Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Meed]

Here's the thing, cornsail. You're clearly intelligent. You're studying the field in question, at a graduate level, where I'm just an interested observer from a somewhat related field (computer science).

And yet you give credence to patent nonsense - for example, neutral monism.

My graduate work and my philosophical interest in consciousness are quite separate. Most of my knowledge in the field also has little relevance to such questions (except for my sense of how much there is we don't know which I try to point out when appropriate). I don't think that's due to lack of education on my part as you suggested, but rather due to the fact that science is not yet in a position to study consciousness as a phenomena effectively. Scientifically, my main interest is concepts.

I'm inclined to agree with AkuManiMani regrading -isms being better off to do without, ultimately. Neutral monism is just a fun position to argue and if one must pick a mind/body stance it's fairly strong. I've also argued for other positions such as epiphenomenalism, idealism and panpsychism in my day.

Brains are physical. Thoughts are brain activity. Therefore neutral monism is untrue.

The mental reduces to the physical. It really is that simple.

Heh

 

[Meed]

Why would I be joking?

Because you gave a nonsensical response. You're basing those conclusions on ALL scientific studies? That implies you've read all scientific studies, which obviously isn't true, and also that all scientific studies have bearing on those two specific topics, which is also obviously not true.

How could the results of any scientific experiment be irrelevant to fundamental (albeit nonsensical) concepts like neutral monism and qualia?

I'm not following. How about an example: how did the Milgram experiment provide evidence that qualia does not exist?

 

[PixyMisa]

My graduate work and my philosophical interest in consciousness are quite separate. Most of my knowledge in the field also has little relevance to such questions (except for my sense of how much there is we don't know which I try to point out when appropriate). I don't think that's due to lack of education on my part as you suggested, but rather due to the fact that science is not yet in a position to study consciousness as a phenomena effectively.

Well, the first thing to do is to decide what we mean when we say consciousness. If we can't do that, it makes it difficuly to study it. I take my cue from Hofstadter and Dennett there.

I'm inclined to agree with AkuManiMani regrading -isms being better off to do without, ultimately. Neutral monism is just a fun position to argue and if one must pick a mind/body stance it's fairly strong, comparatively speaking.

Strong? I won't say it's the first time I've seen that word used to mean "obviously false" (just look at what passes for "strong" evidence in the Conspiracy Theories subforum).

Though neutral monism is interesting in that it's internally consistent and falsifiable.

I've also argued for other positions such as epiphenomenalism

Hmm. In some ways that's more a semantic argument than a philosophical one.

idealism

Well, depends on which of the many forms; some of them actually make perfect sense and some form of idealism might well be what ultimately underlies the apparent physical world.

and panpsychism

Which is impossible. If panpsychism were true, the Pauli exclusion would fail and all matter in the Universe would collapse in on itself under the force of local gravity. (Unless you also propose invisible bigfoots.)

Heh

Shrug. That's what it comes down to in the end. You have two kinds of stuff, the physical, which is really physical, and the mental, which is really physical. In the real world, the proposed neutral of neutral monism turns out to be the physical we already knew about.

 

[PixyMisa]

Because you gave a nonsensical response. You're basing those conclusions on ALL scientific studies? That implies you've read all scientific studies, which obviously isn't true, and also that all scientific studies have bearing on those two specific topics, which is also obviously not true.

Think here of science as a meta-experiment into its own premises. Science, viewed in that light, is itself falsifiable - but has withstood countless tests (admittedly of varying degrees of rigour and relevance).

Those premises include methodological naturalism and the principle of uniformity. Which are not established deductively as true, but have nonetheless withstood every test.

I'm not following. How about an example: how did the Milgram experiment provide evidence that qualia does not exist?

Good question. Let's examine that. How would the outcome have varied if qualia exist, as against how it would run if thoughts and experiences are material processes?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

The thing is that the foundation of epistemic pursuit it one's immediate experience. As it happens, the topic of discussion -- consciousness -- is the sine qua non of all knowledge. Without the subjective there cannot be any knowledge of the objective. One's own consciousness and immediate experience is the only 'ur-substance' that one can have direct knowledge of; all else are hypotheticals with varying degrees of reliability.

Yes, but haven't you simply turned 'experience' into an ism, specifically idealism? I have no reason to believe that my epistemic position in the world, reliant on experience, implies that experience is the most fundamental substance in existence. I don't make that assumption.

