I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[punshhh]

Sorry, can't make head or tail out of it.

Sorry, just thinking about cellular life and that a cell is like one area of the chemical soup which has separated itself off with a membrane and started organising an internal structure. With the aim of persisting and reproducing.

Any definition of "self-aware" is arbitrary.

Our present, or at least mainstream, definition of "self aware" was carefully selected to include humans only. Lately, however,this has been recognized not to hold, since other primates kept sneaking in.

It is important understand that there is no sharp boundary; self-awareness is a continuos scale from planar worms to humans.

Hans

Yes agreed.

 

[punshhh]

Organic life is not part of the definition of "conscious".

We are not talking about definitions, we are talking about the reality outside the mind of the enquirer. To achieve this, the enquirer should put his/her language definitions to one side and conduct empirical observation of what is found in the external world and what can be performed in the way of experiment in the external world. As such the commonly understood definition of consciousness is largely irrelevant provided the language used is addressing effectively the empirical data.

Since you and many posters like a bit of science in their discussions, here it is.

The starting point as I see it (feel free to offer an alternative) is the examples of consciousness (self-consciousness) we have in the empirical data. I.e. humans.

There is a proposed alternate consciousness to be produced by experiment. I.e. AI.

Unfortunately the experiment hasn't reached the point of producing anything approximating consciousness as observed in humans, so all analysis is at this stage speculative.

Regarding the issue of Pzombies and mimics, it is conceivable that the AI produced performs all the actions of the human "parrot" fashion without having any kind of self awareness. As such an experiment to distinguish one from the other is necessary.

Yes, we have, and you are still failing to understand the basic point.

A perfect replica of specifically human consciousness has a human body. A perfect replica of consciousness does not necessarily have one.

Your basic point, which seems to have eluded you here (in bold), is that a perfect replica of consciousness is conscious with or without a body (note that your use of "necessarily" is equivalent to "may", as opposed to "is").

You say this, but we don't have a thorough understanding of what consciousness is, or entails and until such time, we can only refer to it as what is observed empirically, as described in scientific bit above. As such it doesn't have a definition and is only known as a phenomen observed by empirical data.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

...

Regarding the issue of Pzombies and mimics, it is conceivable that the AI produced performs all the actions of the human "parrot" fashion without having any kind of self awareness. As such an experiment to distinguish one from the other is necessary.

...

So you can explain how we conduct such an experiment, right???

 

[punshhh]

So you can explain how we conduct such an experiment, right???

No, with our current understanding of consciousness.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

No, with our current understanding of consciousness.

Why is such an experiment necessary in the first place?

 

[punshhh]

Why is such an experiment necessary in the first place?

To determine if the apparatus is conscious, or just a machine going through the motions like a parrot. Or better still a mimic like the lyrebird. In this clip it mimics the sound of a camera, a car alarm and a chainsaw. Without having to be identical to the mechanism it is mimicking.

Introduced by one of my favourite empiricists.

http://youtu.be/VjE0Kdfos4Y

 

[MRC_Hans]

Sorry, just thinking about cellular life and that a cell is like one area of the chemical soup which has separated itself off with a membrane and started organising an internal structure. With the aim of persisting and reproducing.

Apart from the fact that it is in no way a willful act, OK, I follow you.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

To determine if the apparatus is conscious, or just a machine going through the motions like a parrot. Or better still a mimic like the lyrebird. In this clip it mimics the sound of a camera, a car alarm and a chainsaw. Without having to be identical to the mechanism it is mimicking.

Assuming such an apparatus successfully mimicks a conscious being, how would you be able to know it is not consciuos?

Do you have any reason to assume that it is not in fact conscious?

In other words, do you know of ANY evidence for consciousness, other than conscious behavior?

Hans

 

[Nonpareil]

Since you and many posters like a bit of science in their discussions, here it is.

