I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

You can say it all you like. If the mimic can perform all the actions, it is conceivable that it can do it mechanically without consciousness.

Dammit, Punshhh we've been through this already: consciousness IS an expressed behaviour. Either the P-zombie does NOT display all of the behaviours, or it IS conscious. This is pure logic and definition, here. You have no out.
 
Dammit, Punshhh we've been through this already: consciousness IS an expressed behaviour. Either the P-zombie does NOT display all of the behaviours, or it IS conscious. This is pure logic and definition, here. You have no out.
I don't mean to be annoying, feel free to ignore me if I am. Let's look at it closer.

By analogy the lyrebird is producing a sound* so similar to that of the chainsaw it must be actually cutting some wood in its throat. If it weren't cutting wood in its throat, it would not be able to make all the sounds that a chainsaw would make. Therefore if the sound is perfect**, it must be cutting wood, the lyrebird is actually a chainsaw.

*it is actually in the construction of the sound producing membranes in the throat of the bird, along with the computation and memory regions of its brain which result in the behaviour which makes the sound. It is performing all the processes necessary for a Pzombie to approximate a human.

**there is an issue with perfection here. The lyrebird is not a perfect mimic, it would be possible with sufficient recording equipment to determine this. Likewise a Pzombie or an AI would not be a perfect mimic. But perfection would not be necessary, as humans (who are conducting the experiment) are not perfect and are easily fooled anyway. A lyrebird would easily hoodwink a human.
 
By analogy the lyrebird is producing a sound* so similar to that of the chainsaw it must be actually cutting some wood in its throat.

No, you see, you don't understand the analogy AT ALL.

In the analogy, the lyrebird's soung is the same sound as the chainsaw's. That's it. It's the same sound. It's not another sound that sounds the same but it's the same somehow. It's the exact same sound, because there's no way to tell them apart. No one says that the sound is a chainsaw. That makes no sense.

You are moving the analogy around in order to make it analogous to something else. Don't you realise this ?

Once we come back to consciousness we have this: a machine that reproduces all of the characteristics of human consciousness IS conscious. We're not saying that it's human, or that it plays racketball or studies geometry, but that it is conscious.

Stick to the point of the analogy.
 
(The apparatus mimicking a conscious being) - In the same way as I know (or assume) that thne being is conscious.
If you know the being is conscious by observation of behaviour for example, how do you know it is not a mimic?

Have you any examples of living organisms without a brain exhibiting anything that can be interpreted as consciousness?
I am using an unusual definition of consciousness, which is:

Consciousness = metabolic life = an organism with a rudimentary awareness and responsiveness to its environment.

Self-conscious = fully self aware = human.


Not only would that require a very unusual definition of 'conscious', but given such a definition, 'conscious' behaviour could easily be mimicked by an automation. In fact, I would claim that e.g. a robotic vacuum cleaner could then easily qualify as 'conscious'.

Hans
The difference between an amoeba and a robotic vacuum cleaner is that the amoeba is alive.
 
In traditional mathematics "something exists" or "there exists x" (also notated as ∃x) is not considered as Well Formed Formula, unless x property is also defined for example:

∃xP (where P is a property of x) that can be written as "There exits x such that …" (where "such that …" is x property).

By Neutral monism reasoning ∃x (or "there exists x") is WFF since x is known even if no particular property is related to it.

Furthermore, x exists even if it is not known by any particular observer (x existence is non-particular, non-personal, etc.)
 
You can say it all you like.

And apparently it will be ignored every time.

If the mimic can perform all the actions, it is conceivable that it can do it mechanically without consciousness.

No, it isn't. If it performs all the actions, it is conscious. That is what conscious means.

Until the results of the experiment are in, that's exactly what you are doing, just speculating.

That is not what "speculating" means.

They may be true, it's the conclusions you draw from them which are assumed.

That is not what "assumption" means.

I may use the terms in a slightly different way to yourself.

I'm shocked.

But you seem to have difficulty comprehending the argument.

...No.

We are looking at it scientifically here, definitions outside the parameters of the experiment are entirely irrelevant as I have pointed out.

And you are wrong.

Let me describe the experiment again:

What we want is two objects(physical) which are self-conscious. One is a human (the control), the other is AI(or some other construction).

We have the control, a human, but we don't know how it is self-conscious, so it is a black box. (Correct me if I am wrong).

You're wrong.

