Merged Is Scientism Really Justified?

[Darat]

What types of evidence are appropriate to justify beliefs about realities that, by definition, may be beyond the reach of scientific methods?

You mean non-realities?

 

[Darat]

Probably. I don't fully believe that he is not interested in the supernatural.

Regardless, he has simply restated the already-discussed examples of sources of non-empirical knowledge—logic, mathematics, etc. He didn't engage the discussion of them before, so I have limited faith that he will engage them this time around. It's just a fringe reset.

You old cynic - I am sure this will be the exception that proves the rule.....

 

[JayUtah]

You old cynic - I am sure this will the exception that proves the rule.....

Cynicism is my favorite source of non-empirical knowledge.

 

[catsmate]

What types of evidence are appropriate to justify beliefs about realities that, by definition, may be beyond the reach of scientific methods?

Don't be stupid, there are no "realities" that are "beyond the reach of scientific methods", just idiotic fantasies.

 

[catsmate]

But isn't that precisely the epistemological question?
If something cannot be established by scientific methods, does that automatically make it a fantasy, or could there be other forms of rational justification?
I'm not assuming that such things are real. I'm asking whether scientific verification is a necessary condition for rationally justified belief about reality.

Oh good grief, more silly fantasising to avoid reality.

 

[catsmate]

I understand that if you want to persuade someone else to accept a claim about reality, objective and testable evidence is very important.
But I'm asking a slightly different epistemological question: is objective, scientifically testable evidence the only possible basis for rational justification?
For example, are logical, mathematical, philosophical, or first-person forms of evidence necessarily incapable of providing rational justification, simply because they aren't scientifically testable?
I'm not assuming that any particular non-scientific claim is true. I'm asking whether scientific testability is a necessary condition for rational justification in general.

You're avoiding the question. Again.

 

[Safe-Keeper]

What types of evidence are appropriate to justify beliefs about realities that, by definition, may be beyond the reach of scientific methods?

There's no such thing. Anything that exists is a phenomenon that can be researched scientifically. Anyone trying to tell you otherwise is lying to you.

How would, for example, ghosts or faith healing, if they existed, be impossible to investigate or prove scientifically?

 

[Mojo]

There's no such thing. Anything that exists is a phenomenon that can be researched scientifically. Anyone trying to tell you otherwise is lying to you.

What about things that exist, but have no observable effects on the universe?

 

[JayUtah]

What about things that exist, but have no observable effects on the universe?

Then in what way can they be said to exist?

 

[Mojo]

Then in what way can they be said to exist?

Gubiosak wants to find a way of distinguishing them from things that don't exist.

 

[JayUtah]

Gubiosak wants to find a way of distinguishing them from things that don't exist.

He reiterated that he’s talking about abstract, non-empirical sources of knowledge like mathematics, logic, and morals. We agreed from the very beginning that there are non-empirical sources of knowledge. We discussed the nature of the knowledge produced by these other methods. We resisted all the baiting to adopt “strong scientism.” The OP explicitly abandoned the thread.

A logical conclusion “exists” in a purely abstract way. In that way you can say it has no effect on the universe. It’s just a statement of what can be known by a certain process. That’s not existence in the same way we question whether ghosts or pudding exist.

 

[theprestige]

What annoys me is that the tool set is the same for all of these. Getting to an internally consistent logical proof is the same basic process of reasoning as getting to an empirical observation.

The distinction he's fixed on, between the two cases, is not a distinction that matters to his question.

His question is, can we reason to a conclusion, without the characteristic apparatus and elements of "reasoning to conclusions".

 

[arthwollipot]

I think the toothache example actually illustrates the distinction I'm interested in. The X-ray can provide objective evidence for the physical condition associated with the pain, but it does not directly observe the subjective experience of pain itself. We infer the experience from the person's first-person report, together with the objective evidence. So I'm wondering whether we should distinguish between evidence that objectively verifies an external physical condition and evidence that rationally justifies a belief about a first-person experience. If we accept that subjective reports can have some epistemic value even when they cannot be independently verified in the same way as an X-ray, then perhaps scientific testability is not the only possible form of rational justification. I'm not claiming that subjective experience is sufficient to establish any arbitrary claim about reality. I'm asking whether it can ever constitute genuine evidence, and if so, what limits should apply.

