Has consciousness been fully explained?

[AkuManiMani]

I don't see how that follows.

It's refusal to introspect and recognize it's own irrational motivations makes it impossible for it to see the absurdity at the root of its arguments.

 

[Meed]

Associative memory is memory where the stored information is looked up by content rather than index.

So for example if a computer had associative memory you would be able to give the RAM ( or whatever RAM would be called if it was associative ) a "hint" about what you want and it would return the full set of data that best matches that "hint."

Specifically in the context of neural networks, much research has been done on Hopfield networks and their stochastic counterpart Boltzmann machines.

These networks have an amazing property -- they seem to give results very much like human memory. If the network has been trained properly, you can put it in an initial state -- any state you want -- and it will converge on its own to the closest trained state. In other words, it will remember something. Given a "hint," it will remember whatever it has learned that is closest to that "hint." Sound like human memory?

What sort of recall tasks are you talking about? What sort of training procedure? What sort of hint? And how is "remembering" operationalized? Does it make successful predictions about human memory performance?

I'm not sure how related this is, but I can comment on my own research on concepts and category learning (which is obviously tied to memory). We often use learning tasks where one has to study a set of stimuli that are definable by just a few dimensions and then classify stimuli as belonging or not belonging to that set. There's a feed forward back-propogating network model called ALCOVE that has had some limited success. But over a wide range of categories, ALCOVE is only able to predict about 20% of the variance, while an algebraic rule minimization approach does much better and an invariance based model does better still.

 

[!Kaggen]

I don't see how that follows.

being the operative word.

Pixy no longer sees he projects...

 

[!Kaggen]

snip~

I'm not sure how related this is, but I can comment on my own research on concepts and category learning (which is obviously tied to memory). We often use learning tasks where one has to study a set of stimuli that are definable by just a few dimensions and then classify stimuli as belonging or not belonging to that set. There's a feed forward back-propogating network model called ALCOVE that has had some limited success. But over a wide range of categories, ALCOVE is only able to predict about 20% of the variance, while an algebraic rule minimization approach does much better and an invariance based model does better still.

This looks very interesting.
In laymans terms pretty please

 

[dlorde]

Qualia is just a term for what we all experience.

OK, so why call it 'qualia' if it is just what we experience?

I'm getting the feeling it's just a convenient abstraction for something we like to think exists, but which evaporates under close examination - like 'free will'.

PixyMisa, is hardly in a position to make an argument against their reality or definition, seeing as how he can't even answer a simple question about his own feelings.

ISTR he posted an explanation for why he didn't think qualia were useful or meaningful - and you countered with an insult... [although I may be mistaken].

 

[dlorde]

...in previous discussions I used the analogy of consciousness being akin to a "light" operating in a mental software space, which in turn interfaces with the biological hardware. When the "light" passes thru certain mental elements it produces a spectra of differentiated experiences we refer to as "qualia". The 'light', like all entities capable of physical interaction, is energetic in nature and, therefore, has the capacity to inact physical change. The exertions, and directionality of those exertions, are what we colloquially refer to with words like "will" or "intent"...

Sounds like dualism by the back door.

What does this 'light' entity consist of? how does it enact physical change? What are the 'exertions'? How do you propose this entity produces them?

 

[dlorde]

... I'm saying that, judging from Pixy's overall response history he has no feelings that hes is aware of or willing to acknowledge. This indicates to me that he is seriously emotionally repressed or lacks the capacity altogether (as is the case with psychopathy). Right now, I'm inclined to suspect that the former is the more likely explanation but, in either case, I think he psychologically stunted.

I suspect you entirely misunderstand what he's doing. The realisation that consciousness is a kind of illusion, a sleight-of-brain, and that feelings (not perceptions) are an artefact of that, doesn't make for an unconscious, unfeeling individual, any more than the realisation that free will is an illusion makes me feel I have no control of my actions. The question is, are these things any more physically real than the movement and shimmering that appears in optical illusions like this ?