That is why I think it worthwhile to explore the possibility that experience, feeling, emotion, etc. are not fundamental but are reducible processes. There is only one way to find out and that is to try. It seems to me that proclaiming them fundamental puts an end to enquiry. We can't explain fundamentals.

Hence my objection to turning any model into an ideological view -- an '-ism'.



My point is that attachment to the ideology of physical-ism, and not so much the physical model itself, is the problem.

Who is attached to an ideology? This isn't an ideological war. Every enquiry must begin with some assumptions in place in order to ask questions. I happen to think that a good starting place is -- I don't know what the heck is out there, but we have to have some ground rules. The ground rules that have always worked are these -- the uni/multiverse seems to follow a set of rules, so let's try to figure those out.

I don't care if anyone tacks an ism onto any of this because the label isn't important.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

How memories are stored, how concepts are formed, how motivation and emotion are regulated, how similarity assessments are made, how judgments and decisions are made, how language is processed, how consciousness works, etc.

But we do know an increasingly larger amount about each of those topics. At least for declarative memory, the mechanisms of hippocampal function are beginning to be understood. Long term declarative and procedural memories appear to be due to reformation and strengthening of particular synapes -- the connectosome is the substrate for this. David Buss, amongst others, has done excellent work on emotion and its regulation. While in the past 'the passions' were considered the last place any self-respecting Westerner would want to tread, there are now University courses covering these topics.

The literature on decisions and judgments is huge, as I am sure that you know. My senior thesis in college concerned the desirability of the alternatives in decision making. At a neuronal level we have only simple models, but again this seems to depend critically on the connectosome and the strength, location and number of connections in any network.

While it is certainly true that we do not know everything, it is not the case that we can't see where this is heading with all the work currently being carried out.

 

[!Kaggen]

What are you proposing instead? Magic beans?

Nope, intuition.

"probably no one will ever understand the mysteries of intelligence and consciousness in an intuitive way" Hofstadter

"one must run on faith at this point, for there is so far to go!" Hofstadter

 

[PixyMisa]

Nope, intuition.

That doesn't even make sense.

 

[PixyMisa]

Yes, but haven't you simply turned 'experience' into an ism, specifically idealism?

That's precisely what he has done. And that in spite of the fact that all available evidence points in the exact opposite direction.

That is why I think it worthwhile to explore the possibility that experience, feeling, emotion, etc. are not fundamental but are reducible processes. There is only one way to find out and that is to try. It seems to me that proclaiming them fundamental puts an end to enquiry. We can't explain fundamentals.

And what's more, we can induce these things by literally poking at the brain. If they are fundamental, what the heck is going on there?

 

[!Kaggen]

Yes, but haven't you simply turned 'experience' into an ism, specifically idealism? I have no reason to believe that my epistemic position in the world, reliant on experience, implies that experience is the most fundamental substance in existence. I don't make that assumption.

That is why I think it worthwhile to explore the possibility that experience, feeling, emotion, etc. are not fundamental but are reducible processes. There is only one way to find out and that is to try. It seems to me that proclaiming them fundamental puts an end to enquiry. We can't explain fundamentals.

No matter if we reduce them the reduced information is still assimilated via our consciousness/experience/perception.

The issue for me is not one of fundamentals/ontology/-isms its one of practicality.
Its more a question of motives than fundamentals.

If we do not examine our consciousness by self-knowledge/meta-cognition then our motives forever remain hidden and mostly a burden.

Science ignores the hidden motives of the scientists.

That is why a high level research scientist can still be a theist.

Recently a fundie told me he has changed his approach to science since for him now science is an exercise in confirming the bible!!

This is more and more common I am afraid.

The whole computability ontology is the same thing just more acceptable because computers are not yet telling us what to do yet.

And its these hidden motives that color our view of reality, for the sake of an ontology/-ism

If our motive is to reduce everything for the sake of reductionism instead of the sake of practicality then we end up missing the obvious - qualia for example.

Ignoring plant physiology and ecology has gotten many geneticists running after the reductionist DNA one way street dogma and ending up with total failures in the field.

Boasting that everything is physics is really saying nothing at all about anything except about yourself.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

No matter if we reduce them the reduced information is still assimilated via our consciousness/experience/perception.

The issue for me is not one of fundamentals/ontology/-isms its one of practicality.
Its more a question of motives than fundamentals.

If we do not examine our consciousness by self-knowledge/meta-cognition then our motives forever remain hidden and mostly a burden.

