Has consciousness been fully explained?

[PixyMisa]

No matter if we reduce them the reduced information is still assimilated via our consciousness/experience/perception.

The issue for me is not one of fundamentals/ontology/-isms its one of practicality.
Its more a question of motives than fundamentals.

If we do not examine our consciousness by self-knowledge/meta-cognition then our motives forever remain hidden and mostly a burden.

Actually, science is a powerful tool for examing what motivates us. More powerful than introspection, because it can learn things introspection cannot.

Science ignores the hidden motives of the scientists.

Sure, because they're irrelevant.

That is why a high level research scientist can still be a theist.

It's the method that matters. It's based on procedure, not belief. Science doesn't care what you believe; if you do it right, you get the same answer every time.

Recently a fundie told me he has changed his approach to science since for him now science is an exercise in confirming the bible!!

People say weird things.

This is more and more common I am afraid.

Eh. He's talking nonsense. Nonsense has always been with us. It's no worse now than in years past, and probably somewhat better.

The whole computability ontology is the same thing just more acceptable because computers are not yet telling us what to do yet.

No.

And its these hidden motives that color our view of reality, for the sake of an ontology/-ism

No.

Science works.

If our motive is to reduce everything for the sake of reductionism instead of the sake of practicality then we end up missing the obvious - qualia for example.

There's no such thing.

Ignoring plant physiology and ecology has gotten many geneticists running after the reductionist DNA one way street dogma and ending up with total failures in the field.

Name three.

Boasting that everything is physics is really saying nothing at all about anything except about yourself.

Boasting? What are you talking about?

Everything is physics. It's a fact. It's reality. Join us. It may not always be comfortable, but at least it's true.

 

[PixyMisa]

OK, then may I ask a serious question? If you have already decided that qualia are fundamental, why engage in a conversation about consciousness? If it is fundamental there is nowhere much to go with it; there isn't anything to explain.

Yeah, only problem is that he now has to explain everything else in existence, including other people.

 

[AkuManiMani]

PixyMisa, I'm continuing to hold your feet to the fire on this one -- answer my question:

What are you feeling right now?

 

[PixyMisa]

PixyMisa, I'm continuing to hold your feet to the fire on this one -- answer my question:

What are you feeling right now?

Define, please.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

My point was that the only epistemic base we have is our own consciousness. Any ontological considerations we can entertain are all tentative conceptual structures that we grow from the seed of immediate experience. This isn't to say that our consciousness is necessarily the only real 'stuff' [or even the 'root directory' of the ontological web] but it is the only real thing beyond reasonable doubt. One's own consciousness is not a hypothetical or proposition to place faith in -- it just unequivocally -is-.

That being said, we've an odd state of affairs where there is a jarring conceptual disconnect between our subjective reality and the theoretical structures we use to model the 'exterior' world. The most obvious gap is that nowhere in our physical model is there an accounting of our own 'interior' subjective reality. The closest thing we have to such an accounting is the 'observer' effect in QM.

So, as I said before, I'm not denying the reality of the 'physical' objects we observe [ideal-ism], or asserting a fundamental disconnect between 'physical' objects and observers [dual-ism]. My point is that consciousness --- the observer -- is not described in the explanatory model of the observed.

But, an accounting of subjectivity is precisely what I am asking about and is percisely why we need definitions of these words.

ETA:

I proposed that a good theoretical approach would be to find an equivalence relation between quanta and qualia and all I got from you was a brief comment about my rejection of physicalism. Any opinions regarding this proposal in particular?

My answer would be the same. If you have identified qualia as fundamental, as non-reducible, then you have made an ontological claim. It is, in fact, a claim that rejects the idea that everything we see is reducible to a simpler thing or process -- because you have identified for yourself the one irreducible part of reality. I don't find much use in the idea; it is the end of enquiry, not the beginning.

Like I said, our only non-hypothetical starting point is our own consciousness and its the very thing NOT included in our hypothetical model of the world, except as a hand-waving assumption. This is a problem.

And despite your insistence that ideology has nothing to do with this discussion, I'm afraid that it not only has something to do with the discussion -- it is the main culprit in obstructing it. There are deep ideological assumptions driving the majority of arguments in this exchange. A good portion of the participants in this thread are steadfastly defending physical-ism from any and all perceived challenges. One can't so much as use trigger words like 'subjective', 'feelings', or 'qualia' and the natives go crazy crying 'nonsense!' and 'blasphemy!'. Then the so-called "discussion" turns into an assertion/counter-assertion fest that leads nowhere except farther of people's behinds.