Things being the way they are, I may well be mistaken, but that's the way it looks from here

 

[westprog]

I can’t help but notice that you’ve neglected to provide any cites that would support your claims regarding the impossibility of such things. Telling me I should study basic physics is not an appropriate response to a request for evidence in the form of studies that would actually support your claims.

Pixy used to provide cites, until it turned out that the links he gave explicitly contradicted his claims. Then he stopped doing it.

 

[AkuManiMani]

...in previous discussions I used the analogy of consciousness being akin to a "light" operating in a mental software space, which in turn interfaces with the biological hardware. When the "light" passes thru certain mental elements it produces a spectra of differentiated experiences we refer to as "qualia". The 'light', like all entities capable of physical interaction, is energetic in nature and, therefore, has the capacity to inact physical change. The exertions, and directionality of those exertions, are what we colloquially refer to with words like "will" or "intent"...

Sounds like dualism by the back door.

Not seeing how the above implies dualism. If anything I'm suggesting that consciousness is just a hitherto undefined physical process.

What does this 'light' entity consist of? how does it enact physical change? What are the 'exertions'? How do you propose this entity produces them?

Well if we knew that then we wouldn't be having ontological debates about what consciousness is. ATM, I'm relying on figurative language to covey how it seems consciousness operates "from the inside". Using the analogy of consciousness being a "light", with qualia being it's "spectrum", makes a lot of intuitive sense in terms of describing how the varieties of experience can arise from a common basis. As to how literal this analogy turns out to be, I cannot say -- I'm really just postulating and brainstorming at this point.

However, the basic gist of what I'm getting at is that consciousness is either A) a currently unknown feature of known physical processes or B) lies outside of known physics but has a common basis thru which it can interact with known processes. If qualia can be viewed as the [meta]physical complement of quanta we may have a ready made way of meaningfully integrating consciousness into our current physical model.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I suspect you entirely misunderstand what he's doing. The realisation that consciousness is a kind of illusion, a sleight-of-brain, and that feelings (not perceptions) are an artefact of that, doesn't make for an unconscious, unfeeling individual, any more than the realisation that free will is an illusion makes me feel I have no control of my actions. The question is, are these things any more physically real than the movement and shimmering that appears in optical illusions like this ?

Things being the way they are, I may well be mistaken, but that's the way it looks from here

I'm sorry, but every time I hear the tired cliché that "consciousness is an illusion" I have to suppress a laugh. An illusion is just a misinterpreted perception. In order for there to even be an illlusion there has to be some[one/thing] there to perceive in the first place. Absent consciousness, its absurd to speak of illusion -- ergo, its illogical to call consciousness itself an illusion.

As far as the issue of free will goes, it simply means that a given agent has the ability be inconsistently inconsistent in its deliberate behavior.

 

[AkuManiMani]

OK, so why call it 'qualia' if it is just what we experience?

Because qualia is just a term for what our experiences reduce to, in much the same way that experienced objects reduce to quanta.

I'm getting the feeling it's just a convenient abstraction for something we like to think exists, but which evaporates under close examination - like 'free will'.

I'm saying that the feelings you're getting and the perceptions gained from close examination reduce to qualia. They are the elementary constituents of the subjective.

ISTR he posted an explanation for why he didn't think qualia were useful or meaningful - and you countered with an insult... [although I may be mistaken].

As I told biomorph in another thread my comments to PixyMisa are only as insulting as they make him feel. Being as how he has yet to acknowledge such, I can only assume that he either doesn't have them or is not aware of them. In either case, it would definitely explain his lack of comprehension regarding a concept as simple as qualia

 

[Democracy Simulator]

A basic question seems to be:

Is it dishonest to answer questions such as 'how do you feel?' and 'do you know what it is like to be sad?', with a protestation that one doesn't know what is meant by those questions and a request to define what is meant by those questions? Presumably in everyday 'real life', someone like PixyMisa doesn't do this and is still capable of having a meaningful conversation along those lines? Perhaps (s)he can enlighten us?

