I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

This is an impossible statement. The reflexive property is "X = X".
But Nonpareil is saying this:

Imperfect replica of X = X.

And then just denies it is imperfect, even when it is pointed out to him and indeed when he agreed it was imperfect:rolleyes:
 
How do you know, that you have a body?
I know I have a body because it is my primary apparatus to know I am a being and through which I have knowledge of existence. Logically existence is not in dispute and my entire perception of existence is via my body.
 
But Nonpareil is saying this:

Imperfect replica of X = X.

And then just denies it is imperfect, even when it is pointed out to him and indeed when he agreed it was imperfect:rolleyes:
If a replica of X cannot be distinguished from X then it is a perfect replica.

You have yet to describe a way in which the replica can be distinguished, so you have no grounds for asserting it is not a perfect replica.
 
I know I have a body because it is my primary apparatus to know I am a being and through which I have knowledge of existence. Logically existence is not in dispute and my entire perception of existence is via my body.

So you made a circular argument:
P1: To know something I must have a body.
P2: I know something.
C: I have a body.

Now I like evidence that P1 is sound/true and not an assumption. You know, punshhh, you don't use assumptions; rather you use evidence, so I like evidence for P1.
 
I have done neither of these things.
You are free to say that, but when I point out that you have done that you ignore it and fail to address the your failure.

No, it isn't.
For someone who puts such stake by definitions you are having trouble understanding "is" and its relevance to the debate.


Which is just an attempt to weasel in an edge case where you can say "it isn't really so".
I'm not the one using is ("isn't"), that is you, on high from your pedestal, sporting your flashy blinkers.
We can say that something is the case when all evidence points to it. Nothing is ever irrefutable in the most technical sense.
Well here is the rub, you say (dictate) what is from an acknowledged position of ignorance, because it's meaningless to consider anything other than the current accepted science based understanding. Blinkers indeed, from a pedestal like Nelson's column.


Yes, there is.

Show a case in which they do not behave as though they are self-conscious.
When they are not alive. Mimicry of behaviour is not necessarily the same thing as a behaviour emergent from a complex animated substrate.

It's that simple, where's you logic now?


Because it meets all the criteria for self-consciousness.
As far as we know, which you acknowledge is limited.:rolleyes:



You have yet to show that biological structures are part of the mechanism.
The neurons in the brain performing the computation are complex biological electro-chemical living cells. Which by the way, we are only now beginning to understand scientifically.
Again, every piece of evidence we have points to computation being a necessity, not meat. That all computers that have produced it thus far have been made of meat is irrelevant; there is nothing about the meat that points to inorganic computers being unable to replicate the same process.
There may be more than one necessary component.


Yes, actually, you can. You have to, in fact, if you want words to mean anything at all. It's incredibly trivial to do so, and the fact that you don't like the idea doesn't change it.
You're tying yourself in knots now. The logical basis for the concept of idealism is well understood.


And yet that is what idealism does.
It is only where people try to construct elaborate cosmogonies of an idealistic universe where idealism falls short. As a principle idealism is a logically valid ontology. Even if one assumes dualism, it is not as confining as hard materialism.

X is X. By definition, it is identical.
I addressed this in my post to ehcks, prior to this post.
This is not complicated.
indeed.


Conscious volition, to the best of my knowledge, serves as a final check of the output. The rest of the brain comes up with what it wants to do. The signal is sent, and the conscious mind has a short period in which it has the opportunity to override this in case it spots something the rest hasn't.
The "conscious volition" can be performed unconsciously by a Pzombie or AI.
It's a fascinating subject, really, but I'm not a neuroscientist, so I can't offer much more than that.
Yes it is fascinating, just like the philosophy of being.
 
No, I am not. I am explicitly, repeatedly, and quite clearly saying that a perfect replica of X = X.
A perfect replica has a biological body, doesn't it? We've been over this.


