Has consciousness been fully explained?

[PixyMisa]

Similar, yes. But the structure of the neurons is entirely different. We couldn't run the same program on two processors that were laid out entirely differently. For all we know, the experience of different people is totally different. I can't think of any way to test this.

Ask them.

 

[Pardalis]

One of the problems with defining consciousness is...we're not even sure what it is. We know we are conscious because we experience it firsthand, but how do we know other entities we interact with are conscious? Is it conscious if it passes a Turing test? We don't know.

Sometimes what's really interesting about this conundrum are the questions that it raises, since there are few answers.

Maybe the reason why we can't explain or even define it has to do with the fact that it might not actually exist.

 

[PixyMisa]

Maybe the reason why we can't explain or even define it has to do with the fact that it might not actually exist.

Certainly a lot of the things that people define as consciousness don't exist, or aren't even conceptually coherent.

 

[leon_heller]

Philosophers call subjective experiences like the greenness of an object qualia, although some of them don't believe that they exist:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/

 

[Third Eye Open]

Why do you think it would be the same?

Because we are both human. You're nervous system is the same as mine, you're skeleton is the same, your circulatory system is the same, you're digestive system is the same.

There is no reason to think that your consciousness, which resides in a very similar body, would be radically different from mine.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Similar, yes. But the structure of the neurons is entirely different. We couldn't run the same program on two processors that were laid out entirely differently. For all we know, the experience of different people is totally different. I can't think of any way to test this.

Seriously, you think that when a baby is born and grown up, each brain forms totally differently from the others, works totally differently? How would we even be able to communicate with each other? Humans are all very very similar, you know this from experience. There is no reason to think that their subjective experiences should be that different from each other.

 

[bluskool]

Similar, yes. But the structure of the neurons is entirely different. We couldn't run the same program on two processors that were laid out entirely differently. For all we know, the experience of different people is totally different. I can't think of any way to test this.

But we are talking about something that seems relatively simple. I can see thinking that your experience of green might be slightly different than mine, but our neural structures are not so vastly different as to warrant thinking that your experience of green is like my experience of red or something like that. You didn't actually say anything like that, but the point I am making is that I think we have good reason to think that our experience of green is at least similar just based on what we know about physiology.
Now, when you get into more complicated experiences, like how you and I experience music for example, I think it is warranted to imagine that the differences in experience are more than slight.

As far as the OP's question, yeah, Dennett explained it.

But seriously, I do think Dennett's approach is the most satisfying I have heard. Here is a good interview with him about it.

I guess it ultimately comes down to whether or not you think the hard problem is a real problem. I tend to think it is not, but I can see why some people are persuaded by it.

 

[westprog]

Seriously, you think that when a baby is born and grown up, each brain forms totally differently from the others, works totally differently? How would we even be able to communicate with each other? Humans are all very very similar, you know this from experience. There is no reason to think that their subjective experiences should be that different from each other.

I said differently and you changed that to totally differently. Obviously the brain structures are different. Obviously they are not totally different. What difference does this make to the function of generating consciousness? Nobody knows.

 

[westprog]

Because we are both human. You're nervous system is the same as mine, you're skeleton is the same, your circulatory system is the same, you're digestive system is the same.

There is no reason to think that your consciousness, which resides in a very similar body, would be radically different from mine.

Not radically different. Different. How would this effect the experience of colour, say? We don't know.

 

[westprog]

Philosophers call subjective experiences like the greenness of an object qualia, although some of them don't believe that they exist:

I've come to think of the explanations that just define the tricky bits out of existence as being like the young Earth being created with the appearance of age.

 

[Philosaur]

Or, too often, they define it in ways that are internally inconsistent and then get all irky when you point this out to them.

Come on now, you can't generalize over all philosophers like this and not expect to get called out. William James is a far cry from Georg Hegel, for instance. Philosophers' accounts of consciousness are just as varied as scientists'.

I'll take a good pragmatic definition over a merely metaphysical one any day.

 

[TubbaBlubba]

I feel like Dennet just tiptoes around it by saying "there are no such things as qualia". There being processes in the brain is all fine and dandy, but me actually experiencing it, rather than the process just going on without the "self", seems different. It's just that I can't put my finger on exactly how it's different. Any other person in the world would seem the same to me without the "self", but to me, there would be a difference if I just functioned mechanically, or if there was an inner observer.

But since the difference is just to me, I don't know if there's even a question to be asked.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Not radically different. Different. How would this effect the experience of colour, say? We don't know.

