I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[Belz...]

Funny how that works, we assume mind, then employ this assumption to derive evidence for matter.

No.

 

[Nonpareil]

We assume mind because we can observe the material world ^*). We then observe that there is no evidence for mind being independent of the material world. We therefore assume that mind is a product of the material world.

Bolding mine.

Slight quibble: we therefore conclude that the mind is a product of the material world.

 

[Belz...]

^This.

Besides, we conclude mind because that's how we perceive events. The events we conclude are part of a real world because they are consistent, persistent and independant. Demonstratably.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Bolding mine.

Slight quibble: we therefore conclude that the mind is a product of the material world.

OK.

 

[LarryS]

I don't think so.

We assume mind because we can observe the material world ^*). We then observe that there is no evidence for mind being independent of the material world. We therefore assume that mind is a product of the material world.

Hans

*) Or, if you will, we define mind as the ability to observe the material world.

We don't begin with matter, we begin with observation, and by observation I mean 'being aware of x'. This 'being aware of x' is not a speculation or the product of reasoning, but based on direct experience.

Materialism is elevating the contents of observation to an epistemological principle - this is speculation.

 

[Nonpareil]

We don't begin with matter, we begin with observation, and by observation I mean 'being aware of x'. This 'being aware of x' is not a speculation or the product of reasoning, but based on direct experience.

Materialism is elevating the contents of observation to an epistemological principle - this is speculation.

No, it isn't.

It's the definition of "is".

 

[Dancing David]

Funny how that works, we assume mind, then employ this assumption to derive evidence for matter. Then we state, matter is because it is, and mind is not because there ain't no evidence.

You assume that sensations and perceptions are mind?

I seem to have perceptions, what is mind?

 

[LarryS]

No, it isn't.

It's the definition of "is".

You keep making the same mistake of thinking a thing is what is said of a thing.

 

[Nonpareil]

You keep making the same mistake of thinking a thing is what is said of a thing.

No, I don't.

I determine that a thing is the sum of its characteristics, because that is the only meaningful definition that can be applied. Anything else is meaningless word games.

This includes idealism.

 

[tsig]

We don't begin with matter, we begin with observation, and by observation I mean 'being aware of x'. This 'being aware of x' is not a speculation or the product of reasoning, but based on direct experience.

Materialism is elevating the contents of observation to an epistemological principle - this is speculation.

A baby is made of matter so we begin with matter.

 

[Dancing David]

We don't begin with matter, we begin with observation, and by observation I mean 'being aware of x'. This 'being aware of x' is not a speculation or the product of reasoning, but based on direct experience.

Materialism is elevating the contents of observation to an epistemological principle - this is speculation.

Not in terms of naturalism, the world is as it appears.

 

[punshhh]

No, it isn't. That is exactly the opposite of the problem; to say that it isn't is to ignore reality.

Do you understand the point, though, even though you disagree?
I understand your point and see the assumptions and their resultant conclusions, why won't you support them? All we I get is a repetition of the mantra's, "if it behaves as if it is self-conscious it is self-conscious, because it fulfills the definition of self-consciousness", end of story.
And "because it's the definition of is" etc, end of story.

If something has all the properties of self-consciousness, then it is self-conscious both by definition and by the mechanisms present. That is why it is self-conscious by definition.

Ah, we have properties now. You do realise that the properties of self-consciousness are not fully understood and incomplete?Therefore any definition of self-consciousness derived from the observed properties is also incomplete.
Also that the mechanisms present may have properties themselves which are critical to the observed properties of self-consciousness. Meaning that with a different mechanism there may be a different emergent property produced.

With these short comings, your is must become a may, or it remains an assumption.

You're playing games now.

"Unless you can create self-consciousness, there's no reason to believe it - but because it was created, it wasn't really self-conscious".

Do you have reading comprehension issues, your intepretation is nonsensical and belies numerous incorrect pre-conceived ideas about my position

Circular.