At no point did this happen.
Not directly, perhaps. Anyway, I'm not going to go through all the posts to tease it out. You acknowledge do you not that an X with a biological body is not a perfect replica of an X made up of a congregation of toasters?
 
If a replica of X cannot be distinguished from X then it is a perfect replica.
Unfortunately as I have been pointing out, humanity currently has limited knowledge of the subject and can't presume that a replica which appears to be identical is actually identical. Other that is than a perfect replica in its molecular structure.
You have yet to describe a way in which the replica can be distinguished, so you have no grounds for asserting it is not a perfect replica.
As above.
 
So you made a circular argument:
P1: To know something I must have a body.
P2: I know something.
C: I have a body.

Now I like evidence that P1 is sound/true and not an assumption. You know, punshhh, you don't use assumptions; rather you use evidence, so I like evidence for P1.
I am not making that argument. My argument is in the first sentence "I know I have a body because it is my primary apparatus to know I am a being".

p1: I know Something (I am a being)
P2: I need an apparatus/body to know something.
c: I have a body.

There is one assumption, that a body* is necessary to know something.

*by body I am not saying it has to be made of physical matter, just some kind of material.


Now what you ask about your P1 is what evidence do I have that I need a body.? All cases of knowing something are in bodies. Therefore as I know something I have a body.
 
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I am not making that argument. My argument is in the first sentence "I know I have a body because it is my primary apparatus to know I am a being".

p1: I know Something (I am a being)
P2: I need an apparatus/body to know something.
c: I have a body.

There is one assumption, that a body* is necessary to know something.

*by body I am not saying it has to be made of physical matter, just some kind of material.


Now what you ask about your P1 is what evidence do I have that I need a body.? All cases of knowing something are in bodies. Therefore as I know something I have a body.

Gin a body meet a body,
Comin' through the I
Gin a body kiss a body,
Need a body cry?

 
I am looking for words to define life, it's a slippery notion. I was thinking of a group of molecules separated and independent of the prevailing external conditions, with an internal environment, in the group, which is controlled internally.

Sorry, can't make head or tail out of it.

Agreed, I would look at the word "aware", I see no requirement for it to be fully self-aware. Instinctively aware, behaviorally aware, strategically responsive, reactive, may be acceptable, for example in lower animals and plants.

Any definition of "self-aware" is arbitrary.

Our present, or at least mainstream, definition of "self aware" was carefully selected to include humans only. Lately, however,this has been recognized not to hold, since other primates kept sneaking in.

It is important understand that there is no sharp boundary; self-awareness is a continuos scale from planar worms to humans.

Hans
 
When they are not alive.

Organic life is not part of the definition of "conscious".

Mimicry of behaviour is not necessarily the same thing as a behaviour emergent from a complex animated substrate.

You have yet to point out any way in which it isn't.

It's that simple, where's you logic now?

Where it has always been: pointing out your incoherence.

As far as we know, which you acknowledge is limited.:rolleyes:

Having difficulty keeping the phrase "whatever those criteria are" in mind, I see.

The neurons in the brain performing the computation are complex biological electro-chemical living cells. Which by the way, we are only now beginning to understand scientifically.

And? The end result is that the brain is a computer. It just happens to be made out of meat.

There may be more than one necessary component.

And great Cthulhu might be living on Europa. Unless you can actually point out some evidence for this idea, there's no reason to think that inorganic brains can't be conscious.

You're tying yourself in knots now. The logical basis for the concept of idealism is well understood.

No, actually, I'm not.

Because the "logical basis" for the concept of idealism is incoherent.

As a principle idealism is a logically valid ontology.

No, it isn't.

Because it is the p-zombie problem.

The "conscious volition" can be performed unconsciously by a Pzombie or AI.

Then you have to be able to show a way that it isn't really conscious volition.

This isn't hard.

A perfect replica has a biological body, doesn't it? We've been over this.

Yes, we have, and you are still failing to understand the basic point.

A perfect replica of specifically human consciousness has a human body. A perfect replica of consciousness does not necessarily have one.
 

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