Which is not really a problem. I could be using the word "falipperage" and this would still be valid. If something behaves exactly as though it is something, it is that something, no matter what definition you use for it.
Ah, but in each case where you have said that something (AI, robot, ropes and pulley machine) behaves exactly as something else(a human),
it is not exactly the same( I.e. the structure of the apparatus), is it. The only thing that is the same in your scenario is the computation and it has not been demonstrated that equivalent computation = equivalent consciousness.
This is an assumption, until self-consciousness absent a human body has been observed.
Broadly speaking, however, I use the same definition that you do: self-consciousness.
Agreed.
Yes. Why wouldn't it?
It would have to be a hell of an intricate machine, with a lot of pulleys arranged in extremely odd and arcane patterns, not to mention the weird things you'd have to do to set up sensory apparatuses. But assuming that the end result did, in the end, act exactly as though it were aware of itself, it doesn't matter how strange the medium.
Yes, logically it would be equivalent, in your scenario.
You are assuming that the soul does manifest and using that to make your argument.
That is circular.
I am not concerned with the soul here. You Mentioned it a few pages back, I have just been responding to that. I did bring it up about 20 pages back with someone else as an aside, but I am not using it in any of my points specifically.
Anyway, as I am adopting the idealist position, it is only natural that I should regard a soul, or something like that as a given.
I am not going to play word games with you.
Thankyou.
Which is not actually true. I assume that we are both taking "consciousness" to mean "sense of self", and we know - again, not think, not hypothesize, know - that this is material and computational in origin.
and given idealism it would be the same, only the origin and basis of that material would vary.
I have made this point a number of times, so our discussion about consciousness is only a side issue.
Because if it were a perfect mimic, it would be the thing it is mimicking.
You keep repeating this mistake, in order for a mimic to perform the self-conscious behavior of a human, it does not have to be(or
is not a) human. You only have to look at the apparatus performing to act to see this. On the one side you have a human body on the other you have a mass of ropes and pulleys, or a computer. One is not the other.
In which case it is not a perfect mimic, but it's irrelevant, because we are interested in mimics of consciousness, not of gastric processes. It is you and you alone who asserts that consciousness is metabolic.
This is a rational view following the observation of the known apparatus exhibiting self-consciousness.
No. It is only conscious of the same things as a human if it is a human down to every molecule. If it is not, it may not be a perfect mimic of a human - but it is still a perfect mimic of consciousness.
Yes and if it is merely mimicking consciousness, there is no requirement for it to be self-conscious to perform the act.
Quite. It is conscious whether or not it has a stomach.
And all the necessary qualifications for being called conscious are computational. Any sufficiently advanced computer can model them.
Yes some folk say that all qualifications are computational, the fact that a computer may be able to model them is not evidence of this. At best it is evidence that it can be mimicked.
No. They hold entirely when looking at actual idealism.
As I said, only interpretations of the idealist view.
Yes. That is what I was saying.
So it's either a perfect mimic, in which case it is the thing it's mimicking, or it's not and it isn't and you can show that it isn't.
So any rope duck observed in nature is a duck then and not a fabrication of ropes and pulleys?
You have repeated the same mistake again, the apparatus
is not the same in the mimic.
Which doesn't bear any relevance to the original statement I was replying to.
l repeat logically our personal experience of thinking is an a priori knowledge, all other knowledge is secondary.
Yes. At this point, idealism collapses.
Which leads you right back to solipsism until you climb out again. First problem.
No it doesn't collapse or fall into solipsism, these are caricatures, as I have said. Idealism is a direct extension/interpretation of our a priori knowledge, as such it is a valid and usefull philosophical tool. Solipsism is also a usefull tool, it is only a bottomless pit in the caricaturization of it as a philosophical way of life, which is absurd.
Your whole argument hinges around your assumption of the computational nature of consciousness and your assumption of a materialist ontology, perhaps you don't realise that materialism doesn't have an ontology and has to prop itself up with whatever it can find.