And thus are we once again drawn into the inevitable epistemological dead-end that is solipsism.

If I can't directly observe your pain, how can I know that it exists? I don't know that you think like I do. You say you do, but there's no scientifically testable evidence that you do. I can't know that you experience emotions like I do, I can't know that you have memories like I do, therefore your existence as a person, being without scientifically testable evidence, is in doubt.

Thud. We've hit bottom. Nowhere to go from here.

 

[Thermal]

And thus are we once again drawn into the inevitable epistemological dead-end that is solipsism.

If I can't directly observe your pain, how can I know that it exists? I don't know that you think like I do. You say you do, but there's no scientifically testable evidence that you do. I can't know that you experience emotions like I do, I can't know that you have memories like I do, therefore your existence as a person, being without scientifically testable evidence, is in doubt.

Thud. We've hit bottom. Nowhere to go from here.

Buy the OP offers a glimmer of hope. "Accept any stupid ◊◊◊◊ as the equivalent of empirical evidence and we're all singing Kumbaya".

 

[Reformed Offlian]

What types of evidence are appropriate to justify beliefs about realities that, by definition, may be beyond the reach of scientific methods?

Are you asking about types of evidence that are "beyond the reach of scientific methods", or beliefs that are "beyond...[etc.]"? Either way, the question seems incoherent.

At some point, the claimant needs to answer the question: "How might a world in which your belief was wrong differ noticeably from one in which it was correct?" Only after we have an answer to that question can we start looking at purported evidence for the claim in question.

 

[JayUtah]

Are you asking about types of evidence that are "beyond the reach of scientific methods", or beliefs that are "beyond...[etc.]"? Either way, the question seems incoherent.

And how. He keeps using paranormal-coded language but then disavows that he’s talking about the paranormal. He says he’s talking about things like logic, math, and morals. But those pursuits aren’t evidence-based. So it’s dumb to ask what kind of evidence supports them.

 

[Myriad]

There's well-tested scientific theory, and then there's unfalsifiable waffle about the unknowable.

And then there's most of the knowledge most of us use in day to day life, which falls into neither category. Conventions, definitions, habits, rules, methodologies, etiquette, preferences, culture.

You could do an empirical survey showing that (for instance) 97% of Americans agree that "to get to the other side" is the reason the chicken crossed the road. But that association of answer with question didn't arise from any empirical survey, nor from any empirical study of the behavior of chickens, and doesn't depend on any future empirical inquiries to remain a part of common knowledge. A small, trivial part to be sure. Just a joke, after all. It's nothing so important that someone's life or freedom might depend on it.

So consider law. The nature of law, the practice of law, the operation of systems of law. There are echoes of empiricism here and there in the field. A prosecutor in the US, after all, sometimes (in the rare cases where there's no plea bargain) has to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant possessed over a gram of marijuana. But no prosecutor ever had to prove beyond any level of doubt that possessing over a gram of marijuana is harmful. That was decided by, apparently, a lot of people talking about their opinions (and the decision is currently being gradually revised). Lawyers learn and apply a galaxy of cited facts (laws and precedents and the conceptual patterns of applying them to cases) of which a vanishingly tiny fraction arose from empirical methods.

Or how about finance. A whole world of experiences and concepts, employing millions, concerning trillions of units of currency of approximate value of an ounce of copper, affective almost everyone on a near daily basis. Economics attempts to study it, but reliable theories remain lacking. Observation of its phenomena clearly has never been the cause of those phenomena. Finance doesn't need economics to exist, any more than evolution needs the theory of evolution to occur.