Again, we know - this is not speculation, or an assumption, or anything else - that humans are consciousness because of computation taking place in the brain. We do not know what specific computation results in this, but we know it is computation nonetheless.

We have no way of screening out the mimics (you have conceded that mimics are possible).

Of course they are. But we can screen them out. What you actually want to do is to screen out the perfect mimics as well, which is nonsensical. The perfect mimics are conscious. They should not be screened out.

No one has carried out the screening. They may have observed cases of brain damage or which parts of the brain light up at different times etc. They haven't put a brain in a jar, or brought one back to life, or shown self-consciousness in a dead brain.

Absolutely none of which is relevant (and the last of which is nonsensical).

There is still no reason to believe that there is a non-computational factor in consciousness.

that is nonsense, as the thought experiment is specifically designed with the definition that it is not conscious. So it isn't, unless it can be shown that it would be self-conscious. Show it?

Yes, punshhh, it is nonsense, no matter how much you wish it wasn't.

If the thought experiment involved an object which reflected light at a wavelength of approximately 460nm, but wasn't blue, that would be nonsensical too. Because that's what blue means.

Ah, but the equivalent is a mimic of a human without the thinking (self-consciousness) behind the sound, a parrot, it just reals it off parrot fashion. The lyrebird does not cut wood, that bit is missing.

Which is irrelevant. If the lyrebird can produce an identical sound to the chainsaw, then cutting wood is not necessary to produce that sound.

By analogy the lyrebird is producing a sound* so similar to that of the chainsaw it must be actually cutting some wood in its throat.

This is completely nonsensical and has absolutely nothing to do with any argument that anyone, save yourself, has presented during this discussion..
 
If you know the being is conscious by observation of behaviour for example, how do you know it is not a mimic?

I am using an unusual definition of consciousness, which is:

Consciousness = metabolic life = an organism with a rudimentary awareness and responsiveness to its environment.

Self-conscious = fully self aware = human.


The difference between an amoeba and a robotic vacuum cleaner is that the amoeba is alive.

As a side note, in this interview, Christof Koch suggests he does not think that one can establish whether an entity is consciousness or not by a set of behaviors . . . he would need to look at the hardware to determine how the behavior was generated, and his skepticism grows as the entity is different than human physiology.

http://www.technologyreview.com/news/531146/what-it-will-take-for-computers-to-be-conscious/
 
And apparently it will be ignored every time.



No, it isn't. If it performs all the actions, it is conscious. That is what conscious means.



That is not what "speculating" means.



That is not what "assumption" means.



I'm shocked.



...No.



And you are wrong.



You're wrong.

Again, we know - this is not speculation, or an assumption, or anything else - that humans are consciousness because of computation taking place in the brain. We do not know what specific computation results in this, but we know it is computation nonetheless.



Of course they are. But we can screen them out. What you actually want to do is to screen out the perfect mimics as well, which is nonsensical. The perfect mimics are conscious. They should not be screened out.



Absolutely none of which is relevant (and the last of which is nonsensical).

There is still no reason to believe that there is a non-computational factor in consciousness.



Yes, punshhh, it is nonsense, no matter how much you wish it wasn't.

If the thought experiment involved an object which reflected light at a wavelength of approximately 460nm, but wasn't blue, that would be nonsensical too. Because that's what blue means.



Which is irrelevant. If the lyrebird can produce an identical sound to the chainsaw, then cutting wood is not necessary to produce that sound.



This is completely nonsensical and has absolutely nothing to do with any argument that anyone, save yourself, has presented during this discussion..

You keep pushing the notions that the brain is a computer, and consciousness is a result of computations, and consciousness can be explained by brain activity alone - and we do not know any of the above are facts, and no one has developed even a working theory of how the above can be true.
 
You keep pushing the notions that the brain is a computer, and consciousness is a result of computations, and consciousness can be explained by brain activity alone - and we do not know any of the above are facts, and no one has developed even a working theory of how the above can be true.

Well now's a good time to present your case: what aspect of the human mind is NOT explained, ostensibly, by neurology ?
 
You keep pushing the notions that the brain is a computer, and consciousness is a result of computations, and consciousness can be explained by brain activity alone - and we do not know any of the above are facts

Yes, we do. We know every single one for a fact. We have been over this multiple times.

The brain is a computer. We know that this is true because it can compute. It is a Turing-equivalent device*, and the word for devices that are Turing-equivalent is "computer".