The starting point as I see it (feel free to offer an alternative) is the examples of consciousness (self-consciousness) we have in the empirical data. I.e. humans.

Nit-pick: also animals.

There is a proposed alternate consciousness to be produced by experiment. I.e. AI.

Unfortunately the experiment hasn't reached the point of producing anything approximating consciousness as observed in humans, so all analysis is at this stage speculative.

Everything up to the last clause is correct.

We know the brain is a computer. We know the brain is the source of consciousness. We know that altering the computation taking place in the brain alters consciousness, and we know that analyzing the computation taking place in the brain can show us details of the resulting consciousness' current state.

We know that the brain is the source of consciousness. This is not speculation.

We know that the brain is a computer and is Turing-equivalent. This is not speculation.

We know that what one Turing-equivalent computer does can necessarily be modeled by another Turing-equivalent computer. This is not speculation.

Therefore, we know that everything that the brain does can be modeled by any given Turing-equivalent computer. This is not speculation.

Everything that we know about consciousness indicates that it is computational. There is no indication, or even coherent hypothesis, of any non-computational factors being involved.

The only way to show that consciousness cannot be created on a computer, then, is to show that there is a non-computational factor.

Merely pointing out that it is an organic computer does not do this. The material that the computer is constructed of does not alter its capabilities.

Regarding the issue of Pzombies and mimics, it is conceivable that the AI produced performs all the actions of the human "parrot" fashion without having any kind of self awareness.

If it has no self-awareness, there is necessarily a situation in which it behaves as though it does not.

If there is no such situation, is has self-awareness.

Your basic point, which seems to have eluded you here (in bold), is that a perfect replica of consciousness is conscious with or without a body

No, it is conscious with or without a human body, because human consciousness is not the only type of consciousness.

Consciousness without a body - that is, without a computer to compute it - is nonsensical.

To determine if the apparatus is conscious, or just a machine going through the motions like a parrot. Or better still a mimic like the lyrebird. In this clip it mimics the sound of a camera, a car alarm and a chainsaw. Without having to be identical to the mechanism it is mimicking.

Introduced by one of my favourite empiricists.

http://youtu.be/VjE0Kdfos4Y

Let us set aside, for the sake of argument, that the lyrebird's mimicry is not necessarily perfect. If it did produce perfect copies of those sounds, yes, they would be the same sounds as the ones produced by the chainsaw.

So what?

 

[ynot]

No, I am not. I am explicitly, repeatedly, and quite clearly saying that a perfect replica of X = X.

At no point did this happen.

I suspect you're talking purely in abstract terms. X is an abstract value or representation that can be "perfectly" abstractly replicated by another X. Obviously the pixels forming one X on the screen are not a perfect replica of the pixels forming another X on the screen.

 

[Nonpareil]

I suspect you're talking purely in abstract terms. X is an abstract value or representation that can be "perfectly" abstractly replicated by another X. Obviously the pixels forming one X on the screen are not a perfect replica of the pixels forming another X on the screen.

Yes.

If you want a perfect replica of a certain image represented by specific pixels on the screen, then the same image represented by another set of pixels is obviously not a perfect mimic. But if all you're looking for is a perfect replica of a certain image and don't care which pixels it is represented by, then any will do.

No two humans are perfect replicas of one another, but both are perfect replicas of self-conscious entities. In the same way, a computer intelligence may not have all the properties of a human one, but it can still be self-conscious.

 

[Dancing David]

No, with our current understanding of consciousness.

Sigh, despite neurologists doing it all the time.

 

[ynot]

But if all you're looking for is a perfect replica of a certain image and don't care which pixels it is represented by, then any will do.

Then you're using a very loose meaning of the term "perfect".

 

[Nonpareil]

Then you're using a very loose meaning of the term "perfect".

No. I am using a very precise definition of what I am seeking to replicate.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

To determine if the apparatus is conscious, or just a machine going through the motions like a parrot. ...

Why is that necessary to determine if it is the one or the other?