Nonsense, address the point: we have only one example of a mechanism with the property of self-consciousness. Without a full understanding of how the property emerges from the mechanism, we cannot presume to be able to replicate the same property using a different mechanism?
Unless of course, we throw in a few assumptions along the way.

Which no one is doing.

Yes you are, computation is all you require, whatever performs the computation, rope and cogs, or congregations of toasters.
(Which by the way can be used to replicate all the individual computational process involved in self-consciousness.)

Except that a perfect mimic is the thing it is mimicking.

To be perfect it would need to mimic the properties of the mechanism which are critical to the emergence of self-consciousness. In fact when mimicking a biological organism, there would be a constellation of properties which may be critical, or the presence of the whole constellation of properties may be critical.

You can't get around this.

Agreed, if the mimic has the same mechanism and attendant properties. By definition a perfect mimic would have an identical mechanism. Which was my point in the beginning.

Unfortunately humanity is only able to conceive of an imperfect mimic, it would be folly to presume it would have all the properties of the original. However humanity is well able to conceive of an imperfect mimic good enough to fool anyone into thinking it is self-conscious. Because the level of conception in both cases would be roughly equivalent.

No. But your argument is gibberish. It is self-contradictory and nonsensical.

It may not be conventional, but I have provided my definition of consciousness, the rest is a rational continuation from this.

You cannot have a self without a mind, and if you have a self, you are self-conscious. "Has a conscious self but is not self-conscious" is a meaningless phrase.

Deary me, I have pointed out many times that mind is a recent (in evolutionary terms) development in living organisms. Prior to this development organisms behaved as though they were individual selves/entities/beings.
Being self-conscious does require a mind, because there is self-awareness, which requires some thought. This is not the same thing as an organism that either has a rudimentary instinct of self, or behaves as a self/entity. All three of these critters are selves, only one has a mind.

No, humanity observes that physical reality is an objectively existing thing, and that any attempt to dismiss it as otherwise is meaningless word games that leave you with no functional definition of the word "is".

This belies your naivety on the issue, there is no dispute of the objective existence of physical matter, from idealism, it is only its origin and basis which is in dispute. Either the basis is simply a physicality existing independently of anything else. Or the basis is a universal mind, or atman. The definition of is, is irrelevant to the issue.

Whatever it is that exists, is what is. It is an assumption that humanity is in a position to say what is, rather than what only appears to be through the prism of the human body/brain.

No, it's not, because physical processes are behaviors.

X and ~X is only incoherent if X is identical in either case. But it isn't is it?

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

punshhh, can you give evidence for everything or do you use assumptions yourself?

If the former please state your evidence.
If the latter please state your assumptions.

 

[punshhh]

punshhh, can you give evidence for everything or do you use assumptions yourself?

If the former please state your evidence.
If the latter please state your assumptions.

The assumption I make is that consciousness is primarily metabolic. All the other views I take are derived from analysis of what we(humanity) don't know, or we have limited knowledge of.
Do you have any assumptions or evidence in mind?

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

The assumption I make is that consciousness is primarily metabolic. All the other views I take are derived from analysis of what we(humanity) don't know, or we have limited knowledge of.
Do you have any assumptions or evidence in mind?

How do you know, that you have a body?

 

[punshhh]

First part, correct.

Second part: Not under our current definition of 'life'. That may, of course, change one day.

Agreed.

What does "independent molecular autonomy" mean?

I am looking for words to define life, it's a slippery notion. I was thinking of a group of molecules separated and independent of the prevailing external conditions, with an internal environment, in the group, which is controlled internally.

Awareness of its environment (strategic or otherwise) does not cut it. Your plain vanilla motion detector switch has that.

Agreed, there is something that animates it, with a pattern of growth and development.

Our current definition is someting like: "Aware of itself as a separate entity." - Not that this is too clear, either.