If we retrace human history to a time before much was known about the brain (such as how neurons work etc.), there was already a concept of consciousness that people were able to have meaningful interactions about. So, it seems a strange state of affairs that a concept that is already known is defined by later discoveries - it must be clear that we are talking about two concepts here. Of course later discoveries can tell us more about physical phenomenon, but how can they invalidate the definition of an already established concept?

Clearly we are talking about two things here. When PixyMisa (et al) talk about SRIP, they are not talking about the concept of consciousness and they are not attempting to understand the phenomenon, they have simply dismissed it. This is fine, but I think there needs to be some clarity about this dismissal. Perhaps SRIP should remain SRIP and let's stop talking about consciousness in this context as it does not refer to the phenomenon as widely understood. In the end, the Materialists may be right about their understanding of the brain and how it relates to our subjective state of being (or whatever they'd call that bit of it) but perhaps it would be wise to stop claiming the concept of consciousness for themselves as this is clearly erroneous and leads to confusion. If consciousness is an illusion, then they have nothing to say about consciousness beyond that, consciousness cannot simultaneously be an illusion and SRIP.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Is it dishonest to answer questions such as 'how do you feel?' and 'do you know what it is like to be sad?', with a protestation that one doesn't know what is meant by those questions and a request to define what is meant by those questions?

Not if the individual in question doesn't experience such things. You're spot on, tho. Such protestations indicate that one is either A) dishonest or B) not a person. It ain't a flattering picture either way ya look at it...

 

[PixyMisa]

A basic question seems to be:

Is it dishonest to answer questions such as 'how do you feel?' and 'do you know what it is like to be sad?', with a protestation that one doesn't know what is meant by those questions and a request to define what is meant by those questions? Presumably in everyday 'real life', someone like PixyMisa doesn't do this and is still capable of having a meaningful conversation along those lines? Perhaps (s)he can enlighten us?

Since the meaning of these terms is precisely what is in dispute, it is obvious that any question using those terms requires a suitable definition. And the terms in that definition may require further definition. And so on.

Of course later discoveries can tell us more about physical phenomenon, but how can they invalidate the definition of an already established concept?

An established concept can be completely untrue.

Clearly we are talking about two things here. When PixyMisa (et al) talk about SRIP, they are not talking about the concept of consciousness and they are not attempting to understand the phenomenon, they have simply dismissed it.

Wrong.

What we speak of in day-to-day conversation as consciousness is self-referential information processing - at least, so far as it is real at all.

This is fine, but I think there needs to be some clarity about this dismissal.

It's not.

Perhaps SRIP should remain SRIP and let's stop talking about consciousness in this context as it does not refer to the phenomenon as widely understood.

What, exactly, do you ascribe to consciousness that is not explained by self-referential information processing? And why?

In the end, the Materialists may be right about their understanding of the brain and how it relates to our subjective state of being (or whatever they'd call that bit of it) but perhaps it would be wise to stop claiming the concept of consciousness for themselves as this is clearly erroneous and leads to confusion.

How is it clearly erroneous? I see plenty of confusion, but it is entirely caused by the reluctance to give up on concepts that are false or simply incoherent.

If consciousness is an illusion, then they have nothing to say about consciousness beyond that

Obviously false. An illusion is a real thing, just not what it appears to be.

consciousness cannot simultaneously be an illusion and SRIP.

Also false, of course.

 

[AkuManiMani]

A basic question seems to be:

Is it dishonest to answer questions such as 'how do you feel?' and 'do you know what it is like to be sad?', with a protestation that one doesn't know what is meant by those questions and a request to define what is meant by those questions? Presumably in everyday 'real life', someone like PixyMisa doesn't do this and is still capable of having a meaningful conversation along those lines? Perhaps (s)he can enlighten us?

Since the meaning of these terms is precisely what is in dispute, it is obvious that any question using those terms requires a suitable definition. And the terms in that definition may require further definition. And so on.