Consciousness is a result of computation. We know that this is true because altering the computations that the brain does, whether by altering the brain itself or the neurochemical reactions taking place in it - that is, by altering the things it is computing - we alter consciousness.

Consciousness can be explained by brain activity alone. We know that this is true we are well past the point where we would have found some evidence of something else being required. There is nothing. There isn't even a coherent idea of how something else could be involved. The only way that something else could be responsible is if it turns out that magic is real.

*: Or, to clarify, it is functionally and at least Turing-equivalent. It is not technically a Turing machine because it does not have infinite memory to use in its computations, but it is functionally a Turing machine up until it runs out of storage, which is a boundary that we don't tend to reach and which doesn't alter its fundamental capabilities in any case. It is at least Turing-equivalent because we know that it can do, at the very least, whatever a Turing machine can do. It is possible that it is even more powerful, but that is unlikely and possibly even an incoherent idea; the Church-Turing thesis is that Turing machines are actually the most powerful computers that could ever exist, and there is no computation that they could not perform. Any computer that can perform Turing machine calculations is best described as at least Turing-equivalent, though, in case it turns out that the thesis is incorrect.
 
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Well now's a good time to present your case: what aspect of the human mind is NOT explained, ostensibly, by neurology ?

You are (and Nonpariel) making the claim that the brain is a computer, and human consciousness can be explained totally by brain computations. You have to support the claim.

You have to support the claim that the brain not just has computational power, but is a computer. You have to support the claim that brain as computer supports human consciousness.

For example, if you follow the link above, Koch doesn't think the above claims are true.
 
If you know the being is conscious by observation of behaviour for example, how do you know it is not a mimic?

I don't. In fact I have no reason to belive there is any difference between a successful mimic and a conscious being.

I am using an unusual definition of consciousness, which is:

Consciousness = metabolic life = an organism with a rudimentary awareness and responsiveness to its environment.

No, that is not the usual definition. We do not hold, say, an algae to be conscious.

Self-conscious = fully self aware = human.

OK, but in most discussions of this type, that is assumed equal to conscience.


The difference between an amoeba and a robotic vacuum cleaner is that the amoeba is alive.

'Alive' is not a property, it is a description. It is an arbitrary group of objects that we have made, trying to include only certain objects.

Hans
 
You are (and Nonpariel) making the claim that the brain is a computer, and human consciousness can be explained totally by brain computations. You have to support the claim.

You have to support the claim that the brain not just has computational power, but is a computer. You have to support the claim that brain as computer supports human consciousness.

For example, if you follow the link above, Koch doesn't think the above claims are true.

Actually, he believes that those are precisely true.

What he says is that a software simulation of the brain would not be conscious, in the same way that a software simulation of a black hole would not produce gravity. Which is true, because a simulation is an imperfect mimic. It is a mathematical construct which models certain parts of the system. The equations that describe a black hole are not the black hole itself, but they can tell you what will happen if you get close. In the same vein, a simulated model of consciousness is not conscious itself, but it could tell you the most likely way something that was conscious would act.

What Koch is actually saying is:

I am not saying consciousness is a magic soul. It is something physical. Consciousness is always supervening onto the physical. But it takes a particular type of hardware to instantiate it. A computer made up of transistors, moving charge on and off a gate, with each gate being connected to a small number of other gates, is just a very different cause-and-effect structure than what we have in the brain, where you have one neuron connected to 10,000 input neurons and projecting to 10,000 other neurons. But if you were to build the computer in the appropriate way, like a neuromorphic computer [see “Thinking in Silicon”], it could be conscious.

The brain is still a computer (and arguing against this is just silly; it meets the definition of "computer").

Consciousness still arises from computation.

It just arises from specific types of computation, which standard digital computers today cannot model. Whether or not this is because of practical or theoretical limits*, I cannot say. But the fact remains that consciousness arises from computation.

*: Meaning "is it possible to create consciousness on a digital computer but we just don't know how yet because it's a very simple system and we need to figure out how to apply it to this very complex one, or is digital computation just flatly not capable of creating consciousness due to limits on what can be computed by this method?"
 
Actually, he believes that those are precisely true.

What he says is that a software simulation of the brain would not be conscious, in the same way that a software simulation of a black hole would not produce gravity. Which is true, because a simulation is an imperfect mimic. It is a mathematical construct which models certain parts of the system. The equations that describe a black hole are not the black hole itself, but they can tell you what will happen if you get close. In the same vein, a simulated model of consciousness is not conscious itself, but it could tell you the most likely way something that was conscious would act.