If I were a less brash person I could employ ways to make my same arguments while flattering physicalist sensibilities and using only language that is sanctioned. However, I refuse to tip-toe, round the block, or walk on eggshells because of certain individuals ego-attachments to their favorite "-ism" and the price I pay for that is boneheaded stonewalling. I'd very much prefer to have a calm reasoned discussion as you and I are having now but, for the most part I've had to content myself with slashing thru the psychological issues at the root of this quagmire. Certain individuals here are so psychologically enmeshed in their ideologies that I can scarcely attack the argument without drawing blood from the arguer. After a few years of dealing with the same @#*&damn bull***t I've come to the point where I'm more than happy to do so. So yes, whether you recognize whats going on here or not, ideological commitment is THE obstacle to the meaningful progression of this discussion.

I have been trying to start a conversation about those very words and then getting screamed at for daring to ask for definitions. We cannot discuss them without a common reference point.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Define, please.

If you are sentient the term "feeling' requires no definition. You're failing the Aku Test of consciousness

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I do not agree.

There is lots to explain.

The science of qualities is in its infancy.

What is it about qualities which makes us recognize them?

How do we predict when qualities will arise?

How can we communicate qualities objectively?

What factors effect quality?

I believe Goethe was a pioneer in the science of qualities and if you took the time to study his Theory of Colour - you will understand why I say that.

We rely on the intuitive understanding of quality within the framework of consciousness everytime we interact with the world.

We recognize something first from its qualities (form and colour) before we ask any quantitative questions about what it is we see.

A thorough science of qualities is essential if we are to understand how consciousness works.

First of all, that is not "what is consciousness?" but concerns a discussion of the contents of consciousness. That is a very different type of discussion.

There is no science of qualities. This is all old philosophy dating from the advent of rationalism and discussion of properties. It was picked over repeatedly and eventually evolved into various forms of idealism where it has remained. It amounts to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.

 

[PixyMisa]

How would Hofstadter and Dennett operationalize it?

Self-referential information processing.

Okay... Not sure how this is supposed to relate to the exchange or back up any of the claims you made.

Every science experiment tests the working assumptions of science itself.

Science depends on methodological naturalism, which can only be reliable if metaphysical naturalism is correct.
Science further depends on the principle of uniformity - that not only does the Universe behave consistently under given conditions, but that this is invariant with space and time.

We're more concerned with the former here. Science works reliably if and only if the behaviours of physical Universe we observe are what is really going on. It doesn't care about what the fundamental nature of reality is, but it certainly cares about what things do.

So, science, by its own success in explaining the Universe, in constructing predictive models, systematically confirms and supports its premises. Doesn't ever prove them, of course, any more than a theory within science is ever proven. But for science to work reliably, its premises must hold. And science does work reliably.

Given those premises, the very concept of qualia is incoherent nonsense. And everything we know about the Universe is derived via those premises. And what we know about the Universe is clearly true to a remarkable degree of precision, because we use that knowledge, and it works.

If qualia are real, the entirety of modern science and engineering, all of human civilisation in fact, is just a series of accidents, uncounted quintillions of them all somehow working out the way you'd expect if science, rather than qualia, were real.

I know which way I'd bet.

The situation for neutral monism is different, but no better.

Who knows? You are the one claiming every scientific study shows qualia to not exist, so why don't you explain it to me.

Physical experiments are a clearer example of this than psychological ones, but the same reasoning applies.

 

[PixyMisa]

If you are sentient the term "feeling' requires no definition.

And yet it appears in every dictionary. Who do you suppose those were written for?

You're failing the Aku Test of consciousness

That does not concern me in the slightest.

 

[AkuManiMani]

My point was that the only epistemic base we have is our own consciousness. Any ontological considerations we can entertain are all tentative conceptual structures that we grow from the seed of immediate experience. This isn't to say that our consciousness is necessarily the only real 'stuff' [or even the 'root directory' of the ontological web] but it is the only real thing beyond reasonable doubt. One's own consciousness is not a hypothetical or proposition to place faith in -- it just unequivocally -is-.

That being said, we've an odd state of affairs where there is a jarring conceptual disconnect between our subjective reality and the theoretical structures we use to model the 'exterior' world. The most obvious gap is that nowhere in our physical model is there an accounting of our own 'interior' subjective reality. The closest thing we have to such an accounting is the 'observer' effect in QM.

So, as I said before, I'm not denying the reality of the 'physical' objects we observe [ideal-ism], or asserting a fundamental disconnect between 'physical' objects and observers [dual-ism]. My point is that consciousness --- the observer -- is not described in the explanatory model of the observed.