Science ignores the hidden motives of the scientists.

That is why a high level research scientist can still be a theist.

Recently a fundie told me he has changed his approach to science since for him now science is an exercise in confirming the bible!!

This is more and more common I am afraid.

The whole computability ontology is the same thing just more acceptable because computers are not yet telling us what to do yet.

And its these hidden motives that color our view of reality, for the sake of an ontology/-ism

If our motive is to reduce everything for the sake of reductionism instead of the sake of practicality then we end up missing the obvious - qualia for example.

Ignoring plant physiology and ecology has gotten many geneticists running after the reductionist DNA one way street dogma and ending up with total failures in the field.

Boasting that everything is physics is really saying nothing at all about anything except about yourself.

And if the motive is to understand how it works? How does any of this miss qualia unless you have decided up front that qualia are not reducible?

 

[!Kaggen]

That doesn't even make sense.

We understand qualities through the process of intuition.

Is Bach understood "that time you felt the exhilaration in every nerve in your body?" Hofstadter

Yes, through the process of intuition. No reductionism required.

The details of Bachs work are understood through the intellect. Reductionism required.

Understanding is not just about intellectual understanding.

I would add intuitive and inspirational understanding.

Inspirational understanding being that understanding that happens when we physically do something. Riding a bike for example.

 

[Meed]

Well, the first thing to do is to decide what we mean when we say consciousness. If we can't do that, it makes it difficuly to study it. I take my cue from Hofstadter and Dennett there.

How would Hofstadter and Dennett operationalize it?

Think here of science as a meta-experiment into its own premises. Science, viewed in that light, is itself falsifiable - but has withstood countless tests (admittedly of varying degrees of rigour and relevance).

Those premises include methodological naturalism and the principle of uniformity. Which are not established deductively as true, but have nonetheless withstood every test.

Okay... Not sure how this is supposed to relate to the exchange or back up any of the claims you made.

Good question. Let's examine that. How would the outcome have varied if qualia exist, as against how it would run if thoughts and experiences are material processes?

Who knows? You are the one claiming every scientific study shows qualia to not exist, so why don't you explain it to me.

 

[!Kaggen]

And if the motive is to understand how it works? How does any of this miss qualia unless you have decided up front that qualia are not reducible?

Understanding how something works is not a motive, its what one does due to a motive.
Motives are deeper and often unconscious. e.g. reproductive success.

 

[!Kaggen]

How does any of this miss qualia unless you have decided up front that qualia are not reducible?

Sorry missed this one.

Good question.

I think many definitions/interpretations of qualia have hidden motives and possibly this is where Mary's room fits in.

My definition is the similar to Aku's as its simply the intuitive understanding of quality.

The difficulty we have with this is that no intellectual language (logic, mathematics) conveys what this means and the best method is through the medium of art - hence my sig line.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Understanding how something works is not a motive, its what one does due to a motive.
Motives are deeper and often unconscious. e.g. reproductive success.

Considered in that way, the primary motivation behind the 'will to knowledge/understanding' is practical -- Understand what we see in order to survive.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Sorry missed this one.

Good question.

I think many definitions/interpretations of qualia have hidden motives and possibly this is where Mary's room fits in.

My definition is the similar to Aku's as its simply the intuitive understanding of quality.

The difficulty we have with this is that no intellectual language (logic, mathematics) conveys what this means and the best method is through the medium of art - hence my sig line.

OK, then may I ask a serious question? If you have already decided that qualia are fundamental, why engage in a conversation about consciousness? If it is fundamental there is nowhere much to go with it; there isn't anything to explain.

 

[!Kaggen]

Considered in that way, the primary motivation behind the 'will to knowledge/understanding' is practical -- Understand what we see in order to survive.

Yes that certainly is a very important motive, but there are other motives for knowledge/understanding too.
Fear and guilt being very common candidates.
The fundie seeks knowledge confirming their beliefs in order to avoid the fear of being wrong.
The parent reads parenting books because of the guilt of not being, a parent.

 

[AkuManiMani]

The thing is that the foundation of epistemic pursuit it one's immediate experience. As it happens, the topic of discussion -- consciousness -- is the sine qua non of all knowledge. Without the subjective there cannot be any knowledge of the objective. One's own consciousness and immediate experience is the only 'ur-substance' that one can have direct knowledge of; all else are hypotheticals with varying degrees of reliability.