What Koch is actually saying is:




The brain is still a computer (and arguing against this is just silly; it meets the definition of "computer").

Consciousness still arises from computation.

It just arises from specific types of computation, which standard digital computers today cannot model. Whether or not this is because of practical or theoretical limits*, I cannot say. But the fact remains that consciousness arises from computation.

*: Meaning "is it possible to create consciousness on a digital computer but we just don't know how yet because it's a very simple system and we need to figure out how to apply it to this very complex one, or is digital computation just flatly not capable of creating consciousness due to limits on what can be computed by this method?"


and he also thinks that consciousness may be a fundamental property of matter, and when there is sufficient amount of a specific organization of matter, consciousness can emerge. This implies the brain alone is not sufficient to explain it, and it is not merely the result of a computation (according to Koch)
 
and he also thinks that consciousness may be a fundamental property of matter, and when there is sufficient amount of a specific organization of matter, consciousness can emerge. This implies the brain alone is not sufficient to explain it, and it is not merely the result of a computation (according to Koch)

No. He believes that consciousness is fundamental - that is, it is an integral part of reality, like gravity or electromagnetism. This is not to say that it exists independently of matter; like gravity and electromagnetism, without matter it has no meaning or independent reality.

And yes, he does believe that certain arrangements of matter give rise to consciousness. Those certain arrangements are systems capable of performing the necessary computations.

None of that implies that there is anything more than the brain involved in the production of consciousness.
 
You are (and Nonpariel) making the claim that the brain is a computer, and human consciousness can be explained totally by brain computations. You have to support the claim.

You have to support the claim that the brain not just has computational power, but is a computer. You have to support the claim that brain as computer supports human consciousness.

That has been done already. To summarize:

- Memories are stored in the brain. We know this because manipulating the brain chemically or physically can alter memory.

- Feelings are operated in the brain. We know this for the same reason.

- Same for personality.

- Idem for consciousness itself.

We KNOW these things come from the brain. I am asking you what aspect of the mind is NOT, in your opinion, based on the brain.
 
That has been done already. To summarize:

- Memories are stored in the brain. We know this because manipulating the brain chemically or physically can alter memory.

- Feelings are operated in the brain. We know this for the same reason.

- Same for personality.

- Idem for consciousness itself.

We KNOW these things come from the brain. I am asking you what aspect of the mind is NOT, in your opinion, based on the brain.

Correct, we know the brain (almost assuredly) computes the contents of consciousness, contents such as thoughts, images, memories, emotions, etc; but not necessarily awareness itself.
 
Correct, we know the brain (almost assuredly) computes the contents of consciousness, contents such as thoughts, images, memories, emotions, etc; but not necessarily awareness itself.

Demonstrate that awareness is just part of consciousness. LarryS agrees, then substitutes cognizance. Cognizance is not of the brain. Dirty matter!

No? Well then apprehension! That's not like cognizance.

No? Mindfulness, that'll do it?

No? Sheesh. Tough crowd. Okay, how about comprehension! Yeah, compute your way out of that one.

Still not?! Okay, I'll agree, comprehension is the same as mindfulness and cognizance. You're right, but what about consciousness? The brain does not necessarily compute consciousness.

Yeah, taste the ropes now! Materialist junkies! Taste the qualia of defeat.
 
No. He believes that consciousness is fundamental - that is, it is an integral part of reality, like gravity or electromagnetism. This is not to say that it exists independently of matter; like gravity and electromagnetism, without matter it has no meaning or independent reality.

And yes, he does believe that certain arrangements of matter give rise to consciousness. Those certain arrangements are systems capable of performing the necessary computations.

None of that implies that there is anything more than the brain involved in the production of consciousness.

We're getting to the heart of the 'matter' - - - What are the fundamental properties of matter? We'd all agree that a neutral property such "is" would be fundamental . . . but that is not saying much. How about mass, spin, charge? What do we do if consciousness is the only fundamental property of matter?
 
Correct, we know the brain (almost assuredly) computes the contents of consciousness, contents such as thoughts, images, memories, emotions, etc; but not necessarily awareness itself.

If by "awareness" you mean awareness of something, that's just sensory input, and we know that the brain computes that.

If by "awareness" you mean something other than that, you need a better dictionary.

What do we do if consciousness is the only fundamental property of matter?

It isn't.

As for the rest, go read a physics textbook.
 

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