Glad to see the PixyMisa openly admitting that its not willing to accept any definition provided. If that is not a text book example of intellectual dishonesty, I don't know what is. Unless, of course, we're going to have to burn thru the entire dictionary and thesaurus to define 'dishonesty' as well...

 

[AkuManiMani]

What we speak of in day-to-day conversation as consciousness is self-referential information processing - at least, so far as it is real at all.

[...]

What, exactly, do you ascribe to consciousness that is not explained by self-referential information processing? And why?

[...]

How is it clearly erroneous? I see plenty of confusion, but it is entirely caused by the reluctance to give up on concepts that are false or simply incoherent.

[...]

Obviously false. An illusion is a real thing, just not what it appears to be.

PixyMisa,

Edited by Locknar: 

Edited, breach of rule 0, rule 11, rule 12.

 

[AlBell]

What we speak of in day-to-day conversation as consciousness is self-referential information processing - at least, so far as it is real at all.

[...]

What, exactly, do you ascribe to consciousness that is not explained by self-referential information processing? And why?

[...]

How is it clearly erroneous? I see plenty of confusion, but it is entirely caused by the reluctance to give up on concepts that are false or simply incoherent.

[...]

Obviously false. An illusion is a real thing, just not what it appears to be.

PixyMisa,

Edited by Locknar: 

Moderated content removed.

That, and have a merry christmas once 'merry' is suitably defined.

 

[AkuManiMani]

That, and have a merry christmas once 'merry' is suitably defined.

Merry Christmas to you all as well

 

[dlorde]

I'm sorry, but every time I hear the tired cliché that "consciousness is an illusion" I have to suppress a laugh.

Have you seen anybody about this?

Perhaps your unthinking dismissal has led you to miss the real meaning behind the 'tired cliche'.

An illusion is just a misinterpreted perception. In order for there to even be an illlusion there has to be some[one/thing] there to perceive in the first place. Absent consciousness, its absurd to speak of illusion -- ergo, its illogical to call consciousness itself an illusion.

In this case, 'illusion' simply means something that isn't what it appears to be. We feel our consciousness is thing A, with capacities B, but it turns out not to be the case. Consciousness certainly exists; and we are, to a degree, self-aware, but all is not as it seems.

As far as the issue of free will goes, it simply means that a given agent has the ability be inconsistently inconsistent in its deliberate behavior.

'inconsistently inconsistent' ? Do you mean unpredictable? or random? and 'deliberate' behaviour - how is that different from ordinary behaviour?
A bit off-topic, perhaps better left alone...

 

[Malerin]

A basic question seems to be:

Is it dishonest to answer questions such as 'how do you feel?' and 'do you know what it is like to be sad?', with a protestation that one doesn't know what is meant by those questions and a request to define what is meant by those questions? Presumably in everyday 'real life', someone like PixyMisa doesn't do this and is still capable of having a meaningful conversation along those lines? Perhaps (s)he can enlighten us?

If we retrace human history to a time before much was known about the brain (such as how neurons work etc.), there was already a concept of consciousness that people were able to have meaningful interactions about. So, it seems a strange state of affairs that a concept that is already known is defined by later discoveries - it must be clear that we are talking about two concepts here. Of course later discoveries can tell us more about physical phenomenon, but how can they invalidate the definition of an already established concept?

Clearly we are talking about two things here. When PixyMisa (et al) talk about SRIP, they are not talking about the concept of consciousness and they are not attempting to understand the phenomenon, they have simply dismissed it. This is fine, but I think there needs to be some clarity about this dismissal. Perhaps SRIP should remain SRIP and let's stop talking about consciousness in this context as it does not refer to the phenomenon as widely understood. In the end, the Materialists may be right about their understanding of the brain and how it relates to our subjective state of being (or whatever they'd call that bit of it) but perhaps it would be wise to stop claiming the concept of consciousness for themselves as this is clearly erroneous and leads to confusion. If consciousness is an illusion, then they have nothing to say about consciousness beyond that, consciousness cannot simultaneously be an illusion and SRIP.

I like the cut of your jib, DS.