You can say it all you like.
And apparently it will be ignored every time.
If the mimic can perform all the actions, it is conceivable that it can do it mechanically without consciousness.
No, it isn't. If it performs all the actions,
it is conscious. That is what conscious
means.
Until the results of the experiment are in, that's exactly what you are doing, just speculating.
That is not what "speculating" means.
They may be true, it's the conclusions you draw from them which are assumed.
That is not what "assumption" means.
I may use the terms in a slightly different way to yourself.
I'm shocked.
But you seem to have difficulty comprehending the argument.
...No.
We are looking at it scientifically here, definitions outside the parameters of the experiment are entirely irrelevant as I have pointed out.
And you are wrong.
Let me describe the experiment again:
What we want is two objects(physical) which are self-conscious. One is a human (the control), the other is AI(or some other construction).
We have the control, a human, but we don't know how it is self-conscious, so it is a black box. (Correct me if I am wrong).
You're wrong.
Again, we
know - this is not speculation, or an assumption, or anything else - that humans are consciousness because of computation taking place in the brain. We do not know what
specific computation results in this, but we know it is computation nonetheless.
We have no way of screening out the mimics (you have conceded that mimics are possible).
Of course they are. But we
can screen them out. What you
actually want to do is to screen out the
perfect mimics as well, which is nonsensical. The perfect mimics
are conscious. They should not be screened out.
No one has carried out the screening. They may have observed cases of brain damage or which parts of the brain light up at different times etc. They haven't put a brain in a jar, or brought one back to life, or shown self-consciousness in a dead brain.
Absolutely none of which is relevant (and the last of which is nonsensical).
There is still no reason to believe that there is a non-computational factor in consciousness.
that is nonsense, as the thought experiment is specifically designed with the definition that it is not conscious. So it isn't, unless it can be shown that it would be self-conscious. Show it?
Yes, punshhh, it
is nonsense, no matter how much you wish it wasn't.
If the thought experiment involved an object which reflected light at a wavelength of approximately 460nm, but wasn't blue, that would be nonsensical too. Because that's what blue
means.
Ah, but the equivalent is a mimic of a human without the thinking (self-consciousness) behind the sound, a parrot, it just reals it off parrot fashion. The lyrebird does not cut wood, that bit is missing.
Which is irrelevant. If the lyrebird can produce an identical sound to the chainsaw, then cutting wood is not necessary to produce that sound.
By analogy the lyrebird is producing a sound* so similar to that of the chainsaw it must be actually cutting some wood in its throat.
This is completely nonsensical and has absolutely nothing to do with any argument that anyone, save yourself, has presented during this discussion..