Hans

Agreed, I would look at the word "aware", I see no requirement for it to be fully self-aware. Instinctively aware, behaviorally aware, strategically responsive, reactive, may be acceptable, for example in lower animals and plants.

 

[realpaladin]

Yay, that means I win.

Congrats!

But in all fairness, that *is* how the TM movement keeps it's members from ever finding out it is all a scam: they get taught to ignore other people that don't give in to their dumb mumblings.

 

[tsig]

The assumption I make is that consciousness is primarily metabolic. All the other views I take are derived from analysis of what we(humanity) don't know, or we have limited knowledge of.
Do you have any assumptions or evidence in mind?

How can you analyze what humanity doesn't know?

 

[doronshadmi]

Yes, and I have already commented on it.

Is http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=10424396&postcount=1151 is your comment about my UFT interpretation of set as appears in http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=10417706&postcount=936?

 

[Nonpareil]

Do you understand the point, though, even though you disagree?

Yes, I do.

It's simply incoherent.

I understand your point and see the assumptions and their resultant conclusions, why won't you support them?

I have supported them.

All we I get is a repetition of the mantra's, "if it behaves as if it is self-conscious it is self-conscious, because it fulfills the definition of self-consciousness", end of story.
And "because it's the definition of is" etc, end of story.

That is the support.

And that is the end of the story.

Ah, we have properties now. You do realise that the properties of self-consciousness are not fully understood and incomplete?Therefore any definition of self-consciousness derived from the observed properties is also incomplete.

Which is irrelevant.

Also that the mechanisms present may have properties themselves which are critical to the observed properties of self-consciousness. Meaning that with a different mechanism there may be a different emergent property produced.

Which can still be self-consciousness. It may simply not be human self-consciousness.

With these short comings, your is must become a may, or it remains an assumption.

No. It means the definition of self-consciousness may require adjustment, not a change to the actual argument itself.

Do you have reading comprehension issues, your intepretation is nonsensical and belies numerous incorrect pre-conceived ideas about my position
Nonsense, address the point: we have only one example of a mechanism with the property of self-consciousness. Without a full understanding of how the property emerges from the mechanism, we cannot presume to be able to replicate the same property using a different mechanism?

Well, yes, we can. Because we have an idea of how the end product arises: computation. If we can replicate it using computation, then we have confirmed this idea.

Your "point" is just a weak attempt to handwave away any positive results that might arise from this.

Yes you are, computation is all you require

Because computation is all that's required.

No one is attempting to replicate partial self-consciousness.

To be perfect it would need to mimic the properties of the mechanism which are critical to the emergence of self-consciousness.

Yes.

In fact when mimicking a biological organism, there would be a constellation of properties which may be critical, or the presence of the whole constellation of properties may be critical.

Certainly a lot of things are required.

We have no reason to believe that any of these things are exclusively biological.

It may not be conventional

It doesn't even approach "sensible".

Deary me, I have pointed out many times that mind is a recent (in evolutionary terms) development in living organisms. Prior to this development organisms behaved as though they were individual selves/entities/beings.
Being self-conscious does require a mind, because there is self-awareness, which requires some thought. This is not the same thing as an organism that either has a rudimentary instinct of self, or behaves as a self/entity. All three of these critters are selves, only one has a mind.

This remains self-contradictory gibberish.

This belies your naivety on the issue, there is no dispute of the objective existence of physical matter, from idealism, it is only its origin and basis which is in dispute. Either the basis is simply a physicality existing independently of anything else. Or the basis is a universal mind, or atman. The definition of is, is irrelevant to the issue.

It is entirely relevant.

You refusing to accept that doesn't change it.

Whatever it is that exists, is what is. It is an assumption that humanity is in a position to say what is, rather than what only appears to be through the prism of the human body/brain.

Conclusion.

Because anything else is meaningless word games.

X and ~X is only incoherent if X is identical in either case. But it isn't is it?

Yes.

It is.