But, an accounting of subjectivity is precisely what I am asking about and is percisely why we need definitions of these words.

We already have perfectly workable definitions. The term 'information' is even more broadly defined semantically than 'qualia' yet I see no outcry that its too vague for scientific consideration or too nonsensical to even entertain.

The problem here isn't from a paucity of definition; its psychological aversion to certain words and concepts.

ETA:

I proposed that a good theoretical approach would be to find an equivalence relation between quanta and qualia and all I got from you was a brief comment about my rejection of physicalism. Any opinions regarding this proposal in particular?

My answer would be the same. If you have identified qualia as fundamental, as non-reducible, then you have made an ontological claim. It is, in fact, a claim that rejects the idea that everything we see is reducible to a simpler thing or process -- because you have identified for yourself the one irreducible part of reality. I don't find much use in the idea; it is the end of enquiry, not the beginning.

I never claimed that qualia were necessarily irreducible; I just said that they're fundamental to consciousness. By your reasoning, the fundamentality of quanta puts an end to inquiry. You're failing to recognize that me even asking what the equivalence relation is between quanta and qualia necessarily implies an even deeper basis common to them both.

Like I said, the only non-hypothetical starting point is our own consciousness and its the very thing NOT included in our hypothetical model of the world, except as a hand-waving assumption. This is a problem.

And despite your insistence that ideology has nothing to do with this discussion, I'm afraid that it not only has something to do with the discussion -- it is the main culprit in obstructing it. There are deep ideological assumptions driving the majority of arguments in this exchange. A good portion of the participants in this thread are steadfastly defending physical-ism from any and all perceived challenges. One can't so much as use trigger words like 'subjective', 'feelings', or 'qualia' and the natives go crazy crying 'nonsense!' and 'blasphemy!'. Then the so-called "discussion" turns into an assertion/counter-assertion fest that leads nowhere except farther of people's behinds.

If I were a less brash person I could employ ways to make my same arguments while flattering physicalist sensibilities and using only language that is sanctioned. However, I refuse to tip-toe, round the block, or walk on eggshells because of certain individuals ego-attachments to their favorite "-ism" and the price I pay for that is boneheaded stonewalling. I'd very much prefer to have a calm reasoned discussion as you and I are having now but, for the most part I've had to content myself with slashing thru the psychological issues at the root of this quagmire. Certain individuals here are so psychologically enmeshed in their ideologies that I can scarcely attack the argument without drawing blood from the arguer. After a few years of dealing with the same @#*&damn bull***t I've come to the point where I'm more than happy to do so. So yes, whether you recognize whats going on here or not, ideological commitment is THE obstacle to the meaningful progression of this discussion.

I have been trying to start a conversation about those very words and then getting screamed at for daring to ask for definitions. We cannot discuss them without a common reference point.

I'm sorry but I've already addressed the same question literally hundreds of times in these discussions. The fact of the matter is that, assuming we're all conscious, we already -have- a shared reference point; our common experience of 'perceptions', 'feelings', 'emotions', etc. The definitions available do a more than adequate job of pointing to and outlining those commonalities; if they didn't we'd have no basis for language to begin with.

 

[PixyMisa]

My point was that the only epistemic base we have is our own consciousness.

Which is an illusion.

That being said, we've an odd state of affairs where there is a jarring conceptual disconnect between our subjective reality and the theoretical structures we use to model the 'exterior' world.

There is no such disconnect.

The most obvious gap is that nowhere in our physical model is there an accounting of our own 'interior' subjective reality.

We have such an accounting. It works quite well. You just don't appear to like it very much.

The closest thing we have to such an accounting is the 'observer' effect in QM.

It does help to read the articles you rely on for support:

These experiments demonstrate a puzzling relationship between the act of measurement and the system being measured, although it is clear from experiment that an "observer" consisting of a single electron is sufficient—the observer need not be a conscious observer.

Unfortunately, If I Were an Electron is long out of print, and you can't have my copy.

So, as I said before, I'm not denying the reality of the 'physical' objects we observe [ideal-ism], or asserting a fundamental disconnect between 'physical' objects and observers [dual-ism]. My point is that consciousness --- the observer -- is not described in the explanatory model of the observed.

And our point is: Yeah, it is.

There are deep ideological assumptions driving the majority of arguments in this exchange. A good portion of the participants in this thread are steadfastly defending physical-ism from any and all perceived challenges.

Ideology has nothing to do with that, though. It's about evidence and logic.

