony, upon irrelevant grounds, as if she has finally understood what the defense is objecting to.
Judge Reid rules that there is no foundation for Papa's "expert" conclusions. This is not the same as ruling that Papa is disqualified as an expert; only that the testimony he presented in court cannot be considered expert testimony because it has not been presented correctly as such. But it has the same effect: his testimony is irrelevant.
The defense cross is actually pretty astute. Since Reid has already ruled that Papa may not draw any expert conclusions in his testimony, the cross deals only with the lay portion of Papa's testimony and not his (non-existent) foundation and (inadmissible) conclusions. Papa's testimony after the defense's motions, objections, and crosses is simply that he downloaded certain digital documents from an unknown source and looked at them. The cross-examination destroys the reliability prong of the probative-value question.
Ultimately the documents he tried to refer to are also ruled inadmissible. Originally the defense objected to the pages that contained only the "layers" separated out in Adobe Illustrator but did not object to the first page, which is apparently a printout of the PDF. The printout was also ultimately ruled inadmissible as hearsay. In short, Papa's exhibits were at first entered as evidence but then ruled inadmissible. Taitz doesn't seem to know the difference between entry as evidence and admissibility.
Irey's testimony is another animal. The defense objection to expert qualification was overruled and Taitz laid a (sort of) foundation. See, when you examine an expert, you have to get that expert to testify in open court what his qualifications are and what work he has done to arrive at the expert conclusions he's going to present. This has to be done -- even if the judge has already ruled that the witness can be considered an expert -- for two very important reasons. First, the jury (or other trier of fact) has to hear the qualifications so that they may weight the value of the testimony against them. Second, so that adverse counsel may, if possible, undermine the credibility of the expert upon cross examination by showing that the expert's qualifications and work are insufficient to support the conclusion being drawn. Cross examination can only address what was said in direct examination, so the direct examination is required to provide a basis for opposing counsel to question the expert's qualifications. Taitz didn't do this for Papa, thus denying the defense the right to challenge his testimony on grounds of his having sufficient expertise.
I won't go into the substance of Irey's testimony since that more properly belongs in the moderated thread.
One of the things he pointed out after skimming through what's available is that proceedings were cut off in the middle of cross examination, and that both lawyers did not get to present closing statements.
At first I was under the impression that the Oct. 22 proceeding was simply a hearing on the motion to dismiss. But according to the docket it was intended as an expedited trial under Indiana rule 42(B), which provides for separate trials on individual causes in the complaint where circumstances such as expedition prevail. Hence this should have been a trial in all respects. Trial rule 43(D) provides for opening statements and cases in chief, but not for closing statements. Hence under Indiana law a trial might be considered sufficient without them.
The same rule also gives a judge discretion in limiting or directing the presentation of evidence. This includes setting limits on the time, and has a good chance of withstanding appellate review in this case given Taitz' incompetence and tendency to screech and ramble incoherently. Judges have leeway to reign in unruly counsel by such means.
By Taitz' characterization of the discussion
in camera, the defendants disclosed that they had no case in chief (or at least no witnesses). The only substantive grounds for Taitz to appeal would be that she was allowed no redirect on her final witness. Otherwise the record will show that she presented her case in chief and would have had no opportunity for cross-examination in a defense presentation. Hence it would be very difficult for her to show that she did not have her day in court.
The real disadvantage, as we have noted, is the incomplete cross examination of Irey. While the trial rules give the judge discretion over the order and circumstances of presenting evidence, it does not give Reid leave to simply omit a cross examination, previously imposed time limit or not. As your friend notes, if she rules for the plaintiffs she will face a fairly stern-faced appeals court on that basis. However this may render moot any eventual claim by Taitz that she was not permitted a redirect for Irey, since there was little if any cross and therefore little need to rehabilitate that witness.
Whatever is coming down the pike does not look good for Orly.
Not at all. Orders were due today by close of business. However, I do not expect a ruling forthwith because I expect Judge Reid to stall until it's too late for Taitz to make some sort of hare-brained attempt at an emergency appeal before the election. The "emergency" motion to enjoin Obama's name from appearing on the ballot has already been denied.