Merged Is Scientism Really Justified?

[theprestige]

None that we know of.

 

[JayUtah]

What types of evidence are appropriate to justify beliefs about realities that, by definition, may be beyond the reach of scientific methods?

Give some examples of such beliefs. Tell us how you know they are "realities" as opposed to merely proposals.

 

[Mojo]

What types of evidence are appropriate to justify beliefs about realities that, by definition, may be beyond the reach of scientific methods?

Can you identify any of these "realities"?

Can you suggest any appropriate types of evidence to justify such beliefs?

 

[Carrot Flower King]

What types of evidence are appropriate to justify beliefs about realities that, by definition, may be beyond the reach of scientific methods?

Errr, because they aren't really realities? They remain suppositions or fantasies, by definition...

 

[Thermal]

What types of evidence are appropriate to justify beliefs about realities that, by definition, may be beyond the reach of scientific methods?

Any kind you please. It will just likely be inconclusive, and hence unpersuasive, hence kind of ◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ worthless.

Best case scenario: say you have a toothache, and tell us so. That's subjective experience, and we can't verify or give it a ton of evidentiary weight. You may feel pain, and we would casually give you the benefit of the doubt. Low stakes, low risk, right? We might be able to view your dental x-rays, and agree that the abscessed tooth we see is consistent with causing the pain you claim, and assign high credibility to your claim. But it was only the empiricly evidenced x-ray that moved the needle from benefit of the doubt to persuasively evidenced.

 

[Gubiosak]

Errr, because they aren't really realities? They remain suppositions or fantasies, by definition...

But isn't that precisely the epistemological question?
If something cannot be established by scientific methods, does that automatically make it a fantasy, or could there be other forms of rational justification?
I'm not assuming that such things are real. I'm asking whether scientific verification is a necessary condition for rationally justified belief about reality.

 

[JayUtah]

If something cannot be established by scientific methods, does that automatically make it a fantasy, or could there be other forms of rational justification?

Give us an example of a "reality that by definition may be beyond the reach of scientific methods." Vague generalities do not make an argument.

I'm not assuming that such things are real. I'm asking whether scientific verification is a necessary condition for rationally justified belief about reality.

You can believe whatever you want for whatever reason. If you want me to believe what you believe, you must give me objective testable evidence.

 

[Gubiosak]

You can believe whatever you want for whatever reason. If you want me to believe what you believe, you must give me objective testable evidence

I understand that if you want to persuade someone else to accept a claim about reality, objective and testable evidence is very important.
But I'm asking a slightly different epistemological question: is objective, scientifically testable evidence the only possible basis for rational justification?
For example, are logical, mathematical, philosophical, or first-person forms of evidence necessarily incapable of providing rational justification, simply because they aren't scientifically testable?
I'm not assuming that any particular non-scientific claim is true. I'm asking whether scientific testability is a necessary condition for rational justification in general.

 

[Carrot Flower King]

But isn't that precisely the epistemological question?
If something cannot be established by scientific methods, does that automatically make it a fantasy, or could there be other forms of rational justification?
I'm not assuming that such things are real. I'm asking whether scientific verification is a necessary condition for rationally justified belief about reality.

Might help if I was much interested in epistemology, but I'm not, as it rapidly seems to descend into mental masturbation and "What do you mean, mean?" nonsense. None of which is remotely helpful.

And you still haven't given much of a hint what these other things actually are, so I don't know what you are talking about, which is why I will assume them to be fantasy until intelligibly defined.

 

[Gubiosak]

Any kind you please. It will just likely be inconclusive, and hence unpersuasive, hence kind of ◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ worthless.

Best case scenario: say you have a toothache, and tell us so. That's subjective experience, and we can't verify or give it a ton of evidentiary weight. You may feel pain, and we would casually give you the benefit of the doubt. Low stakes, low risk, right? We might be able to view your dental x-rays, and agree that the abscessed tooth we see is consistent with causing the pain you claim, and assign high credibility to your claim. But it was only the empiricly evidenced x-ray that moved the needle from benefit of the doubt to persuasively evidenced.

I think the toothache example actually illustrates the distinction I'm interested in. The X-ray can provide objective evidence for the physical condition associated with the pain, but it does not directly observe the subjective experience of pain itself. We infer the experience from the person's first-person report, together with the objective evidence. So I'm wondering whether we should distinguish between evidence that objectively verifies an external physical condition and evidence that rationally justifies a belief about a first-person experience. If we accept that subjective reports can have some epistemic value even when they cannot be independently verified in the same way as an X-ray, then perhaps scientific testability is not the only possible form of rational justification. I'm not claiming that subjective experience is sufficient to establish any arbitrary claim about reality. I'm asking whether it can ever constitute genuine evidence, and if so, what limits should apply.

 

[JayUtah]

Any kind you please. It will just likely be inconclusive, and hence unpersuasive, hence kind of ◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ worthless.

Best case scenario: say you have a toothache, and tell us so. That's subjective experience, and we can't verify or give it a ton of evidentiary weight.