One can't so much as use trigger words like 'subjective', 'feelings', or 'qualia' and the natives go crazy crying 'nonsense!' and 'blasphemy!'.

Qualia are nonsense. Everybody knows that.

If I were a less brash person I could employ ways to make my same arguments while flattering physicalist sensibilities and using only language that is sanctioned.

Really? How would that make any difference to your utter lack of evidence or reasoned argument?

However, I refuse to tip-toe, round the block, or walk on eggshells because of certain individuals ego-attachments to their favorite "-ism" and the price I pay for that is boneheaded stonewalling.

Well, no. This is not the case.

I'd very much prefer to have a calm reasoned discussion as you and I are having now but, for the most part I've had to content myself with slashing thru the psychological issues at the root of this quagmire. Certain individuals here are so psychologically enmeshed in their ideologies that I can scarcely attack the argument without drawing blood from the arguer.

Any time you wish to address the argument, much less attack it, you're welcome to do so.

After a few years of dealing with the same @#*&damn bull***t I've come to the point where I'm more than happy to do so. So yes, whether you recognize whats going on here or not, ideological commitment is THE obstacle to the meaningful progression of this discussion.

Yes, that would certainly appear to be the case. But I really can't help you with your problem there.

 

[PixyMisa]

We already have perfectly workable definitions. The term 'information' is even more broadly defined semantically than 'qualia'

Nope.

yet I see no outcry that its too vague for scientific consideration or too nonsensical to even entertain.

That is because it is very specifically defined. You are confusing the existence of multiple, specific meanings, different but related (information), with simple incoherence (qualia).

 

[AkuManiMani]

If you are sentient the term "feeling' requires no definition.

And yet it appears in every dictionary. Who do you suppose those were written for?

To provide the word association with the phenomenon in question and facilitate verbal communication of it between English speakers. If, however, an individual in question does not experience feelings the definitions are meaningless to them. Ergo, my hypothesis that you have a key trait of psychopathy: lack of emotion.

You're failing the Aku Test of consciousness

That does not concern me in the slightest.

Then you have no objection to me treating you as less than human

 

[AkuManiMani]

That is because it is very specifically defined. You are confusing the existence of multiple, specific meanings, different but related (information), with simple incoherence (qualia).

I suppose it would be 'incoherent' to you; you've given little to no indication that you even have a interior subjective existence yourself. Hence, why I seriously question your personhood.

ETA:

Oh, and what are you feeling right now?

 

[AkuManiMani]

It does help to read the articles you rely on for support:

These experiments demonstrate a puzzling relationship between the act of measurement and the system being measured, although it is clear from experiment that an "observer" consisting of a single electron is sufficient—the observer need not be a conscious observer.

Unfortunately, If I Were an Electron is long out of print, and you can't have my copy.

You -do- realize that you've just supported my point, right? Lack of comprehension indeed...

 

[Malerin]

PixyMisa, I'm continuing to hold your feet to the fire on this one -- answer my question:

What are you feeling right now?

Define, please.

We've now reached the point where Jabberwackytm is more interesting to talk to than the computationalists here. Sad, sad.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

We already have perfectly workable definitions. The term 'information' is even more broadly defined semantically than 'qualia' yet I see no outcry that its too vague for scientific consideration or too nonsensical to even entertain.

The problem here isn't from a paucity of definition; its psychological aversion to certain words and concepts.

Right, but what I am suggesting is that the definitions could be improved. They don't work well for understanding how they apply to physical systems.

I never claimed that qualia were necessarily irreducible; I just said that they're fundamental to consciousness. By your reasoning, the fundamentality of quanta puts an end to inquiry. You're failing to recognize that me even asking what the equivalence relation is between quanta and qualia necessarily implies an even deeper basis common to them both.

My mistake, then. So, it should be the case that qualia being fundamental only to consciousness and not a fundamental ur-substance could be reducible to simpler processes? The thrust of what I was asking about earlier was how we go about understanding qualia in terms of something simpler. You seemed to define them in terms of emotion, sensation, feeling, experience -- I assume that those processes are also not irreducible? If that is the case, then we should be able to arrive at simpler explanations for them.

I'm sorry but I've already addressed the same question literally hundreds of times in these discussions. The fact of the matter is that, assuming we're all conscious, we already -have- a shared reference point; our common experience of 'perceptions', 'feelings', 'emotions', etc. The definitions available do a more than adequate job of pointing to and outlining those commonalities; if they didn't we'd have no basis for language to begin with.

Those definitions get us nowhere but circles. How about trying another course? If you don't want to bother, then that's fine.