We can perform a study quantifying our overwhelming preference for wearing our underwear on the inside. But what empirical finding established that practice? Was it by the same prestigious body of scientists who established the utility and necessity of neckties, or the relative eroticism of male versus female human nipples? What principle of what established branch of science am I violating if I wear a pair of briefs on top of my jeans?

If how we educate our children were determined by sufficiently empirically tested methods, we'd have been getting better at it for generations. We have not. You can observe and describe education systems empirically (e.g. measure how bad we're doing at it) but you can't justify their practices empirically.

For most practical purposes, the most common way we acquire knowledge is neither intuition nor empirical inquiry. It's deciding who already knows and then asking them. Sure, if you've misplaced your pants you can sit down and meditatively ask the universe where they are. Or you can investigate, by examining places where you think your pants might be and ruling those places out if the pants aren't there. But you only do either one when there's no other choice. Usually...

 

[Roger Ramjets]

I think the toothache example actually illustrates the distinction I'm interested in. The X-ray can provide objective evidence for the physical condition associated with the pain, but it does not directly observe the subjective experience of pain itself. We infer the experience from the person's first-person report, together with the objective evidence.

Inference is normal in science. There is a statistical correlation between observed tooth decay and reported pain. From that we infer that the pain is 'real'. To assume otherwise would be foolish.

This reminds me of the first time I had a tooth filled. The dentist asked me if I wanted an anesthetic, and I thought how bad could it be and said no. Big mistake!

So I'm wondering whether we should distinguish between evidence that objectively verifies an external physical condition and evidence that rationally justifies a belief about a first-person experience.

Yes. All data is only as good as the instrument that measured it. This applies not just to the sensor but also data processing and storage. Our senses are very good in some ways, but very poor in others. Our brains are generally good at pattern matching and removing noise, but are prone to misinterpretation and the storage is very lossy.

First-person experience can provide valuable information so long as its quirks and limitations are taken into account. However in most cases instruments are preferred because they are more accurate and reliable. Pain is one notable exception. Our nervous system has developed over millions of years of evolution to become very good at detecting and avoiding harm. Generally if someone feels pain there's a good reason for it.

If we accept that subjective reports can have some epistemic value even when they cannot be independently verified in the same way as an X-ray, then perhaps scientific testability is not the only possible form of rational justification. I'm not claiming that subjective experience is sufficient to establish any arbitrary claim about reality. I'm asking whether it can ever constitute genuine evidence, and if so, what limits should apply.

Subjective experience is genuine evidence, it's just not very reliable evidence. It can be just as valuable as physical evidence. It can also be completely wrong. But that applies to other instruments too.

To summarize, in science a human is just another kind of instrument, good at measuring some things, poor at others. You can apply the scientific method to subjective experience. In normal circumstances you can rely on it without without any verification, which we can infer because the survival of the species depends on it. Of course it can be very wrong too. We use the same methods to assess it as we do other instruments. 'Anomalous readings' are not taken as eg. proof of the supernatural, but rather as anomalous operation of the instrument.

 

[Roger Ramjets]

And thus are we once again drawn into the inevitable epistemological dead-end that is solipsism.

If I can't directly observe your pain, how can I know that it exists? I don't know that you think like I do. You say you do, but there's no scientifically testable evidence that you do. I can't know that you experience emotions like I do, I can't know that you have memories like I do, therefore your existence as a person, being without scientifically testable evidence, is in doubt.

Thud. We've hit bottom. Nowhere to go from here.

Actually there is somewhere to go, because this is a bogus argument. To say we can't 'know' that other people experience pain and emotions like we do is wrong. We have the same biology, so we can infer that it works the same. It's not direct knowledge, but it is valid logic.

 

[arthwollipot]

Actually there is somewhere to go, because this is a bogus argument. To say we can't 'know' that other people experience pain and emotions like we do is wrong. We have the same biology, so we can infer that it works the same. It's not direct knowledge, but it is valid logic.

It's logical, but there is no direct evidence of it, which is the point.

And it's also why science is more than just direct evidence despite the suggestions of those who say that science can't know everything.