Yes, but haven't you simply turned 'experience' into an ism, specifically idealism? I have no reason to believe that my epistemic position in the world, reliant on experience, implies that experience is the most fundamental substance in existence. I don't make that assumption.

That is why I think it worthwhile to explore the possibility that experience, feeling, emotion, etc. are not fundamental but are reducible processes. There is only one way to find out and that is to try. It seems to me that proclaiming them fundamental puts an end to enquiry. We can't explain fundamentals.

My point was that the only epistemic base we have is our own consciousness. Any ontological considerations we can entertain are all tentative conceptual structures that we grow from the seed of immediate experience. This isn't to say that our consciousness is necessarily the only real 'stuff' [or even the 'root directory' of the ontological web] but it is the only real thing beyond reasonable doubt. One's own consciousness is not a hypothetical or proposition to place faith in -- it just unequivocally -is-.

That being said, we've an odd state of affairs where there is a jarring conceptual disconnect between our subjective reality and the theoretical structures we use to model the 'exterior' world. The most obvious gap is that nowhere in our physical model is there an accounting of our own 'interior' subjective reality. The closest thing we have to such an accounting is the 'observer' effect in QM.

So, as I said before, I'm not denying the reality of the 'physical' objects we observe [ideal-ism], or asserting a fundamental disconnect between 'physical' objects and observers [dual-ism]. My point is that consciousness --- the observer -- is not described in the explanatory model of the observed.

ETA:

I proposed that a good theoretical approach would be to find an equivalence relation between quanta and qualia and all I got from you was a brief comment about my rejection of physicalism. Any opinions regarding this proposal in particular?

Hence my objection to turning any model into an ideological view -- an '-ism'.

[...]

My point is that attachment to the ideology of physical-ism, and not so much the physical model itself, is the problem.

Who is attached to an ideology? This isn't an ideological war. Every enquiry must begin with some assumptions in place in order to ask questions. I happen to think that a good starting place is -- I don't know what the heck is out there, but we have to have some ground rules. The ground rules that have always worked are these -- the uni/multiverse seems to follow a set of rules, so let's try to figure those out.

I don't care if anyone tacks an ism onto any of this because the label isn't important.

Like I said, the only non-hypothetical starting point is our own consciousness and its the very thing NOT included in our hypothetical model of the world, except as a hand-waving assumption. This is a problem.

And despite your insistence that ideology has nothing to do with this discussion, I'm afraid that it not only has something to do with the discussion -- it is the main culprit in obstructing it. There are deep ideological assumptions driving the majority of arguments in this exchange. A good portion of the participants in this thread are steadfastly defending physical-ism from any and all perceived challenges. One can't so much as use trigger words like 'subjective', 'feelings', or 'qualia' and the natives go crazy crying 'nonsense!' and 'blasphemy!'. Then the so-called "discussion" turns into an assertion/counter-assertion fest that leads nowhere except farther of people's behinds.

If I were a less brash person I could employ ways to make my same arguments while flattering physicalist sensibilities and using only language that is sanctioned. However, I refuse to tip-toe, round the block, or walk on eggshells because of certain individuals ego-attachments to their favorite "-ism" and the price I pay for that is boneheaded stonewalling. I'd very much prefer to have a calm reasoned discussion as you and I are having now but, for the most part I've had to content myself with slashing thru the psychological issues at the root of this quagmire. Certain individuals here are so psychologically enmeshed in their ideologies that I can scarcely attack the argument without drawing blood from the arguer. After a few years of dealing with the same @#*&damn bull***t I've come to the point where I'm more than happy to do so. So yes, whether you recognize whats going on here or not, ideological commitment is THE obstacle to the meaningful progression of this discussion.

 

[!Kaggen]

OK, then may I ask a serious question? If you have already decided that qualia are fundamental, why engage in a conversation about consciousness? If it is fundamental there is nowhere much to go with it; there isn't anything to explain.

I do not agree.

There is lots to explain.

The science of qualities is in its infancy.

What is it about qualities which makes us recognize them?

How do we predict when qualities will arise?

How can we communicate qualities objectively?

What factors effect quality?

I believe Goethe was a pioneer in the science of qualities and if you took the time to study his Theory of Colour - you will understand why I say that.

We rely on the intuitive understanding of quality within the framework of consciousness everytime we interact with the world.

We recognize something first from its qualities (form and colour) before we ask any quantitative questions about what it is we see.

A thorough science of qualities is essential if we are to understand how consciousness works.