Technically we can. Electroencephalography can register the fact that you are experiencing pain. Electromyelography can localize those impulses. We don't do those things, typically, but we can. The notion that we subjectively experience these physically demonstrable facts as a sensation of pain is (to me) no different than the oscilloscope "experiencing" it as some wavy lines.

I want to know what can be described as "reality" and yet "by definition" fall outside the ability of science to observe it. Pain does not by definition lie outside the ability of science to objectively observe evidence of it.

 

[Gubiosak]

Might help if I was much interested in epistemology, but I'm not, as it rapidly seems to descend into mental masturbation and "What do you mean, mean?" nonsense. None of which is remotely helpful.

And you still haven't given much of a hint what these other things actually are, so I don't know what you are talking about, which is why I will assume them to be fantasy until intelligibly defined.

Fair enough. Let me make the question more concrete. I'm not necessarily talking about supernatural entities. I'm interested in cases such as subjective conscious experience, mathematical truths, logical truths, moral claims, and metaphysical claims about the nature of reality. My question is not whether these are true, but whether scientific evidence is necessarily the only kind of evidence that can rationally justify beliefs about them. For example, we don't establish mathematical truths through experiments in the same way we establish empirical claims. Likewise, we have direct access to our own subjective experiences, but other people cannot independently observe those experiences in the same way they can observe a physical object. So I'm asking whether "not scientifically testable" necessarily entails "mere fantasy," or whether there are other standards of rational justification depending on the type of claim.

 

[JayUtah]

...but it does not directly observe the subjective experience of pain itself.

So you're arguing "hard problem" yet again. Got any better arguments this time around?

 

[JayUtah]

Fair enough. Let me make the question more concrete. I'm not necessarily talking about supernatural entities. I'm interested in cases such as subjective conscious experience, mathematical truths, logical truths, moral claims, and metaphysical claims about the nature of reality.

You started this thread on this subject and resigned from it in defeat. Why are you simply asking the original questions again?

...or whether there are other standards of rational justification depending on the type of claim.

Asked and answered.

 

[Thermal]

I'm asking whether scientific testability is a necessary condition for rational justification in general.

Not strictly necessary, but definitely the best. In the absence of scientific testability, the justification has little weight and is valued as such.

 

[Steve]

Fair enough. Let me make the question more concrete. I'm not necessarily talking about supernatural entities. I'm interested in cases such as subjective conscious experience, mathematical truths, logical truths, moral claims, and metaphysical claims about the nature of reality. My question is not whether these are true, but whether scientific evidence is necessarily the only kind of evidence that can rationally justify beliefs about them. For example, we don't establish mathematical truths through experiments in the same way we establish empirical claims. Likewise, we have direct access to our own subjective experiences, but other people cannot independently observe those experiences in the same way they can observe a physical object. So I'm asking whether "not scientifically testable" necessarily entails "mere fantasy," or whether there are other standards of rational justification depending on the type of claim.

So you have just circled back to your original post and asked the same question again. What, if anything, have you learned in the past 27 pages of posts?

 

[JayUtah]

For example, are logical, mathematical, philosophical, or first-person forms of evidence necessarily incapable of providing rational justification, simply because they aren't scientifically testable?

All these questions have been addressed previously in this thread. You chose to ignore them in favor of trying to bait your critics into defending "hard scientism." I gave you several well-considered posts, which you did not answer.

Convince us you're not just trying to reset the argument back to the beginning.

 

[JayUtah]

Nearly alll scientific observation is indirect. This is not a problem for actual scientists. When you tell them you can't directly observe pain, they just laugh at you. We can't directly observe light, sound, electromagnetic fields, or gravity. We can ever only observe indirect effects of them. Science progresses while the more esoteric philosophers continue wringing their hands and furrowing their brows. The philosophy of science is much more concerning to philosophers than it is to scientists. Science existed first. The philosophy of science exists largely to keep philosophers occupied.

 

[Thermal]

Technically we can. Electroencephalography can register the fact that you are experiencing pain. Electromyelography can localize those impulses. We don't do those things, typically, but we can. The notion that we subjectively experience these physically demonstrable facts as a sensation of pain is (to me) no different than the oscilloscope "experiencing" it as some wavy lines.

Of course, you are right, but the simplified example I offered (as has been offered to OP multiple times) is that subjective accounts are simply weak, and empirical evidence strong.

I want to know what can be described as "reality" and yet "by definition" fall outside the ability of science to observe it. Pain does not by definition lie outside the ability of science to objectively observe evidence of it.

I'm pretty sure he is lobbying to have weak evidence to be taken on par with powerhouse evidence, which doesn't really fly. That way, in the absence of objective fact, a little smoke and mirror routine can 'prove' whatever supernatural posit appears on the presumably levitating table?

 

[JayUtah]

I'm pretty sure he is lobbying to have weak evidence to be taken on par with powerhouse evidence, which doesn't really fly.

Probably. I don't fully believe that he is not interested in the supernatural.

Regardless, he has simply restated the already-discussed examples of sources of non-empirical knowledge—logic, mathematics, etc. He didn't engage the discussion of them before, so I have limited faith that he will engage them this time around. It's just a fringe reset.