 

[LarryS]

To determine if the apparatus is conscious, or just a machine going through the motions like a parrot. Or better still a mimic like the lyrebird. In this clip it mimics the sound of a camera, a car alarm and a chainsaw. Without having to be identical to the mechanism it is mimicking.

Introduced by one of my favourite empiricists.

http://youtu.be/VjE0Kdfos4Y

Are you questioning whether 'being conscious' is really a behavior, or is required for any set of behaviors? For example, if we define 'being conscious' as being aware of the first person experience, then being conscious is not required for leaping out of the way of an oncoming car, being conscious is not required for acquiring or digesting food, being conscious is not required for appearing to be in love.
Even long term planning and strategies are merely algorithms that can evolve in non sentient creatures.
If we are machine, any being aware of first person experience has nothing to do with behavior, the first person experience doesn't do anything.

 

[Myriad]

...being conscious is not required for leaping out of the way of an oncoming car...

Are you sure? If your calculations for leaping out of the car's way include, "I'd better leap to the right, because if the driver swerves to avoid me at the last moment he'll go farther left," and if you retain narrative memory of the event afterward, then consciousness might be a necessary result of having those capabilities.

I've never seen an unconscious person leaping out of the way of anything.

 

[Donn]

We are not talking about definitions, we are talking about the reality outside the mind of the enquirer. To achieve this, the enquirer should put his/her language definitions to one side and conduct empirical observation of what is found in the external world and what can be performed in the way of experiment in the external world. As such the commonly understood definition of consciousness is largely irrelevant provided the language used is addressing effectively the empirical data.

We see to voc in re what isms but shan't chatter teeth for whence is I? Tum so much as per sense because for in which perception will not abide.

Placing to one hand the morph of the senses while vocing slant besides, gives the sensation of momentum no-if with direction.

Thee and me percepts perhaps what ifs and speaks; aside - voc null not with and nada some sum accrue?

Yes, maps?

(I hope you got that. It was nice to put the dictionary aside and really communicate for once.)

 

[tsig]

We see to voc in re what isms but shan't chatter teeth for whence is I? Tum so much as per sense because for in which perception will not abide.

Placing to one hand the morph of the senses while vocing slant besides, gives the sensation of momentum no-if with direction.

Thee and me percepts perhaps what ifs and speaks; aside - voc null not with and nada some sum accrue?

Yes, maps?

(I hope you got that. It was nice to put the dictionary aside and really communicate for once.)

But maps not being the territory will not track one on one with reality so we have an imperfect artifact that misleads instead of informs so we see the truth of if the blind leads the blind they both need maps in Braille and since even a blind horse will find water then if the blind lead the blind they should ride a blind horse in the desert.

This proves the interconnectedness of all things and leads us to the water of life that flows thru the soul of our beings and enriches our spirit.

 

[LarryS]

Are you sure? If your calculations for leaping out of the car's way include, "I'd better leap to the right, because if the driver swerves to avoid me at the last moment he'll go farther left," and if you retain narrative memory of the event afterward, then consciousness might be a necessary result of having those capabilities.

I've never seen an unconscious person leaping out of the way of anything.

From what I've read, research consistently shows that the thought or decision to leap, comes after the body has already begun the process, even though subjectively we feel we are making the choice. That's what I mean by being conscious is not a requirement for what we regard as human behavior.
This is purely semantics - and stems from our never defining what we mean by being conscious.
What is required to leap out of the way of an oncoming mass is perception and some brain functioning - not being conscious in the sense their being an agent, certainly not being aware of first person experience.
My first contact with this type of research was while reading Sam Harris's book on Free Will.

Note: I'm sure we've all had a thought similar to "I am going to lift my arm now." or "I am in charge of my actions." . . . but can we really locate the agent in charge? The above thoughts are not the agent, they are just thoughts that came into attention.

So, is 'being conscious' really a behavior?