Merged Is Scientism Really Justified?

[Darat]

What types of evidence are appropriate to justify beliefs about realities that, by definition, may be beyond the reach of scientific methods?

You mean non-realities?

 

[Darat]

Probably. I don't fully believe that he is not interested in the supernatural.

Regardless, he has simply restated the already-discussed examples of sources of non-empirical knowledge—logic, mathematics, etc. He didn't engage the discussion of them before, so I have limited faith that he will engage them this time around. It's just a fringe reset.

You old cynic - I am sure this will be the exception that proves the rule.....

 

[JayUtah]

You old cynic - I am sure this will the exception that proves the rule.....

Cynicism is my favorite source of non-empirical knowledge.

 

[catsmate]

What types of evidence are appropriate to justify beliefs about realities that, by definition, may be beyond the reach of scientific methods?

Don't be stupid, there are no "realities" that are "beyond the reach of scientific methods", just idiotic fantasies.

 

[catsmate]

But isn't that precisely the epistemological question?
If something cannot be established by scientific methods, does that automatically make it a fantasy, or could there be other forms of rational justification?
I'm not assuming that such things are real. I'm asking whether scientific verification is a necessary condition for rationally justified belief about reality.

Oh good grief, more silly fantasising to avoid reality.

 

[catsmate]

I understand that if you want to persuade someone else to accept a claim about reality, objective and testable evidence is very important.
But I'm asking a slightly different epistemological question: is objective, scientifically testable evidence the only possible basis for rational justification?
For example, are logical, mathematical, philosophical, or first-person forms of evidence necessarily incapable of providing rational justification, simply because they aren't scientifically testable?
I'm not assuming that any particular non-scientific claim is true. I'm asking whether scientific testability is a necessary condition for rational justification in general.

You're avoiding the question. Again.

 

[Safe-Keeper]

What types of evidence are appropriate to justify beliefs about realities that, by definition, may be beyond the reach of scientific methods?

There's no such thing. Anything that exists is a phenomenon that can be researched scientifically. Anyone trying to tell you otherwise is lying to you.

How would, for example, ghosts or faith healing, if they existed, be impossible to investigate or prove scientifically?

 

[Mojo]

There's no such thing. Anything that exists is a phenomenon that can be researched scientifically. Anyone trying to tell you otherwise is lying to you.

What about things that exist, but have no observable effects on the universe?

 

[JayUtah]

What about things that exist, but have no observable effects on the universe?

Then in what way can they be said to exist?

 

[Mojo]

Then in what way can they be said to exist?

Gubiosak wants to find a way of distinguishing them from things that don't exist.

 

[JayUtah]

Gubiosak wants to find a way of distinguishing them from things that don't exist.

He reiterated that he’s talking about abstract, non-empirical sources of knowledge like mathematics, logic, and morals. We agreed from the very beginning that there are non-empirical sources of knowledge. We discussed the nature of the knowledge produced by these other methods. We resisted all the baiting to adopt “strong scientism.” The OP explicitly abandoned the thread.

A logical conclusion “exists” in a purely abstract way. In that way you can say it has no effect on the universe. It’s just a statement of what can be known by a certain process. That’s not existence in the same way we question whether ghosts or pudding exist.

 

[theprestige]

What annoys me is that the tool set is the same for all of these. Getting to an internally consistent logical proof is the same basic process of reasoning as getting to an empirical observation.

The distinction he's fixed on, between the two cases, is not a distinction that matters to his question.

His question is, can we reason to a conclusion, without the characteristic apparatus and elements of "reasoning to conclusions".