Fair enough. I assume it is basically the same because people act basically the same.

 

[bluskool]

I feel like Dennet just tiptoes around it by saying "there are no such things as qualia". There being processes in the brain is all fine and dandy, but me actually experiencing it, rather than the process just going on without the "self", seems different. It's just that I can't put my finger on exactly how it's different. Any other person in the world would seem the same to me without the "self", but to me, there would be a difference if I just functioned mechanically, or if there was an inner observer.

But since the difference is just to me, I don't know if there's even a question to be asked.

He's only tiptoeing if qualia really do exist. I don't think that intuition is enough to prove that they do exist.

 

[Philosaur]

I feel like Dennet just tiptoes around it by saying "there are no such things as qualia".

Maybe it would help to think of it this way:

Imagine if someone gave a name to the one-inch cube of space centered between their eyes six-inches away. Suppose they called it the "floog". Now suppose that person asked why the floog behaved differently than any other thing in the known universe. It's density continually fluctuates (such as when the person jumps into a swimming pool, or lays face-down on a pillow), it moves in reaction to the person's thoughts, it's invisible, but the person just *knows* the floog is there.

I think Dennet is saying qualia don't really exist in the same way that this cube of space doesn't exist. And all the arguments and attributions about qualia are similar to arguments and attributions about the floog.

There being processes in the brain is all fine and dandy, but me actually experiencing it, rather than the process just going on without the "self", seems different.

And unless I misunderstand Dennet, he says it's not actually possible for the processes to happen without the attendant experience.

It's just that I can't put my finger on exactly how it's different. Any other person in the world would seem the same to me without the "self", but to me, there would be a difference if I just functioned mechanically, or if there was an inner observer.

But there's no way for you to know this. It just "seems" that way. It's what Dennet might characterize as a false intuition.

But since the difference is just to me, I don't know if there's even a question to be asked.

There may not be...

 

[Plat]

Wow, this topic is really complex since the answers I have been getting ranges from "no, it is one of the biggest mysteries in science" to "we don't even know why cant even explain it" to "it has been explained a fair amount", I mean which one is it really closest too? I guess it depends on how you view it, so is it then fair to say that we need to know A LOT more about consciousness?

 

[CurtC]

I guess a follow up question would be, how much of it has been explained? or should I even attempt to ask that question?

I've heard it said that to a physicist, everything is just physics. Chemistry, biology, etc., are just stamp collecting.

That's kind of the way I look at consciousness. It's just neuron biochemistry piled up into a giant heap. It has all been explained in terms of neurons - we can explain the details of how they work. The rest is just semantics of how we refer to things they do in large numbers.

 

[Plat]

I've heard it said that to a physicist, everything is just physics. Chemistry, biology, etc., are just stamp collecting.

That's kind of the way I look at consciousness. It's just neuron biochemistry piled up into a giant heap. It has all been explained in terms of neurons - we can explain the details of how they work. The rest is just semantics of how we refer to things they do in large numbers.

The physical processes in the brain might be explained somewhat but the subjective experience that emerges from it has not been, but then again that right there ties in to, do I dare say it, the hard problem of consciousness...then the opinions come flying in.

 

[TubbaBlubba]

Maybe it would help to think of it this way:

Imagine if someone gave a name to the one-inch cube of space centered between their eyes six-inches away. Suppose they called it the "floog". Now suppose that person asked why the floog behaved differently than any other thing in the known universe. It's density continually fluctuates (such as when the person jumps into a swimming pool, or lays face-down on a pillow), it moves in reaction to the person's thoughts, it's invisible, but the person just *knows* the floog is there.

I think Dennet is saying qualia don't really exist in the same way that this cube of space doesn't exist. And all the arguments and attributions about qualia are similar to arguments and attributions about the floog.



And unless I misunderstand Dennet, he says it's not actually possible for the processes to happen without the attendant experience.



But there's no way for you to know this. It just "seems" that way. It's what Dennet might characterize as a false intuition.



There may not be...

Yeah, it seems that the only way to get a reasonable answer out of the whole "consciousness" mess is to assume that the consciousness doesn't really exist.

 

[Dancing David]

Maybe the reason why we can't explain or even define it has to do with the fact that it might not actually exist.

Well some of us feel that way.

I don't know if I am a p-zombie, I have all the behaviors of consciousness, but I can't tell if I am conscious, other than the medical definition.