 

[rocketdodger]

That is far too broad a search term for me to know what you're talking about. If you're saying we know more than zero, then yes, that's obviously true.

Associative memory is memory where the stored information is looked up by content rather than index.

So for example if a computer had associative memory you would be able to give the RAM ( or whatever RAM would be called if it was associative ) a "hint" about what you want and it would return the full set of data that best matches that "hint."

Specifically in the context of neural networks, much research has been done on Hopfield networks and their stochastic counterpart Boltzmann machines.

These networks have an amazing property -- they seem to give results very much like human memory. If the network has been trained properly, you can put it in an initial state -- any state you want -- and it will converge on its own to the closest trained state. In other words, it will remember something. Given a "hint," it will remember whatever it has learned that is closest to that "hint." Sound like human memory?

The more you train it, the more it can remember -- up to a point. If it is trained in too many states, or the trained states are too similar, it will have trouble remembering. Sound like human memory?

And there are different ways it can "fail" to remember. It can sort of endlessly visit similar states without converging -- ever been trying to remember something and have the feeling that it was just out of reach, that you could "almost" remember, but not quite? Or it could remember the wrong state for a given initial state -- ever tried to remember something and you keep arriving at the wrong memory? Or it could just take time. Ever had a memory take a few seconds, or even longer, to arrive? When I learned about the behavior of Hopfield networks I was shocked at how well the model explains the way humans remember things.

On the flip side, we know that human memory works via synaptic plasticity -- synapses get weaker or stronger and the flow of impulses through the brain changes accordingly. Turns out this is exactly how Hopfield networks function as well -- states are trained into the network only by changing edge weights between nodes, not creating or destroying the edges themselves (although conceptually giving an edge a weight of zero is destroying it, but biological neurons can do this as well ).

All that is left is for someone to map the neural connections of the hippocampus and confirm that the topography is similar to that of a Hopfield net. There is a very high probability that it will be.

 

[Beth]

That was interesting. Thank you RD

 

[AkuManiMani]

We already have perfectly workable definitions. The term 'information' is even more broadly defined semantically than 'qualia' yet I see no outcry that its too vague for scientific consideration or too nonsensical to even entertain.

The problem here isn't from a paucity of definition; its psychological aversion to certain words and concepts.

Right, but what I am suggesting is that the definitions could be improved. They don't work well for understanding how they apply to physical systems.

Hmm... I think that such an improvement would require a restructuring of the semantics we use with regard to both. A common opinion here is that the language relating the subjective to the objective should simply be at the level of neural net interactions. However, I strongly suspect that we're going to have to go deeper down the emergent scale to the level of elementary physics to get the job done.

I never claimed that qualia were necessarily irreducible; I just said that they're fundamental to consciousness. By your reasoning, the fundamentality of quanta puts an end to inquiry. You're failing to recognize that me even asking what the equivalence relation is between quanta and qualia necessarily implies an even deeper basis common to them both.

My mistake, then. So, it should be the case that qualia being fundamental only to consciousness and not a fundamental ur-substance could be reducible to simpler processes? The thrust of what I was asking about earlier was how we go about understanding qualia in terms of something simpler. You seemed to define them in terms of emotion, sensation, feeling, experience -- I assume that those processes are also not irreducible? If that is the case, then we should be able to arrive at simpler explanations for them.

Well, in previous discussions I used the analogy of consciousness being akin to a "light" operating in a mental software space, which in turn interfaces with the biological hardware. When the "light" passes thru certain mental elements it produces a spectra of differentiated experiences we refer to as "qualia". The 'light', like all entities capable of physical interaction, is energetic in nature and, therefore, has the capacity to inact physical change. The exertions, and directionality of those exertions, are what we colloquially refer to with words like "will" or "intent". I propose that higher order organization of this basic process is what gives rise to the varieties and gradations of experience we give names like "emotion", "sensation", "perception", "desire" etc..

I'm sorry but I've already addressed the same question literally hundreds of times in these discussions. The fact of the matter is that, assuming we're all conscious, we already -have- a shared reference point; our common experience of 'perceptions', 'feelings', 'emotions', etc. The definitions available do a more than adequate job of pointing to and outlining those commonalities; if they didn't we'd have no basis for language to begin with.

Those definitions get us nowhere but circles. How about trying another course? If you don't want to bother, then that's fine.

I suppose we could try doing that but we hit a bit of a road block when I earlier attempted to start mucking about with our basic semantic structure. If you're willing to bear with me this time I'd be more than happy to give it another go